U.S. Negotiates Retreat From Afghanistan
30
July, 2018
The
United States seems ready to give up on Afghanistan.
After
the World Trade Center came down the U.S. accused al-Qaeda, parts of
which were hosted in Afghanistan. The Taliban government offered the
U.S. to extradite al-Qaeda chief Osama Bin Laden to an Islamic
country to be judged under Islamic law. The U.S. rejected that and
decided instead to destroy the Afghan government.
Taliban
units, supported by Pakistani officers, were at that time still
fighting against the Northern Alliance which held onto a few areas in
the north of the country. Under threats from the U.S. Pakistan, which
sees Afghanistan as its natural depth hinterland, was pressed into
service. In exchange for its cooperation with the U.S. operation it
was allowed to extradite its forces and main figures of the Taliban.
U.S.
special forces were dropped into north Afghanistan. They came with
huge amounts of cash and the ability to call in B-52 bombers.
Together with the Northern Alliance they move towards Kabul bombing
any place where some feeble resistance came from. The Taliban forces
dissolved. Many resettled in Pakistan. Al-Qaeda also vanished.
A
conference with Afghan notables was held in Germany's once capital
Bonn. The Afghans wanted to reestablish the former Kingdom but were
pressed into accepting a western style democracy. Fed with large
amounts of western money the norther warlords, all well known
mass-murderers, and various greedy exiles were appointed as a
government. To them it was all about money. There was little
capability and interest to govern.
All
these U.S. mistakes made in the early days are still haunting the
country.
For
a few years the Taliban went quiet. But continued U.S. operations,
which included random bombing of weddings, torture and abduction of
assumed al-Qaeda followers, alienated the people. Pakistan feared
that it would be suffocated between a permanently U.S. occupied
Afghanistan and a hostile India. Four years after being ousted the
Taliban were reactivated and found regrown local support.
Busy
with fighting an insurgency in Iraq the U.S. reacted slowly. It then
surged troops into Afghanistan, pulled back, surged again and is now
again pulling back. The U.S. military aptly demonstrated its
excellent logistic capabilities and its amazing cultural
incompetence. The longer it fought the more Afghan people stood up
against it. The immense amount of money spent to 'rebuild'
Afghanistan went
to U.S.
contractors and Afghan warlords but had little effect on the ground.
Now half the country is back under Taliban control while the other
half is more or less contested.
Before
his election campaign Donald Trump spoke
out against
the war on Afghanistan. During his campaign he was more cautious
pointing to the danger of a nuclear Pakistan as a reason for staying
in Afghanistan. But Pakistan is where the U.S. supply line is coming
through and there are no reasonable alternatives. Staying in
Afghanistan to confront Pakistan while depending on Pakistan for
logistics does not make sense.
Early
this year the U.S. stopped all aid to Pakistan. Even the old
Pakistani government was already talking about
blocking the logistic line. The incoming prime minister Imran Khan
has campaigned for years against the U.S. war on Afghanistan. He very
much prefers an alliance
with China over
any U.S. rapprochement. The U.S. hope is that Pakistan will have to
ask the IMF for another bailout and thus come back under Washington's
control. But it is more
likely that
Imran Khan will ask China for financial help.
Under
pressure from the military Trump had agreed to raise the force in
Afghanistan to some 15,000 troops. But these were way to few to hold
more than some urban areas. Eighty percent of the Afghan people live
in the countryside. Afghan troops and police forces are incapable or
unwilling to fight their Taliban brethren. It was obvious that this
mini-surge would
fail:
By most objective measures, President Donald Trump’s year-old strategy for ending the war in Afghanistan has produced few positive results.
Afghanistan’s beleaguered soldiers have failed to recapture significant new ground from the Taliban. Civilian deaths have hit historic highs. The Afghan military is struggling to build a reliable air force and expand the number of elite fighters. Efforts to cripple lucrative insurgent drug smuggling operations have fallen short of expectations. And U.S. intelligence officials say the president’s strategy has halted Taliban gains but not reversed their momentum, according to people familiar with the latest assessments.
To
blame Pakistan for its support for some Taliban is convenient, but
makes little sense. In a recent talk John
Sopko, the U.S. Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
(SIGAR), made a
crucial point:
“We keep referring to Pakistan as being the key problem. But the problem also was that the Afghan government at times was viewed very negatively by their local people and what you really need is to insert a government that the people support, a government that is not predatory, a government that is not a bunch of lawless warlords,” observed Sopko.
He went on to say that the U.S. policy of pouring in billions of dollars in these unstable environments contributed to the problem of creating more warlords and powerful people who took the law into their own hands.
“In essence, the government we introduced, particularly some of the Afghan local police forces, which were nothing other than warlord militias with some uniforms on, were just as bad as the terrorists before them,” said Sopko ...
This
was the problem from the very beginning. The U.S. bribed itself into
Afghanistan. It spent tons of money but did not gain real support. It
bombed and shot aimlessly at 'Taliban' that were more often than not
just the local population. It incompetently fought 17 one-year-long
wars instead of a consistently planned and sustained political,
economic and military campaign.
After
a year of another useless surge the Trump administration decided to
pull back from most active operations and to bet
on negotiations with the
Taliban:
The shift to prioritize initial American talks with the Taliban over what has proved a futile “Afghan-led, Afghan-owned” process stems from a realization by both Afghan and American officials that President Trump’s new Afghanistan strategy is not making a fundamental difference in rolling back Taliban gains.
While no date for any talks has been set, and the effort could still be derailed, the willingness of the United States to pursue direct talks is an indication of the sense of urgency in the administration to break the stalemate in Afghanistan.
...
Afghan officials and political leaders said direct American talks with the Taliban would probably then grow into negotiations that would include the Taliban, the Afghan government, the United States and Pakistan.
In
February the Taliban declared their position in a public Letter
of the Islamic Emirate to the American people (pdf).
The five pages letter offered talks but only towards one aim:
Afghans have continued to burn for the last four decades in the fire of imposed wars. They are longing for peace and a just system but they will never tire from their just cause of defending their creed, country and nation against the invading forces of your warmongering government because they have rendered all the previous and present historic sacrifices to safeguard their religious values and national sovereignty. If they make a deal on their sovereignty now, it would be unforgettable infidelity with their proud history and ancestors.
Last
weeks talks between the Taliban and U.S. diplomats took place in
Doha, Qatar. Remarkably the Afghan government was excluded. Despite
the rousing tone of the Reuters report
below the positions that were exchanged do
not point to
a successful conclusion:
According to one Taliban official, who said he was part of a four-member delegation, there were “very positive signals” from the meeting, which he said was conducted in a “friendly atmosphere” in a Doha hotel.
“You can’t call it peace talks,” he said. “These are a series of meetings for initiating formal and purposeful talks. We agreed to meet again soon and resolve the Afghan conflict through dialogue.”
...
The two sides had discussed proposals to allow the Taliban free movement in two provinces where they would not be attacked, an idea that President Ashraf Ghani has already rejected. They also discussed Taliban participation in the Afghan government.
“The only demand they made was to allow their military bases in Afghanistan,” said the Taliban official.
...
“We have held three meetings with the U.S. and we reached a conclusion to continue talks for meaningful negotiations,” said a second Taliban official.
...
“However, our delegation made it clear to them that peace can only be restored to Afghanistan when all foreign forces are withdrawn,” he said.
This
does not sound promising:
- In a first step the Taliban want to officially rule parts of the country and use it as a safe haven. The Afghan government naturally rejects that.
- Participation of the Taliban in the Afghan government is an idea of the Afghan president Ghani. It is doubtful that this could be successfully arranged. Norther Alliance elements in the Afghan government, like the 'chief executive' Abdullah Abdullah, are unlikely to ever agree to it. The Taliban also have no interest to be 'part of the government' and to then get blamed for its failures. Their February letter makes clear that they want to be the government.
- The U.S. wants bases in Afghanistan. The Taliban, and Pakistan behind them, reject that and will continue to do so.
It
is difficult to see how especially the last mutually exclusive
positions can ever be reconciled.
The
Taliban are ready to accept a peaceful retreat of the U.S. forces.
That is their only offer. They may agree to keep foreign Islamist
fighters out of their country. The U.S. has no choice but to accept.
It is currently retreating to the cities and large bases. The
outlying areas will fall to the Taliban. Sooner or later the U.S.
supply lines will be cut. Its bases will come under fire.
There
is no staying in Afghanistan. A retreat is the only issue the U.S.
can negotiate about. It is not a question of "if" but of
"when".
The
Soviet war in Afghanistan took nine years. The time was used to build
up a halfway competent government and army that managed to hold off
the insurgents for three more years after the Soviet withdrawal. The
government only fell when the Soviets cut the money line. The
seventeen year long U.S. occupation did not even succeed in that. The
Afghan army is corrupt and its leaders are incompetent. The U.S.
supplied it with expensive and complicate equipment that does
not fit Afghan needs.
As soon as the U.S. withdraws the whole south, the east and Kabul
will immediately fall back into Taliban hands. Only the north may
take a bit longer. They will probably ask China to help them in
developing their country.
The erratic
empire failed
in another of its crazy endeavors. That will not hinder it to look
for a new ones. The immense increase of
the U.S. military budget, which includes 15,000 more troops, points
to a new large war. Which country will be its next target?
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