Russia is preparing to sell its oil for anything but dollars. Meanwhile the collapse of the oil price is forŠ°ing financial reality on the Kingdom of Saud.
Taking The 'Petro' Out Of The Dollar
30
April, 2016
Saudi
Arabia has been in the news recently for several interconnected
reasons. Underlying it all is a spendthrift country that is rapidly
becoming insolvent.
While
the House of Saud remains strongly resistant to change, a mixture of
reality and power-play is likely to dominate domestic politics in the
coming years, following the ascendency of King Salman to the Saudi
throne.This
has important implications for the dollar, given its historic role in
the region.
Last
year’s collapse in the oil price has forced financial reality upon
the House of Saud. The young deputy crown prince, Mohammed bin
Salman, possibly inspired by a McKinsey
report,
aims to diversify the state rapidly from oil dependency into a
mixture of industries, healthcare and tourism. The
McKinsey report looks like a wish-list, rather than reality,
particularly when it comes to tourism. The
religious police are unlikely to take kindly to bikinis on the Red
Sea’s beeches, or to foreign women in mini-shorts wandering around
Jeddah.
It
is hard to imagine Saudi Arabia, culturally stuck in the middle ages,
embracing the changes recommended by McKinsey, without fundamentally
reforming the House of Saud, or even without a full-scale
revolution. Nearly
all properties and businesses are personally owned or controlled by
members of the extended royal family, not the state, nor by lesser
mortals. The principal exception is Aramco, estimated to be worth $2
trillion.
The
state is subservient to the House of Saud.
It is therefore hard to see how, as McKinsey recommends, the country
can “shift from its current government-led economic model to a more
market-based approach”. The country is barely government led: a
puppet of the Saudis is more like it. But the state’s lack of funds
is making it increasingly desperate.
It
was for this reason the Kingdom recently placed a $10bn five-year
syndicated loan, the first time it has entered capital markets since
Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. It proposes to raise a further $100bn
by selling a 5% stake in Aramco. The
financial plan appears to be a combination of this short-term
money-raising, contributions from oil revenue, and sales of US
Treasuries (thought to total as much as $750bn).
The government has, according to informed sources, been secretly
selling gold, mainly to Asian central banks and sovereign wealth
funds. Will it see the Kingdom through this sticky patch?
Maybe. Much
more likely, buying time is a substitute for ducking fundamental
reform. But
one can see how stories coming out of Washington, implicating Saudi
interests in the 9/11 twin-towers tragedy, could easily have pulled
the trigger on all those Treasuries.
Whatever
else was discussed, it seems likely that this topic will have been
addressed at the two special FOMC meetings “under expedited
measures” at the Fed earlier this month, and then at Janet Yellen’s
meeting with the President at the White House. This week’s holding
pattern on interest rates would lend support to this theory.
The
White House’s involvement certainly points towards a matter
involving foreign affairs, rather than just interest rates. If the
Saudis had decided to dump their Treasuries on the market, it would
risk collapsing US bond markets and the dollar. Through
financial transmission, euro-denominated sovereign bonds and Japanese
government bonds, all of which are wildly overpriced, would also
enter into free-fall, setting off the global financial crisis that
central banks have been trying to void.
Perhaps
this is reading too much into Saudi Arabia’s financial
difficulties, but the possibility of the sale of Treasuries certainly
got wide media coverage. These reports generally omitted to mention
the Saudi’s underlying financial difficulties, which could equally
have contributed to their desire to sell.
While
the Arab countries floated themselves on oceans of petro-dollars
forty years ago, they have little need for them now. So
we must now turn our attention to China, which is well positioned to
act as white knight to Saudi Arabia. China’s SAFE sovereign wealth
fund could easily swallow the Aramco stake, and there are good
strategic reasons why it should.
A quick deal would help stabilise a desperate financial and political
situation on the edges of China’s rapidly growing Asian interests,
and keep Saudi Arabia onside as an energy supplier. China has dollars
to dispose, and a mutual arrangement would herald a new era of
tangible cooperation. The
US can only stand and stare as China teases Saudi Arabia away from
America’s sphere of influence.
In
truth, trade matters much more than just talk, which is why a
highly-indebted America finds herself on the back foot all the time
in every financial skirmish with China. Saudi
Arabia has little option but to kow-tow to China, and her commercial
interests are moving her into China’s camp anyway. It seems logical
that the Saudi riyal will eventually be de-pegged from the US dollar
and managed in line with a basket of her oil customers’ currencies,
dominated by the yuan.
Future
currency policies pursued by both China and Saudi Arabia and their
interaction will affect the dollar. China
wants to use her own currency for trade deals, but must not flood the
markets with yuan, lest she loses control over her currency. The
internationalisation of the yuan must therefore be a gradual process,
supply only being expanded when permanent demand for yuan requires
it. Meanwhile, western analysts expect the riyal to be devalued
against the dollar, unless there is a significant and lasting
increase in the price of oil, which is not generally expected. But a
devaluation requires a deliberate act by the state, which is not in
the personal interests of the individual members of the House of
Saud, so is a last resort.
It
is clear that both Saudi Arabia and China have enormous quantities of
surplus dollars to dispose in the next few years. As
already stated, China could easily use $100bn of her stockpile to buy
the 5% Aramco stake, dollars which the Saudis would simply sell in
the foreign exchange markets as they are spent domestically. China
could make further dollar loans to Saudi Arabia, secured against
future oil sales and repayable in yuan, perhaps at a predetermined
exchange rate. The Saudis would get dollars to spend, and China could
balance future supply and demand for yuan.
It
would therefore appear that a large part of the petro-dollar mountain
is going to be unwound over time. There
is now no point in the Saudis also hanging onto their US Treasury
bonds, so we can expect them to be liquidated, but not as a
fire-sale. On this point, it has been suggested that the US
Government could simply block sales by China and Saudi Arabia, but
there would be no quicker way of undermining the dollar’s
international credibility. More likely, the Americans would have to
accept an orderly unwinding of foreign holdings.
The
US has exploited the dollar’s reserve currency status to the full
since WW2, leading to massive quantities of dollars in foreign
ownership. The pressure for dollars to return to America, when the
Vietnam war was wound down, was behind the first dollar crisis,
leading to the failure of the London gold pool in the late
sixties. After
the Nixon Shock in 1971, the cycle of printing money and credit for
export resumed.
In
the seventies, higher oil prices were paid for by printing dollars
and by expanding dollar bank credit, in turn kept offshore by lending
these exported dollars to Latin American dictators. That
culminated in the Latin American debt crisis.
From the eighties onwards, the internationalisation
of business was all done on the back of yet more exported dollars,
and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan echoed the earlier wars of Korea and
Vietnam.
Many
of these factors have now either disappeared or diminished. For
the last eighteen months, the dollar had a last-gasp rally, as
commodity and oil prices collapsed. The contraction in global trade
since mid-2014 had signalled a swing in preferences from commodities
and energy towards the money they are priced in, which is dollars.
The concomitant liquidation of malinvestments in the
commodity-exporting countries has been contained for now by
aggressive monetary policies from China, Japan and the Eurozone. The
tide is now swinging the other way: preferences are swinging out of
the dollar towards oversold commodities again, exposing the dollar to
a second version of the gold pool crisis. This
time, China, Saudi Arabia and the BRICS will be returning their
dollars from whence they came.
In
essence, this is the market argument in favour of gold. Over
time, the price of commodities and their manufactured derivatives
measured in grams of gold is relatively stable. It is the price
measured in fiat currencies that is volatile, with an upward bias.
The price of a barrel of oil in 1966, fifty years ago, was 2.75 grams
of gold. Today it is 1.0 gram of gold, so the purchasing power of
gold measured in barrels of oil has risen nearly three-fold. In
dollars, the prices were $3.10 and $40 respectively, so the
purchasing power of the dollar measured in barrels of oil has fallen
by 92%. Expect these trends to resume.
This
is also the difference between sound money and dollars, which has
worked to the detriment of nearly all energy and commodity-producing
countries. With
a track-record like that, who needs dollars?
It
is hard to see how the purchasing power of dollars will not fall over
the rest of the year. The liquidation of malinvestments denominated
in external dollars has passed. Instead,
the liquidation of financial investments carry-traded out of euros
and yen is strengthening those currencies. That too will pass, but it
won’t rescue the dollar.
Dollar, good-bye: Russia will sell oil for rubles
ŠŠ¾Š»Š»Š°Ń,
Š³ŃŠ“-Š±Š°Š¹: Š Š¾ŃŃŠøŃ Š±ŃŠ“ŠµŃ ŠæŃŠ¾Š“Š°Š²Š°ŃŃ Š½ŠµŃŃŃ
Š·Š° ŃŃŠ±Š»Šø
30
April, 2016
Ongoing
reformatting of the domestic economy, finally came to the oil market.
Yesterday, the Russian experts in an interview with Bloomberg was
made an interesting statement.
After
months of preparation Russia launches its own production of financial
document for independent implementation of Urals oil. Thus, it will
create an open system in which the oil is valued most fairly. Bidding
will be held at the St. Petersburg international Mercantile exchange
(SPIMEX) and negotiations are underway to establish cooperation with
foreign partners.
By
the way, SPIMEX is the largest Russian oil exchange platform, created
in 2008 after the Government ordered companies to sell mandatory 5-10
per cent produced domestically. Annual turnover for 2015 of around
533 billion rubles ($7.8 billion), or more than 15 percent of the
total fuel supplied to the domestic market
But
most importantly, the rejection of pricing in dollars. From now on,
Urals will be traded in the Russian national currency. This
innovation will reduce the impact of fluctuating oil prices and
stabilizes the market. Will also be reduced costs because you'll fail
from the intermediate dollar currency.
Now,
in order to attract traders, the Bank of Russia is preparing
amendments to the legislation for granting foreign firms access to
commodities and their derivatives.
"Russia
is doing what failed other: the dollar loses its security of oil
contracts. In the medium term, Moscow will increase revenues from oil
sales. Piping to bypass the dollar of the enormous flow of trade, the
authorities will seek to reduce the credibility of the us dollar and
boost demand for the ruble, killing two birds with one stone".
This
practice is the transfer of trade of petroleum operations on the
national currency is not new. Norway concludes his transactions, only
using the inner crown, saving yourself from a lot of expenses and
risks, but at the same time strengthening currency in the global
market.
Therefore,
the Government of the Russian Federation makes a very thoughtful, and
correct strategic move in the near future will show its fruits and
positively affect the lives of every Russian.
…..
ŠŃŠ¾Š“Š¾Š»Š¶Š°ŃŃŠµŠµŃŃ
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Š¼Š½Š¾Š³Š¾Š¼ŠµŃŃŃŠ½Š¾Š¹ ŠæŠ¾Š“Š³Š¾ŃŠ¾Š²ŠŗŠø Š Š¾ŃŃŠøŃ
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ŃŠ¾Š²Š°ŃŠ½Š¾-ŃŃŃŃŠµŠ²Š¾Š¹ Š±ŠøŃŠ¶Šø (Š”ŠŠ±ŠŠ¢Š”Š) Šø ŃŠµŠ¹ŃŠ°Ń
Š²ŠµŠ“ŃŃŃŃ ŠæŠµŃŠµŠ³Š¾Š²Š¾ŃŃ ŠæŠ¾ Š½Š°Š»Š°Š¶ŠøŠ²Š°Š½ŠøŃ
ŃŠ¾ŃŃŃŠ“Š½ŠøŃŠµŃŃŠ²Š° Ń Š·Š°ŃŃŠ±ŠµŠ¶Š½ŃŠ¼Šø ŠæŠ°ŃŃŠ½ŠµŃŠ°Š¼Šø.
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2008 Š³Š¾Š“Ń ŠæŠ¾ŃŠ»Šµ ŃŠ¾Š³Š¾ ŠŗŠ°Šŗ ŠŃŠ°Š²ŠøŃŠµŠ»ŃŃŃŠ²Š¾
Š¾Š±ŃŠ·Š°Š»Š¾ ŠŗŠ¾Š¼ŠæŠ°Š½ŠøŠø ŠæŃŠ¾Š“Š°Š²Š°ŃŃ Š¾Š±ŃŠ·Š°ŃŠµŠ»ŃŠ½ŃŠµ
5-10 ŠæŃŠ¾ŃŠµŠ½ŃŠ¾Š² Š“Š¾Š±ŃŃŠ¾Š³Š¾ Š²Š½ŃŃŃŠø ŃŃŃŠ°Š½Ń.
ŠŠ¾Š“Š¾Š²Š¾Š¹ ŃŠ¾Š²Š°ŃŠ¾Š¾Š±Š¾ŃŠ¾Ń Š·Š° 2015 — Š¾ŠŗŠ¾Š»Š¾ 533
Š¼ŠøŠ»Š»ŠøŠ°ŃŠ“Š° ŃŃŠ±Š»ŠµŠ¹ (7,8 Š¼ŠøŠ»Š»ŠøŠ°ŃŠ“Š° Š“Š¾Š»Š»Š°ŃŠ¾Š²),
ŠøŠ»Šø Š±Š¾Š»ŠµŠµ ŃŠµŠ¼ 15 ŠæŃŠ¾ŃŠµŠ½ŃŠ¾Š² Š²ŃŠµŠ³Š¾ ŃŠ¾ŠæŠ»ŠøŠ²Š°,
ŠæŠ¾ŃŃŠ°Š²Š»ŃŠµŠ¼Š¾Š³Š¾ Š½Š° Š²Š½ŃŃŃŠµŠ½Š½ŠøŠ¹ ŃŃŠ½Š¾Šŗ
ŠŠ¾
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Š“Š¾Š»Š»Š°ŃŠ°Ń
. ŠŃŠ½ŃŠ½Šµ, Urals Š±ŃŠ“ŠµŃ ŃŠ¾ŃŠ³Š¾Š²Š°ŃŃŃŃ
Š·Š° ŃŠ¾ŃŃŠøŠ¹ŃŠŗŃŃ Š½Š°ŃŠøŠ¾Š½Š°Š»ŃŠ½ŃŃ Š²Š°Š»ŃŃŃ.
ŠŠ¾Š“Š¾Š±Š½Š¾Šµ Š½Š¾Š²Š¾Š²Š²ŠµŠ“ŠµŠ½ŠøŠµ ŠæŠ¾Š·Š²Š¾Š»ŠøŃ ŃŠ½ŠøŠ·ŠøŃŃ
Š²Š»ŠøŃŠ½ŠøŠµ ŠŗŠ¾Š»ŠµŠ±Š»ŃŃŠøŃ
ŃŃ ŃŠµŠ½ Š½Š° Š½ŠµŃŃŃ Šø
ŃŃŠ°Š±ŠøŠ»ŠøŠ·ŠøŃŃŠµŃ ŃŃŠ½Š¾Šŗ. Š¢Š°ŠŗŠ¶Šµ Š±ŃŠ“ŃŃ ŃŠ½ŠøŠ¶ŠµŠ½Ń
ŠøŠ·Š“ŠµŃŠ¶ŠŗŠø, ŠæŠ¾ŃŠŗŠ¾Š»ŃŠŗŃ ŠæŃŠ¾ŠøŠ·Š¾Š¹Š“ŠµŃ Š¾ŃŠŗŠ°Š·
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Š”ŠµŠ¹ŃŠ°Ń,
Š“Š»Ń ŃŠ¾Š³Š¾, ŃŃŠ¾Š±Ń ŠæŃŠøŠ²Š»ŠµŃŃ ŃŃŠµŠ¹Š“ŠµŃŠ¾Š², ŠŠ°Š½Šŗ
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Š“Š¾ŃŃŃŠæŠ° Šŗ Š±ŠøŃŠ¶ŠµŠ²ŃŠ¼ ŃŠ¾Š²Š°ŃŠ°Š¼ Šø ŠøŃ
ŠæŃŠ¾ŠøŠ·Š²Š¾Š“Š½ŃŃ
.
«Š Š¾ŃŃŠøŃ
Š“ŠµŠ»Š°ŠµŃ ŃŠ¾, ŃŃŠ¾ Š½Šµ ŠæŠ¾Š»ŃŃŠøŠ»Š¾ŃŃ Ń Š“ŃŃŠ³ŠøŃ
:
Š“Š¾Š»Š»Š°Ń Š»ŠøŃŠ°ŠµŃŃŃ Š¾ŃŠ½Š¾Š²Ń ŃŠ²Š¾ŠµŠ³Š¾ Š¾Š±ŠµŃŠæŠµŃŠµŠ½ŠøŃ
— Š½ŠµŃŃŃŠ½ŃŃ
ŠŗŠ¾Š½ŃŃŠ°ŠŗŃŠ¾Š². Š ŃŃŠµŠ“Š½ŠµŃŃŠ¾ŃŠ½Š¾Š¹
ŠæŠµŃŃŠæŠµŠŗŃŠøŠ²Šµ ŠŠ¾ŃŠŗŠ²Š° ŃŠ²ŠµŠ»ŠøŃŠøŃ Š“Š¾Ń
Š¾Š“Ń Š¾Ń
ŠæŃŠ¾Š“Š°Š¶Šø Š½ŠµŃŃŠø. ŠŃŃŠŗŠ°Ń Š² Š¾Š±Ń
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ŠŗŠ¾Š»Š¾ŃŃŠ°Š»ŃŠ½ŃŠµ ŠæŠ¾ŃŠ¾ŠŗŠø ŃŠ¾Š²Š°ŃŠ¾Š¾Š±Š¾ŃŠ¾ŃŠ°,
Š²Š»Š°ŃŃŠø Š±ŃŠ“ŃŃ ŃŃŃŠµŠ¼ŠøŃŃŃŃ ŃŠ¼ŠµŠ½ŃŃŠøŃŃ
Š°Š²ŃŠ¾ŃŠøŃŠµŃ Š°Š¼ŠµŃŠøŠŗŠ°Š½ŃŠŗŠ¾Š¹ Š²Š°Š»ŃŃŃ Šø ŠæŠ¾Š²ŃŃŠ°ŃŃ
ŃŠæŃŠ¾Ń Š½Š° ŃŃŠ±Š»Ń, ŃŠ±ŠøŠ²Š°Ń ŃŃŠ°Š·Ń Š“Š²ŃŃ
Š·Š°Š¹ŃŠµŠ²».
ŠŠ¾Š“Š¾Š±Š½Š°Ń
ŠæŃŠ°ŠŗŃŠøŠŗŠ° ŠæŠµŃŠµŠ²Š¾Š“Š° ŃŠ¾ŃŠ³Š¾Š²ŃŃ
Š½ŠµŃŃŃŠ½ŃŃ
Š¾ŠæŠµŃŠ°ŃŠøŠ¹ Š½Š° Š½Š°ŃŠøŠ¾Š½Š°Š»ŃŠ½ŃŃ Š²Š°Š»ŃŃŃ Š½Šµ
Š½Š¾Š²Š°. ŠŠ¾ŃŠ²ŠµŠ³ŠøŃ Š·Š°ŠŗŠ»ŃŃŠ°ŠµŃ ŃŠ²Š¾Šø ŃŠ“ŠµŠ»ŠŗŠø,
ŠøŃŠæŠ¾Š»ŃŠ·ŃŃ Š»ŠøŃŃ Š²Š½ŃŃŃŠµŠ½Š½ŃŃ ŠŗŃŠ¾Š½Ń, ŠøŠ·Š±Š°Š²Š»ŃŃ
ŃŠµŠ±Ń Š¾Ń Š¼Š½Š¾Š¶ŠµŃŃŠ²Š° ŃŠ°ŃŃ
Š¾Š“Š¾Š² Šø ŃŠøŃŠŗŠ¾Š², Š°
Š·Š°Š¾Š“Š½Š¾ ŃŠŗŃŠµŠæŠ»ŃŃ Š²Š°Š»ŃŃŃ Š½Š° Š¼ŠøŃŠ¾Š²Š¾Š¼ ŃŃŠ½ŠŗŠµ.
ŠŠ¾ŃŠµŠ¼Ń,
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ŠæŃŠ¾Š“ŃŠ¼Š°Š½Š½ŃŠ¹, ŠæŃŠ°Š²ŠøŠ»ŃŠ½ŃŠ¹ Šø ŃŃŃŠ°ŃŠµŠ³ŠøŃŠµŃŠŗŠøŠ¹
ŃŠ°Š³, ŠŗŠ¾ŃŠ¾ŃŃŠ¹ ŃŠ¶Šµ Š² Š±Š»ŠøŠ¶Š°Š¹ŃŠµŠ¼ Š±ŃŠ“ŃŃŠµŠ¼
ŠæŠ¾ŠŗŠ°Š¶ŠµŃ ŃŠ²Š¾Šø ŠæŠ»Š¾Š“Ń Šø Š±Š»Š°Š³Š¾ŃŠ²Š¾ŃŠ½Š¾
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