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The following comes courtesy of Mark Sleboda.
Charles Lister 
Bring
Syria’s Assad and his backers to account now
21
October, 2016
JohnAllen, a retired U.S. Marine general, led the International Security
Assistance Force in Afghanistan from 2011 to 2013 and the
international coalition to counter the Islamic State from 2014 to
2015. Charles R. Lister is a senior fellow at the Middle East
Institute and author of “The Syrian Jihad: Al-Qaeda, the Islamic
State and the Evolution of an Insurgency.”
For
5½ years, the Syrian government has tortured, shot, bombed and
gassed its own people with impunity, with the resulting human cost
clear for all to see: nearly 500,000 dead and 11 million displaced.
Since Russia’s military intervention began one year ago, conditions
have worsened, with more than 1 million people living in 40 besieged
communities. Thirty-seven of those are imposed by pro-government
forces.
While
subjecting his people to unspeakable medieval-style brutality, Syrian
President Bashar al-Assad has sabotaged diplomatic initiatives aimed
at bringing a lasting calm to his country. The most recent such
diplomatic scheme was trashed not just by Assad, but also Russia,
whose aircraft were accused of subjecting a U.N.-mandated aid convoy
to a ferocious two-hour attack in September.
Since
then, at least 2,500 people have been killed and wounded in eastern
districts of Aleppo, amid horrendous bombardment by Syrian and
Russian aircraft, and Russia cynically vetoed a U.N. resolution that
would have prohibited further airstrikes in the city.
It
is time for the United States to act more assertively on Syria, to
further four justifiable objectives: to end mass civilian killing; to
protect what remains of the moderate opposition; to undermine
extremist narratives of Western indifference to injustice; and to
force Assad to the negotiating table. The United States should not be
in the business of regime change, but the Assad clique and its
backers must be brought to account before it is too late. The world
will not forgive us for our inaction.
The
consequences of continued inaction are dreadful. U.S. policy has
never sought to decisively influence the tactical situation on the
ground. Unrealistic limitations on vetting and a policy that
prohibited arming groups to fight the regime left us unable to
effectively fight the Islamic State or to move Assad toward a
transition. U.S. policy and strategy on Syria had a major disconnect,
in being focused militarily on a group that was a symptom of the
civil war without any means to achieve the stated policy objective:
Assad’s departure.
The
hole in this strategy could only have been filled by a comprehensive
train-and-equip program for moderate Syrians to fight the Islamic
State and decisively resist regime forces. Sadly, we have allowed
this connective tissue between our counter-Islamic State strategy and
our policy to remove Assad — the moderate Syrian opposition — to
come under sustained attack by the regime and Russia.
For
years we’ve said there can be no military outcome in Syria, but the
Russians and their allies have pushed the military dimension of the
crisis to strengthen the regime’s political position and, in the
name of fighting “terrorism,” to systematically eliminate the
opposition, including moderate Syrians we judged should be part of
the political process of transitioning Assad out. These objectives
were derived from our unwillingness to tangle with the regime, and
now also the Russians.
The
administration’s condemnation of Russia, and its forecast of a
Vietnam-like morass for Moscow, seem a misunderstanding of Moscow’s
calculus. Russia will determinedly protect its interests by any
means, including attacking civilians and U.N. aid convoys. The
expectation that Russia will tire of its Syria “quagmire” and
become diplomatically pliable ignores reality. Russia has shown a
remarkable capacity to dig in behind bad policy and fight under
adversity. Ultimately, Vladimir Putin’s Russia must be — or at
least seem to be — on the ascendancy, as it is in Ukraine, along
NATO’s frontier, in Syria and even in Libya. Russia’s repaired
relationship with Turkey and improved ties elsewhere further
complicate U.S. policy.
Ultimately,
this leaves us only two options. First, the United States should
encourage and join its European allies in imposing an escalatory set
of economic sanctions against Russia and bodies and individuals
supporting its military and paramilitary activities in Syria, Ukraine
and elsewhere.
The
second option is one the Russians believe the United States will
never do: Escalate the conflict. The United States must challenge the
status quo and end the regime’s war crimes, by force if necessary.
This need not require some major pronouncement. Indeed, for now, a
quiet warning may be more effective, since a major public
announcement would almost certainly polarize the situation further.
For
a start, the United States must save Aleppo. Damascus, Moscow and
Tehran are razing the city to prepare for an eventual ground assault.
As both the CIA and Pentagon have concluded, an opposition loss in
Aleppo would severely undermine the United States’ counterterrorism
objectives in Syria. The city’s symbolism and strategic value are
unmatched, and allowing it to fall would dramatically empower
extremist narratives. Groups linked to al-Qaeda would reap the
rewards of our shortcomings.
To
save Aleppo, the United States and its allies must both accelerate
and broaden the provision of lethal and nonlethal assistance to
vetted moderate opposition groups. This assistance would aim to
empower other frontlines in northern and southern Syria to force
pro-regime forces to divert attention from Aleppo. Opposition groups
should also be provided with the means to bombard regime military
airfields, many of which already lie within indirect fire and
artillery rocket range.
Simultaneously,
the United States must use existing multilateral mechanisms to push
for a new cessation of hostilities in Syria in which flagrant
violations will be met with targeted U.S. military consequences.
Should such an agreement prove impossible due to the likely
intransigence from Damascus and its supporters, the United States
should gather a “coalition of the willing” to credibly threaten
military action against Assad’s military infrastructure.
Initiating
such a sequence would almost certainly result in the eventual use of
targeted, punitive force in Syria. Any action should target Syrian
military facilities and assets involved in supporting the bombardment
of civilians, such as military airfields, aircraft, weapons stores
and artillery positions. We should expect the possible intentional
co-mingling of Syrian and Russian forces and assets as a deterrent.
While this may complicate targeting strategies, we should not miss
the opportunity to hit offending Syrian elements and units, while
sustaining counter-Islamic State operations elsewhere.
In
addition, the United States should consider establishing and
supporting a task force of regional Special Operations forces, which
could play an advisory role in assisting vetted opposition groups in
attacking regime assets.
The
credibility of the United States as the leader and defender of the
free world must be salvaged from the horrific devastation of Syria.
It is not too late to enforce international law and norms. However,
we cannot wait for a new administration in Washington. Events are
moving too quickly. Bashar al-Assad is not the solution to the Syrian
crisis, and he is the least-qualified possible partner in a fight
against terrorism, having spent much of the past 16 years aiding and
abetting al-Qaeda and, it would appear, the Islamic State as well.
Action certainly presents risks, but to allow events to continue to
unfold as they are means raising the cost yet further for a future,
inevitable U.S. intervention.
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