The
Ukraine in Turmoil
by
Israel Shamir
18
May, 2014
It
is not much fun to be in Kiev these days. The revolutionary
excitement is over, and hopes for new faces, the end of corruption
and economic improvement have withered. The Maidan street revolt and
the subsequent coup just reshuffled the same marked deck of cards,
forever rotating in power.
The new acting President has
been an acting prime minister, and a KGB (called “SBU” in
Ukrainian) supremo. The new acting prime minister has been a foreign
minister. The oligarch most likely to be “elected” President in a
few days has been a foreign minister, the head of the state bank, and
personal treasurer of two coups, in 2004 (installing Yushchenko) and
in 2014 (installing himself). His main competitor, Mme Timoshenko,
served as a prime minister for years, until electoral defeat in
2010.
These people had brought Ukraine to its present
abject state. In 1991, the Ukraine was richer than Russia, today it
is three times poorer because of these people’s mismanagement and
theft. Now they plan an old trick: to take loans in Ukraine’s name,
pocket the cash and leave the country indebted. They sell state
assets to Western companies and ask for NATO to come in and protect
the investment.
They play a hard game, brass knuckles and
all. The Black Guard, a new SS-like armed force of the neo-nazi Right
Sector, prowls the land. They arrest or kill dissidents, activists,
journalists. Hundreds of American soldiers, belonging to the
“private” company Academi (formerly Blackwater) are spread out in
Novorossia, the pro-Russian provinces in the East and South-East.
IMF–dictated reforms slashed pensions by half and doubled the
housing rents. In the market, US Army rations took the place of local
food.
The new Kiev regime had dropped the last pretence of
democracy by expelling the Communists from the parliament. This
should endear them to the US even more. Expel Communists, apply for
NATO, condemn Russia, arrange a gay parade and you may do anything at
all, even fry dozens of citizens alive. And so they did.
The
harshest repressions were unleashed on industrial Novorossia, as its
working class loathes the whole lot of oligarchs and
ultra-nationalists. After the blazing inferno of Odessa and a wanton
shooting on the streets of Melitopol the two rebellious provinces of
Donetsk and Lugansk took up arms and declared their independence from
the Kiev regime. They came under fire, but did not surrender. The
other six Russian-speaking industrial provinces of Novorossia were
quickly cowed. Dnepropetrovsk and Odessa were terrorised by personal
army of Mr Kolomoysky; Kharkov was misled by its tricky governor.
Russia did not interfere and did not support the rebellion, to the
great distress of Russian nationalists in Ukraine and Russia who
mutter about “betrayal”. So much for the warlike rhetoric of
McCain and Brzezinski.
Putin’s
respect for others’ sovereignty is exasperating. I understand this
sounds like a joke, -- you hear so much about Putin as a “new
Hitler”. As a matter of fact, Putin had legal training before
joining the Secret Service. He is a stickler for international law.
His Russia has interfered with other states much less than France or
England, let alone the US. I asked his senior adviser, Mr Alexei
Pushkov, why Russia did not try to influence Ukrainian minds while
Kiev buzzed with American and European officials. “We think it is
wrong to interfere”, he replied like a good Sunday schoolboy. It is
rather likely Putin’s advisors misjudged public sentiment. « The
majority of Novorossia's population does not like the new Kiev
regime, but being politically passive and conservative, will submit
to its rule”, they estimated. “The rebels are a small bunch of
firebrands without mass support, and they can’t be relied upon”,
was their view. Accordingly, Putin advised the rebels to postpone the
referendum indefinitely, a polite way of saying “drop it”.
They
disregarded his request with considerable sang froid and convincingly
voted en masse for secession from a collapsing Ukraine. The turnout
was much higher than expected, the support for the move near total.
As I was told by a Kremlin insider, this development was not foreseen
by Putin’s advisers.
Perhaps the advisors had read it
right, but three developments had changed the voters’ minds and had
sent this placid people to the barricades and the voting booths:
1.
The first one was the fiery holocaust of Odessa, where the peaceful
and carelessly unarmed demonstrating workers were suddenly attacked
by regime’s thugs (the Ukrainian equivalent of Mubarak’s shabab)
and corralled into the Trade Unions Headquarters. The building was
set on fire, and the far-right pro-regime Black Guard positioned
snipers to efficiently pick off would-be escapees. Some fifty, mainly
elderly, Russian-speaking workers were burned alive or shot as they
rushed for the windows and the doors. This dreadful event was turned
into an occasion of merriment and joy by Ukrainian nationalists who
referred to their slain compatriots as “fried beetles”. (It is
being said that this auto-da-fé was organised by the shock troops of
Jewish oligarch and strongman Kolomoysky, who coveted the port of
Odessa. Despite his cuddly bear appearance, he is pugnacious and
violent person, who offered ten thousand dollars for a captive
Russian, dead or alive, and proposed a cool million dollars for the
head of Mr Tsarev, a Member of Parliament from Donetsk.)
2.
The second was the Mariupol attack on May 9, 2014. This day is
commemorated as V-day in Russia and Ukraine (while the West
celebrates it on May 8). The Kiev regime forbade all V-day
celebrations. In Mariupol, the Black Guard attacked the peaceful and
weaponless town, burning down the police headquarters and killing
local policemen who had refused to suppress the festive march.
Afterwards, Black Guard thugs unleashed armoured vehicles on the
streets, killing citizens and destroying property.
The
West did not voice any protest; Nuland and Merkel weren’t horrified
by this mass murder, as they were by Yanukovich’s timid attempts to
control crowds. The people of these two provinces felt abandoned;
they understood that nobody was going to protect and save them but
themselves, and went off to vote.
3. The third development
was, bizarrely, the Eurovision jury choice of Austrian transvestite
Conchita Wurst for a winner of its song contest. The sound-minded
Novorossians decided they want no part of such a Europe.
Actually,
the people of Europe do not want it either: it transpired that
the majority of British viewers preferred a Polish duo, Donatan &
Cleo, with its We Are Slavic. Donatan is half Russian, and has
courted controversy in the past extolling the virtues of pan-Slavism
and the achievements of the Red Army, says the Independent. The
politically correct judges of the jury preferred to “celebrate
tolerance”, the dominant paradigm imposed upon Europe. This is the
second transvestite to win this very political contest; the first one
was Israeli singer Dana International. Such obsession with
re-gendering did not go down well with Russians and/or
Ukrainians.
The Russians have readjusted their sights, but
they do not intend to bring their troops into the two rebel
republics, unless dramatic developments should force them.
Russian
plans
Imagine:
you are dressed up for a night on Broadway, but your neighbours are
involved in a vicious quarrel, and you have to gun up and deal with
the trouble instead of enjoying a show, and a dinner, and perhaps a
date. This was Putin’s position regarding the Ukrainian turmoil.
A
few months ago, Russia had made a huge effort to become, and to be
seen as, a very civilised European state of the first magnitude. This
was the message of the Sochi Olympic
games:
to re-brand, even re-invent Russia, just as Peter the Great once had,
as part of the First World; an amazing country of strong European
tradition, of Leo Tolstoy and Malevich, of Tchaikovsky and Diaghilev,
the land of arts, of daring social reform, of technical achievements,
of modernity and beyond -- the Russia of Natasha Rostova riding a
Sikorsky ‘copter. Putin spent $60 b to broadcast this image.
Putin
spent $60 billion on the Olympics. They had opening and closing
ceremonies, trying to show Russia as a normal progressive state. So
it isn't possible that he, three days later, would voluntarily start
an assault on Ukraine. There is no doubt that… at all times he
wanted Ukraine in a subordinate position. And at all times, every
senior Russian that I've ever met, including dissidents like
Solzhenitsyn and Brodsky, looked at Ukraine as part of the Russian
heritage. But I don't think he had planned to bring it to a head
now.
However, Washington hawks decided to do whatever it
takes to keep Russia out in the cold. They were afraid of this image
of “a normal progressive state” as such Russia would render NATO
irrelevant and undermine European dependence on the US. They were
adamant about retaining their hegemony, shattered as it was by
the Syrian
confrontation.
They attacked Russian positions in the Ukraine and arranged a violent
coup, installing
a viciously anti-Russian regime supported
by football fans and neo-Nazis, paid for by Jewish oligarchs and
American taxpayers. The victors banned the Russian language and
prepared to void treaties with Russia regarding its Crimean naval
base at Sebastopol on the Black Sea. This base was to become a great
new NATO base, controlling the Black Sea and threatening
Russia.
Putin had to deal quickly and so he did,
by accepting
the Crimean people’s request
to join Russian Federation.
This dealt with the immediate problem of
the base, but the problem of Ukraine remained.
The Ukraine
is not a foreign entity to Russians, it is the western half of
Russia. It was artificially separated from the rest in 1991, at the
collapse of the USSR. The people of the two parts are interconnected
by family, culture and blood ties; their economies are intricately
connected. While a separate viable Ukrainian state is a possibility,
an “independent” Ukrainian state hostile to Russia is not viable
and can’t be tolerated by any Russian ruler. And this for military
as well as for cultural reasons: if Hitler had begun the war against
Russia from its present border, he would have taken Stalingrad in two
days and would have destroyed Russia in a week.
A
more pro-active Russian ruler would have sent troops to Kiev a long
time ago. Thus did Czar Alexis when the Poles, Cossacks and Tatars
argued for it in 17th century. So also did Czar Peter the Great, when
the Swedes occupied it in the 18th century. So did Lenin, when the
Germans set up the Protectorate of Ukraine (he called its
establishment “the obscene peace”). So did Stalin, when the
Germans occupied the Ukraine in 1941.
Putin still hopes to
settle the problem by peaceful means, relying upon the popular
support of the Ukrainian people. Actually, before the Crimean
takeover, the majority of Ukrainians (and near all Novorossians)
overwhelmingly supported some sort of union with Russia. Otherwise,
the Kiev coup would not have been necessary. The forced Crimean
takeover seriously undermined Russian appeal. The people of Ukraine
did not like it. This was foreseen by the Kremlin, but they had to
accept Crimea for a few reasons. Firstly, a loss of Sevastopol naval
base to NATO was a too horrible of an alternative to contemplate.
Secondly, the Russian people would not understand if Putin were to
refuse the suit of the Crimeans.
The Washington hawks
still hope to force Putin to intervene militarily, as it would give
them the opportunity to isolate Russia, turn it into a monster pariah
state, beef up defence spending and set Europe and Russia against
each other. They do not care about Ukraine and Ukrainians, but use
them as pretext to attain geopolitical goals.
The
Europeans would like to fleece Ukraine; to import its men as
“illegal” workers and its women as prostitutes, to strip assets,
to colonise. They did it with Moldova, a little sister of Ukraine,
the most miserable ex-Soviet Republic. As for Russia, the EU would
not mind taking it down a notch, so they would not act so grandly.
But the EU is not fervent about it. Hence, the difference in
attitudes.
Putin would prefer to continue with his
modernisation of Russia. The country needs it badly. The
infrastructure lags twenty or thirty years behind the West. Tired by
this backwardness, young Russians often prefer to move to the West,
and this brain drain causes much damage to Russia while enriching the
West.
Even Google is a result of this brain drain, for Sergey Brin is
a Russian immigrant as well. So are hundreds of thousands of Russian
scientists and artists manning every Western lab, theatre and
orchestra. Political liberalisation is not enough: the young people
want good roads, good schools and a quality of life comparable to the
West. This is what Putin intends to deliver.
He is doing a
fine job of it. Moscow now has free bikes and Wi-Fi in the parks like
every Western European city. Trains have been upgraded. Hundreds of
thousands of apartments are being built, even more than during the
Soviet era.
Salaries and pensions have increased seven-to-tenfold in
the past decade. Russia is still shabby, but it is on the right
track. Putin wants to continue this modernisation.
As
for the Ukraine and other ex-Soviet states, Putin would prefer they
retain their independence, be friendly and work at a leisurely pace
towards integration a la the European Union. He does not dream of a
new empire. He would reject such a proposal, as it would delay his
modernisation plans.
If the beastly neocons would not have
forced his hand by expelling the legitimate president of Ukraine and
installing their puppets, the world might have enjoyed a long spell
of peace. But then the western military alliance under the US
leadership would fall into abeyance, US military industries would
lose out, and US hegemony would evaporate. Peace is not good for the
US military and hegemony-creating media machine. So dreams of peace
in our lifetime are likely to remain just dreams.
What
will Putin do?
Putin
will try to avoid sending in troops as long as possible. He will have
to protect the two splinter provinces, but this can be done with
remote support, the way the US supports the rebels in Syria, without
‘boots on the ground’. Unless serious bloodshed on a large scale
should occur, Russian troops will just stand by, staring down the
Black Guard and other pro-regime forces.
Putin will try to
find an arrangement with the West for sharing authority, influence
and economic involvement in the failed state. This can be done
through federalisation, or by means of coalition government, or even
partition. The Russian-speaking provinces of Novorossia are those of
Kharkov (industry), Nikolayev (ship-building), Odessa (harbour),
Donetsk and Lugansk (mines and industry), Dnepropetrovsk (missiles
and high-tech), Zaporozhe (steel), Kherson (water for Crimea and
ship-building), all of them established, built and populated by
Russians. They could secede from Ukraine and form an independent
Novorossia, a mid-sized state, but still bigger than some
neighbouring states. This state could join the Union State of Russia
and Belarus, and/or the Customs Union led by Russia. The rump Ukraine
could manage as it sees fit until it decides whether or not to join
its Slavic sisters in the East. Such a set up would produce two
rather cohesive and homogeneous states.
Another
possibility (much less likely at this moment) is a three-way division
of the failed Ukraine: Novorossia, Ukraine proper, and Galicia&Volyn.
In such a case, Novorossia would be strongly pro-Russian, Ukraine
would be neutral, and Galicia strongly pro-Western.
The EU
could accept this, but the US probably would not agree to any
power-sharing in the Ukraine. In the ensuing tug-of-war, one of two
winners will emerge. If Europe and the US drift apart, Russia wins.
If Russia accepts a pro-Western positioning of practically all of
Ukraine, the US wins. The tug-of-war could snap and cause all-out
war, with many participants and a possible use of nuclear weapons.
This is a game of chicken; the one with stronger nerves and less
imagination will remain on the track.
Pro
and Contra
It
is too early to predict who will win in the forthcoming
confrontation. For the Russian president, it is extremely tempting to
take all of Ukraine or at least Novorossia, but it is not an easy
task, and one likely to cause much hostility from the Western
powers.
With Ukraine incorporated, Russian recovery from
1991 would be completed, its strength doubled, its security ensured
and a grave danger removed. Russia would become great again. People
would venerate Putin as Gatherer of Russian Lands.
However,
Russian efforts to appear as a modern peaceful progressive state
would have been wasted; it would be seen as an aggressor and expelled
from international bodies. Sanctions will bite; high tech imports may
be banned, as in the Soviet days. The Russian elites are reluctant to
jeopardise their good life. The Russian military just recently began
its modernisation and is not keen to fight yet, perhaps not for
another ten years. But if they feel cornered, if NATO moves into
Eastern Ukraine, they will fight all the same.
Some
Russian politicians and observers believe that Ukraine is a basket
case; its problems would be too expensive to fix. This assessment has
a ‘sour grapes’ aftertaste, but it is widespread. An interesting
new voice on the web, The Saker, promotes
this view.
“Let the EU and the US provide for the Ukrainians, they will come
back to Mother Russia when hungry”, he says. The problem is, they
will not be allowed to reconsider. The junta did not seize power
violently in order to lose it at the ballot box.
Besides,
Ukraine is not in such bad shape as some people claim. Yes, it would
cost trillions to turn it into a Germany or France, but that's not
necessary. Ukraine can reach the Russian level of development very
quickly –- in union with Russia. Under the EC-IMF-NATO, Ukraine
will become a basket case, if it's not already. The same is true for
all East European ex-Soviet states: they can modestly prosper with
Russia, as Belarus and Finland do, or suffer depopulation,
unemployment, poverty with Europe and NATO and against Russia, vide
Latvia, Hungary, Moldova, Georgia. It is in Ukrainian interests to
join Russia in some framework; Ukrainians understand that; for this
reason they will not be allowed to have democratic
elections.
Simmering Novorossia has a potential to change
the game. If Russian troops don't come in, Novorossian rebels may
beat off the Kiev offensive and embark on a counter-offensive to
regain the whole of the country, despite Putin’s pacifying
entreaties. Then, in a full-blown civil war, the Ukraine will hammer
out its destiny.
On a personal level, Putin faces a hard
choice. Russian nationalists will not forgive him if he surrenders
Ukraine without a fight. The US and EU threaten the very life of the
Russian president, as their sanctions are hurting Putin’s close
associates, encouraging them to get rid of or even assassinate the
President and improve their relations with the mighty West. War may
come at any time, as it came twice during the last century – though
Russia tried to avoid it both times. Putin wants to postpone it, at
the very least, but not at any price.
His is not an easy
choice. As Russia procrastinates, as the US doubles the risks, the
world draws nearer to the nuclear abyss. Who will chicken
out?
No comments:
Post a Comment
Note: only a member of this blog may post a comment.