Stuxnet:
UK and US nuclear plants at risk as malware spreads outside Russia
Security
experts have warned the notorious Stuxnet malware has likely infected
numerous power plants outside of Russia and Iran.
11
November, 2013
Experts
from FireEye and F-Secure told V3 the nature of Stuxnet means it is
likely many power plants have fallen victim to the malware, when
asked about comments made by security expert Eugene Kaspersky
claiming at least one Russian nuclear plant has already been
infected.
"[The
member of staff told us] their nuclear plant network, which was
disconnected from the internet [...] was badly infected by Stuxnet,"
Kaspersky said during a speech at Press Club 2013.
Stuxnet
is sabotage-focused malware that was originally caught targeting
Windows systems in Iranian nuclear facilities in 2011. The malware is
believed to originally have been designed to target only the Iranian
nuclear industry, but subsequently managed to spread itself in
unforeseen ways.
F-Secure
security analyst Sean Sullivan told V3 Stuxnet's unpredictable nature
means it has likely spread to other facilities outside of the plant
mentioned by Kaspersky.
"It
didn't spread via the internet. It spread outside of its target due
to a bug and so it started traveling via USB. Given the community
targeted, I would not be surprised if other countries had nuclear
plants with infected PCs," he said.
Director
of security strategy at FireEye, Jason Steer, mirrored Sullivan's
sentiment, adding the insecure nature of most critical infrastructure
systems would make them an ideal breeding ground for Stuxnet.
"Stuxnet
has mostly spread by USB and CD rom using removable drive
vulnerabilities in Windows to date and continues to spread using
remote calls to talk to and infect other computers on the network,"
Steer told V3.
"Many
of these control systems are not connected to the internet, because
they are so old and delicate that they cannot withstand any serious
probing and examination, and frankly are not designed to connect to
the internet as they are so insecure. Getting a vulnerability to a
network not connected is not so difficult anymore if it's important
enough."
Steer
added the atypical way Stuxnet spreads and behaves, means traditional
defences are ill equipped to stop, or even accurately track the
malware's movements.
"It's
highly likely that other plants globally are infected and will
continue to be infected as it's in the wild and we will see on a
weekly basis businesses trying to figure out how to secure the risk
of infected USB flash drives," he said.
"When
a PC is infected, the malware does many clever things, including not
showing all the things that are on the USB so it's impossible to know
if the USB is to be trusted or not and, as we know, using AV
signatures doesn't solve some of these issues either."
Critical
infrastructure networks' poor security and their use of outdated
Windows XP and SCADA systems - industrial control software designed
to monitor and control processes in power plants and factories - have
been an ongoing concern for industry and governments.
Prior
to Kaspersky's claims, experts Bluecoat Systems and the Jericho forum
argued at the London 2012 Cybergeddon conference that critical
infrastructure providers opened themselves up to cyber attacks by
prematurely moving key systems online.
The
US Department of Defense (DoD) said the premature move online is
doubly dangerous as Chinese hackers are skilled enough to mount
Stuxnet-level cyber attacks on critical infrastructure.
The
use of XP in power plants is set to become even more dangerous as
Microsoft has confirmed it will officially cut support for the
12-year-old OS in less than a year. The lack of support means XP
systems will no longer receive critical security updates from
Microsoft.
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