Revenge
of the Bear: Russia Strikes Back in Syria
Juan
Cole
.
20
May, 2013
President
Vladimir Putin of the Russian Federation has drawn a line in the sand
over Syria, the government of which he is determined to protect from
overthrow. Not since the end of the Cold War in 1991 has the Russian
Bear asserted itself so forcefully beyond its borders in support of
claims on great power status. In essence, Russia is attempting to
play the role in Syria that France did in Algeria in the 1990s, of
supporting the military government against rebels, many of them
linked to political Islam. France and its allies prevailed, at the
cost of some 150,000 dead. Can Putin and Syrian President Bashar
al-Assad pull off the same sort of victory?
Even
as Damascus pushes back against the rebels militarily, Putin has
swung into action on the international and regional stages. The
Russian government persuaded U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry to
support an international conference aimed at a negotiated settlement.
Putin upbraided Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu over his
country’s air attacks on Damascus. Moscow is sending sophisticated
anti-aircraft batteries, anti-submarine missiles and other munitions
to beleaguered Assad, and has just announced that 12 Russian warships
will patrol the Mediterranean. The Russian actions have raised
alarums in Tel Aviv and Washington, even as they have been praised in
Damascus and Tehran.
The
Syrian regime has been on a military roll in the past few weeks. It
has made a bloody push into the hinterlands of Damascus, fortifying
the capital. With Hezbollah support, it has assaulted the rebel-held
Qusair region near northern Lebanon, an important smuggling route for
the rebels and the key to the central city of Homs. The Baath
government needs to keep Homs in order for Russia to resupply the
capital via the Syrian port of Latakia on the Mediterranean. The
Syrian government’s victories would not have been possible without
Russian and Iranian help.
Regionally,
a Moscow-Tehran axis has formed around Syria that is resisting Qatari
and Saudi backing for the rebels. The increasing dominance of rebel
fighting forces in the north by radical groups such as the al-Nusra
Front, which has openly affiliated itself with al-Qaida, has resulted
in a falloff of support for the revolution even in Saudi Arabia. Most
Syrians who oppose the government are not radicals or even
fundamentalists, but the latter have had the best record of military
victories. Russian characterizations of the rebels as radical
terrorists are a form of war propaganda; however, they have been
effective. The Saudi and Jordanian plan to create a less radical
southern opposition front at Deraa has met with a setback,
since the regime recaptured that city last week. Doha and Riyadh are
reeling from the Russia-backed counteroffensive.
At
the same time, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov pulled off a
coup
two weeks ago by persuading Kerry to support the international
conference on Syria, to which both the Baath government and the
rebels would be invited, as a way station toward a negotiated
settlement of the conflict (Russia’s holy grail). The agreement
represented a climb-down for the Obama administration, which had
earlier insisted that Assad leave office as a prerequisite to a
resolution, language that the joint Russian-American communique
issuing from the Kerry-Lavrov meeting in Moscow conspicuously
avoided. Lavrov, a South Asia expert and guitar-playing poet, speaks
as though what happened in Yemen, with a negotiated solution and a
government of national unity, is a plausible scenario for Syria. But
so much blood has been spilled in the latter that a military victory
by one side or the other now seems far more likely.
When
sources in the Pentagon leaked the information that explosions in
Damascus on May 5 were an Israeli airstrike, Putin appears to have
been livid.
He tracked down Netanyahu on the prime minister’s visit to Shanghai
and harangued him on the phone. The two met last week in Moscow,
where Putin is alleged to have read Netanyahu the riot act.
Subsequently, the Likud government leaked to The New York Times that
its aim
in the airstrike
had been only to prevent Syrian munitions from being transferred to
Hezbollah in Lebanon, not to help in overthrowing the Baath
government. The Israelis were clearly attempting to avoid further
provoking Moscow’s ire, and wanted to send a signal to Damascus
that they would remain neutral on Syria but not on further arming of
Hezbollah.
Putin,
not visibly mollified by Netanyahu’s clarification, responded by
announcing forcefully that he had sent to Syria Yakhont anti-ship
cruise missiles and was planning to dispatch sophisticated S-300
anti-aircraft batteries. Both U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff Gen. Martin Dempsey and Israeli military analysts protested
the Russian shipments. Although Netanyahu went on insisting that
Israel would bomb Syria at will when it suspected supplies were being
sent to Hezbollah, Putin had clearly just raised the risks of such
intervention.
Russia’s
motives have sometimes been attributed to the profits it realizes
from its arms trade with Syria, going back to the Soviet era, but
that business is actually quite small. Others have suggested that
Syria’s leasing to Russia of a naval base at Tartous, Russia’s
only toehold on the Mediterranean, is a consideration. Rather,
Russia’s support of Assad is part of its reassertion on the world
stage as a great power with areas under its control. Putin wants to
raise
Russia
from the world’s ninth- to fifth-largest capitalist economy.
Smarting from the aggressive American expansion of NATO into Eastern
Europe and the planting of U.S. bases in Central Asia, Moscow is
determined to recover its former spheres of influence. In addition,
some senior Russian military analysts see “color revolutions” as
a ploy
by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency to overthrow unfriendly
governments and then to plunder the resulting weak states of their
resources, a tactic they fear menaces Russia itself. Drawing a line
at Syria, in this view, is a way of underscoring that Putin’s own
neo-authoritarian regime will not go quietly.
Russia
is only a 24-hour drive from Aleppo, Syria’s northernmost
metropolis.
Having crushed a Muslim fundamentalist uprising in
Chechnya and Dagestan at the turn of the century, and having stood up
a friendly Chechen state government in the aftermath, Moscow is wary
of the spread of radical Muslim movements in the nearby Levant.
Moreover, some 10 to 14 percent of Syrians are Christians, many of
them belonging to the Eastern Orthodox branch that predominates in
Russia itself. The Russian
Orthodox Church,
a key constituency for Putin, has opposed the overthrow of the
secular Baath government, seeing it as a protector of those
coreligionists.
The
thinking of the Russian foreign ministry is clear from its Saturday
press release on the revival of the radical Sunni insurgency in Iraq
in recent weeks. Complaining about what it termed terrorist attacks
in Mosul and Baghdad, the ministry’s website said, according to a
translation done for the U.S. government’s Open Source Center, that
“We are particularly concerned about growing sectarian tensions in
Iraq, which are turning into a direct armed confrontation between
radical elements in the Shi’a and Sunni communities. This is
largely due to the crisis situation in neighboring Syria and the
spread of terrorist activities of militants operating there.” In
other words, Russia sees the Syrian revolution as dominated by
al-Qaida-linked groups such as the al-Nusra Front. Moscow views the
civil war as a destabilizing event with the potential for
radicalizing the Middle East, which it views as its soft underbelly.
The
momentum of the Syrian rebels has palpably slowed in the last month,
as Putin’s riposte has stiffened the resolve in Damascus and given
its military the wherewithal to regain territory. The Russian
president is weaving a protective web around his client, fending off
the Wahhabi winds of Muslim fundamentalism blowing from the Arabian
Peninsula. He has also pushed back against opportunistic Israeli
intervention, worried that it might further destabilize Damascus. At
the same time, he has impressed on Washington the need for a
negotiated settlement, an idea that President Obama, long skittish
about sending troops into further possible Middle East quagmires, has
begun to tolerate. Putin’s supply of powerful new weapons systems
to Assad’s military, and his dispatch of warships from the Russian
Pacific fleet through the Strait of Gibraltar into the Mediterranean,
make clear that the full force of Russian military might is, if need
be, at the service of its Baath client. Putin’s gambit may or may
not prove successful, but he is indisputably demonstrating that the
age of the sole superpower and of American unilateralism is passing
in favor of a multipolar world.
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