Minsk Agreement 2.0 discussed

Here is a selection of commentary on the Minsk ceasfire from the usual crowd:

Based on this we can see the following:

• The Russians, Hollande and, persumably Merkel are very happy with a hard-won deal
• Poroshenko is visably unhappy with the deal and has immediately contradicted the main parts of the agreement - “no federalisation or autonomy” for Novorussia
• The leaders of DPR/LPR (Zakharenko and Plotnitsky) were not signaturies to this deal
• The Anglo-American side are clearly unhappy and immediately expressing scepticism (reflected well by the rapidly pro-war Guardian), although Obama is saying he would roll back sanctions if the deal is effective
• It is a deal based on Realpolitik and the very real interests of the Russians not to be the ones to take the world to the edge of a nuclear holocaust.
• The usual crowd is saying immediately that this is a betrayal, ‘appeasement’
• The reality is that no-one on the ground has a real reason to observe the ceasefire – not the Novorussia militias who are winning this war hands down, or Poroshenko whon only ever wanted to win yet another breathing space to regroup his forces, this time with American arms.
• The next war, when it comes, will be a big one and involve direct conflict between Russia and the West.

This, at least is what I have gleaned on a quick glance.

---Seemorerocks

One picture is worth a thousand words

Minsk peace plan 2.0 - 

Everyone's happy except for 

Ukraine's leader

This is one Russian (non-official) view

A new calm before a big war

Ситуация в Дебальцево может опрокинуть все 

минские договоренности

"There is no cauldron, Mister President!"

http://fortruss.blogspot.co.nz/2015/02/a-new-calm-before-big-war.html

February 12, 2015

Evgeny Krutikov for Vzgliad

Translated from Russian by Kristina Rus

The situation in Debaltsevo may overturn all Minsk 

agreements

During the entire Minsk negotiations Ukrainian General staff disinformed Poroshenko about the situation in Debaltsevo, and the most important trump card in the hands of the President of Ukraine turned out to be a bluff. UAF was not able to crack open the cauldron, and it has turned into the most sticking point of negotiations, which may turn everything agreed upon in Minsk upside down.

Poroshenko's perception of reality was ultimately shattered by his propaganda trip to Kramatorsk in the company of the chief of the General staff Muzhenko and a French philosopher-Russophobe Bernard-Henri Levy. The President of Ukraine is a man not too brave, very emotional and gullible. What was originally conceived as "pumping" of Western public opinion with all the classic moves of PR campaigns, turned into a psychological trap for himself.

The Minister of Defense and head of General staff, spurred by Turchynov, had promised the President to carry out the operation, which will deblock Debaltsevo, and at the same time "will pay back for Kramatorsk." When Poroshenko was already flying to Minsk, he was convinced that it is enough to buy some time and the attack on Logvinovo will end in complete victory, and he will get a new starting position for negotiations. Throughout the entire night Poroshenko checked for updates from his General staff, but victory did not come. It hasn't come by morning, and a light bulb went off: something is not right, the cauldron does exist! Although he has already for 10 hours told respected people that it did not.

One can only guess about the motives of the security block of Ukraine for disorienting and misinforming their Commander In Chief. The dominant conspiracy theory: Turchynov, actually managing the security block, thus was buying time, following the general American line. More down to earth and realistic version: it was a traditional (of all times and all peoples) aspiration of parquet generals to please and ward off accusations, glossing over reality. Considering the general panic mood, combined with an unbridled propaganda, it is much more likely than a transatlantic conspiracy about Debaltsevo cauldron. The Ukrainian command also doesn't quite understand what is happening. There is no connection with some units for more than a week, and if there is, it boils down mainly to cries for help and heated exchanges about "who is to blame". The chain of misinformation may well start from the very bottom, gradually accumulating "meat". And to treat any information in a favorable light is a very common mistake of bad scouts and analysts. The past six months revealed much about the strategists of the Ukrainian General staff.

All night from Wednesday to Thursday UAF tried to exert pressure upon the entire front line. A formation of two thousand from Svetlodarsk, which was assembled by UAF for almost a week, went head on to the strongholds and minefields of NAF at Logvinovo, but the militia has also strengthened this position in recent days. NAF even managed to transfer significant reserves to Uglegorsk. As a result an attack on Logvinovo from two sides (there was also an attack from Debaltsevo, but very unconvincing) was stopped only by the morning. By this moment Poroshenko got his own localized apocalypse.

UAF also tried to attack directly from Lugansk through the infamous village of Schastye, simultaneously firing on the city from MLRS, which has not happened for six months. UAF command, as it turned out later, believed that LPR units were too busy near Debaltsevo and Bakhmut highway, that supposedly weakened defense of the direct road to Lugansk (this is, again, another demonstration of the low level of Ukrainian intelligence and strategic analysis). Battalion "Azov" again imitated the offensive on the coastal route through the neutral zone with the same results, as a few days ago. These people are generally more prone to simulate turbulent activity than to thoughtful action.

Where UAF is not capable of real activity, the pressure was carried out using MRLS and heavy weapons. For example, Peski, Opytnoye, Donetsk itself, Gorlovka, Yenakievo, Makeevka, Dokuchayevsk, and Dzerzhinsk were heavily shelled.

Vladimir Putin, appearing to the press after the talks, openly called on the Ukrainian side to allow troops in Debaltsevo to surrender, or to arrange an organized exit. Poroshenko wanted to turn the situation around Debaltsevo into his almost only trump card, and in the end it became a monstrous failure. In fact, regardless of what and in what language is written in the agreement of the contact group, Debaltsevo cauldron may turn into a huge mass grave in the next two days, because none of the demoralized generals (as Poroshenko himself) will give an order to surrender. And to organize a controlled exit of the Ukrainian troops from the encirclement in such a short time is impossible. Soldiers are not concentrated in any one place, but scattered in groups by checkpoints, many without communications, without commanders and without ammo. Even if they can scavenge some food at homesteads, no one will bring them ammo or medical supplies. In the steppes there is dirt and slush, to detour the positions of the militia on the road to Logvinovo through fields is impossible, even if there was fuel. Militia doesn't even need to use heavy weaponry, it is enough to gradually cut off one checkpoint from the another.

After the defeat of Ukrainian attack on Logvinovo a real danger emerged to get a second cauldron in Svetlodarsk, which would trap this other "deblocking unit", that was built up over a week. Another thing is that it is problematic to create a new operational encirclement of a large formation in two days, and any offensive action by NAF will now be associated with hysterical information uproar in Ukraine, although UAF themselves have failed at Uglegorsk, Logvinovo, and now of Svetlodarsk. Only officers and soldiers can explain to the Ukrainian public that "a cauldron - is no good", but if they start talking, it will seem more like a riot, and in a hysterical atmosphere no one will listen.

It is interesting, that a new offensive on Logvinovo was started by UAF immediately after the announcement of the results of Minsk talks, sometime around noon. Commander Semen Semenchenko - one of the most active "Twitter warriors" - said that the Ukrainians had already taken Logvinovo and are "carrying out a sweep". In reality, the situation remained exactly what it was, a new attack on "cauldron lid" is purely political in nature.

Thus, a small village Logvinovo on the highway Debaltsevo - Artemovsk turned for Poroshenko into a "new airport", only now these attacks also have a purely military, practical value.

Poroshenko will be now learning about the difficult reality with apparent difficulty and reluctance. For him this reality, among other things, is dotted with various "red lines" which he can't cross even verbally. The military situation had become a taboo, although it remains a key part of the agenda. Even the questions of the political status can be brushed off, creating "joint commissions" including representatives from DPR and LPR, but the front line requires immediate decisions. Sometimes everything depends not on big ideas and global plays, but simply on the human qualities of a particular politician or officer. But a commander in chief of the Ukrainian army, alas, got this position as a figure of compromise and was controllable from the start. He, as a person, may want to achieve something. To preserve peace in Europe, for example. But it is beyond the range of circumstances and human power.

Debaltsevo cauldron has evolved from a military operation of a local value into the main factor of political settlement. What will happen there in the next few days (or rather, what steps will Kiev take to change the situation) will determine the further balance of power. To demonstrate DPR and LPR in the face of Europeans as "wild barbarians", and Russia as the aggressor will not work anymore. You were given options - it's your choice. Even Zakharchenko and Plotnitsky were brought to you for negotiations, and in the end we got a vague paper signed by Kuchma, whose position at the moment is - a retiree. "Ratified verbally" certain agreements - it's such a fresh and new phenomenon in international diplomacy that all textbooks should be rewritten.

To seriously discuss the details of pulling the heavy artillery to some distance from the front line (lines?) is pointless. As well as to discuss clause-by-clause an agreement, from which there will not even be a memory left in a short time. Yes, the Ukrainian troops will be pulled from the actual line, but Ukraine's control over the border with Russia can only be restored after a constitutional reform, guaranteeing new status for Donetsk and Lugansk. That is, "money - in the morning, chairs - in the evening".

A much more important question, is how long can the state of "no peace, no war" hold. To predict it now is extremely difficult, it all depends on many factors, including purely private, invisible to the naked eye. Most of these factors are now in Kiev. What will happen to public opinion, if the losses exceed all reasonable limits? When and on what conditions will Debaltsevo surrender? How hard will the Parliament groups fight against the bills on the new status of Donbass, and how will Poroshenko cope with it? There is a myriad of these key elements. Especially that in reality there is no monitoring mechanism for the removal of heavy weapons from either side. OSCE can not monitor the ceasefire: tanks and 80 mm mortars will remain at the contact line, which do not fall under the category of "heavy artillery", and in an urban setting - they are terrible, deadly weapons. A mine doesn't break the asphalt, but bounces from it. Shrapnel flies in all directions parallel to the ground, and people lose their legs.

All this looks like a new calm before a big war.

Minsk Talks Didn’t Lead to a Magical Peace

The Normandy four have agreed to a ceasefire in Donbas, but real challenges remain if Ukraine is to ever experience a lasting peace.

Andrew Korybko

Sputnik News,

12 February, 2015

The ceasefire is planned to take place beginning on 15 February, and according to initial reports, the withdrawal of heavy artillery from the front lines is to be completed within two weeks. Not only that, but if all goes according to plan, foreign mercenaries, “illegal armed groups”, and military equipment are to leave Ukraine, and the OSCE is envisaged as playing some kind of stabilizing force. Ukraine is also supposed to enact some kind of special status for Donetsk and Luhansk that will guarantee their rights and autonomy.

All of this sounds fine and dandy in theory, but serious problems aren't being addressed in fact. In the countdown to the ceasefire, both sides are expected to wage an all-out war to consolidate their gains, and most observers are forgetting that there is still a sizeable (and violent) portion of Ukrainian society that is absolutely opposed to halting the fighting in Donbas.

While global eyes were directed on Minsk, the US announced that it would begin training Ukraine’s National Guard in March, showing that it’s digging itself even deeper into the country’s civil war and fortifying its influence in the country.

The Countdown

In the coming days, both Kiev and the southeastern Ukrainian republics will likely fight an all-out conflict to consolidate their respective gains to either use as bargaining chips in future negotiations or to hold on to for long-term gain.

No matter if heavy artillery is removed as expected or not, there are still thousands of troops on the ground more motivated than ever to ‘beat the clock’ and lay claim to as much territory as possible before the ceasefire commences.

A major unresolved issue is what becomes of Kiev’s troops encircled in Debaltseve, since if they remain there after the ceasefire and don’t surrender or are eliminated beforehand, it could create a bridgehead for the capital to claim more eastern territory, and possibly disrupt a sizeable segment of the self-proclaimed republics’ gains acquired since their counter-offensive last month.

Poroshenko’s Political Plight

Ukraine’s leader placed himself into a dark political corner by agreeing to the ceasefire, since there are many militant elements in his country’s society that are opposed to any cessation of violence in Donbas or special autonomy for the region. It’s not just regular civilians (who most actively protested for a more ‘successful’ campaign back in the fall), but also the irregular pro-Kiev militias that Poroshenko has to fear. Just two weeks ago, many members of the Aidar battalion attempted to storm the Ministry of Defense headquarters to protest their official disbandment by Kiev. These fighters are known for their brutality and have been accused of war crimes by Amnesty International, thus evidencing their propensity for extremely violent ‘solutions’ to their ‘problems’.

The Aidar Battalion isn’t alone, as likeminded extreme nationalist groups such as oligarch Igor Kolomoyskiy’s Azov Battalion and Dmytro Yarosh’s Right Sector are also opposed to peace in Donbas. If these three groups teamed up and applied pressure on Poroshenko for being a ‘sell-out’ and ‘soft on terrorism’ (which is what they accused him of being during last September’s Minsk talks), then they could potentially rile up enough of the population to create serious destabilization in Kiev and possibly enact another color revolution, if not a direct militant coup.

This scenario is certainly foreseeable since the agreement supposedly stipulates the disarmament of “illegal armed groups”, which could be interpreted as being against the three aforementioned nationalist groups just as much as against the militias of Donetsk and Luhansk. In the first case, they’ll likely team up and fight against Kiev if they can’t be formally integrated into its armed forces, whereas for the latter, they’ll vie to have an official status within their respective territories, which would obviously upset the nationalist groups and individuals in the rest of Ukraine. Either way, the nationalist groups are likely to remain a factor of political and military instability in Ukraine long after 15 February, and they present the greatest threat to Poroshenko’s power and any peace in Donbas.  

Where’s Washington?

While the entire Minsk hubbub was dominating the news circuits, an important tidbit of information was lost on most of the global public. Ben Hodges, the commander of US Army Europe, announced that the American military will be training 600 members of Ukraine’s National Guard beginning in March. Semon Semenchenko, the commander of the pro-Kiev Donbas volunteer battalion, described the future exercises as being like “the traditional training systems of the US Navy Seals and Delta Force”, which are among the world’s most elite special forces units. This underreported news could likely be even more significant than the ‘ceasefire’ achieved at Minsk, since it has widely reverberating implications for any potential peace in Ukraine.

The US is now training the vanguard force for any future operations in Donbas, and these 600 individuals can then pass along their US-acquired skills and knowledge to other members of Kiev’s military.

This means that Blackwater’s training is no longer necessary (nor allowed by the proposed agreement), and that the mercenary trainers are simply being swapped out for actual US Army personnel.

Other than increasing the efficiency of Kiev’s forces, the US may also seek to train them in operating unfamiliar Western weaponry in preparation for its eventual delivery to Ukraine. No matter if there’s an active war in Donbas or not, that won’t prevent the US or its allies from selling weapons to Ukraine if they want to. The US can either do this directly via shipments through the Black Sea or indirectly through its Polish and Romanian proies.

So in the greater mix of things, although Washington wasn’t present at the current Minsk talks, its growing military influence in Ukraine was definitely the elephant in the room that nobody wanted to address.

The Minsk "Agreement"

by Alexander Mercouris

http://vineyardsaker.blogspot.co.nz/2015/02/the-minsk-agreement.html

Already there is debate about who has "won" and who has "lost" in the Minsk talks.

The short answer is that as the German foreign minister Steinmeier correctly said there is no breakthrough but the Russians and the NAF have made progress.

One point needs to be explained or reiterated (since I have explained it already and many times).

The agreement does not make provision for federalisation or autonomy for the Donbass but still only refers to the grant of a law according the Donbass temporary special status within the Ukraine.

There could not be an agreement for federalisation out of the Minsk negotiations because they are primarily a summit meeting of five powers - Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, German and France. The Russians have always insisted that this is an internal conflict and civil war within the Ukraine and between Ukrainians and it is for the Ukrainians and them alone to resolve their internal differences between them through negotiations.

Given that this is Russia's stance, Russia and the other powers cannot impose a federalisation scheme on the Ukrainians and they have not - at least overtly - sought to do so. What the stated objective of the Minsk talks is - at least from the Russian point of view - is to set up conditions and a process for the constitutional negotiations that the Russians have been pushing for (and which were supposedly agreed on 21st February 2014 and on 17th April 2014 and 5th September 2014) to take place.

The Russians have been insisting on these negotiations since the February coup. The Russians are not publicly pre-ordaining the outcome of those negotiations because were they to do so they would not be negotiations at all. Whatever a negotiation is, it is by definition not something whose outcome is preordained.

If the Russians sought to preordain the outcome of the negotiations by insisting on federalisation as the outcome they would be imposing their views on the parties and would be admitting that they are a party to the conflict, which is what they have consistently said they are not. They would in effect be doing what the US has tried to do in the Syrian conflict, which is insist on an outcome to negotiations (Assad's resignation) before negotiations even take place. The Russians have always opposed this sort of behaviour and they are being consistent in not openly adopting it now.

Depending on what the parties agree between them, the negotiations could in theory result in decentralisation, federalisation, a confederation or even outright independence for the Donbass (the Russians floated that idea as a serious possibility in the summer). The latter is not by the way contrary to the reaffirmation of respect or even support for the Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity that we saw in the statement today. If the internal parties to the conflict were to decide on a formal partition as the solution to the Ukraine's conflict, then international actors like Russia could recognise it without calling into question their previous declared support for the Ukraine's territorial integrity, as they previously did when Czechoslovakia split up.

In reality everybody knows that the Russians' preferred option is federalisation and the Europeans are now edging towards that solution. Whether it is a viable solution is another matter.

Once this key point is understood everything else starts to fall into place.

Last spring and summer the Russians sought a ceasefire so the constitutional negotiations could begin. The Europeans are now also demanding a ceasefire (they were less keen on the idea last spring and summer). There is now therefore an agreement for a ceasefire.

Back in August the Russians demanded the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the Donbass. There is now an agreement for the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the Donbass.

If that happens it will be a major weakening of the Junta's position in the Donbass because it is the Junta whose military has the big preponderance in heavy weapons. If the opposing sides are left with light infantry forces, the advantage on the ground will pass decisively to the NAF.

The political machinery that was supposed to have been agreed in Minsk on 5th September 2014 to create the conditions for the constitutional elections is being revived. Thus there is to be a law of special status for the Donbass pending the constitutional negotiations to clarify its current legal status and provide legal mechanisms for its internal administration by the NAF (Ukraine passed one previously and then reneged on it), more elections etc.

There is a new provision, which is the first indications of some sort of timeline for this process with the constitutional negotiations supposed to have been concluded by the end of the year.

There are also some ideas for a beefed up monitoring process via the OSCE.

Will any of this happen? Highly doubtful I would say. Consider what happened after the Minsk process of 5th September 2014. The Junta did not withdraw its heavy weapons. It did not retreat to the agreed boundary line. It imposed an economic blockade on the Donbass (it is now obliged to lift it). It rescinded the law on the Donbass's special status. It reinforced its army and in January it attempted to renew its offensive.

Is there any more prospect of this process succeeding than did the one that was agreed in Minsk in September?

The big difference between this process and the previous process is that the Europeans are now formally involved. Its success or failure ultimately depends on whether the Europeans are going to insist on the Junta fulfilling its obligations. They spectacularly failed to do so before and I have to say I think it is very unlikely they will do so now. If the Europeans fail to insist on the Junta fulfilling its obligations then the process will unravel as the previous Minsk process did and with the balance of advantage continuing to shift every day on the ground towards the NAF we will see a further renewal of the fighting and a further NAF advance in the spring.

In the meantime control of the border, disarmament of "illegal armed groups" etc are now overtly linked to the successful conclusion of the constitutional negotiations, which is supposed to happen before the end of the year. Of course if the constitutional negotiations succeed, then when all these things happen we will have a different Ukraine from the one we have now. At that point the control of border posts etc will be in the hands of differently constituted authorities from those that exist today.

Will those negotiations actually happen? Will they succeed if they do? I doubt it. The Junta will resist them tooth and nail if only because those negotiations put in jeopardy the whole Maidan project and by their mere fact call into question the Junta's legitimacy.

It depends in the end on what the Europeans do. This has been true of the conflict from the start.

That it depends on what the Europeans do is in itself a good reason to doubt this process will succeed. The probability is more conflict down the road but in the meantime Poroshenko's admission that there is "no good news for the Ukraine" from this process tells us who is winning.

Comments from Jon Hellivig

Deja Vu

Via Facebook

The first feeling one gets of this new Minsk agreement is a feeling of deja vue. From the details that are emerging from today’s Minsk agreemet, it does not seem to be significantly different from the September Minsk agreement. The only real difference is the show of strong interest from the side of European Union in the persons of the leaders of the two of its most powerful countries, Germany and France. The Russian position represented by Putin has all the time been strongly in favor of agreement and compromise, some people think that even excessively so.

Now the question is whether the German-French push is genuine and what does the ultimate leader of the West, USA, think? We don’t know what Hollande and Merkel has agreed with Obama, and if the latter is in reality interested in that. European Union surely needs the peace for both economic and political reasons. The already morbid economies of EU countries are spiraling down because of the sanctions and the anti-war opposition iselle growing among the populations and some of the leaders. The Greek Government is strongly speaking in favor of Russia, Hungary has voiced an understanding for Russia, same with Slovakia and the Czech Republic together with other countries. And the two key opposition politicians of France, Le Pen and Sarkozy also lambasted the Western position towards Russia.

On the other hand, we must remember that the US engineered sanctions against Russia were never in reality connected with the Ukrainian crisis, which only served as a pretext to get at Russia. I would not think that the USA has now changed its position. They want to continue squeezing on Russia, but might be forced in view of the European activities to effect a tactical retreat from the hardline position.

We also have the very messy political, economic and humanitarian situation in the Ukraine. There are signs that warring fractions could actually take to arms against each other. It is very difficult to build consensus there to push accepting this solution. Ukraine might not even have a possibility to actually implement some of the key provisions of this new Minsk agreement. Notwithstanding the announced IMF package, the economy is practically bankrupt so the government will not have a possibility to actually take on the social commitments to the Donbass people that are a part of the agreement. And then there is the problem of what to do with all the men that in a national frenzy were enlisted for all the mercenary and punitive troops committing wanton repression in Donbass with impunity. The Ukrainian government has a real problem of how to push that paste back in the tube, the more as they will not be returning as victors met with a ticker-tape parade on the Kreshatik but as disgruntled and disillusioned men defeated on the front and unwanted at home.

Finally, we need to understand that there is one fundamental problem – which wraps up all the other issues discussed previously - that dampens any hope for a lasting peace. That is the ideological nature of the present Ukrainian regime and its elite at large, it is ultra-nationalist and even guilty of actions and making statements that can without exaggeration be viewed as fascist. In the known history such a government has not in any country been conducive of peace, prosperity and respect of minority rights.

The Minsk Peace Deal: Farce Or Sellout? — Paul Craig Roberts

Paul Craig Roberts

Paul Craig Roberts,

12 February, 2015

Judging by the report on RT, I conclude that the Ukraine peace deal worked out in Minsk by Putin, Merkel, Hollande, and Poroshenko has little chance of success.

As Washington is not a partner to the Minsk peace deal, how can there be peace when Washington has made policy decisions to escalate the conflict and to use the conflict as a proxy war between the US and Russia?

The Minsk agreement makes no reference to the announcement by Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, commander of US Army Europe, that Washington is sending a battalion of US troops to Ukraine to train Ukrainian forces how to fight against Russian and rebel forces. The training is scheduled to begin in March, about two weeks from now. Gen. Hodges says that it is very important to recognize that the Donetsk and Luhansk forces “are not separatists, these are proxies for President Putin.”

How is there a peace deal when Washington has plans underway to send arms and training to the US puppet government in Kiev?

Looking at the deal itself, it is set up to fail. The only parties to the deal who had to sign it are the leaders of the Donetsk and Lugansk break-away republics. The other signers to the Minsk deal are an OSCE representative which is the European group that is supposed to monitor the withdrawal of heavy weapons by both sides, a former Ukrainian president Viktor Kuchma, and the Russian ambassador in Kiev. Neither the German chancellor nor the French, Ukrainian, and Russian presidents who brokered the deal had to sign it.

In other words, the governments of Germany, France, Ukraine, and Russia do not appear to be empowered or required to enforce the agreement. According to RT, “the declaration was not meant to be signed by the leaders, German foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier said.” http://rt.com/news/231571-putin-minsk-ukraine-deal/

The terms of the agreement depend on actions of the Ukrainian parliament and prime minister, neither of which are under Poroshenko’s control, and Poroshenko himself is a figurehead under Washington’s control. Moreover, the Ukrainian military does not control the Nazi militias. As Washington and the right-wing elements in Ukraine want conflict with Russia, peace cannot be forthcoming.

The agreement is nothing but a list of expectations that have no chance of occurring.

One expectation is that Ukraine and the republics will negotiate terms for future local elections in the provinces that will bring them back under Ukraine’s legal control. The day after the local elections, but prior to the constitutional reform that provides the regions with autonomy, Kiev takes control of the borders with Ukraine and between the provinces. I read this as the total sell-out of the Donetsk and Lugansk republics. Apparently, that is the way the leaders of the republics see it as well, as Putin had to twist their arms in order to get their signatures to the agreement.

Another expectation is that Ukraine will adopt legislation on self-governance that would be acceptable to the republics and declare a general amnesty for the republics’ leaders and military forces.

Negotiations between Kiev and the autonomous areas are to take place that restore Kiev’s taxation of the autonomous areas and the provision of social payments and banking services to the autonomous areas.

After a comprehensive constitutional reform in Ukraine guaranteeing acceptable (and undefined) autonomy to the republics, Kiev will take control over the provinces’ borders with Russia.

By the end of 2015 Kiev will implement comprehensive constitutional reform that decentralizes the Ukrainian political system and provides privileges of autonomy to the Donetsk and Lugansk regions.

Both Putin and Poroshenko are both reported as stating that the main thing achieved is a ceasefire starting on February 15.

The ceasefire is of no benefit to the Donetsk and Lugansk republics as they are prevailing in the conflict. Moreover, the deal requires the republics’ forces to give up territory and to pull back to the borders of last September and to eject fighters from France and other countries who have come to the aid of the break-away republics. In other words, the agreement erases all of Kiev’s losses from the conflict that Kiev initiated.

All of the risks of the agreement are imposed on the break-away republics and on Putin. The provinces are required to give up all their gains while Washington trains and arms Ukrainian forces to attack the provinces. The republics have to give up their security and trust Kiev long before Kiev votes, assuming it ever does, autonomy for the republics.

Moreover, if the one-sided terms of the Minsk agreement result in failure, Putin and the republics will be blamed.

Why would Putin make such a deal and force it on the republics? If the deal becomes a Russian sell-out of the republics, it will hurt Putin’s nationalist support within Russia and make it easier for Washington to weaken Putin and perhaps achieve regime change. It looks more like a surrender than a fair deal.

Perhaps Putin’s strategy is to give away every advantage in the expectation that the deal will fail, and the Russian government can say “we gave away the store and the deal still failed.”

Washington’s coup in Kiev and the attack on the Russian-speaking Ukrainians in the east and south is part of Washington’s strategy to reassert its uni-power position. Russia’s independent foreign policy and Russia’s growing economic and political relationships with Europe became problems for Washington. Washington is using Ukraine to attack and to demonize Russia and its leader and to break-up Russia’s economic and political relations with Europe. That is what the sanctions are about. A peace deal in Ukraine on any terms other than Washington’s is unacceptable to Washington. The only acceptable deal is a deal that is a defeat for Russia.

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Russian government made a strategic mistake when it did not accept the requests of the break-away provinces to be united with Russia. The people in the Donetsk and Lugansk provinces favored unification with the same massive majorities that the people in Crimea showed. If the provinces had been united with Russia, it would have been the end of the conflict. Neither Ukraine nor Washington is going to attack Russian territory.

By failing to end the conflict by unification, Putin set himself up as the punching bag for Western propaganda. The consequence is that over the many months during which the conflict has been needlessly drawn out, Putin has had his image and reputation in the West destroyed. He is the “new Hitler.” He is “scheming to restore the Soviet Empire.” “Russia ranks with ebola and the Islamist State as the three greatest threats.” “RT is a terrorist organization like Boco Haram and the Islamist State.” And so on and on. This CNN interview with Obama conducted by Washington’s presstitute Fareed Zakaria shows the image of Putin based entirely on lies that rules in the West.

Putin could be no more demonized even if the Russian military had invaded Ukraine,

conquered it, and reincorporated Ukraine in Russia of which Ukraine was part for centuries prior to the Soviet collapse and Ukraine’s separation from Russia at Washington’s insistence.

The Russian government might want to carefully consider whether Moscow is helping Washington to achieve another victory in Ukraine

This analysis is from Stratfor

The Terms Of The Ukraine Cease-Fire: Presenting "East Ukraine"

Zero Hedge,

12 February, 2015

From Stratfor

The Terms of Ukraine's Cease-Fire

Following marathon talks in Minsk that lasted more than 17 hours, the leaders of Germany, France, Russia and Ukraine reached an agreement that appears to align with the Kremlin's demands. The document calls for a cease-fire to begin Feb. 15, the withdrawal of weapons and the enactment of constitutional reforms in Ukraine. Though Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko has denied that the agreement includes provisions for the creation of autonomous regions or the federalization of Ukraine, the document on the whole does fulfill several of the Kremlin's long-standing demands with regards to the status of Donbas.

The new cease-fire agreement is based largely on the original one that went into effect Sept. 5. It focuses on the withdrawal of heavy artillery systems, which have been prominent throughout the conflict, within 14 days of the cease-fire's implementation. The new cease-fire requires these artillery systems to be withdrawn far beyond their maximum effective ranges, a move that will create a buffer to prevent escalation and heavy artillery fire on the demarcation line. Missing from the agreement, however, is a decision on the fate of the still heavily contested Ukrainian positions in Debaltseve. Because both sides will have to withdraw their artillery systems, the result will be a very deep area without artillery cover in the center of the demarcation line.

The agreement's most important impact on the military balance is its requirement to withdraw foreign forces and mercenaries from Ukraine. Separatists have depended heavily on the combat power of the Russian military and Russian volunteer forces. Without these, the separatists would have been incapable of repelling the Ukrainian offensive, and in the future would be rendered much weaker than their Ukrainian counterparts.

The signing of the new Minsk agreement, as well as Russian President Vladimir Putin's direct participation in the negotiations, points to the Kremlin's willingness to at least partially de-escalate the conflict at this time. The agreement includes some vague measures and conditions that all sides may ultimately chose not to implement. Several key points of contention remain unaddressed, and there are still many opportunities for the agreement to break down if they are not resolved. Therefore, political will, rather than the actual terms of the agreement, will determine whether a significant de-escalation is to take place

This is the Guardian speaking for its beloved pro-European facist Junta and expressing the views of the war party inside the Anglo-American empire

Ukraine ceasefire: European leaders sceptical peace plan will work

Worries privately voiced about potential escalation of fighting before truce is supposed to take hold in eastern Ukraine on Sunday

The Guardian,

12 February, 2015

European leaders on Thursday praised Germany and France for brokering a ceasefire and peace plan for Ukraine, but privately voiced scepticism that the pact struck after a marathon all-night summit in Belarus would work. They worried that an upsurge in fighting before the truce is supposed to take hold in eastern Ukraine on Sunday could quickly turn into a bloodbath.

“The next 48 hours will be crucial,” said one EU diplomat at a summit in Brussels dominated by the Ukraine breakthrough.

Pro-Russia separatist forces have up to 8,000 Ukrainian troops surrounded at the strategic railway hub of Debaltseve in eastern Ukraine and are demanding their surrender.

Vladimir Putin, the president of Russia, emphasised the issue in his first remarks following the summit in Minsk with Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, the French president, François Hollande, and Ukraine’s president, Petro Poroshenko, who western officials and diplomats believe came off worst in the negotiations.

The pro-Russia separatist forces around the town, Putin said, “have surrounded a significant grouping, from 6,000 to 8,000 men. They, of course, assume that this grouping lays down its arms and ceases resistance”.

The conflict in east Ukraine has claimed at least 5,400 lives. Nine people were reportedly killed and 35 wounded in east Ukraine on Thursday morning.

The ceasefire is intended to pave the way for a comprehensive political settlementof the country’s crisis. It was agreed early on Thursday in Minsk, following a fraught 16 hours of overnight negotiations.

The marathon summit in Minsk resulted in a pact providing for a ceasefire between Ukrainian government troops and Russian-backed separatists from Sunday, a withdrawal of heavy weaponry from the battle zone which is to be demilitarised, amnesties on both sides and exchanges of prisoners and hostages.

The agreement is clearly fragile, previous attempts at a truce have utterly failed, and expectations are high of an upsurge in fighting ahead of the Saturday deadline.

But Merkel spoke of a ray of hope that the agreement might take the edge off what has quickly become the worst security crisis in Europesince the end of the cold war with the potential to assume much more dangerous dimensions.

But western mistrust of Putin has soared over the past year, with the result that there was no euphoria over the pact. Putin sounded satisfied. “It’s not the best night of my life,” he said, but it is, in my view, a good morning because we managed to agree on the main things.”

Washington was guardedly positive about the outcome in Minsk. “The agreement represents a potentially significant step toward a peaceful resolution of the conflict and the restoration of Ukraine’s sovereignty,” said a White House statement.

If the early peacemaking measures take effect, they are to be followed by more ambitious political moves aimed at an overall political settlement by the end of the year when Ukraine is supposed to have a new constitution, the rebel-held areas are to be granted decentralised “special status” and cross-border links with Russia, local elections are to be held in the breakaway areas while Kiev is also slated to take control of the border with Russia.

The US said success of the agreement would hinge on whether the Kiev government was able to restore control of its border with Russia.

Under the plan, that is not to take place fully for almost a year and the agreement gives the Donbass rebels a veto over the key issue, stating that the government in Kiev may only secure its own border with Russia with the agreement of the separatists. This was a demand that the rebel leaders tabled earlier in the week in the preparations for the summit.

Donald Tusk, the former Polish prime minister who chairs EU summits, is known to be sceptical that the peace plan will work. The Polish government was also critical. Britain appeared less than impressed. Privately, diplomats also said that the International Monetary Fund, which on Thursday announced $17.5bn in assistance for Ukraine, had used the financial package to press Poroshenko into accepting the peace terms.

The World Bank said on Thursday it would provide Ukraine with up to $2 billion in support in 2015, with assistance focused on aiding the poor, supporting reforms and fighting corruption. The World Bank said the financing would be part of a package from the international community. “It is vital that Ukraine undertakes comprehensive reforms quickly,” the World Bank president, Jim Yong Kim, said in a statement. 

In European concessions to Putin, the Russian leader was told he would be party to negotiations over the detail and impact of Ukraine’s free trade pact with the EU, a number of conditions were attached to the special rights to be granted to the pro-Russia territories, central government funding of social and welfare benefits was to be restored to the pro-Russia areas and Germany and France promised to facilitate the financial transfers and repair the broken banking system.

 People pass a wall covered with portraits of Ukrainian soldiers who have died in the conflict in eastern Ukraine, in downtown Kiev. Photograph: Roman Pilipey/EPA

Merkel and Hollande went to Minsk to see Putin and Poroshenko for what was seen as a fateful summit following days of the most intensive diplomacy on Ukraine since the crisis erupted a year ago. Failure, it was feared, would have resulted in a major escalation of the conflict, with Poroshenko warning he could impose martial law on the entire country.

“It was worth it,” said Merkel, capping one of the most frantic weeks of her 10-year chancellorship and before dashing to Brussels for an EU summit. But she cautioned against over-optimism and was guarded about whether the 13-point peace pact would be observed and implemented. “We have a glimmer of hope ... but no illusions.”

The negotiations appeared extremely tense and highly combustible amid simmering hostility between Putin on the one hand and Merkel and Poroshenko on the other. At various points during the night, the talks looked close to collapse, with Poroshenko leaving the negotiating table and and talking of being confronted with “unacceptable conditions”.

“We have a very long night behind us, but we have managed to come to an agreement, to a ceasefire and a comprehensive political settlement for the Ukraine crisis,” said Hollande.

A sticking point was whether the separatist leaders, also in Minsk but not taking part directly in the summit, would sign off on the deal agreed by the four heads of state. Putin sought to force Poroshenko to negotiate directly with the separatist leaders.

In the end the two main rebel leaders, from Donetsk and Luhansk, signed the plan which also included an annex on the detail of the autonomy foreseen for their fiefdoms.

The ceasefire is to come into force at midnight on Saturday, following which heavy weapons on both sides are to be withdrawn by up to 140km from the frontlines depending on the range and calibre of the weapons. The withdrawals are to take a fortnight. The ceasefire and weapons pullback is to be monitored by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

The more ambitious political aspects of the pact stipulate that Kiev is to draft a new constitution by the end of the year, with a “key element’ entailing decentralisation and special status for the breakaway regions. An eight-point annex to the accord lists elements of the special status, including local control of police, court, and judicial systems and a regime of cross-border cooperation between the eastern regions and Russia.

Moscow fiercely resisted Ukrainian and European demands for Kiev control over the eastern border with Russia, arguing that this would lead to the encirclement and eventual suppression of the secessionist rebellion. The agreement says that Ukraine will start to exercise control of the border once new local elections are held in the east, but will only finalise its border control once the new constitution and the special status regime are in force and “in consultation and in agreement with” the separatists.

This is a make-or-break moment for Ukraine

There are certain to be sharp disputes on these arrangements in the months ahead. Poroshenko promptly declared that Ukraine will “always be a unitary state” and will never be “federalised.”

A separate document signed by the three presidents and the chancellor committed Putin to respecting Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, although clearly last year’s Russian annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea peninsula will be ignored here.

The French and the Germans agreed to trilateral talks between Russia, Ukraine, and the EU on energy issues and Russian gas supplies, on the EU-Ukraine free trade agreement concluded last year, and to joint monitoring of and negotiations over the peace pact.

“There’s a real chance to turn things for the better,” said Merkel. “We pledged to monitor the implementation. I assume that this will also be necessary.”