FSA
to al-Qaeda: Killing of Syria rebel official ‘declaration of war’
The
rebel Free Syrian Army (FSA) said the killing of Kamal al-Hamami, an
FSA official, by members of the al-Qaeda-linked Islamic State of Iraq
and the Levant was a “declaration of war.”
14
July, 2013
Hamami,
also known as Abu Baseer al-Ladkani – was a member of the FSA’s
Supreme Military Council. He was meeting with members of the Islamic
State of Iraq and the Levant in the Syrian port city of Latakia on
Friday when they killed him, Reuters quoted FSA spokesman Qassem
Saadeddine as saying.
In
an interview with Al Arabiya, FSA spokesman Louay Almokdad said the
Syrian armed opposition’s demand that Hamami’s killers be handed
over to the FSA was “a rightful request.”
“A
criminal named Abu Ayman al-Baghdadi killed an FSA official in cold
blood using his personal gun and in front of eye witnesses that
include FSA leaders,” Almokdad said. “We do not threaten, we do
not warn and we do not instigate battles with anyone. This murderer
must be handed over to a just and fair judiciary, so justice can run
its course.”
Almokdad
also said that the FSA was still not informed as to why Hamami was
killed.
“We
are waiting to know the reason why he was killed. It’s been 48
hours now and no clarification has been issued yet,” he told Al
Arabiya. “Hamami was killed whilst discovering a Syrian regime
position in order to carry out a military operation,” Almokdad
said.
“Hamami’s
murderers [served] the interest of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Those
who murdered Hamami must explain why they did it, otherwise, let them
announce that they work with Bashar al-Assad.”
Almokdad
also commented on the relation between the FSA and al-Qaeda-linked
groups.
“What
is currently happening is not tension between the FSA and al-Qaeda
groups, because there wasn’t a relation in the first place. They
consider us infidels and they [instructed] Abu Baseer’s companion
to tell us: “we will kill you all.’”
Divisions
within the Syrian “Opposition”? The FSA and the Supreme Military
Council Support Al Qaeda Terrorists
13
July, 2013
Recent
reports within mainstream media are pushing the theory that divisions
are forming within the various camps of opposition militants in
Syria, while also making attempts to highlight the disparity between
the supposed “moderate” rebel forces of the “FSA” – which
does not exist beyond a small
cadre of defectors with no autonomy inside Syria – and the Al Qaeda
affiliated militia of Jabhat al Nusra, (JaN) or the Islamic state of
Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), while also whitewashing the presence of the
larger Salafist brigades that fight alongside them, predominantly
Ahrar al-Sham (SIF).
To
comprehend these alleged divisions, it is fundamental to understand
what exactly the “FSA”, or “Supreme Military Council”
consists of. In short, these Western-backed outfits and the
oft-referenced “spokesmen” that carry them hold no value inside
Syria, or any amount of authority among the plethora of militia
fighting on the ground. This has been the case since day one of the
Syrian crisis. The “FSA” was a retroactive PR stunt implemented
by the West and the GCC to uphold a facade of “moderation”, and
bolster the false image of militants fighting for “freedom and
democracy”. In reality, the FSA represents a branding exercise;
enabling foreign powers to rally behind disparate groups of militants
– often led by extremists – to undertake their desired use and
mask the true identity of what are, by western legal standards,
“terrorists”.
When
the media refer to the “FSA”, at best it is lazy journalism, at
worst it is disingenuous and designed to mislead the reader –
otherwise known as propaganda. Yet the “FSA”, or “SMC” seem
to have a new lease of life within the media. Furthermore, General
Salim Idriss has been at the forefront of recent media campaigns to
persuade foreign powers to increase military aid to the rebels
(including a
photo-op with
renowned peace advocate John McCain); rebels that Idriss, nor any
other commander in the “SMC” or “FSA” have any control over.
I posited
the theory in early May
that the US and its GCC partners (now minus the deposed Qatari Emir)
were attempting to marginalize the very militants they fomented,
sponsored and armed in order to build a new “moderate” force
under their control that is agreeable to the public, and the many
European and American Parliamentarians and Congressman that have
expressed concern about the “rising” influence of radicals among
the militants they are indirectly supporting.
Recent
attempts to purport divisions could be construed as part of this
“re-branding” policy. In a Reuters
report
titled “New front opens in Syria as rebels say Al Qaeda attack
means war” we learn that a “Commander” from the Supreme
Military Council was assassinated by ISIS’ Emir: Sheikh Abu Bakr
al-Baghdadi. Whether this is even true remains to be seen; several
prominent analysts have cast doubt on the report, claiming it may be
a psy-op on the FSA’s behalf; presumably in order to marginalize
Baghdadi and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham militants that
follow him.
These
artificial divisions bear hallmarks to recent reports and recent
analysis covering the supposed “split” between the Syrian wing of
Al Qaeda, otherwise known as Jabhat al Nusra (JaN), and the Iraqi
wing of Al Qaeda, otherwise known as the Islamic state of Iraq (ISI).
When Baghdadi, the Emir of ISI retroactively
announced the “merger”
of these groups and declared the militia should now be addressed as
the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham, a spat broke out between him
and Jabhat al-Nusra Emir Abu Mohammed al-Jolani. The following
analysis and reports covering the dispute were blown out of all
proportion and have continued in this vain ever since. Again, actual
divisions on the ground between ISI and JaN were minimal and did not
affect either tactical, nor ideological cooperation and kinship.
ISI
and JaN are one and the same, in both a tactical and ideological
sense, there are slight differences in their outlook for a possible
future Syria, but crucially, both the tactical relationship and core
ideologies remain untouched and unified. Furthermore, JaN was
concieved through ISI funding and logistic cooperation. Journalists
and analysts suggesting these groups are separate do not understand
their mutual ideology, or they are being purposefully misleading to
suit an agenda – that agenda seems to be to highlight ISI as the
“bad rebels”, this could be to allow space for the “good
rebels” under JaN’s leadership – which are predominantly led by
Syrians and not foreigners, therefore more likely to win “hearts
and minds” – to join the “moderate” brigades under the SMC
command.
The
first paragraph of the Reuters report fulfills the false narrative
that the “FSA” represents a larger force than that of
“Islamists”: (NB: Reuters lazy wording not mine.)
Rivalries
have been growing between the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and the
Islamists, whose smaller but more effective forces control most of
the rebel-held parts of northern Syria more than two years after
pro-democracy protests became an uprising.
One
has to wonder how the supposed “Islamists” which, according to
Reuters are a smaller force than the “FSA” can possibly hold more
territory than the Western-backed moderates. Again, Reuters is
pushing a false narrative upon its readers to uphold the image that
the majority of “rebels” fighting inside Syria are moderate
secularists under the command of the “FSA”, or “Supreme
Military Council”. The truth of the matter has always been that
Jabhat al Nusra – who are one and the same as Al Qaeda in Iraq with
slightly different outlooks for their respective homelands – along
with the more populist, and larger in number Salafi militia, such as
Ahrar al-Sham, who operate under the umbrella group the Syrian
Islamic Front (SIF), represent the vast majority of opposition
fighters in Syria. These groups have close links, and it is likely
that fighters often interchange depending on expertise, experience
and geographical requirements. Since the onset they have cooperated
closely with logistics and paramilitary operations.
Supposed
“secular” opposition forces in Syria simply do not exist; under
the “FSA” command or anywhere else. There are many smaller groups
that espouse an inclusive, and indeed, moderate outlook for a future
Syria. These groups have in the majority been rampant with
criminality, infighting, and a lack of funds. Leaving disillusioned
fighters with the option of joining the better organised and funded
Salafi brigades; which have consistently received
funding and arms from both state and non-state actors in the Gulf.
The
“FSA” commander quoted in the Reuters piece claims: “we are
going to wipe the floor with them”. Presumably this is aimed at
Baghdadi and his fellow ideologues, or as Reuters labels them:
“Islamists”. Again, we are supposed to buy the theory that the
FSA is in a position to strike anyone militarily inside Syria – let
alone a commander of one of the strongest opposition groups
operating. At this moment in time, the “FSA” as a fighting force
could possibly be at its weakest since its artificial inception.
Recent reports have suggested there are up to 6,000 foreign militants
fighting against the government in Syria. It is likely that the vast
majority of foreigners have joined the more radical outfits such as
ISIS, for the same reasons as mentioned above, but can also be
explained by the public sectarian tone being applied to the conflict,
and calls to the regions Sunni community to engage in “Holy War”
against the Syrian state from influential clerics such as Yusuf
Qaradawi.
Recent
political developments also shed light on the “re-branding” of
the Syrian opposition. The Emir of Qatar’s unexpected departure
from the throne – to be replaced by his son – may have been an
indicator as to
Qatar’s failures in leading the Syrian insurgency.
It is common knowledge that Saudi Arabia have been given the “Syria
File”. A fact that is portrayed with no irony by western analysts;
who manage to conveniently whitewash exactly which state actor is
delegating the “files” – could it be “Mother”?
This
handing over of the baton was solidified with the departure of SNC
Prime Minister Ghassan Hitto – a Muslim Brotherhood member chosen
by Qatar in attempts to consolidate the Muslim Brotherhood’s hold
on the SNC. Hitto was replaced by Ahmed
al-Jarba,
an influential tribal figure with close links to the Saudi Monarchy.
Reports
on the ground in Syria have also suggested that the rebels weapons
flow – including such basics as ammunition – have come to an
almost standstill. And several rebel commanders have relayed
their frustration at the lack of promised US weapons.
Recent developments in the US Congress have also given Obama the
back-door he was looking for, at least to buy himself more time until
a more suitable fighting force is able to undertake the task at hand
– if such force ever
materializes. Direct US arms supplies – or, to be precise; the
official funding for arms supplies – have been blocked by Congress
until the administration can determine exactly which rebel groups it
intends to arm, and what exactly the administration intends to
achieve from what seem to be futile efforts to validate the now
almost two-year covert policy of arming the rebels, and achieving
nothing but bloodshed and destruction – of course, it would be
ridiculous to suggest that was the plan?
US allies in the region will undoubtedly be working under their own
terms with regard to their destructive policies in Syria, to some
extent.
Contrary
to the Saud monarchies renewed efforts to wrest control of the
insurgency; recent developments on the ground, along with Russia’s
steadfast support and mass public opinion against supporting the
extremist dominated rebels; the Syrian Army have kept the insurgency
at bay whilst they choose their strategic victories. Homs
is about to become the latest “rebel stronghold” to fall, as
rebels announced this morning another “tactical retreat”.
One
imagines the rebel
siege being laid upon 2 million civilians
– a war-crime that Western “diplomats” seem reluctant to
“intervene” on, or indeed make any mention of - in
government controlled Western Aleppo will be the Syrian military’s
next priority. The Saudis through their new puppet al-Jarba have
promised a huge influx of “game-changing” weapons, but without a
massive influx of military hardware, and indeed, trained fighters to
use them, it appears the trajectory of the conflict will remain in
the Syrian military’s favour. What the various actors supporting
the insurgency are willing to do to change that trajectory in the
short-term, if anything substantial, remains to be seen. There are at
least three interested and powerful parties whose objectives can be
served by allowing the Syrian conflict to drag on for years to come;
yet none of them necessarily want to see Assad fall.
Phil
Greaves
is a UK based writer/analyst, focusing on UK/US Foreign Policy and
conflict analysis in the Middle East post WWII.
http://notthemsmdotcom.wordpress.com
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