American
General Says 'Adversaries' Are Jamming AC-130 Gunships in Syria
Russia, which already appears to be waging a hybrid conflict against the United States in the country, is very likely behind these attacks.
There is every indication that the Kremlin will continue to conduct these types of activities for the foreseeable future as is seeks to push American forces out of Syria for good
Russia, which already appears to be waging a hybrid conflict against the United States in the country, is very likely behind these attacks.
25
April, 2018
The
head of the U.S. Special Operations Command says unspecified
opponents in Syria, almost certainly Russian or Russian-support
forces, have reportedly launched electronic warfare attacks against
U.S. Air Force AC-130 gunships operating in the country, as well as
other communications links. This is the latest in a string of reports
that highlight the growing threat of jamming and other non-kinetic
attacks to American military activities in the region and in general.
U.S.
Army General Raymond Thomas revealed the new details in a keynote
speech at the U.S. Geospatial Intelligence Foundation’s 2018 GEOINT
Symposium. The officer, who is in charge of all of America’s
special operations activities, used the anecdote to describe some of
the challenges his operator face in sending and receiving
intelligence and other critical information across the battlefield.
“Right
now in Syria, we’re in the most aggressive EW [electronic warfare]
environment on the planet from our adversaries,” Thomas said.
“They’re testing us every day, knocking our communications down,
disabling our AC-130s, etcetera.”
Other
reports have suggested the general actually referred to the U.S. Air
Force’s EC-130H Compass Call electronic warfare aircraft, but this
does not appear to be the case when listening to recordings of the
talk. In addition, Thomas says “our” aircraft and the EC-130s are
not part of the Air Force’s Special Operations Command, which is
assigned to SOCOM. Of course, he could also just be using "our"
to describe American forces in Syria in general.
You
can watch General Thomas' full speech below. He makes his comments
about Syria at around 9:20 in the runtime.
For
AC-130 crews, an enemy jamming their communications systems or data
links could be especially perilous for both American special
operators and supporting conventional forces and innocent bystanders.
The gunships rely heavily on those systems to help locate and
positively identify targets and then coordinate their attacks with
other manned and unmanned aircraft and joint tactical air controllers
on the ground.
Without
those added tools, it can be extremely difficult for the crew to
differentiate between friendly and hostile forces, and civilians, in
the heat of a firefight. This is especially so at night, when AC-130s
almost exclusively operate, and when American personnel are calling
for support in so-called “danger close” situations where they
might be situated very near to the intended target.
This
could force a gunship to abort a potentially critical attack run or
otherwise delay desperately needed fire support. If the crew were to
press ahead with the mission, they could be doing so with increased
risks. We have seen various examples of how badly this could play out
in the past few years.
During
a now infamous terrorist ambush of American and Nigerien troops in
Niger in October 2017, French Mirage multi-role combat aircraft that
arrived overhead did not attack the enemy fighters for fear of
hitting friendly forces who were “overlapping” with the
militants. The degraded capability, or outright inability, of U.S.
personnel to communicate with the pilots was reportedly a factor.
In
October 2015, an AC-130U Spooky gunship inadvertently destroyed a
hospital in Kunduz, Afghanistan that the humanitarian group Médecins
Sans Frontières, also known as doctors without borders, was
operating at the time. A subsequent investigation showed that a key
data link on the aircraft was not working at the time and that U.S.
special operators on the ground blocks away from the intended target
had decided to try and “talk in” the strike using only verbal
descriptions of a building they could not physically see.
A
friendly fire incident in Afghanistan in 2014, in which a B-1 bomber
accidentally killed five Americans, offers yet another example of how
things can go wrong. A final review of that incident found that the
inability of the aircraft’s targeting system to detect infrared
strobes that special operators use to identify themselves to friendly
aircraft and miscommunication were both contributing factors.
Jamming
GPS receivers could also more directly impair a gunships ability to
accurately attack targets. The AC-130W Stinger II, one of the types
we know has been flying over Syria and Iraq, relies heavily on
precision-guided munitions, including GPS-guided types such as the
GBU-39/B Small Diameter Bomb (SDB).
Many
of the same factors could apply to any EC-130H or even regular C-130
operations in Syria. In addition to being able to jam targets
themselves, the Compass Calls can locate enemy emitters and quickly
relay that information on to other units who can then take additional
action to either gather information or strike those targets.
And
while the United States has set up a number of forward operating
bases, complete with airstrips in many cases, to help resupply forces
in Syria, the jamming could impede airlift missions or airdrops of
supplies, the latter of which could be vital in an emergency. Not
only do C-130s use GPS-enabled navigation systems to guide them to
their drop zones, the U.S. Air Force also now employs GPS-assisted
airdrop systems to better guide those deliveries closer to their
intended recipients. This reduces the chances the packages will end
up in a difficult or impossible to reach location, get damaged after
impacting especially rugged terrain, or fall into enemy hands.
Depending
on the how widespread and effective the electronic attacks are, they
might have an impact on other types of U.S. manned and unmanned
aircraft operating over Syria, too. A wide array of fixed-wing combat
and combat support aircraft, as well as helicopters, are presently
supporting the American-led fight against ISIS in the eastern part of
the country.
And
though General Thomas did not name any adversaries specifically,
Russia has and continues to demonstrate its expanding electronic
warfare capabilities, especially in Europe, and has publicly stated
that it has deployed them in Syria. Syrian government forces or
militias aligned with the country’s dictator Bashar Al Assad could
have some capabilities of their own, as well, but would have almost
certainly sourced them from the Kremlin.
Russian
mercenaries could even be the ones operating the Syrian equipment,
allowing officials Moscow to distance themselves from attacks on
American troops. We at The War Zone have already noted previous U.S.
military reports about GPS jamming in Syria and other information
about installing jam-resistant equipment on secretive spy planes
supporting special operations forces in the region.
It’s
also worth noting that the full extent of Russian electronic warfare
capabilities in Syria, or those of any other actor, remains unclear.
Previous reports have suggested that unmanned aircraft, such as the
MQ-9 Reaper, have not suffered as a result of at least some of the
jamming, suggesting the attacks could be highly localized or
otherwise not powerful enough to disable microwave satellite
communications data links. Thomas’ remarks, however, would seem to
suggest the situation is far more dangerous than we previously
understood.
Regardless,
the Kremlin has every reason to do as much as it can, as I have
written before with regards to the apparent jamming of American
drones:
“And
it’s hard to imagine that Russia would not take advantage of this
capability in its larger effort to impede American activities in
Eastern Syria, which is staunchly opposes. Jamming the short-range
drones limits the ability American troops to gain a better
understanding of the situation around them, which can in turn only
hamper their mission planning process and increase risks for them
during more extended operations.
“Jamming
would also be a way to help keep U.S. unmanned aircraft out of
Western Syria, where Assad's regime is more firmly in control and
where his forces continue to commit crimes against humanity with
impunity. Still, manned aircraft from the American-led coalition
fighting ISIS long ago stopped flying in that part of the country and
the dubious de-confliction line Russia and the United States have
agreed to in order to separate their operations should preclude any
drones from missions there, as well.
…
“Jamming
the linkages between a drone and its controllers on the ground is
also a relatively low-risk proposition for Russia. If it succeeds in
destroying the aircraft it is unlikely that an American service
member will die in the process, reducing the likelihood of any
immediate escalation. The largely opaque relationship actual Russian
troops in the country have with private military contractors,
militias aligned with Assad, Iranian personnel, and Syrian government
forces give the Kremlin significant avenues to deny any
responsibility whatsoever.”
The
same logic applies to more widespread electronic warfare attacks
against other aircraft and communications nodes on the ground. It
makes even more sense after the U.S.-led missile strikes on Assad’s
chemical weapons infrastructure on April 14, 2018. Though, as we
noted, there have been reports that this has been going on for years
now, the Kremlin is only likely to step up these activities as a
low-cost, but still direct retaliatory response to the missile
barrage. It is a much more deniable and discreet way of harassing the
United States than other threats the Russians have made, such as
reported plans to supply the Syrian regime with long-range S-300
surface-to-air missiles.
More
to the point, the electronic warfare attacks, which can hamper
operations or reduce confidence in certain communications and
navigation systems, are well in line with Russia’s new hybrid
warfare concepts, which also involve the use of proxy forces and
information operations to muddy the waters surrounding various
conflicts and obscure its involvement. General Thomas’ speech is
only the most recent indication that there is truly a low-grade fight
occurring between Russian and U.S. forces in Syria, as well as their
respective partners, despite official narratives to the contrary.
There is every indication that the Kremlin will continue to conduct these types of activities for the foreseeable future as is seeks to push American forces out of Syria for good
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