China
Slams Abe's "Malicious Slander"; Warns Japan Is "Doomed
To Failure"
15
December, 2013
Overnight
rhetoric in Asia became increasingly heated when China's
Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed"strong
dissastisfaction" at the slanderous actions of Abe's Japanese
government over
the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) and the "theft and
embezzlement" of the Diaoyu Islands. "Japan's attempt
isdoomed
to failure,"
China warned ominously and as we highlight below, a reflection on the
possible rational reasons for China and Japan to go to war over the
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands highlights the seriousness of theongoing
brinksmanship in the East China Sea.
If a war is fought over these long-contested islands, it will have an
eminently rational explanation underlying all the historical mistrust
and nationalism on the surface.War
in the East China Sea is possible, despite the economic costs.
The
'triangle' of doom in the East China Sea...
Q: Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe held in Japan recently - especially during the ASEAN summit, accusing China to unilaterally change the status of the East China Sea, East China Sea, said China's air defense identification zone designation is improper for the high seas against the freedom of overflight, asked China to revoke the measure. What is your comment?
A: We have made some Japanese leaders use international slanderous remarks China expresses strong dissatisfaction.
Diaoyu Islands are China's inherent territory. Japan over the Diaoyu Islands theft and embezzlement have always been illegal and invalid. Since last year, the Japanese deliberately provoked the Diaoyu Islands dispute, unilaterally change the status quo of the Diaoyu Islands issue is none other than the Japanese themselves. In this regard, the Chinese law to take the necessary measures to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial fully justified, blameless.
East China's air defense identification zone designation is intended to protect national defense aviation security measures, consistent with international law and international practice, do not affect the countries of aircraft overflight freedoms enjoyed under international law.Deliberate on this issue in Japan to China to launch an attack, an attempt to tamper with the concept, the implementation of double standards, mislead international public opinion, Japan's attempt is doomed to failure.
"Rationalist
Explanations For War" In
The East China Sea
Events
in the East China Sea since 2009 have thrust to the forefront the
following frightening question: will China and Japan imminently go to
war? Conventional
answers in the affirmative point to the deep level of historical
mistrust and a certain level of “unfinished business” in East
Asian international politics, stemming from the heyday of Showa
Japan’s imperialism across Asia. Those on the negative often point
to the astronomical economic costs that would follow from a war
that pinned the world’s first and third largest economies against
its second in a fight over a few measly islands, undersea hydrocarbon
reserves be damned.
I
can’t pretend to arbitrate between these two camps but I find
that far
too many observers sympathize with the second camp based on rational
impulse. Of
course China and Japan wouldn’t fight a war! That’d ruin their
economies! I
sympathize with the Clausewtizean notion of war being a continuation
of politics “by other means,” and the problems caused by
information asymmetries (effectively handicapping rational
decision-making), but the situation over the Senkaku/Diaoyu
islands can result
in war even if the top leaders in Tokyo and Beijing are eminently
rational.
Political
scientist James D. Fearon’s path-breaking
article “Rationalist
Explanations for War”
provides a still-relevant schema that’s
wonderfully applicable to the contemporary situation between China
and Japan in the East China Sea. Fearon’s paper was initially
relevant because it challenged the overly simplistic rationalist’s
dogma: if war is so costly, then there has to
be some sort of diplomatic solution that is preferable to all parties
involved — barring information asymmetries and communication
deficits, such an agreement should and will be
signed.
Of
course, this doesn’t correspond to reality where we know that many
incredibly costly wars have been fought (from the first World War to
the Iran-Iraq War). So,
if wars are costly — as one over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands is
likely to be — why do they still occur? Well, the answer isn’t
Japanese imperialism or because states just sometimes irrationally
dislike each other (as the affirmative camp would argue). It’s more
subtle.
Fearon’s
“bargaining model” assumes a few dictums about state knowledge,
behavior and expectations ex
ante.
I’ll cast the remainder of the model in terms of Japan and China
since they’re our subjects of interest (and to avoid floating off
into academic abstractions).
First,
China and Japan both know that there is an actual probability
distribution of the likely outcomes of the war. They
don’t know what the actual distribution is, but they can estimate
what is likely in terms of the costs and outcomes of going to war.
For example, Japan can predict that it would suffer relatively low
naval losses and would strengthen its administrative control of the
islands; China could predict the same outcome, or it could interpret
things in its favor. In essence, they acknowledge that war is
predictable in its unpredictability.
Second,
China and Japan want to limit risk or are neutral to risk, but
definitely do not crave risk. War
is fundamentally risky so this is tantamount to an acknowledgement
that war is costlier than maintaining peace or negotiating an ex
ante diplomatic
solution.
The third
assumption is
a little dressed up in academic jargon: there can be no “issue
indivisibility.” In
plain English, this essentially means that whatever the states are
fighting over (usually territory, but it could be a pot of gold) can
be divided between them in an infinite number of ways on a line going
from zero to one. Imagine
that zero is Japan’s ideal preference (total Japanese control of
the Senkakus and acknowledgement as such by China) and one is China’s
ideal preference (total Chinese control of Diaoyu and acknowledgement
by Japan). Fearon’s assumption requires that there exist points
like 0.23 and 0.83 (and so forth) which set up some sort sharing
between the warring parties. Even solutions, such as one proposed by
Zheng Wang here at The
Diplomat to
establish a “peace
zone,”
could sit on this line.
If
the third assumption sounds the shakiest to you that’s probably
because it is. “Issue indivisibility” is a nasty problem and a
subject of quite some research. It usually is at the heart of wars
that seek to decide which state should control a territory such as a
Holy City (the intractability of the Arab-Israeli conflict is said to
be plagued by indivisible issues).
So,
is the dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu fundamentally
indivisible? Probably
in the sense of splitting sovereignty over the islands, but probably
not in the sense of some ex
ante bargain
similar to what Zheng proposed. Even if the set of solutions isn’t
infinitely divisible, whatever finite solutions exist might not fall
within whatever range of solutions either Japan or China is willing
to tolerate — leading to war.
Fearon
actually doesn’t buy the indivisibility-leading-to-war theory
himself. He reasons that generally almost every issue is complex
enough to be divisible to a degree acceptable by each party
(undermining the infinite divisibility requirement), and that states
can link issues and offer payments to offset any asymmetrical
outcome. In the Senkaku/Diaoyu case, this would mean a solution could
hinge upon Japan making a broader apology for its aggression against
China in the 20th century or China taking a harsher stance on North
Korea (both unlikely).
Relevant
to the Air Defense Identification Zone is Fearon’s description of
war arising between rational states due to incentives to misrepresent
capabilities. China and Japan’s leaders know more about their
country’s actual willingness to go to war than anyone else, and it
benefits to signal strong resolve on the issue to extract more
concessions in any potential deal. Japan
announcing its willingness to shoot down Chinese drones earlier this
year and its most
recent defense plans are
example of this, and China’s ADIZ is probably the archetype of such
a signal. Instead of extracting a good deal, what such declarations
can do is force rational hands to war over the Senkaku/Diaoyu
islands.
Fearon’s
final explanation — regarding commitment problems leading to war —
is slightly ancillary to the core discussion about the Senkaku/Diaoyu
islands given Japan’s constitutional restraints on the use of force
(rendering preemptive, preventative, and offensive wars largely
irrelevant in the Japanese case). Regardless,
the point remains that even if the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands might seem
like a terribly silly thing for the world’s second and third
largest economies to go to war over, war can still be likely.
As
I observe events in the East China Sea, I mostly recall Fearon’s
warnings on certain
types of signals leading to brinksmanship (the
divisibility issue is far murkier). Both Japan and China don’t seem
to be relenting on these sorts of deleterious signals. Additionally,
given that Chinese
and Japanese diplomats haven’t had high-level contact in fourteen
months,
even the more primitive rationalist’s explanation, that war occurs
because a lack of communication leads to rational miscalculations,
becomes plausible.
A
reflection on the possible rational reasons for China and Japan to go
to war over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands highlights the seriousness of
the ongoing brinksmanship in the East China Sea. If a war is fought
over these long-contested islands, it will have an eminently rational
explanation underlying all the historical mistrust and nationalism on
the surface. War in the East China Sea is possible, despite the
economic costs.
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