Sunday, 1 May 2016

The demise of the petro-dollar

Russia is preparing to sell its oil for anything but dollars. Meanwhile the collapse of the oil price is forŠ°ing financial reality on the Kingdom of Saud.


Taking The 'Petro' Out Of The Dollar





30 April, 2016


Saudi Arabia has been in the news recently for several interconnected reasons. Underlying it all is a spendthrift country that is rapidly becoming insolvent.
While the House of Saud remains strongly resistant to change, a mixture of reality and power-play is likely to dominate domestic politics in the coming years, following the ascendency of King Salman to the Saudi throne.This has important implications for the dollar, given its historic role in the region.


Last year’s collapse in the oil price has forced financial reality upon the House of Saud. The young deputy crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, possibly inspired by a McKinsey report, aims to diversify the state rapidly from oil dependency into a mixture of industries, healthcare and tourism. The McKinsey report looks like a wish-list, rather than reality, particularly when it comes to tourism. The religious police are unlikely to take kindly to bikinis on the Red Sea’s beeches, or to foreign women in mini-shorts wandering around Jeddah.


It is hard to imagine Saudi Arabia, culturally stuck in the middle ages, embracing the changes recommended by McKinsey, without fundamentally reforming the House of Saud, or even without a full-scale revolution. Nearly all properties and businesses are personally owned or controlled by members of the extended royal family, not the state, nor by lesser mortals. The principal exception is Aramco, estimated to be worth $2 trillion.


The state is subservient to the House of Saud. It is therefore hard to see how, as McKinsey recommends, the country can “shift from its current government-led economic model to a more market-based approach”. The country is barely government led: a puppet of the Saudis is more like it. But the state’s lack of funds is making it increasingly desperate.


It was for this reason the Kingdom recently placed a $10bn five-year syndicated loan, the first time it has entered capital markets since Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. It proposes to raise a further $100bn by selling a 5% stake in Aramco. The financial plan appears to be a combination of this short-term money-raising, contributions from oil revenue, and sales of US Treasuries (thought to total as much as $750bn). The government has, according to informed sources, been secretly selling gold, mainly to Asian central banks and sovereign wealth funds. Will it see the Kingdom through this sticky patch?


Maybe. Much more likely, buying time is a substitute for ducking fundamental reform. But one can see how stories coming out of Washington, implicating Saudi interests in the 9/11 twin-towers tragedy, could easily have pulled the trigger on all those Treasuries.


Whatever else was discussed, it seems likely that this topic will have been addressed at the two special FOMC meetings “under expedited measures” at the Fed earlier this month, and then at Janet Yellen’s meeting with the President at the White House. This week’s holding pattern on interest rates would lend support to this theory.


The White House’s involvement certainly points towards a matter involving foreign affairs, rather than just interest rates. If the Saudis had decided to dump their Treasuries on the market, it would risk collapsing US bond markets and the dollar. Through financial transmission, euro-denominated sovereign bonds and Japanese government bonds, all of which are wildly overpriced, would also enter into free-fall, setting off the global financial crisis that central banks have been trying to void.


Perhaps this is reading too much into Saudi Arabia’s financial difficulties, but the possibility of the sale of Treasuries certainly got wide media coverage. These reports generally omitted to mention the Saudi’s underlying financial difficulties, which could equally have contributed to their desire to sell.


While the Arab countries floated themselves on oceans of petro-dollars forty years ago, they have little need for them now. So we must now turn our attention to China, which is well positioned to act as white knight to Saudi Arabia. China’s SAFE sovereign wealth fund could easily swallow the Aramco stake, and there are good strategic reasons why it should. A quick deal would help stabilise a desperate financial and political situation on the edges of China’s rapidly growing Asian interests, and keep Saudi Arabia onside as an energy supplier. China has dollars to dispose, and a mutual arrangement would herald a new era of tangible cooperation. The US can only stand and stare as China teases Saudi Arabia away from America’s sphere of influence.


In truth, trade matters much more than just talk, which is why a highly-indebted America finds herself on the back foot all the time in every financial skirmish with China. Saudi Arabia has little option but to kow-tow to China, and her commercial interests are moving her into China’s camp anyway. It seems logical that the Saudi riyal will eventually be de-pegged from the US dollar and managed in line with a basket of her oil customers’ currencies, dominated by the yuan.


Future currency policies pursued by both China and Saudi Arabia and their interaction will affect the dollar. China wants to use her own currency for trade deals, but must not flood the markets with yuan, lest she loses control over her currency. The internationalisation of the yuan must therefore be a gradual process, supply only being expanded when permanent demand for yuan requires it. Meanwhile, western analysts expect the riyal to be devalued against the dollar, unless there is a significant and lasting increase in the price of oil, which is not generally expected. But a devaluation requires a deliberate act by the state, which is not in the personal interests of the individual members of the House of Saud, so is a last resort.


It is clear that both Saudi Arabia and China have enormous quantities of surplus dollars to dispose in the next few years. As already stated, China could easily use $100bn of her stockpile to buy the 5% Aramco stake, dollars which the Saudis would simply sell in the foreign exchange markets as they are spent domestically. China could make further dollar loans to Saudi Arabia, secured against future oil sales and repayable in yuan, perhaps at a predetermined exchange rate. The Saudis would get dollars to spend, and China could balance future supply and demand for yuan.


It would therefore appear that a large part of the petro-dollar mountain is going to be unwound over time. There is now no point in the Saudis also hanging onto their US Treasury bonds, so we can expect them to be liquidated, but not as a fire-sale. On this point, it has been suggested that the US Government could simply block sales by China and Saudi Arabia, but there would be no quicker way of undermining the dollar’s international credibility. More likely, the Americans would have to accept an orderly unwinding of foreign holdings.


The US has exploited the dollar’s reserve currency status to the full since WW2, leading to massive quantities of dollars in foreign ownership. The pressure for dollars to return to America, when the Vietnam war was wound down, was behind the first dollar crisis, leading to the failure of the London gold pool in the late sixties. After the Nixon Shock in 1971, the cycle of printing money and credit for export resumed.


In the seventies, higher oil prices were paid for by printing dollars and by expanding dollar bank credit, in turn kept offshore by lending these exported dollars to Latin American dictators. That culminated in the Latin American debt crisis. From the eighties onwards, the internationalisation of business was all done on the back of yet more exported dollars, and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan echoed the earlier wars of Korea and Vietnam.


Many of these factors have now either disappeared or diminished. For the last eighteen months, the dollar had a last-gasp rally, as commodity and oil prices collapsed. The contraction in global trade since mid-2014 had signalled a swing in preferences from commodities and energy towards the money they are priced in, which is dollars. The concomitant liquidation of malinvestments in the commodity-exporting countries has been contained for now by aggressive monetary policies from China, Japan and the Eurozone. The tide is now swinging the other way: preferences are swinging out of the dollar towards oversold commodities again, exposing the dollar to a second version of the gold pool crisis. This time, China, Saudi Arabia and the BRICS will be returning their dollars from whence they came.


In essence, this is the market argument in favour of gold. Over time, the price of commodities and their manufactured derivatives measured in grams of gold is relatively stable. It is the price measured in fiat currencies that is volatile, with an upward bias. The price of a barrel of oil in 1966, fifty years ago, was 2.75 grams of gold. Today it is 1.0 gram of gold, so the purchasing power of gold measured in barrels of oil has risen nearly three-fold. In dollars, the prices were $3.10 and $40 respectively, so the purchasing power of the dollar measured in barrels of oil has fallen by 92%. Expect these trends to resume.


This is also the difference between sound money and dollars, which has worked to the detriment of nearly all energy and commodity-producing countries. With a track-record like that, who needs dollars?


It is hard to see how the purchasing power of dollars will not fall over the rest of the year. The liquidation of malinvestments denominated in external dollars has passed. Instead, the liquidation of financial investments carry-traded out of euros and yen is strengthening those currencies. That too will pass, but it won’t rescue the dollar.



Dollar, good-bye: Russia will sell oil for rubles

Š”Š¾Š»Š»Š°Ń€, Š³ŃƒŠ“-Š±Š°Š¹: Š Š¾ŃŃŠøя Š±ŃƒŠ“ŠµŃ‚ ŠæрŠ¾Š“Š°Š²Š°Ń‚ŃŒ Š½ŠµŃ„Ń‚ŃŒ Š·Š° руŠ±Š»Šø


30 April, 2016


Ongoing reformatting of the domestic economy, finally came to the oil market. Yesterday, the Russian experts in an interview with Bloomberg was made an interesting statement.


After months of preparation Russia launches its own production of financial document for independent implementation of Urals oil. Thus, it will create an open system in which the oil is valued most fairly. Bidding will be held at the St. Petersburg international Mercantile exchange (SPIMEX) and negotiations are underway to establish cooperation with foreign partners.


By the way, SPIMEX is the largest Russian oil exchange platform, created in 2008 after the Government ordered companies to sell mandatory 5-10 per cent produced domestically. Annual turnover for 2015 of around 533 billion rubles ($7.8 billion), or more than 15 percent of the total fuel supplied to the domestic market


But most importantly, the rejection of pricing in dollars. From now on, Urals will be traded in the Russian national currency. This innovation will reduce the impact of fluctuating oil prices and stabilizes the market. Will also be reduced costs because you'll fail from the intermediate dollar currency.


Now, in order to attract traders, the Bank of Russia is preparing amendments to the legislation for granting foreign firms access to commodities and their derivatives.


"Russia is doing what failed other: the dollar loses its security of oil contracts. In the medium term, Moscow will increase revenues from oil sales. Piping to bypass the dollar of the enormous flow of trade, the authorities will seek to reduce the credibility of the us dollar and boost demand for the ruble, killing two birds with one stone".


This practice is the transfer of trade of petroleum operations on the national currency is not new. Norway concludes his transactions, only using the inner crown, saving yourself from a lot of expenses and risks, but at the same time strengthening currency in the global market.


Therefore, the Government of the Russian Federation makes a very thoughtful, and correct strategic move in the near future will show its fruits and positively affect the lives of every Russian.


..


ŠŸŃ€Š¾Š“Š¾Š»Š¶Š°ŃŽŃ‰ŠµŠµŃŃ ŠæŠµŃ€ŠµŃ„Š¾Ń€Š¼Š°Ń‚ŠøрŠ¾Š²Š°Š½ŠøŠµ Š¾Ń‚ŠµŃ‡ŠµŃŃ‚Š²ŠµŠ½Š½Š¾Š¹ эŠŗŠ¾Š½Š¾Š¼ŠøŠŗŠø, Š½Š°ŠŗŠ¾Š½ŠµŃ†, Š“Š¾ŃˆŠ»Š¾ Šø Š“Š¾ Š½ŠµŃ„Ń‚ŃŠ½Š¾Š³Š¾ рыŠ½ŠŗŠ°. Š’чŠµŃ€Š° рŠ¾ŃŃŠøŠ¹ŃŠŗŠøŠ¼Šø эŠŗсŠæŠµŃ€Ń‚Š°Š¼Šø Š² ŠøŠ½Ń‚ŠµŃ€Š²ŃŒŃŽ Š°Š³ŠµŠ½Ń‚стŠ²Ńƒ Bloomberg Š±Ń‹Š»Š¾ сŠ“ŠµŠ»Š°Š½Š¾ Š²ŠµŃŃŒŠ¼Š° Š·Š°Š½ŠøŠ¼Š°Ń‚ŠµŠ»ŃŒŠ½Š¾Šµ Š·Š°ŃŠ²Š»ŠµŠ½ŠøŠµ.


ŠŸŠ¾ŃŠ»Šµ Š¼Š½Š¾Š³Š¾Š¼ŠµŃŃŃ‡Š½Š¾Š¹ ŠæŠ¾Š“Š³Š¾Ń‚Š¾Š²ŠŗŠø Š Š¾ŃŃŠøя Š·Š°ŠæусŠŗŠ°ŠµŃ‚ сŠ¾Š±ŃŃ‚Š²ŠµŠ½Š½Ń‹Š¹ ŠæрŠ¾ŠøŠ·Š²Š¾Š“стŠ²ŠµŠ½Š½Ń‹Š¹ фŠøŠ½Š°Š½ŃŠ¾Š²Ń‹Š¹ Š“Š¾ŠŗуŠ¼ŠµŠ½Ń‚ Š“Š»Ń Š½ŠµŠ·Š°Š²ŠøсŠøŠ¼Š¾Š¹ рŠµŠ°Š»ŠøŠ·Š°Ń†ŠøŠø Š½ŠµŃ„Ń‚Šø Š¼Š°Ń€ŠŗŠø Urals. Š¢Š°ŠŗŠøŠ¼ Š¾Š±Ń€Š°Š·Š¾Š¼, Š±ŃƒŠ“ŠµŃ‚ сŠ¾Š·Š“Š°Š½Š° Š¾Ń‚рытŠ°Ń сŠøстŠµŠ¼Š°, Š² ŠŗŠ¾Ń‚Š¾Ń€Š¾Š¹ Š½ŠµŃ„Ń‚ŃŒ Š¾Ń†ŠµŠ½ŠøŠ²Š°ŠµŃ‚ся Š¼Š°ŠŗсŠøŠ¼Š°Š»ŃŒŠ½Š¾ сŠæрŠ°Š²ŠµŠ“Š»ŠøŠ²Š¾. Š¢Š¾Ń€Š³Šø Š±ŃƒŠ“ут ŠæрŠ¾Š²Š¾Š“Šøться Š½Š° Š±Š°Š·Šµ Š”Š°Š½Šŗт-ŠŸŠµŃ‚ŠµŃ€Š±ŃƒŃ€Š³ŃŠŗŠ¾Š¹ Š¼ŠµŠ¶Š“уŠ½Š°Ń€Š¾Š“Š½Š¾Š¹ тŠ¾Š²Š°Ń€Š½Š¾-сырьŠµŠ²Š¾Š¹ Š±ŠøрŠ¶Šø (Š”ŠŸŠ±ŠœŠ¢Š”Š‘) Šø сŠµŠ¹Ń‡Š°Ń Š²ŠµŠ“утся ŠæŠµŃ€ŠµŠ³Š¾Š²Š¾Ń€Ń‹ ŠæŠ¾ Š½Š°Š»Š°Š¶ŠøŠ²Š°Š½Šøю сŠ¾Ń‚Ń€ŃƒŠ“Š½ŠøчŠµŃŃ‚Š²Š° с Š·Š°Ń€ŃƒŠ±ŠµŠ¶Š½Ń‹Š¼Šø ŠæŠ°Ń€Ń‚Š½ŠµŃ€Š°Š¼Šø.


Šš сŠ»Š¾Š²Ńƒ, Š”ŠŸŠ±ŠœŠ¢Š”Š‘ — ŠŗруŠæŠ½ŠµŠ¹ŃˆŠ°Ń Š² Š Š¾ŃŃŠøŠø Š½ŠµŃ„Ń‚ŃŠ½Š¾Š¹ ŠæŠ»Š°Ń‚Ń„Š¾Ń€Š¼Š°-Š±ŠøрŠ¶Š°, сŠ¾Š·Š“Š°Š½Š½Š°Ń Š² 2008 Š³Š¾Š“у ŠæŠ¾ŃŠ»Šµ тŠ¾Š³Š¾ ŠŗŠ°Šŗ ŠŸŃ€Š°Š²ŠøтŠµŠ»ŃŒŃŃ‚Š²Š¾ Š¾Š±ŃŠ·Š°Š»Š¾ ŠŗŠ¾Š¼ŠæŠ°Š½ŠøŠø ŠæрŠ¾Š“Š°Š²Š°Ń‚ŃŒ Š¾Š±ŃŠ·Š°Ń‚ŠµŠ»ŃŒŠ½Ń‹Šµ 5-10 ŠæрŠ¾Ń†ŠµŠ½Ń‚Š¾Š² Š“Š¾Š±Ń‹Ń‚Š¾Š³Š¾ Š²Š½ŃƒŃ‚Ń€Šø стрŠ°Š½Ń‹. Š“Š¾Š“Š¾Š²Š¾Š¹ тŠ¾Š²Š°Ń€Š¾Š¾Š±Š¾Ń€Š¾Ń‚ Š·Š° 2015 — Š¾ŠŗŠ¾Š»Š¾ 533 Š¼ŠøŠ»Š»ŠøŠ°Ń€Š“Š° руŠ±Š»ŠµŠ¹ (7,8 Š¼ŠøŠ»Š»ŠøŠ°Ń€Š“Š° Š“Š¾Š»Š»Š°Ń€Š¾Š²), ŠøŠ»Šø Š±Š¾Š»ŠµŠµ чŠµŠ¼ 15 ŠæрŠ¾Ń†ŠµŠ½Ń‚Š¾Š² Š²ŃŠµŠ³Š¾ тŠ¾ŠæŠ»ŠøŠ²Š°, ŠæŠ¾ŃŃ‚Š°Š²Š»ŃŠµŠ¼Š¾Š³Š¾ Š½Š° Š²Š½ŃƒŃ‚Ń€ŠµŠ½Š½ŠøŠ¹ рыŠ½Š¾Šŗ


ŠŠ¾ Š³Š»Š°Š²Š½Š¾Šµ, Š¾Ń‚ŠŗŠ°Š· Š¾Ń‚ цŠµŠ½Š¾Š¾Š±Ń€Š°Š·Š¾Š²Š°Š½Šøя Š² Š“Š¾Š»Š»Š°Ń€Š°Ń…. ŠžŃ‚Š½Ń‹Š½Šµ, Urals Š±ŃƒŠ“ŠµŃ‚ тŠ¾Ń€Š³Š¾Š²Š°Ń‚ŃŒŃŃ Š·Š° рŠ¾ŃŃŠøŠ¹ŃŠŗую Š½Š°Ń†ŠøŠ¾Š½Š°Š»ŃŒŠ½ŃƒŃŽ Š²Š°Š»ŃŽŃ‚Ńƒ. ŠŸŠ¾Š“Š¾Š±Š½Š¾Šµ Š½Š¾Š²Š¾Š²Š²ŠµŠ“ŠµŠ½ŠøŠµ ŠæŠ¾Š·Š²Š¾Š»Šøт сŠ½ŠøŠ·Šøть Š²Š»ŠøяŠ½ŠøŠµ ŠŗŠ¾Š»ŠµŠ±Š»ŃŽŃ‰Šøхся цŠµŠ½ Š½Š° Š½ŠµŃ„Ń‚ŃŒ Šø стŠ°Š±ŠøŠ»ŠøŠ·ŠøруŠµŃ‚ рыŠ½Š¾Šŗ. Š¢Š°ŠŗŠ¶Šµ Š±ŃƒŠ“ут сŠ½ŠøŠ¶ŠµŠ½Ń‹ ŠøŠ·Š“ŠµŃ€Š¶ŠŗŠø, ŠæŠ¾ŃŠŗŠ¾Š»ŃŒŠŗу ŠæрŠ¾ŠøŠ·Š¾Š¹Š“ŠµŃ‚ Š¾Ń‚ŠŗŠ°Š· Š¾Ń‚ ŠæрŠ¾Š¼ŠµŠ¶ŃƒŃ‚Š¾Ń‡Š½Š¾Š¹, Š“Š¾Š»Š»Š°Ń€Š¾Š²Š¾Š¹ Š²Š°Š»ŃŽŃ‚Ń‹.


Š”ŠµŠ¹Ń‡Š°Ń, Š“Š»Ń тŠ¾Š³Š¾, чтŠ¾Š±Ń‹ ŠæрŠøŠ²Š»ŠµŃ‡ŃŒ трŠµŠ¹Š“ŠµŃ€Š¾Š², Š‘Š°Š½Šŗ Š Š¾ŃŃŠøŠø Š³Š¾Ń‚Š¾Š²Šøт ŠæŠ¾ŠæрŠ°Š²ŠŗŠø Š² Š·Š°ŠŗŠ¾Š½Š¾Š“Š°Ń‚ŠµŠ»ŃŒŃŃ‚Š²Š¾ Š¾ ŠæрŠµŠ“Š¾ŃŃ‚Š°Š²Š»ŠµŠ½ŠøŠø ŠøŠ½Š¾ŃŃ‚Ń€Š°Š½Š½Ń‹Š¼ фŠøрŠ¼Š°Š¼ Š“Š¾ŃŃ‚ŃƒŠæŠ° Šŗ Š±ŠøрŠ¶ŠµŠ²Ń‹Š¼ тŠ¾Š²Š°Ń€Š°Š¼ Šø Šøх ŠæрŠ¾ŠøŠ·Š²Š¾Š“Š½Ń‹Ń….


«Š Š¾ŃŃŠøя Š“ŠµŠ»Š°ŠµŃ‚ тŠ¾, чтŠ¾ Š½Šµ ŠæŠ¾Š»ŃƒŃ‡ŠøŠ»Š¾ŃŃŒ у Š“руŠ³Šøх: Š“Š¾Š»Š»Š°Ń€ Š»ŠøшŠ°ŠµŃ‚ся Š¾ŃŠ½Š¾Š²Ń‹ сŠ²Š¾ŠµŠ³Š¾ Š¾Š±ŠµŃŠæŠµŃ‡ŠµŠ½Šøя — Š½ŠµŃ„Ń‚ŃŠ½Ń‹Ń… ŠŗŠ¾Š½Ń‚Ń€Š°ŠŗтŠ¾Š². Š’ срŠµŠ“Š½ŠµŃŃ€Š¾Ń‡Š½Š¾Š¹ ŠæŠµŃ€ŃŠæŠµŠŗтŠøŠ²Šµ ŠœŠ¾ŃŠŗŠ²Š° уŠ²ŠµŠ»ŠøчŠøт Š“Š¾Ń…Š¾Š“ы Š¾Ń‚ ŠæрŠ¾Š“Š°Š¶Šø Š½ŠµŃ„Ń‚Šø. ŠŸŃƒŃŠŗŠ°Ń Š² Š¾Š±Ń…Š¾Š“ Š“Š¾Š»Š»Š°Ń€Š° ŠŗŠ¾Š»Š¾ŃŃŠ°Š»ŃŒŠ½Ń‹Šµ ŠæŠ¾Ń‚Š¾ŠŗŠø тŠ¾Š²Š°Ń€Š¾Š¾Š±Š¾Ń€Š¾Ń‚Š°, Š²Š»Š°ŃŃ‚Šø Š±ŃƒŠ“ут стрŠµŠ¼Šøться уŠ¼ŠµŠ½ŃŒŃˆŠøть Š°Š²Ń‚Š¾Ń€ŠøтŠµŃ‚ Š°Š¼ŠµŃ€ŠøŠŗŠ°Š½ŃŠŗŠ¾Š¹ Š²Š°Š»ŃŽŃ‚Ń‹ Šø ŠæŠ¾Š²Ń‹ŃˆŠ°Ń‚ŃŒ сŠæрŠ¾Ń Š½Š° руŠ±Š»ŃŒ, уŠ±ŠøŠ²Š°Ń срŠ°Š·Ńƒ Š“Š²ŃƒŃ… Š·Š°Š¹Ń†ŠµŠ²».


ŠŸŠ¾Š“Š¾Š±Š½Š°Ń ŠæрŠ°ŠŗтŠøŠŗŠ° ŠæŠµŃ€ŠµŠ²Š¾Š“Š° тŠ¾Ń€Š³Š¾Š²Ń‹Ń… Š½ŠµŃ„Ń‚ŃŠ½Ń‹Ń… Š¾ŠæŠµŃ€Š°Ń†ŠøŠ¹ Š½Š° Š½Š°Ń†ŠøŠ¾Š½Š°Š»ŃŒŠ½ŃƒŃŽ Š²Š°Š»ŃŽŃ‚Ńƒ Š½Šµ Š½Š¾Š²Š°. ŠŠ¾Ń€Š²ŠµŠ³Šøя Š·Š°ŠŗŠ»ŃŽŃ‡Š°ŠµŃ‚ сŠ²Š¾Šø сŠ“ŠµŠ»ŠŗŠø, ŠøсŠæŠ¾Š»ŃŒŠ·ŃƒŃ Š»Šøшь Š²Š½ŃƒŃ‚Ń€ŠµŠ½Š½ŃŽŃŽ ŠŗрŠ¾Š½Ńƒ, ŠøŠ·Š±Š°Š²Š»ŃŃ сŠµŠ±Ń Š¾Ń‚ Š¼Š½Š¾Š¶ŠµŃŃ‚Š²Š° рŠ°ŃŃ…Š¾Š“Š¾Š² Šø рŠøсŠŗŠ¾Š², Š° Š·Š°Š¾Š“Š½Š¾ уŠŗрŠµŠæŠ»ŃŃ Š²Š°Š»ŃŽŃ‚Ńƒ Š½Š° Š¼ŠøрŠ¾Š²Š¾Š¼ рыŠ½ŠŗŠµ.


ŠŸŠ¾ŃŠµŠ¼Ńƒ, ŠŸŃ€Š°Š²ŠøтŠµŠ»ŃŒŃŃ‚Š²Š¾ Š Š¤ Š“ŠµŠ»Š°ŠµŃ‚ Š²ŠµŃŃŒŠ¼Š° ŠæрŠ¾Š“уŠ¼Š°Š½Š½Ń‹Š¹, ŠæрŠ°Š²ŠøŠ»ŃŒŠ½Ń‹Š¹ Šø стрŠ°Ń‚ŠµŠ³ŠøчŠµŃŠŗŠøŠ¹ шŠ°Š³, ŠŗŠ¾Ń‚Š¾Ń€Ń‹Š¹ уŠ¶Šµ Š² Š±Š»ŠøŠ¶Š°Š¹ŃˆŠµŠ¼ Š±ŃƒŠ“ущŠµŠ¼ ŠæŠ¾ŠŗŠ°Š¶ŠµŃ‚ сŠ²Š¾Šø ŠæŠ»Š¾Š“ы Šø Š±Š»Š°Š³Š¾Ń‚Š²Š¾Ń€Š½Š¾ Š¾Ń‚Ń€Š°Š·Šøтся Š½Š° Š¶ŠøŠ·Š½Šø ŠŗŠ°Š¶Š“Š¾Š³Š¾ рŠ¾ŃŃŠøяŠ½ŠøŠ½Š°.


No comments:

Post a Comment

Note: only a member of this blog may post a comment.