'Thank
God for the Saudis': ISIS, Iraq, and the Lessons of Blowback
U.S
lawmakers encouraged officials in Riyadh to arm Syrian rebels. Now
that strategy may have created a monster in the Middle East.
23
June, 2014
“Thank
God for the Saudis and Prince Bandar,” John McCain told CNN’s
Candy Crowley in January 2014. “Thank God for the Saudis and Prince
Bandar, and for our Qatari friends,” the senator said once again a
month later, at the Munich Security Conference.
McCain
was praising Prince Bandar bin Sultan, then the head of Saudi
Arabia’s intelligence services and a former ambassador to the
United States, for supporting forces fighting Bashar al-Assad’s
regime in Syria. McCain and Senator Lindsey Graham had previously met
with Bandar to encourage the Saudis to arm Syrian rebel forces.
But
shortly after McCain’s Munich comments, Saudi Arabia’s King
Abdullah relieved Bandar of his Syrian covert-action portfolio, which
was then transferred to Saudi Interior Minister Prince Mohammed bin
Nayef. By mid-April, just two weeks after President Obama met with
King Abdullah on March 28, Bandar had also been removed from his
position as head of Saudi intelligence—according to official
government statements, at “his own request.” Sources close to the
royal court told me that, in fact, the king fired Bandar over his
handling of the kingdom’s Syria policy and other simmering
tensions, after initially refusing to accept Bandar’s offers to
resign. (Bandar retains his title as secretary-general of the king’s
National Security Council.)
The
Free Syrian Army (FSA), the “moderate” armed opposition in the
country, receives a lot of attention. But two of the most successful
factions fighting Assad’s forces are Islamist extremist groups:
Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the
latter of which is now amassing territory in Iraq and threatening to
further destabilize the entire region. And that success is in part
due to the support they have received from two Persian Gulf
countries: Qatar and Saudi Arabia.
Qatar’s
military and economic largesse has made its way to Jabhat al-Nusra,
to the point that a senior Qatari official told me he can identify
al-Nusra commanders by the blocks they control in various Syrian
cities. But ISIS is another matter. As one senior Qatari official
stated, “ISIS has been a Saudi project.”
ISIS,
in fact, may have been a major part of Bandar’s covert-ops strategy
in Syria. The Saudi government, for its part, has denied allegations,
including claims made by Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, that
it has directly supported ISIS. But there are also signs that the
kingdom recently shifted its assistance—whether direct or
indirect—away from extremist factions in Syria and toward more
moderate opposition groups.
“ISIS
has been a Saudi project,” one Qatari official said.
The
United States, France, and Turkey have long sought to support the
weak and disorganized FSA, and to secure commitments from Qatar and
Saudi Arabia to do the same. When Mohammed bin Nayef took the Syrian
file from Bandar in February, the Saudi government appeared to
finally be endorsing this strategy. As The Washington Post’s David
Ignatius wrote at the time, “Prince Mohammed’s new oversight role
reflects the increasing concern in Saudi Arabia and other neighboring
countries about al-Qaeda’s growing power within the Syrian
opposition.”
The
worry at the time, punctuated by a February meeting between U.S.
National Security Adviser Susan Rice and the intelligence chiefs of
Turkey, Qatar, Jordan, and others in the region, was that ISIS and
al-Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra had emerged as the preeminent
rebel forces in Syria. The governments who took part reportedly
committed to cut off ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra, and support the FSA
instead. But while official support from Qatar and Saudi Arabia
appears to have dried up, non-governmental military and financial
support may still be flowing from these countries to Islamist groups.
Senior
White House officials have refused to discuss the question of any
particular Saudi officials aiding ISIS and have not commented on
Bandar’s departure. But they have emphasized that Saudi Arabia is
now both supporting moderate Syrian rebels and helping coordinate
regional policies to deal with an ascendant ISIS threat.
Like
elements of the mujahideen, which benefited from U.S. financial and
military support during the Soviet war in Afghanistan and then later
turned on the West in the form of al-Qaeda, ISIS achieved scale and
consequence through Saudi support, only to now pose a grave threat to
the kingdom and the region. It’s this concern about blowback that
has motivated Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Martin Dempsey and
Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel to encourage restraint in arming Syrian
rebels. President Obama has so far heeded these warnings.
John
McCain’s desire to help rebel forces toss off a brutal dictator and
fight for a more just and inclusive Syria is admirable. But as has
been proven repeatedly in the Middle East, ousting strongmen doesn’t
necessarily produce more favorable successor governments. Embracing
figures like Bandar, who may have tried to achieve his objectives in
Syria by building a monster, isn't worth it.
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