A
well-written and researched look into how America is transforming
itself into a fascist power – in short, a tyranny - where
violation of the constitution becomes the norm.
U.S.
Military ‘Power Grab’ Goes Into Effect
Pentagon
Unilaterally Grants Itself Authority Over ‘Civil Disturbances’
By
Jed Morey
14
May, 2013
The
manhunt for the Boston Marathon bombing suspects offered the nation a
window into the stunning military-style capabilities of our local law
enforcement agencies. For the past 30 years, police departments
throughout the United States have benefitted from the government’s
largesse in the form of military weaponry and training, incentives
offered in the ongoing “War on Drugs.” For the average citizen
watching events such as the intense pursuit of the Tsarnaev brothers
on television, it would be difficult to discern between fully
outfitted police SWAT teams and the military.
The
lines blurred even further Monday as a new dynamic was introduced to
the militarization of domestic law enforcement. By making a few
subtle changes to a regulation in the U.S. Code titled “Defense
Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies” the military has
quietly granted itself the ability to police the streets without
obtaining prior local or state consent, upending a precedent that has
been in place for more than two centuries.
The
most objectionable aspect of the regulatory change is the inclusion
of vague language that permits military intervention in the event of
“civil disturbances.” According to the rule:
Federal
military commanders have the authority, in extraordinary emergency
circumstances where prior authorization by the President is
impossible and duly constituted local authorities are unable to
control the situation, to engage temporarily in activities that are
necessary to quell large-scale, unexpected civil disturbances.
Bruce
Afran, a civil liberties attorney and constitutional law professor at
Rutgers University, calls the rule, “a wanton power grab by the
military,” and says, “It’s quite shocking actually because it
violates the long-standing presumption that the military is under
civilian control.”
A
defense official who declined to be named takes a different view of
the rule, claiming, “The authorization has been around over 100
years; it’s not a new authority. It’s been there but it hasn’t
been exercised. This is a carryover of domestic policy.” Moreover,
he insists the Pentagon doesn’t “want to get involved in civilian
law enforcement. It’s one of those red lines that the military
hasn’t signed up for.” Nevertheless, he says, “every person in
the military swears an oath of allegiance to the Constitution of the
United States to defend that Constitution against all enemies foreign
and domestic.”
One
of the more disturbing aspects of the new procedures that govern
military command on the ground in the event of a civil disturbance
relates to authority. Not only does it fail to define what
circumstances would be so severe that the president’s authorization
is “impossible,” it grants full presidential authority to
“Federal military commanders.” According to the defense official,
a commander is defined as follows: “Somebody who’s in the
position of command, has the title commander. And most of the time
they are centrally selected by a board, they’ve gone through
additional schooling to exercise command authority.”
As
it is written, this “commander” has the same power to authorize
military force as the president in the event the president is somehow
unable to access a telephone. (The rule doesn’t address the
statutory chain of authority that already exists in the event a
sitting president is unavailable.) In doing so, this commander must
exercise judgment in determining what constitutes, “wanton
destruction of property,” “adequate protection for Federal
property,” “domestic violence,” or “conspiracy that hinders
the execution of State or Federal law,” as these are the
circumstances that might be considered an “emergency.”
“These
phrases don’t have any legal meaning,” says Afran. “It’s no
different than the emergency powers clause in the Weimar constitution
[of the German Reich]. It’s a grant of emergency power to the
military to rule over parts of the country at their own discretion.”
Afran
also expresses apprehension over the government’s authority “to
engage temporarily in activities necessary to quell large-scale
disturbances.”
“Governments
never like to give up power when they get it,” says Afran. “They
still think after twelve years they can get intelligence out of
people in Guantanamo. Temporary is in the eye of the beholder. That’s
why in statutes we have definitions. All of these statutes have one
thing in common and that is that they have no definitions. How long
is temporary? There’s none here. The definitions are absurdly
broad.”
The
U.S. military is prohibited from intervening in domestic affairs
except where provided under Article IV of the Constitution in cases
of domestic violence that threaten the government of a state or the
application of federal law. This provision was further clarified both
by the Insurrection Act of 1807 and a post-Reconstruction law known
as the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 (PCA). The Insurrection Act
specifies the circumstances under which the president may convene the
armed forces to suppress an insurrection against any state or the
federal government. Furthermore, where an individual state is
concerned, consent of the governor must be obtained prior to the
deployment of troops. The PCA—passed in response to federal troops
that enforced local laws and oversaw elections during
Reconstruction—made unauthorized employment of federal troops a
punishable offense, thereby giving teeth to the Insurrection Act.
Together,
these laws limit executive authority over domestic military action.
Yet Monday’s official regulatory changes issued unilaterally by the
Department of Defense is a game-changer.
The
stated purpose of the updated rule is “support in Accordance With
the Posse Comitatus Act,” but in reality it undermines the
Insurrection Act and PCA in significant and alarming ways. The most
substantial change is the notion of “civil disturbance” as one of
the few “domestic emergencies” that would allow for the
deployment of military assets on American soil.
To
wit, the relatively few instances that federal troops have been
deployed for domestic support have produced a wide range of results.
Situations have included responding to natural disasters and
protecting demonstrators during the Civil Rights era to,
disastrously, the Kent State student massacre and the 1973 occupation
of Wounded Knee.
Michael
German, senior policy counsel to the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU), noted in a 2009 Daily Kos article that, “there is no doubt
that the military is very good at many things. But recent history
shows that restraint in their new-found domestic role is not one of
them.”
At
the time German was referring to the military’s expanded
surveillance techniques and hostile interventions related to border
control and the War on Drugs. And in fact, many have argued that
these actions have already upended the PCA in a significant way. Even
before this most recent rule change, the ACLU was vocal in its
opposition to the Department of Defense (DoD) request to expand
domestic military authority “in the event of chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear, or high yield explosive (CBRNE) incidents.”
The ACLU’s position is that civilian agencies are more than
equipped to handle such emergencies since 9/11. (ACLU spokespersons
in Washington D.C. declined, however, to be interviewed for this
story.)
But
while outcomes of military interventions have varied, the protocol by
which the president works cooperatively with state governments has
remained the same. The president is only allowed to deploy troops to
a state upon request of its governor. Even then, the
military—specifically the National Guard—is there to provide
support for local law enforcement and is prohibited from engaging in
any activities that are outside of this scope, such as the power to
arrest.
Eric
Freedman, a constitutional law professor from Hofstra University,
also calls the ruling “an unauthorized power grab.” According to
Freedman, “The Department of Defense does not have the authority to
grant itself by regulation any more authority than Congress has
granted it by statute.” Yet that’s precisely what it did. This
wasn’t, however, the Pentagon’s first attempt to expand its
authority domestically in the last decade.
Déjà
vu
During
the Bush Administration, Congress passed the 2007 Defense
Authorization Bill that included language similar in scope to the
current regulatory change. It specifically amended the Insurrection
Act to expand the president’s ability to deploy troops domestically
under certain conditions including health epidemics, natural
disasters and terrorist activities, though it stopped short of
including civil disturbances. But the following year this language
was repealed under the National Defense Authorization Act of 2008 via
a bill authored by Vermont Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) who cited the
“useful friction” between the Insurrection and Posse Comitatus
Acts in limiting executive authority.
According
to the DoD, the repeal of this language had more to do with procedure
and that it was never supposed to amend the Insurrection Act. “When
it was actually passed,” says the defense official, “Congress
elected to amend the Insurrection Act and put things in the
Insurrection Act that were not insurrection, like the support for
disasters and emergencies and endemic influenza. Our intent,” he
says, “was to give the president and the secretary access to the
reserve components. It includes the National Guard and, rightfully
so, the governors were pretty upset because they were not consulted.”
Senator
Leahy’s office did not have a statement as of press time, but a
spokesperson said the senator had made an inquiry with the DoD in
response to our questions. The defense official confirmed that he was
indeed being called in to discuss the senator’s concerns in a
meeting scheduled for today. But he downplayed any concern, saying,
“Congress at any time can say ‘we don’t like your
interpretation of that law and how you’ve interpreted it in making
policy’—and so they can call us to the Hill and ask us to justify
why we’re doing something.”
Last
year, Bruce Afran and another civil liberties attorney Carl Mayer
filed a lawsuit against the Obama Administration on behalf of a group
of journalists and activists lead by former New York Times journalist
Chris Hedges. They filed suit over the inclusion of a bill in the
NDAA 2012 that, according to the plaintiffs, expanded executive
authority over domestic affairs by unilaterally granting the
executive branch to indefinitely detain U.S. citizens without due
process. The case has garnered international attention and invited
vigorous defense from the Obama Administration. Even Afran goes so
far as to say this current rule change is, “another NDAA. It’s
even worse, to be honest.”
For
Hedges and the other plaintiffs, including Pentagon Papers
whistleblower Daniel Ellsberg, the government’s ever-expanding
authority over civilian affairs has a “chilling effect” on First
Amendment activities such as free speech and the right to assemble.
First District Court Judge Katherine Forrest agreed with the
plaintiffs and handed Hedges et al a resounding victory prompting the
Department of Justice to immediately file an injunction and an
appeal. The appellate court is expected to rule on the matter within
the next few months.
Another
of the plaintiffs in the Hedges suit is Alexa O’Brien, a journalist
and organizer who joined the lawsuit after she discovered a Wikileaks
cable showing government officials attempting to link her efforts to
terrorist activities. For activists such as O’Brien, the new DoD
regulatory change is frightening because it creates, “an
environment of fear when people cannot associate with one another.”
Like Afran and Freedman, she too calls the move, “another grab for
power under the rubric of the war on terror, to the detriment of
citizens.”
As
far as what might qualify as a civil disturbance, Afran notes, “In
the Sixties all of the Vietnam protests would meet this description.
We saw Kent State. This would legalize Kent State.”
But
the focus on the DoD regulatory change obscures the creeping
militarization that has already occurred in police departments across
the nation. Even prior to the NDAA lawsuit, journalist Chris Hedges
was critical of domestic law enforcement agencies saying, “The
widening use of militarized police units effectively nullifies the
Posse Comitatus Act of 1878.”
This
de facto nullification isn’t lost on the DoD.
The
DoD official even referred to the Boston bombing suspects manhunt
saying, “Like most major police departments, if you didn’t know
they were a police department you would think they were the
military.” According to this official there has purposely been a
“large transfer of technology so that the military doesn’t have
to get involved.” Moreover, he says the military has learned from
past events, such as the siege at Waco, where ATF officials
mishandled military equipment. “We have transferred the technology
so we don’t have to loan it,” he states.
But
if the transfer of military training and technology has been so
thorough, it boggles the imagination as to what kind of disturbance
would be so overwhelming that it would require the suspension of
centuries-old law and precedent to grant military complete authority
on the ground. The DoD official admits not being able to “envision
that happening,” adding, “but I’m not a Hollywood
screenwriter.”
Afran,
for one, isn’t buying the logic. For him, the distinction is
simple.
“Remember,
the police operate under civilian control,” he says. “They are
used to thinking in a civilian way so the comparison that they may
have some assault weapons doesn’t change this in any way. And they
can be removed from power. You can’t remove the military from
power.”
Despite
protestations from figures such as Afran and O’Brien and past
admonitions from groups like the ACLU, for the first time in our
history the military has granted itself authority to quell a civil
disturbance. Changing this rule now requires congressional or
judicial intervention.
“This
is where journalism comes in,” says Freedman. “Calling attention
to an unauthorized power grab in the hope that it embarrasses the
administration.”
Afran
is considering amending his NDAA complaint currently in front of the
court to include this regulatory change.
As
we witnessed during the Boston bombing manhunt, it’s already
difficult to discern between military and police. In the future it
might be impossible, because there may be no difference.
No comments:
Post a Comment
Note: only a member of this blog may post a comment.