Our nuclear infrastructure is a radioactive time bomb
Brendan Scott
VICE,
29
April, 2014
The
Nuclear Regulatory Commission has had a busy few weeks. Last month,
thanks to Freedom of Information Act queries filed by numerous
organizations, the Commission was forced
to disclose a dossier of emails
showing the lengths it had gone to in the immediate aftermath
of the Fukushima disaster to downplay the risk of a
similar catastrophe happening in the US. The correspondence
showed a startling lack of preparedness.
In
one example, NRC public affairs officer David McIntyre offered
his opinion on what Energy Secretary Steven Chu should have done
when asked by CNN whether American nuclear plants could withstand a
force 9.0 earthquake: “He should just say, ‘Yes, it can.’
Worry about being wrong when it doesn't. Sorry if I sound cynical."
The
documents
also show a background briefing for then NRC chairman
Gregory Jaczko and other commissioners that split
intelligence into “public answer" and "additional
technical, non-public information."
In some cases the NRC withheld crucial details and
misdirected the media.
It's
been 35 years since an American nuclear plant has malfunctioned. At 4
AM on March 28, 1979, a relief valve failed to close at Three Mile
Island, Pennsylvania, severely damaging the
reactor's core. Two days later gas was released from
the facility, but only exposed local residents to background
doses of radiation. Some are concerned the next accident could be
disastrous.
Edwin
Lyman, a senior global security scientist with the nuclear watchdog
Union of Concerned Scientists, concedes that the
NRC's disclosed email exchanges have been taken out of
context. Nevertheless, he remains a savage critic of the
regulator.
“After
Three Mile Island there was an effort to take a more expansive view
of nuclear safety. A lot of the recommendations in the wake
of the accident were to take a broader view and not be so
sure you understood all possible contingencies as well as you thought
you did,” he told me. “The NRC at the time ended up not taking
that strategy, instead going forward with a piecemeal approach. We're
worried that after Fukushima they're still not getting the
message and are going to try to patch a few more holes but not take a
broader view necessary to really reduce the risk of something
like that happening again in our lifetimes.”
One of
the NRC's guiltiest shortcomings is
its torpid reaction to changing seismic
hazards.
When
reactors were sited three decades ago, the worst known earthquakes
and ground motion in the area were evaluated. Power plants were then
built with a safety margin. But in many cases those risks were
underestimated. Take the Diablo Canyon Power Plant in California.
Commissioned in 1985, the reactor had to be reinforced halfway
through construction following the discovery of the nearby
Hosgri fault. Now the plant is at the center of controversy
once again, following the discovery in 2008 of a shoreline fault just
over half a mile off the coast.
In
the immediate aftermath of the Fukushima disaster, the utility
company operating the site, Pacific Gas and Electric, asked
the NRC to suspend a pending license-renewal request (the NRC grants
40-year licences, which it can choose to extend by 20 years) so
that it could carry out a three-year seismic study. The results
of this study
will determine whether or not the plant pursues its license renewal.
At
the same time PG&E halted its license renewal application, the
NRC gave Diablo Canyon a clean bill of health after completing a
safety evaluation report. It found that PG&E had “identified
actions that have been or will be taken to manage the effects of
aging in the appropriate safety systems, structures, and
components of the plant, and that their functions will be maintained
during the period of extended operation.” The findings of PG&E's
seismic study are pending, but the utility corporation contests
that the Diablo Canyon plant is perched 85 feet above sea level,
putting it out of reach of any possible tsunami
“The
NRC has been dragging its feet for a long time on dealing with this,”
says Lyman. “It has been locked in a kind of dance with the utility
about how to interpret and react to that. It seems like
the preferred view these days is to acknowledge there
is a higher risk but say that it's still small, then use
cost-benefit analysis to decide there is no need to spend on the
upgrade.”
Three
years ago a 5.8 magnitude earthquake shook Mineral,
Virginia, 11 miles from the North Anna Nuclear Station. It was a
shock the plant was never built to withstand. Its operator, Dominion,
claimed
there was no functional damage
(despite a small crack) and that spent fuel canisters had shifted no
more than four inches during the tremor.
A preliminary NRC
review made public in 2011 concluded that North Anna's two reactors
are among
27 in need of upgrades
because they are at risk of being struck by an earthquake more
powerful than they were designed to bear. Nonetheless, two months
after the earthquake, the regulator, which approved North Anna's
licence renewal in 2003, permitted the
plant to go back online.
“Some
people look at [the North Anna earthquake] and say, 'The way we build
these reactors leaves a lot of extra margin,'" says Lyman. "The
problem is that because there hasn't been a full analysis to
understand all of the potential impacts, you
can't really just extrapolate. What the NRC has done
since Fukushima is to ask all of the utilities
to re-examine the size of the seismic and flooding risks
and that process is ongoing. The problem is, no one really knows how
to do that because, to plug into the formulas that the
NRC uses to decide whether a reactor is risky enough to
impose new regulations, you need a pretty good knowledge of what that
risk is, and no one can predict with any certainty what
the seismic risk of any site is. It's an exercise in futility."
New
York is going head to head with the NRC. State governor Andrew
Cuomo is calling for the closure of Indian Point, a
2,000-megavolt site (America's biggest, the Vogtle plant in Georgia,
generates 4,536 megavolts) located 30 miles up the Hudson from
Yankee Stadium. By way of comparison, Chernobyl has a 18.5-mile
exclusion zone, and the Fukushima Daiichi plant's cordon
has a 12.5-mile radius. The NRC's current rules prescribe only
a 10-mile evacuation zone, regardless of the size of the plant.
Entergy,
Indian Point's operator, has said
it is confident it will win a pending licence renewal
from the NRC. Earlier this month, the Commission rejected
a petition
to stretch its evacuation zone to 25 miles.
America's
nuclear energy infrastructure is creaking. The industry's biggest
problem is that it has become uneconomic in the face of the shale gas
revolution and subsequent crash in energy prices. This has made it
harder for utilities to justify investing in safety when
there's less money to be made.
Corporations
are scrimping on infrastructure upgrades and applying to an
obliging regulator for renewals, kicking the can down the
road. There are currently 62 commercially operated nuclear
power plants with 100 reactors in 31 states in the US.
The NRC, meanwhile, has approved 73
license renewals and
only blocked one application… ever. This has left the industry to
moulder—the average age of commercial reactors clocks in at 33
years.
To
its critics, the NRC is an industry patsy. Its predecessor, the
Atomic Energy Commission, was dissolved in 1975 for its
impotence. The same mistakes are being repeated. In 1987, a year
after the Chernobyl meltdown, a congressional committee
published
a report rebuking the NRC's cozy relationship with
the industry it
was tasked to regulate.
Only one of the body's five commissioners is elected independently. The rest must be approved by the nuclear industry itself before being appointed by Congress. Former chair Gregory Jazcko was the first presidential appointee and became a lone gladfly in a biased regulator.
In
the wake of the Fukushima disaster, Jazcko rejected
the development of two new reactors at Georgia's 27-year-old Vogtle
plant, the first to be approved by the NRC since 1978, saying that he
could not “support issuing this license as if
Fukushima never happened.” He was voted down 4–1 and forced out
of the organization three months later. Vogtle's new reactors are
currently under construction.
His replacement, Allison Macfarlane, is championing the same causes. Like Jaczko, she opposes the burial of America's 56,000 (and counting) tons of spent nuclear fuel under Yucca Mountain. She argued against the project, located beneath a ridgeline 100 miles northwest of Las Vegas, on the grounds that seismic activity in the area posed too great a risk.
The
site had its federal funding pulled in 2009 after meeting
resistance from the Obama administration, but last August the
court of appeals ordered the NRC to renew its licensing review. By
abandoning the assessment in 2011 the NRC had ignored due process,
the court ruled.
While
the NRC has been ordered to complete the review on a technicality,
Yucca Mountain has all but been abandoned. The Obama administration
is not willing to underwrite the project, and it's likely too
sensitive for any future government to revive. Short of any
agreement on alternatives, however, waste continues to
be stockpiled on site across the South, Midwest, and
Northeast.
In
Fukushima, clinicians are discovering increased cases of thyroid
cancer in children and young adults. Japanese
scientist Toshihide Tsuda has observed
a surge among under-18s
in the region. Some have questioned the veracity of his and
similar findings, arguing that the population is simply being
screened more closely than before, meaning higher recorded
rates of cancer are inevitable. But if the Environmental Protection
Agency's guidelines are anything to go by, no one
truly knows the levels of exposure
above background radiation that cause stochastic damage such as
cancer.
The
NRC says it is taking adequate precautions to ensure the
public's safety; for the NRC's critics, its historical
partisanship means that whatever solution is reached for America's
decrepit reactors and growing mountain of nuclear waste is likely to
favor the industry.
Lyman,
for one, has little faith in future regulation unless something is
done to claw influence back from those who stand to gain the most
from the sale of nuclear energy. “Do you shut down a plant because
it fails to meet new standards," he asks, "or do
you adapt the standards?"
No comments:
Post a Comment
Note: only a member of this blog may post a comment.