Sexy Metal: The Missing Element In The Korean Puzzle
Pepe
Escobar
23
June,2018
US
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo knows the importance of rare earth
elements, and North Korea has reportedly found one of the world's
biggest deposits 150km from Pyongyang; is this another factor behind
the recent thaw with the US?
This
may not be about condos on North Korean beaches after all.
Arguably,
the heart of the matter in the Trump administration’s embrace of
Kim Jong-un has everything
to do with one of the largest deposits of rare
earth elements (REEs) in
the world, located
only 150 km northwest of Pyongyang and potentially worth billions of
US dollars.
All
the implements of 21st century technology-driven everyday
life rely
on the chemical and physical properties of 17 precious elements on
the periodic chart also known
as REEs.
Currently, China
is believed to control over 95% of global production of rare earth
metals, with
an estimated 55 million tons in deposits. North Korea for its part
holds at least 20 million tons.
Rare
earth elements are not the only highly strategic minerals and
metals in this power play. The
same deposits are sources of tungsten, zirconium, titanium, hafnium,
rhenium and molybdenum; all of these are absolutely critical not only
for myriad military
applications but
also for nuclear power.
Rare
earth metallurgy also happens to be essential for US, Russian and
Chinese weapons systems. The THAAD system needs rare earth elements,
and so do Russia’s S-400 and S-500 missile defense systems.
It’s
not far-fetched to consider ‘The Art of the Deal’ applied to rare
earth elements. If
the US does not attempt to make a serious play on the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK’s) allegedly vast rare earth
resources, the winner, once again, may be Beijing. And Moscow as well
– considering the Russia-China strategic partnership, now
explicitly recognized on the record.
The
whole puzzle may revolve around who offers the best return on
investment; not on real estate but sexy metal, with
the Pyongyang leadership potentially able to collect an immense
fortune.
Is
Beijing capable of matching a possible American deal? This
may well have been a key topic of discussion during the third meeting
in only a few weeks between Kim Jong-un and President Xi Jinping,
exactly when the entire geopolitical chessboard hangs in the balance.
So metals are not sexy?
Researcher
Marc Sills, in a paper titled ‘Strategic Materials Crises and Great
Power Conflicts’, says:
“Conflict over strategic minerals is inevitable. The dramas will likely unfold at or near the mines, or along the transportation lines the materials must travel, and especially at world’s strategic chokepoints the US military is now generally tasked to control. Again, the power equation is written to include both control of possession and denial of possession by others.”
This
applies, for instance, to the Ukraine puzzle. Russia badly needs
Ukraine’s titanium, zirconium and hafnium for its
industrial-military complex.
Earlier
this year Japanese researchers discovered a deposit of 16 million
tons of rare earth elements (less than the North Korean reserves)
beneath the seabed in the Western Pacific. But that’s unlikely
to change China’s
– and potentially the DPRK’s – prominence. The key in the whole
rare earth element process is to devise a profitable production
chain, as the Chinese have done. And that takes a long time.
Detailed
papers such as ‘China’s Rare Earth Elements Industry’, by Cindy
Hurst (2010), published by the Institute for the Analysis of Global
Security (IAGS) or ‘Rare Earth in Selected US Defense
Applications’, by James Hedrick, presented at the 40th Forum
on the Geology of Industrial Minerals in 2004, convincingly map all
the connections. Sills stresses how minerals and metals, though, seem
to attract attention only in mining trade publications:
“And that would seem to explain in part why the REE contest in Korea has eluded attention. Metals just ain’t that sexy. But weapons are.”
Metals
are certainly sexy for US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. It’s
quite enlightening to remember how Pompeo, then CIA director, told
a Senate Committee in
May 2017 how foreign control of rare earth elements was “a very
real concern.”
Fast
forward to one year later, when Pompeo, taking
over at
the State Department, emphasized a new “swagger” in US foreign
policy.
And
fast forward again to only a few weeks ago, with Pompeo’s swagger
applied to meetings with Kim Jong-un.
Way
apart from a Netflix-style plot twist, a quite possible narrative is
Pompeo impressing on Kim the beauty of a sweet, US-brokered rare
earth elements deal. But China and Russia must be locked out. Or
else. It’s not hard to visualize Xi understanding the implications.
The
DPRK – this unique mix of Turkmenistan and post-USSR Romania –
may be on the cusp of being integrated to a vast supply chain via an
Iron Silk Road, with the Russia-China strategic partnership
simultaneously investing in railways, pipelines and ports in parallel
to North-South Korean special economic zones (SEZs), Chinese-style,
coming to fruition.
As
Gazprom’s Deputy CEO Vitaly Markelov has revealed: “The
South Korean side has asked Gazprom” to re-start a key project –
a gas pipeline across North Korea, an umbilical cord between South
Korea and the Eurasian landmass.
Since
key discussions at the Far East Summit in Vladivostok in September
2017, the roadmap is set for South Korea, China and Russia to attach
the DPRK to Eurasia integration, developing its agriculture,
hydropower and – crucially – mineral wealth.
As
much as the Trump administration may be late in the game, it’s
unthinkable Washington would abandon a piece of the (metal) action.
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