Escalation in Syria – how
far can the Russians be pushed?
15 February, 2018
[This analysis was
written for the Unz Review]
Events in Syria have
recently clearly taken a turn for the worse and there is an increasing amount
of evidence that the Russian task force in Syria is being targeted by a
systematic campaign of “harassing attacks”.
First, there was the
(relatively successful) drone and mortar attack on the Russian Aerospace base
in Khmeimin. Then there was the shooting down of a Russian SU-25 over the city
of Maasran in the Idlib province. Now we hear of Russian casualties in the US
raid on a Syrian column (along with widely exaggerated claims of “hundreds” of
killed Russians). In the first case, Russian officials did openly voice their
strong suspicion that the attack was if not planned and executed by the USA,
then at least coordinated with the US forces in the vicinity. In the case of
the downing of the SU-25, no overt accusations have been made, but many experts
have stated that the altitude at which the SU-25 was hit strongly suggests a
rather modern MANPAD of a type not typically seen in Syria (the not so subtle
hint being here that these were US Stingers sent to the Kurds by the USA). As
for the latest attack on the Syrian column, what is under discussion is not who
did it but rather what kind of Russian personnel was involved, Russian military
or private contractors (the latter is a much more likely explanation since the
Syrian column had no air-cover whatsoever). Taken separately, none of these
incidents mean very much but taken together they might be indicative of a new
US strategy in Syria: to punish the Russians as much as possible short of an
overt US attack on Russian forces. To me this hypothesis seems plausible for
the following reasons:
First, the USA and
Israel are still reeling in humiliation and impotent rage over their defeat in
Syria: Assad is still in power, Daesh is more or less defeated, the Russians
were successful not only their military operations against Daesh but also in their
campaign to bring as many “good terrorists” to the negotiating table as
possible. With the completion of a successful conference on Syria in Russia and
the general agreement of all parties to begin working on a new constitution,
there was a real danger of peace breaking out, something the AngloZionist are
absolutely determined to oppose (check out this apparently hacked document
which, if genuine, clearly states the US policy not to allow the Russian to get
anything done).
Second, both Trump
and Netanyahu have promised to bring in lots of “victories” to prove how manly
and strong they are (as compared to the sissies which preceded them). Starting
an overt war against Russian would definitely be a “proof of manhood”, but a
much too dangerous one. Killing Russians “on the margins”, so to speak, either
with plausible deniability or, alternatively, killing Russians private
contractors is much safer and thus far more tempting option.
Third, there are
presidential elections coming up in Russia and the US Americans are still
desperately holding on to their sophomoric notion that if they create trouble
for Putin (sanctions or body bags from Syria) they can somehow negatively
impact his popularity in Russia (in reality they achieve the opposite effect,
but they are too dull and ignorant to realize that).
Last but not least,
since the AngloZionist have long lost the ability to actually getting anything
done, their logical fall-back position is not let anybody else succeed either.
This is the main purpose of the entire US deployment in northern Syria: to
create trouble for Turkey, Iran, Syria and, of course, Russia.
The bottom line is
this: since the US Americans have declared that they will (illegally) stay in
Syria until the situation “stabilizes” they now must do everything their power
to destabilize Syria. Yes, there is a kind of a perverse logic to all that…
For Russia, all this
bad news could be summed up in the following manner: while Russia did defeat
Daesh in Syria she is still far from having defeated the AngloZionists in the
Middle-East. The good news is, however, that Russia does have options to deal
with this situation.
Step one:
encouraging the Turks
There is a
counter-intuitive but in many ways an ideal solution for Russia to counter the
US invasion of Syria: involve the Turks. How? Not by attacking the US forces
directly, but by attacking the Kurdish militias the US Americans are currently
“hiding” behind (at least politically). Think of it, while the US (or Israel)
will have no second thoughts whatsoever before striking Syrian or Iranian
forces, actually striking Turkish forces would carry an immense political risk:
following the US-backed coup attempt against Erdogan and, just to add insult to
injury, the US backing for the creation of a “mini-Kurdistsan” both in Iraq and
in Syria, US-Turkish relations are at an all-time low and it would not take
much to push the Turks over the edge with potentially cataclysmic consequences
for the US, EU, NATO, CENTCOM, Israel and all the AngloZionist interests in the
region. Truly, there is no overstating the strategic importance of Turkey for
Europe, the Mediterranean and the Middle-East, and the US Americans know that.
From this flows a very real if little understood consequence: the Turkish armed
forces in Syria basically enjoy what I would call a “political immunity” from
any US attacks, that is to say that (almost) no matter what the Turks do, the
US would (almost) never consider actually openly using force against them
simply because the consequence of, say, a USAF strike on a Turkish army column
would be too serious to contemplate.
In fact, I believe
that the US-Turkish relationship is so bad and so one-sided that I see a
Turkish attack on a Kurdish (or “good terrorist”) column/position with embedded
US Special Forces far more likely than a US attack on a Turkish army column.
This might sound counter-intuitive, but let’s say the Turks did attack a
Kurdish (or “good terrorist”) column/position with US personnel and that US
servicemen would die as the result. What would/could the US do? Retaliate in
kind? No way! Not only is the notion of the US attacking a fellow NATO country
member is quite unthinkable, it would most likely be followed by a Turkish
demand that the US/NATO completely withdraw from Turkey’s territory and
airspace. In theory, the US could ask the Israelis to do their dirty job for
them, but the Israelis are not stupid (even if they are crazy) and they won’t
have much interest in starting a shooting war with Turkey over what is a
US-created problem in a “mini-Kurdistan”, lest any hallowed “Jewish blood” be
shed for some basically worthless goyim.
No, if the Turks
actually killed US servicemen there would be protests and a flurry of
“consultations” and other symbolic actions, but beyond that, the US would take
the losses and do nothing about it. As for Erdogan, his popularity at home
would only soar even higher. What all this means in practical terms is that if
there is one actor which can seriously disrupt the US operations in northern
Syria, or even force the US to withdraw, it is Turkey. That kind of capability
also gives Turkey a lot of bargaining power with Russia and Iran which I am
sure Erdogan will carefully use to his own benefit. So far Erdogan has only
threatened to deliver an “Ottoman slap” to the USA and Secretary of State
Tillerson is traveling to Ankara to try to avert a disaster, but the Turkish
instance that the USA chose either the Turkish or the Kurdish side in the
conflict very severely limits the chances of any real breakthrough (the Israel
lobby being 100% behind the Kurds). One should never say never, but I submit
that it would take something of a miracle at this point to really salvage the
US-Turkish relationship. Russia can try to capitalize on this dynamic.
The main weakness of
this entire concept is, of course, that the USA is still powerful enough,
including inside Turkey, and it would be very dangerous for Erdogan to try to
openly confront and defy Uncle Sam. So far, Erdogan has been acting boldly and
in overt defiance of the USA, but he also understands the risks of going too
far and for him to even consider taking such risks there have to be prospects
of major benefits from him. Here the Russians have two basic options: either to
promise the Turks something very inciting or to somehow further deteriorate the
current relationship between the US and Turkey. The good news here is that
Russian efforts to drive a wedge between the US and Turkey are be greatly
assisted by the US support for Israel, Kurds, and Gulenists.
The other obvious
risk is that any anti-Kurdish operation can turn into yet another partition of
Syria, this time by the Turks. However, the reality is that the Turks can’t
really stay for too long in Syria, especially not if Russia and Iran oppose
this. There is also the issue of international law which is much easier for the
USA to ignore than for the Turks.
For all these
reasons using the Turks to put pressure on the USA has its limitations. Still,
if the Turks continue to insist that the USA stop supporting the Kurds, or if
they continue putting military pressure on the Kurdish militias, then the
entire US concept of a US-backed “mini-Kurdistan” collapses and, with it, the
entire US partition plan for Syria.
So far, the Iraqis
have quickly dealt with the US-sponsored “mini-Kurdistan” in Iraq and the Turks
are now taking the necessary steps to deal with the US-sponsored
“mini-Kurdistan” in Syria at which point *their* problem will be solved. The
Turks are not interested in helping Assad or, for that matter, Putin and they
don’t care what happens to Syria as long as *their* Kurdish problem is under
control. This means that the Syrians, Russians, and Iranians should not place
too much hope on the Turks turning against the USA unless, of course, the
correct circumstances are created. Only the future will tell whether the
Russians and the Iranians will be able to help to create such circumstances.
Step two: saturating
Syria with mobile modern short/middle range air defenses
Right now nobody
knows what kind of air-defense systems the Russians have been delivering to the
Syrians over the past couple of years, but that is clearly the way to go for
the Russians: delivering as many modern and mobile air defense systems to the
Syrians. While this would be expensive, the best solution here would be to
deliver as many Pantsir-S1 mobile Gun/SAM systems and 9K333 Verba MANPADs as
possible to the Syrians and the Iranians. The combination of these two systems
would immensely complicate any kind of air operations for the US Americans and
Israelis, especially since there would be no practical way of reliably
predicting the location from which they could operate. And since both the USA
and Israel are operating in the Syrian skies in total violation of
international law while the Syrian armed forces would be protecting their own
sovereign airspace, such a delivery of air-defense systems by Russia to Syria
would be impeccably legal. Best of all, it would be absolutely impossible for
the AngloZionist to know who actually shot at them since these weapon systems
are mobile and easy to conceal. Just like in Korea, Vietnam or Lebanon, Russian
crews could even be sent to operate the Syrian air defense systems and there
would be no way for anybody to prove that “the Russians did it” when US and
Israeli aircraft would start falling out of the skies. The Russians would enjoy
what the CIA calls “plausible deniability”. The US Americans and Israelis
would, of course, turn against the weaker party, the Syrians, but that other
than feeling good that would not really make a difference on the ground as the
Syrians skies would not become safer for US or Israelis air forces.
The other option for
the Russians would be to offer upgrades (software and missile) to the existing
Syrian air defense systems, especially their road-mobile 2K12 Kub and 9K37 Buk
systems. Such upgrades, especially if combined with enough deployed Pantsirs
and Verbas would be a nightmare for both the US Americans and the Israelis. The
Turks would not care much since they are already basically flying with the full
approval of the Russians anyway, and neither would the Iranians who, as far as
I know, have no air operations in Syria.
One objection to
this plan would be that two can play this game and that there is nothing
preventing the USA from sending even more advanced MANPADs to their “good
terrorist” allies, but that argument entirely misses the point: if both sides
do the same thing, the side which is most dependent on air operations (the USA)
stands to lose much more than the side which has the advantage on the ground
(the Russians). Furthermore, by sending MANPADs to Syria, the USA is alienating
a putative ally, Turkey, whereas if Russia sends MANPADs and other SAMs to
Syria the only one who will be complaining will be the Israelis. When that
happens, the Russians will have a simple and truthful reply: we did not start
this game, your US allies did, you can go and thank them for this mess.
The main problem in
Syria is the fact that the US and the Israelis are currently operating in the
Syrian skies with total impunity. If this changes, this will be a slow and
gradual process. First, there would be a few isolated losses (like the Israeli
F-16 recently), then we would see that the location of US and/or Israeli
airstrikes would gradually shift from urban centers and central command posts
to smaller, more isolated targets (such as vehicle columns). This would
indicate an awareness that the most lucrative targets are already too well
defended. Eventually, the number of air sorties would be gradually replaced by
cruise and ballistic missiles strikes. Underlying it all would be a shift from
offensive air operations to force protection which, in turn, would give the
Syrians, Iranians, and Hezbollah a much easier environment to operate in. But
the necessary first step for any of that to happen would be to dramatically
increase the capability of Syrian air defenses.
Hezbollah has, for
decades, very successfully operated under a total Israelis air supremacy and
their experience of this kind of operations would be invaluable to the Syrians
until they sufficiently built up their air defense capabilities.
Conclusion: is
counter-escalation really the only option?
Frankly, I am
starting to believe that the Empire has decided to attempt upon a partial
“reconquista” of Syria, even Macron is making some noises about striking the
Syrians to “punish” them for their use of (non-existing) chemical weapons. At
the very least, the USA wants to make the Russians pay as high a price as
possible for their role in Syria. Further US goals in Syria include:
The imposition of a
de-facto partition of Syria by taking under control the Syrian territ
ory east
of the Euphrates river (we could call that “plan C version 3.0”)
The theft of the gas
fields located in northeastern Syria
The creation of a
US-controlled staging area from which Kurdish, good terrorist and bad terrorist
operations can be planned and executed
The sabotaging of
any Russian-backed peace negotiations
The support for
Israeli operations against Iranian and Hezbollah forces in Lebanon and Syria
Engaging in regular
attacks against Syrian forces attempting to liberate their country from foreign
invaders
Presenting the
invasion and occupation of Syria as one of the “victories” promised by Trump to
the MIC and the Israel lobby
So far the Russian
response to this developing strategy has been a rather a passive one and the
current escalation strongly suggests that a new approach might be needed. The
shooting down of the Israeli F-16 is a good first step, but much more needs to
be done to dramatically increase the costs the Empire will have to pay for is
policies towards Syria. The increase in the number of Russian commentators and
analysts demanding a stronger reaction to the current provocations might be a
sign that something is in the making.
The Saker
Solari Report interview with the Saker: Neocons & the War Lobby
To listen to podcast GO HERE
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