Putin
and Trump’s Unagreed Agreement – a Catastrophe for Europe
By
Rostislav Ishchenko
Translated by Ollie Richardson and Angelina Siardcross posted with http://www.stalkerzone.org/rostislav-ishchenko-putin-and-trumps-unagreed-agreement-a-catastrophe-for-europe/
source: https://ukraina.ru/exclusive/20180717/1020630485.html
18
July, 2018
Contradictions
between Russia and the US are so substantial and common ground is so
small that the vast majority of experts, recognising the importance
of the fact of the meeting in Helsinki itself, nevertheless stressed
that one shouldn’t expect some breakthrough in bilateral relations
or at least reaching an agreement on one minor question…
Washington
and Moscow have no minor questions and, taking into account the
global level of the standoff, even such unnecessary and burdensome
things for the US as Ukraine (which there is a need to first of all
relinquish), can’t be handed over by Trump without any conditions
(or at least not yet). This is an asset, even if it is garbage, and
it is necessary to sell it, even cheaply. At least, Washington isn’t
yet ready to throw Kiev into the political garbage heap, having
recognised that in 2014 they mistakenly acquired rotten goods.
So,
we have a situation where both parties even prior to negotiations
knew that they wouldn’t be able to come to some arrangement, and
they didn’t even prepare for such a thing (it wasn’t planned to
sign anything following the results of negotiations). At the same
time both parties needed the event to be successful. Trump obviously
blackmails the European Union with a possible agreement with Russia.
But Putin also needs to show Europe that there are other fish in the
sea besides them. The Europeans, who were already abandoned by the
US, have been turning towards Russia for too long and with
uncertainty. Moreover, they constantly send signals to Washington
about their readiness to more or less preserve their rigid
anti-Russian position (in things that don’t concern the gas supply)
if Trump stops“undermining
transatlantic solidarity”.
The
position of Europe is clear. It isn’t a coincidence that Trump,
while enumerating the enemies of the US (the EU, China, and Russia)
made it clear that he considers Russia to be the smaller problem,
because there are practically no economic contradictions (“Nord
Stream-2” doesn’t
count) with it. It’s not China, with which the US has the biggest
negative trade balance, but the EU, which Trump fairly defined as the
main trade competitor receiving unjustified economic benefits from
political agreements with the US, that is the main enemy of the US.
In
these conditions, America hypothetically resolving its
military-political contradictions with Russia reduced the value of
the EU as an ally for Washington to zero. In this case Trump, who
already threatened European leaders, could indeed end all
military-political and economic agreements with Europe, which, in
turn, would be fraught with a political and economic catastrophe for
the European Union.
Neither
the Russian nor the Chinese market can simultaneously consume in one
fell swoop the entire volume of the EU’s export to the US. On the
contrary, both Beijing and Moscow carry out profitable trade with the
European Union. In this direction the EU covered its deficit thanks
to making profit from trade with the US. Europe used (and hoped to
continue to use it) its role of a springboard for the fight against
Russia as an argument that was supposed to keep Trump away from
making the last step (complete separation with the EU). In recent
days, Merkel, after the NATO summit, started talking literally with
Poroshenko’s words, declaring that Trump’s pretensions to Europe
concerning the insufficient financial contribution to NATO aren’t
justified, because Europe battles with Russia for the interests of
the US.
For
the EU it was crucial that this argument continued to work.
Otherwise, Washington indeed would have more common ground with
Moscow than with Brussels. And Europe isn’t ready for a sharp
confrontation with the US. Having rested on its laurels, it wasn’t
engaged (in difference, for example, from China) in the
diversification of economic ties and appeared to be strongly
dependent on access to the American market.
Without
having risked to be ahead Trump in the question of normalising
relations with Russia, EU leaders were fatally afraid that Trump and
Putin, despite all difficulties, will do the impossible and reach an
agreement, especially as both proved to be people who are ready to
instantly make decisions that change the destiny of the world.
The
position taken by the EU raised the value of the summit for Russia
too. Concerning relations with the US, Moscow can wait until
Washington is ready for reconciliation on its conditions. But, taking
into account the obvious intention of Europe to manoeuvre between
Russia and the US, trying to preserve the geopolitical configuration
that is profitable for itself, but doesn’t suit either Trump nor
Putin, Russia was also interested in showing to the whole world the
success of the summit and good prospects for achieving definitive and
comprehensive agreements.
And
it is indeed this task that was the most difficult problem for both
parties. Think about it. You know that you can’t reach an
agreement. You also know that the whole world is afraid of your
agreement, because playing on your contradictions helped many
countries to rise, become stronger, and start laying down claims for
the first roles. A Russian-American agreement would’ve immediately
cancelled out half (if not more) these achievements. You know that
everybody knows that you can’t reach an agreement, and everyone
closely watches the results of your meeting.
It
is possible to try to dupe observers and to present some communiqué
that means nothing as an agreement. Hundreds, if not thousands of
journalists and “experts” from
hot-air shows would be deceived. They, in turn, would deceive
millions of readers and viewers. But this will give nothing.
Professional politicians and diplomats can’t be caught on chaff.
They will immediately understand that you achieve anything and that
you are simply trying to hide this failure, and will start to act in
the corresponding manner. The opinion of “ochlos“ in
this case doesn’t play a role — international politics isn’t
elections, decisions aren’t made by universal suffrage and are
never transparent.
Trump
and Putin were faced with the task of holding the meeting in such a
way that nobody would be deceived concerning its results, but
nevertheless selling to the world the absence of any decisions as a
serious success. And this is what they did.
Just
the phrase of Putin that he at first was sceptical about the meeting
giving any result, but conversation was very promising and there is
sense in having further regular meetings, is worth a lot by itself.
Approximately the same assessment, only in other expressions, sounded
from Trump’s lips.
For
Europe this is a catastrophe. It means that in the near future
Washington has to avoid strengthening the confrontation with Russia,
because dialogue with it started to be outlined with the possibility
of arriving at some agreements. What was so constructive about
what Trump offered to Putin that made the Russian president sharply
raise his assessment of the productivity of the meeting, nobody
knows. But Europeans know the American tradition – brought to
perfection by Trump – of solving their problems at the expense of
former allies when their services become unneeded. And they are
afraid and try to guess who (or what) Washington decided to sacrifice
this time.
The
absolute predictability of the results of the meeting played a mean
trick on European politicians. They very much got used to a
two-dimensional world where everything that isn’t a victory is a
defeat; they very much expected clashes between the personal
ambitions of Putin and Trump so much so that the elementary move –
documenting the contradictions, discussing the versions of decisions
proposed by the parties, and, without anticipating the result,
agreeing to hold further negotiations – turned out for them to be
an unpleasant surprise that is worse than if Trump had directly
recognised Crimea as Russian and withdrew the US from NATO in
Helsinki.
It
would be at least some certainty. It would be clear for them what to
do and how to react. And what to do in the circumstances? Where to
run: to Washington or to Moscow? To remain loyal to an old suzerain
or to try to adhere to a new one before the others do? How to solve
the contradictions inside the EU? And there are still a lot of
important questions that remain unanswered.
Moreover,
unlike Russia, Europe can’t wait. By meeting Putin, Trump brought
the US out of zugzwang, having handed over to the European Union the
right to make this same move, which only its worsens position.
After
all, according to the logic of how events developed that politicians
and diplomats have to obligatorily take into account, consultations
between Moscow and Washington must start for the purpose of arriving
at concrete agreements. They can fruitlessly last months and even
years, but can almost suddenly yield fruits.
If
the EU wants to remain in the game, then it must formulate its
position and its proposals before Moscow and Washington reach an
agreement. Otherwise an agreement will be reached at the expense of
the EU. In this case Europe won’t even be invited to the table,
similar to how Ukraine hasn’t been invited for more than a year,
and in passing, among really important problems, attempts were made
to parr it off onto each other to supplement real bonuses received in
other directions.
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