The Coming Collapse Of The Petrodollar System
20
May, 2013
By Andrew McKillop
PETRODOLLAR
WAR
The
theory of Petrodollar Warfare can be attributed to US analyst and
author William R Clarke, and his 2005 book of that title which
interpreted the US-UK decision to invade Iraq in 2003. He called this
an "oil currency war", but the concept of the petrodollar
system and petrodollar recyling dates back to the eve of the first
Oil Shock in 1973-1974. The role of the petrodollar system as a
driving force of US foreign policy is explained by analysts and
historians as basic to maintaining the dollar's status as the world's
dominant reserve currency - and the currency in which oil is priced.
The
term "petrodollar warfare" as used by William R. Clark says
that major
international war, legal or not, was seen as justified to protect the
petrodollar system.
Over and above the loss of human life, the combined costs of the
Afghan and Iraq wars for the US are controversial like the
interpretation of these wars as "oil wars", but analysts
like Joseph Stiglitz and Linda Bilmes put the total combined war cost
at above $4 trillion. This can be compared with - and totally dwarfs
- the annual cost of US oil imports, which are now sharply declining
on a year-in year-out basis as domestic shale oil output ramps up,
and US oil demand stagnates.
Clarke's
theory, like the explanation of the role and power of
the "petrodollar
system" depends on two basic drivers. Most
major developed countries rely on oil imports, which are purchased
using dollars, so they are forced to hold large stockpiles of dollars
in order to continue importing oil. In turn this also creates
consistent demand for dollars, and prevents the dollar from losing
its relative international monetary value, regardless of what happens
to the US economy.
Variants
of the Petrodollar War concept include the role of oil currency
conflicts and rivalry, notably concerning US relations with Iran,
Venezuela and Russia, and possibly with Europe concerning the gradual
replacement of US dollars with the euro, for oil transactions.
More important, the entire petromoney system and the potential for
Petrodollar War hinges on global oil import demand and the oil price.
Both of these have to hold up. When or if they do not, foreign oil
importer nations who formerly found it beneficial to hold dollars to
pay for oil, would have to find some other (unexplained) reason for
huge holdings of dollars, when their oil imports decline and-or oil
prices also decline.
The
"currency war" variant of the petrodollar system theory,
holding that a shift to notably euros or gold for oil payments would
undermine the system, is unrealistic when given any serious analysis,
because all world moneys are interchangeable or convertible, and gold
is priced in US dollars.
THE
THREE PHASES OF THE SYSTEM
These
are easy to define.
1974-1986
The first phase. The
1972 start of "petrodollar recycling" initiated by Nixon
and Kissinger just before the fivefold rise in oil prices of
1973-74, set the process of US-Saudi Arabian cooperation for the
near-exclusive benefit of these two players. The US dollar was
"backstopped" by the transfer of Saudi liquidities to the
US Federal Reserve system banks, especially the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York. A small number of other chosen central banks,
especially the Bank of England, and the central banks of Germany,
France, Italy and Japan also benefitted.
1986-1999
The second phase. This
also featured US and Saudi control, but under Clinton's two mandates
the focus radically changed to the controlled deflation or reduction
of both oil prices and the world value of the US dollar. While the US
continued to benefit from "petrodollar recycling", Saudi
Arabia was the major loser, undoubtedly changing its perceptions of
the system's utility to KSA.
2000-2013
The third and last phase. This
period featured a major longterm rise in oil prices and the entry not
in force, but progressively of the euro currency into the now
enlarged "petromoney recycling" process. Euros now cover
about 25% of global oil transactions, for an annual value of around
€700 billion, with about the same amount of back-to-back additional
lquidities. The massive growth of QE and central bank "easing",
from 2008, has heavily reduced the role of "petromoney
recycling".
Among
the major changes of the petromoney system during these 3 phases, the
first phase set the basic political concept among US deciders that
"petrodollar recycling" could at one and the same time
enable the US to run huge trade and budget deficits, low or very low
interest rates, and prevent the collapse of the dollar's value due to
the forced need of all world buyers of oil to hold US dollars to make
purchases of oil. By the second phase, this underlying concept shaded
to including non-oil assets as the focus of value manipulation,
controlled inflation and controlled deflation of value. In the third
phase, massive increases of the oil price to 2008 played a major role
in enabling the continued depreciation of the dollar's world value as
US sovereign debt also massively increased, but since
2008 and the start of central bank QE the need for, and role of the
petrodollar system have heavily contracted.
THE
SYSTEM IS NOW MENACED
Estimates
of the exact size and role of petrodollars and petroeuros in the
international money system, finance system, and economic system are
varied. Many analysts however say the minimum role of the petrodollar
system is to create, back-to-back, liquidities at least equivalent to
the transaction value of the world oil trade, which for crude and
products is about $3.4 trillion-a-year. Combined,
the approximate minimum total $6.8 trillion annual value of oil trade
plus the petromoney system is about 10% of world annual GNP,
equivalent to about 45% of US annual GDP. This
may appear as still large and important but has to be compared with,
for example, the exposure of national private banks only in Europe in
relation to national GDPs, which is often 300% - 400%.
Only
QE can "plaster over" these liabilities.
Petromoney
recycling is still treated by "the elites" as a critical
prop to monetary system integrity, and explains why the USA is far
from the only country depending on the system holding up. All
oil producers, even smaller-sized, are beneficiaries the same way as
all major developed nations' central banks, but the US is still the
prime beneficiary. However, the basic supports for the system's
operation - continuing high oil demand, high oil prices, and oil
priced in dollars - have all weakened or are threatened, today.
In particular when global oil demand declines or stagnates, and when
oil prices decline, the dollars that will no longer be needed for
global purchases of oil will return in massive amounts back to their
country of origin, the USA. The consequences can only be dramatic,
and threaten the start of a process completely unlike the Clinton-era
controlled devaluation of the dollar's value along with the decline
of oil prices consented by Saudi Arabia.
The
now-menaced "petrodollar system" is also weakened because
of worldwide change in the perception of oil and oil energy.From
the dawn of the petroleum age to its accelerating twilight, today,
geopolitical strategies concocted by developed nations featured the
maintenance of secured access to world oil supplies. This was
believed to be a win-win strategy for developed nation policy makers,
and especially for US policy makers. From the 1970s and the first Oil
Shock of 1973-1974, the only "morph' in this policy and strategy
was to substitute expensive oil, for cheap oil.
For
the USA's ability to run deficits and the petrodollar system, much
higher oil prices were a major gain, not a loss,
and this is almost surely still the perception of the Obama
administration today.
In
its first phase and last phase, the economic and political incentives
for ensuring national access to oil supplies, and the existence of
the petrodollar system as a monetary and finance tool - unrelated to
the economy - worked better with higher oil prices. Today however,
with the major and massive changes of oil resource availability
revealed by the shale energy revolution, rising global oil production
capabilities, stagnating oil demand, and rising renewable energy
supplies in all major developed countries, and the constantly
declining role of oil in the economy, the
Petrodollar System's days are surely numbered,
like the notion that $100-oil prices are "normal".
The
impact of this will be massive.
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