Last
month this article by blogger, John Michael Greer which, without
naming him,offered a criticism of Guy McPherson and called the
conclusions reached that humanity is likely headed for near-term
extinction (NTE) a 'fantasy'. Without ever once addressing the
science that has led to such a conclusion and extrapolating from
previous 'failed prophecies' he assserts that this is just one more
'fantasy'.
One
indication to me was this line: "Rather than debating another
round of cherrypicked factoids, I suggest it's time to address the
narrative itself"
I
have been engaged by people with a similar sort of logic before. It
is a hugely frustrating experience because you cannot argue over the
facts. Perhaps it's a case of "don't let the facts get in the
way of a good argument.
Here
is the article with just one rebuttal. I suggest reading the
originals for all the letters that accompany them.
Make
up your own mind.
The
Pleasures of Extinction
John
Michael Greer
26
January, 2013
One
of the wry pleasures that’s repeatedly come my way since the
beginning of this blog seven years ago is that of watching a good
many of my predictions come true in short order. Now it’s true that
I’ve also made a certain number of failed predictions over that
time. Back in 2007 and 2008, for instance, I insisted that the US
government wouldn’t be dumb enough to try to cover its ballooning
budget deficits by spinning the printing presses; some idiocies, I
thought, were too extreme even for the inmates of the current
American political class. As th Fed proceeds merrily through yet
another round of quantitative easing, that assumption has proved to
be rather too naive.
Even
so, my batting average so far has been pretty respectable. In the
early days of this blog, for example, Daniel Yergin was insisting at
the top of his lungs that the price of oil would settle down shortly
to a long-term plateau of $38 a barrel, while fans of a dozen
different alternative technologies were claiming just as stridently
that if the price of oil ever got to the unthinkable level of $60 a
barrel, the technology they favored would be profitable enough to
sweep all before it. There were very few of us back then who
predicted that oil would go quite a bit past $60 a barrel and stay
there, and even fewer who pointed out that abundant cheap fossil fuel
energy made alternatives look much more viable than they were. These
days, with oil wobbling around $100 a barrel and most of the
alternatives still wholly dependent on government subsidies, that
turned out to be tolerably prescient.
Over
the last few weeks, another of my predictions has turned out spot on
the money. A little less than six months ago, as New Age bookstores
around the world were quietly emptying entire bookshelves dedicated
to December 21, 2012 and putting 50%-off stickers on the contents, I
noted in a blog post here that it wouldn’t be long before people
who were looking for an excuse to put off doing anything about the
crisis of industrial society would have a replacement for 2012.
Well,
it’s here. The latest apocalyptic fad is near-term human
extinction, or NTE for short: the claim that humanity, along with
most other life on Earth, will inevitably be extinct by 2030 at the
latest.
It’s
probably necessary to say up front that humanity will certainly go
extinct eventually—no species lasts forever—and there’s always
the chance that it could happen in short order; a stray asteroid with
enough mass, or a few rearranged codons in some virus nobody’s
heard about yet, could do the job quite readily. Still, there’s a
great difference between claiming that human extinction is possible
and insisting that it’s certainly going to happen in the next
seventeen years, especially when the arguments used to defend that
claim amount to nothing more than an insistence that worst-case
scenarios are the only possible outcome.
There’s
a tolerably long history to such claims. When I was growing up in the
1970s, there were people on the far end of the environmental movement
who insisted that humanity would certainly be extinct before the year
2000, and the same prediction has been repeated with different dates
and justifications ever since. Those of my readers who remember the
Solar Temple mass suicides of 1994 and 1995 may recall that the
collective suicide note left behind by the members of that ill-fated
order made exactly that claim: Earth would be uninhabitable by the
year 2000, Solar Temple founder Luc Jouret insisted, and so the
initiates of the Solar Temple were getting out while the getting was
good.
In
the early days of the peak oil movement, similarly, the same
insistence on imminent extinction popped up tolerably often. I was
convinced at the time, and remain convinced today, that this was
largely a product of an odd and very American habit I’ve termed
"apocalypse machismo." One consequence of America’s
pervasive anti-intellectualism, with its frankly weird equation of
manhood with chest-thumping brainlessness, is that many male American
intellectuals end up burdened by doubts about their own masculinity,
and some of them respond by trying to talk as tough as possible;
intellectual women in this male-dominated culture find they often
have to copy that same habit, sometimes to even greater extremes, in
order to get taken seriously at all. This has been a major factor
all through America’s recent history; the neoconservative movement,
packed as it was with academic intellectuals whose obsession with
proving their own virility on a global stage drove them into one
foreign policy fiasco after another, makes as good a poster child as
any.
In
the same way, we had a lot of apocalypse machismo in the early peak
oil movement. In the first few years of this blog, for that matter,
I could count on fielding (and deleting) a comment every month or two
from somebody who wanted to talk about the new scenario for imminent
human extinction he’d just worked up. The Deepwater Horizon blowout
and the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear meltdown fielded a bumper crop of
the same thing; those of my readers who doubt this are invited to go
digging back through the archives of any unmoderated peak oil forum,
where they’ll find, in the days and weeks immediately following
each of these disasters, colorful if implausible scenarios predicting
the imminent demise of all life on earth presented as sober fact.
No
doubt there’s at least some of that at work in the sudden surge of
interest in near-term human extinction, but I question whether it’s
the main driving force this time around. There are at least two other
factors that are likely to be involved, and one of them unfolds
directly from the points made in the last few posts in the current
sequence.
The
shape of time sketched out by Augustine of Hippo in the pages of The
City of God, and adopted thereafter by most of the western world
until the rise of the later mythology of perpetual progress, allows a
range of variations. Even within the mainstream of western
Christianity, the options extend over a much broader landscape than
most of my readers may realize, and the versions of the Augustinian
mythos found outside the Christian mainstream are even more diverse.
In his useful 1998 book Millennium Rage, sociologist Philip Lamy
argued that most beliefs about the future in today’s America are
"fractured apocalypses," in which the events foretold in
the Book of Revelation are pulled out of context and rearranged in
response to contemporary social trends.
His
insight can be applied a good deal more generally: the whole
Augustinian story has been subjected to similar treatment. Eden, the
Fall, the vale of tears, the righteous remnant, the redeeming
revelation, the rising struggle between good and evil, the final
catastrophe and the return to paradise thereafter—you’ll find
these, or most of these, in a great many current belief systems, but
the order and relative importance of each element may vary, and it’s
far from uncommon for one or two of the classic themes of the story
to be stretched nearly out of recognition, or deleted entirely.
One
detail that often comes in for serious reworking in modern social
movements is the final step, the one in which the elect are welcomed
back into paradise while everyone else is herded into the lake of
fire to be punished for all eternity. The habit of morphological
thinking discussed earlier in this sequence of posts is of crucial
importance here: take a close look at the development over time of
social movements that embrace the Augustinian narrative, and the
historical shifts in that last part of the story have a fascinating
message to communicate.
The
wave of Christian fundamentalism that’s currently breaking and
flowing back out to sea makes a good case in point. Back in the days
of the Jesus People and the Good News Bible, when that wave first
began building, its rhetoric was triumphant: the whole nation was
turning to Christ, the rest of the world would surely follow, and the
imminent Second Coming would see everyone but a few stubborn sinners
rushing forward joyfully to embrace God’s infinite love. Fast
forward a couple of decades, and the proportion between the saved and
the damned shifted significantly closer to the sort of thing you’d
hear in an old-fashioned hellfire-and-brimstone sermon, but the saved
were still utterly convinced of their own salvation: those were the
days when "In Case Of Rapture, This Car Will Be Unoccupied"
bumper stickers sprouted on the rear ends of cars all over America.
You
won’t see too many of those bumper stickers these days. Just as the
optimistic faith that a new generation could win the world for Christ
gave way gradually to the far more pessimistic vision of a world
mired in wickedness from which the elect would shortly be teleported
to safety—beamed up by St. Scotty, as the joke had it, to the
bridge of the USS Enterchrist—so the serene confidence on the part
of believers that they would be numbered among the elect has been
replaced, in these latter days of the movement, by an increasingly
pervasive sense of sin and unworthiness. Too many dates for the
Rapture have come and gone, too many once-respected preachers have
been caught with their pants around their ankles in one sense or
another, and the well-founded suspicion that the Republican party is
using the evangelical churches every bit as cynically and shamelessly
as the Democratic party is using the environmental movement has got
to weigh on a lot of once-hopeful minds.
Christian
theology places hard limits on just how far the exclusion from future
blessedness can extend, as there has to be "a great multitude,
which no man could number" (Revelations 7:9) of the saved
gathered around the throne of God when the boom comes down. Outside
Christianity, the same process routinely goes much further. A good
example is the New Age movement, which emerged out of a variety of
older fringe spiritualities right around the same time that the
current round of Christian fundamentalism got going in America. The
early days of the New Age movement were pervaded by the same
optimistic sense that a new and more enlightened epoch was about to
dawn, and everyone—even, or especially, those who made fun of the
movement’s pretensions—would soon fall in line.
As
the movement matured and the New Age stubbornly refused to arrive, in
turn, the same mood shift that affected fundamentalism had a
comparable impact; New Age teachers began to talk more about the
ascension of enlightened individuals into higher planes of being, the
activities of evil powers who were maintaining the illusion of a
world of limits, and the imminence of a world-cleansing cataclysm
that would finally get around to ushering in the New Age. By the time
the hoopla began building over 2012, finally, the prophecies trotted
out in advance of that much-ballyhooed nonevent ranged all over the
map; there were still optimists of the old school, who insisted that
a great shift in consciousness would make everyone get around to
agreeing with them; there were many more who expected mass death to
leave the world purified for the usual minority of the elect; and
there were no small number who were retailing scenarios in which the
entire human race would be exterminated.
This
is a familiar rhythm in the history of American popular spirituality.
At regular intervals, some movement that’s existed out on the
fringes for decades suddenly gets a mass following, turns into a pop
culture phenomenon, and has thirty to forty years of popularity
before it returns to the fringes. Some traditions repeat the process;
Christian fundamentalism has had two periods of pop stardom—once
between the Roaring Nineties and the Great Depression, and then again
from the late 1970s to the present—and a strong case could be made
that the New Age movement is a rehash of the vogue for occultism that
was so huge a part of American pop culture between 1890 and 1929.
Other movements fill the void when the ones just named head for the
fringes; from the 1930s to the 1970s, liberal Christian churches were
a dominant force in American religion, and there’s some reason to
think that the pendulum is headed the same way again as
fundamentalism sunsets out a second time.
If
human beings were rational actors, as economists like to imagine,
they wouldn’t respond to the disconfirmation of their beliefs by
postulating world-wrecking catastrophes. Here as elsewhere, though,
the fond fantasies of economists stand up poorly as models for
predicting events in the real world. If you haven’t had the
experience of devoting decades of your life to a failed belief
system, dear reader, try to put yourself into such a person’s
shoes. It would take a degree of equanimity rare even among saints
to look back on such an experience without harvesting a bumper crop
of resentment, grief and guilt—and if fantasies of apocalyptic
destruction play any role at all in your belief system, one way to
deal with those difficult emotions in their first and rawest forms is
to pour them into a belief in some cataclysm big enough to punish the
world and everyone in it for their failure to live up to your hopes.
The
environmental movement is not a religion, but its course in America
in recent decades followed the pattern I’ve just outlined. Like
fundamentalism and the New Age movement, it came in from the fringe
in the 1970s with the same sense of imminent triumph that guided the
other movements I’ve named. Its transformation from a charismatic
movement of outsiders to a set of bureaucratic institutions closely
intertwined with the existing order of society followed the same
trajectory as fundamentalist churches, and its sense of triumphant
expectancy faded out at roughly the same pace, replaced by the same
struggle against evil that brought fundamentalist Christians into
their devil’s pact with the GOP and inspired New Age believers to
embrace conspiracy theories and the paranoid fantasies of David Icke.
At
this point, roughly in parallel with fundamentalism and the New Age,
the environmental movement is having to come face to face with the
total failure of its hopes. Back in the heady days of its early
successes, the vision that guided it saw environmental protection as
the next step forward in the same trajectory of social progress that
included the civil rights movement and second wave feminism; it was
in this spirit, for example, that environmental lawyers proposed that
trees be given legal standing. The hope all along was that industrial
civilization could achieve a permanent peace with the world of nature
and continue up the infinite road of progress without leaving a
scorched and looted planet in its wake.
That
hope is dead. If there was ever a chance to achieve it, it went
whistling down the wind decades ago, and at this point the jaws of
resource depletion and environmental degradation are tightening
around the collective throat of the world’s industrial societies,
in exactly the fashion predicted in detail forty years ago in the
pages of The Limits to Growth. Even if the green technologies
promoted by an increasingly frantic minority of environmentalists
could support something like today’s rates of energy use, which
they can’t, we can no longer afford the sort of massive buildout of
those technologies that would be necessary to supplant even a
significant part of our current fossil fuel consumption. If what’s
left of the environmental movement managed to overcome its own
internal dysfunctions and the formidable opposition of its foes, and
became a mass movement again, the most it could accomplish at this
point would be the protection of some of the most vulnerable
ecosystems as industrial society stumbles down the first bitter steps
of the long descent into the deindustrial future.
That’s
still a goal worth achieving, but it’s not the goal to which the
environmental mainstream committed itself when it embraced a role
among the socially acceptable institutions of American public life,
with the perks and salaries that this status involves. This
explains, I suggest, the way that certain mainstream
environmentalists have turned to proselytizing for nuclear power and
other frankly ecocidal technologies, under the curious delusion that
"possibly a little better than the worst" somehow amounts
to "good." The desperation in such rhetoric is palpable,
and signals the end of the road—an end that, in this case as in the
others I’ve cited, involves a good many fantasies of total
destruction.
Still,
there’s another factor here, and it unfolds from one of the least
creditable aspects of the way that the environmental movement has
evolved over time. It has become increasingly clear that the perks,
the salaries, and the comfortable middle class lifestyles embraced so
enthusiastically by so many people in the movement are themselves
part of the problem. I was intrigued to read earlier this month a
thoughtful essay by leading British climate scientist Kevin Anderson
arguing, in terms that will sound very familiar to regular readers of
The Archdruid Report, that the failure of climate change activism to
make any headway in changing people’s behavior may have more than a
little to do with the fact that the people who are urging such
changes aren’t making them themselves.
I
have no reason to think that Anderson reads my blog or, for that
matter, knows me from Hu Gadarn’s off ox, but then you don’t need
to wear an archdruid’s funny hat to notice that people these days
are acutely sensitive to signs of hypocrisy, or to grasp that even
the most vital changes aren’t going to happen if even the people
who are most aware of their importance aren’t willing to start
making them in their own lives. For reasons a post last year
discussed at some length, those who have built their lives on the
fantasy that it’s possible to have their planet and eat it too are
not going to find such reflections welcome, or even bearable.
Fantasies
of imminent human extinction are one comforting if futile response to
this ugly predicament. If you want a justification for living as
though there’s no tomorrow, insisting that in fact, there’s no
tomorrow is certainly one option. If I’m right, the pleasures of
believing in near-term human extinction are likely to appeal to a
very large and well-heeled audience in the years immediately ahead,
and those of my readers interested in cashing in on the next
2012-style bonanza should probably take note.
John
Michael Greer’s Cognitive Dissonance on Near-Term Extinction
18 May, 2013
I
saw yesterday that peak oil historian John Michael Greer weighed in
on the current debate over NTE or near-term extinction for humanity.
After reading his post The Pleasures of Extinction, I was quite
disappointed in his outright dismissal of the possibility of NTE in
the face of recent unprecedented climatic changes. His post does not
address any of the scientifically backed findings which, with
business-as-usual, point to an uninhabitable future for mankind, let
alone most other flora and fauna. Indeed, the predictions of the IPCC
have been proven to be much too conservative and do not take into
account known positive feedback loops. As they say on Wall Street,
past performance does not necessarily predict future results. Even if
all human-generated CO2 ceased today, we have a future of
environmental catastrophe awaiting us with what has already been
pumped into the atmosphere. Referring to NTE as “apocalypse
machismo”, Greer paints it as some sort of passing cultural fad in
keeping with other doomsday scenarios our culture has popularized,
such as the Mayan Prophecy of 2012 or the Rapture of Christian
Fundamentalists. He also lumps NTE in with the suicide pacts of
lunatic-fringe cult groups:
…Those
of my readers who remember the Solar Temple mass suicides of 1994 and
1995 may recall that the collective suicide note left behind by the
members of that ill-fated order made exactly that claim: Earth would
be uninhabitable by the year 2000, Solar Temple founder Luc Jouret
insisted, and so the initiates of the Solar Temple were getting out
while the getting was good.
After
reading through the numerous comments on Greer’s post, I found
several people who had the same incredulous reaction I did:
And
this one…
Here
was Greer’s response to the above comment by Andrea:
WTF?
The science is not the essence of the argument??? I suppose we could
say the same for Peak Oil, Ocean Acidification, The 6th Mass
Extinction, The Global Die-Off of Forests, etc. They are all part of
the doomsday narrative that people are pushing with no science
backing up the essence of their argument. Must be a global conspiracy
created by some shadowy network of armageddonists.
Besides
the cultural obsession with doomsaying which Greer describes in his
essay, what reason does he give for why people are pushing such
disturbing arguments? Well, he answers that in his comments section:
Mr.
Greer, aren’t you a part of this apocalypse lobby? And is Peak Oil
the only reality you subscribe to?




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