The new Middle East: A North/South divide where Israel is losing its narrative and its old game plan
A new geo-political Middle East is emerging which pits northern states and southern states against one another based on divergent economic and security interests. Saudi is top dog in the south which means that Israel is losing its ability to act unilaterally.
Adam
Garrie
11
November, 2017
With
the wars in Syria and Iraq drawing to a close and with the
governments of both states standing victorious over both Takfiri
terrorism as well as (broadly speaking) Kurdish ethno-nationalism, a
new reality in the Middle East has emerged where the region is
broadly divided between a geo-political north and south.
In
the north there is the Syria-Iraq alliance made possible by common
enemies and a common history, in spite of the Ba’athist schism of
1966-2003. Both states, for slightly different reasons are also
allied with Iran and for oddly similar, are reasons partners with
Russia. In the case of Syria, Damascus is an historic Soviet ally and
in the case of post-Ba’ahist Iraq, the government looks to attain
defence independence by working with a Russian state which unlike the
US, is willing to sell arms to any reasonable nation without
political preconditions.
Iran,
Iraq and Syria in turn are allied with Hezbollah, which in effect
means a large portion of Lebanon and in terms of geo-strategic
defence considerations, it means the most important part of Lebanon.
Turkey is now a partner of Iran, Iraq (to a surprisingly important
degree) and Russia. While Syria will be very unlikely to forgive
Turkey for its previous support of Takfiri driven regime change, in
reality, Syria and Turkey have a common post-Takfiri enemy: the
continued rumblings Kurdish ethno-nationalism. This means that it is
becoming increasingly likely that Syria and Turkey may end up
cooperating in the future, even if it means doing so at a covert
level because of heightened sensitivities to such a thing among the
general public in both Turkey and Syria.
To
the south, there is another story. Saudi Arabia and Egypt are now
close allies. The mentality and political independence of the Nasser
years are all but done in Cairo. Jordan can also be-lumped into this
group. Like Egypt, Jordan is one of the only two Arab states to have
normal relations with Israel and by many accounts Saudi Arabia will
soon follow. As goes Saudi, so goes the UAE, Bahrain and to a lesser
extent Kuwait and to an even lesser extent the relatively politically
unimportant Oman. Qatar finds it self in a situation that is both
precarious and surprisingly advantages, as I explored in a the piece
below.
The
alliance between the northern Middle East powers and the alliance
between the southern Middle East powers are not formal blocs in the
sense of the Warsaw Pact and NATO which divided most of Europe into
east and west. Instead, the new geo-political blocs of the Middle
East constitute a rapidly consolidating reality where countries are
united based on the pragmatic acknowledgement of common interests. By
including Turkey into the mix, one cannot say it is a “Shi’a
crescent” and likewise, by including both Turkey and Iran into the
northern Middle East, it is neither Pan-Arab. The same is true when
it comes to including Israel in the southern portion of the alliance,
which is very much where Israel is.
Against
this backdrop, it is easy to see why many in Saudi Arabia and beyond
are eyeing Lebanon as a potential prize. Lebanon, as a small state
with beautiful real estate, is a microcosm of the entire alliance,
certainly in terms of religious affiliation.
Hezbollah
is well aware of this and in a move that can only be described as
politically masterful and in terms of security, highly ethical,
Hezbollah like the fellow Shi’a Amal Movement and the broadly
Christian Free Patriotic Movement, have urged political unity at a
time when clearly Saudi Arabia is attempting to sow divisions in the
country.
Hezbollah
is openly positioning itself as a ‘national party’ in a country
that doesn’t have national parties. Lebanese politics often looks
like ‘the art of the impossible’ with sectarian pacts being more
prevalent than a unifying patriotism, as it is in Ba’athist Syria.
Hezbollah cannot change this and certainly cannot modify it
overnight, but in playing the national card rather than the Shi’a
versus Sunni/Wahhabi card, Hezbollah has transcended the extreme
sectarian politics of Lebanon, just as Saudi Arabia is becoming
unable to transcend the family feud between some men from the House
of Saud and other men from the House of Saud.
This
attitude which will give Hezbollah and its coalition partners the
moral high ground while refusing to exclude or scapegoat Lebanese
Sunnis for Saudi’s meddling, means that Lebanon is well placed to
become part of the political north of the Middle East.
This
leaves Israel and Palestine. For the Israeli regime, recent events
have all but killed Tel Aviv’s preferred narrative which it has
invoked since 1947. For Israeli propagandists it was always “us
versus the Arab world” and when the Arab world was attempting to
unite in the age of Nasser, there was some truth to an Arab world
uniting against Israel. This is something that the Arab world saw
positively and Israel saw negatively. After 1979, the Israeli
propaganda narrative was modified to be “The Arab world + Iran –
Egypt versus us”.
Today
though, with Jordan and Egypt on good terms with Tel Aviv, with Saudi
Arabia looking to increase its ties with Israel and with only one
Arab state, Syria, still fully behind the Palestinian cause, Israel’s
narrative has collapsed.
There
is no “Arab Israeli conflict” because half of the Arabs either
tacitly or overtly accept the presence of the settler state.
Likewise, Iran is a stalwart supporter of Palestine and Turkey is
becoming ever more distant from Israel.
Israel is on the verge of turning Turkey into an enemy
The collapse of Israel’s creation myth narrative also means increased Israeli isolation from a military standpoint. Just as Israel boosts its relations with the Arab states of the southern half of the Middle East, so too does it mean that Israel will have a more difficult time acting unilaterally.
Hezbollah’s
leader Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah has admitted for the first
time that under the “new” Muhammad bin Salman regime in Saudi
Arabia, the Israeli regime is being coerced by Saudi into making
provocative moves while Israel remains cautious for selfish reasons.
As recently as last week, it was assumed that Tel Aviv called the
shots, not Riyadh.
This
means that if Israel is going to preserve its new friends in the
southern part of the Middle East, it will have to do something it has
never done: consult with others in order to preserve alliances.
This
weakens Israel’s ability to fight its customary blitzkrieg wars, as
such wars rely on a single front against a united enemy. Instead, the
region now has multiple possible fronts with many different enemies
to rage at, in many scattered locations and many different partners
to placate or even show deference towards.
By contrast, Saudi Arabia
prefers slow burning/grinding conflicts for obvious logistical
reasons but also for the tactical reason that Saudi Arabia wants to
present itself as the legitimate leader of the Arabs while Israel is
keen to present itself as the country that Arabs fear. In reality,
Israel is more hated than feared and Saudi is far from a leader of
the Arab world, but these are the aims, however preposterous, of both
states, respectively.
Even
in Yemen where Saudi has used a large amount of shock and awe, it is
still far from the Israeli blitzkrieg where a swift ground attack
follows shortly from aerial bombardment. Likewise, Israel probably
wouldn’t have the patience for such a protracted war, while Saudi
at least for now, still is intend on beating the Houthis in Yemen, a
task which will likely prove impossible.
This
helps explain Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah’s confidence in the fact that
Israel will not go to war in Lebanon even at Saudi’s gold plated
behest. Israel knows that a conflict in Lebanon in 2017 would be a
long protracted struggle, the kind Saudi might be willing to put up
with in Yemen, but Israel does not have the stomach for on its
border.
I
previously wrote how this new reality could work in the favour of the
besieged Palestinians in the long term. I stated,
“On the one hand, if Tel Aviv concentrates on both co-opting and being co-opted by states like Saudi, Egypt and Jordan who in recent decades have shown little enthusiasm for the Palestinian cause, there is a danger that Palestinian land could become a tragic ghetto of isolation in an otherwise booming region. However, on the other hand, the idea of prosperity trickling horizontally across a newly booming economic region could actually take the wind out of the sails of the Israel-Palestine conflict, something which in the long term bodes well for Palestine reclaiming its full statehood. This is the case because if the Tel Aviv regime becomes fully immersed in a mostly Arab led regional prosperity initiative, having to contend with rightfully angry Palestinians could only exorcise all parties. Furthermore, Palestinian grievances in a would-be south-Arab ghetto could further incur the wrath of Palestine’s meaningful allies including Lebanon (aka Hezbollah), Syria, non-Arab Iran and in the future, quote possibly a revitalised and almost certainly pro-Palestine Iraq. Wanting to keep such countries away from Saudi’s ‘south Arab’ project would be in the interests (however selfish) of Saudi, Jordan, Egypt and the regime in Tel Aviv.
And here is where a peaceful one-state solution could come into play. Rather than divide a portion of an increasingly inter-dependent south-Arab region (aka the two-state solution), leaving open the possibility of Syria, Hezbollah, Iraq and non-Arab Iran playing a part in this new region via the Palestinian back door, it might instead be easier to create a single state along the pre-1947 Palestinian borders that could be described as Palestine with cosmopolitan characterises or perhaps Israel with Arab characteristics, depending on the demographics and political will of various countries in ten years or more from today.
Just as Lebanon is a cosmopolitan country that is increasingly tied in with the north-Arab region, so too could this new Palestine be a kind of cosmopolitan bridge to the south, a place which like Lebanon has a shared history that at times has been peaceful and at others has been horrific. Tragically, Israeli meddling is by far the greatest author of mystery in both Palestine and Lebanon.
Ultimately, unless something radically changes in Egypt, Jordan or Saudi, the kind of good will that countries like Syria has for Palestine will never be present in the new ‘south Arab’ bloc. However, pragmatism which would come about in the ‘new Arab south’ to spite countries like Syria and groups like Hezbollah, could indeed force a pragmatic one-state solution based on the peace that is implicit in the need to pacific a region in order to make it ‘prosperity friendly’. In this sense, Palestine could breath a much needed breath after decades of asphyxiation, while Palestine friends in the ‘new Arab north’ would have something of a last laugh as they have got a decades long running start in developing key relations with China and Russia.
This situation is both far from assured and also far from ideal in many ways. It is however, a possible solution which still represents some improvement on the hopeless status quo”.
Thus,
we see the emergence of a new Middle East, one which has risen from
the sinews of war in the north and political stagnation in the south.
As Israel, Saudi, Egypt and Jordan become ever more economically
interdependent, this will only further limit Israel’s ability to
act in a unilateral fashion in its old blitzkrieg style.
While
the north is increasingly revitalised by victory, the south is
increasingly interdependent. Into this fray, the most heavily armed
state in the Middle East, Israel is now trapped in a cycle of
interdependence, without its old narrative, without its old might,
without its old confidence and without its old boogie men.
Israel’s
devious attempts to destroy Arab unity have just backfired in a
spectacular fashion. Israel has built itself a fortress of partners
and these partners have a lot to say to Israel and not all of it is
the echo of a choir. For the first time in history, Israel may just
have to listen to what others are saying.
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