Forget
Cyprus, Japan Is The Real Crisis
James
Gruber
23
March, 2013
Forget
Cyprus. A much bigger story in the coming weeks and months will be in
Japan, where one of the greatest economic experiments in the modern
era is about to begin. A country where government debt even dwarfs
those of Europe’s crisis-ridden nations, Japan will attempt to
inflate its way out of a 23-year deflationary spiral.
The
overwhelming consensus among the world’s economists is that
quantitative easing (QE) has saved the day in the U.S. and that Japan
needs to follow suit, on a larger scale. I beg to differ and suggest
this policy will almost certainly lead to a hyperinflationary
disaster in Japan. If that’s right, it will have serious
ramifications for other countries, dragged down by an acceleration of
the so-called currency wars. More broadly though, it is likely to
destroy the myth pushed by today’s economists that QE is a cure-all
for downtrodden economies. It isn’t and Japan will become the
template to prove it.
Monster
stimulus on the way
The
new Bank of Japan (BoJ) Governor, Haruhiko Kuroda, started work on
Thursday and his first day on the job disappointed investors. At a
press conference, Kuroda pledged to do whatever it takes to defeat
deflation and reiterated the government’s target of 2% inflation.
But he provided little in the way of specifics and investors promptly
bought the yen and sold stocks.
More
concrete measurers will almost certainly come by the central bank
meeting on April 3-4. There are good odds that they may come even
earlier via an emergency meeting of the bank.
It’s
widely expected that the BoJ will expand its 101 trillion yen
(US$1.06 trillion) asset buying program by more than 10 million yen.
Also, it will start buying Japanese government bonds with remaining
maturities of up to five years by scrapping the upper limit of three
years by the end of April.
The
idea behind the strategy is that you create money out of thin air,
use that money to buy government bonds off private institutions and
others, thereby increasing money supply and possibly inflation. Also,
the institutions will start lending the money out, thereby
kick-starting spending and the economy. That’s the theory anyhow.
What
was fascinating to watch was the verbal sparring between the outgoing
and incoming BoJ governors. In Japan, where group consensus rules,
this was almost an outright brawl.
Outgoing
Governor Masaaki Shirakawa has never been a believer in the
inflationist policies of the new government and he didn’t mince his
words in his final days in office:
“Even
if prices rise 2% and wages do the same, that won’t mean an
improvement in people’s living standards … what we want to
achieve is an increase in real economic growth…
…
Past figures in Japan as
well as in Europe and the U.S. show that the link between monetary
base and prices has been broken.”
The
latter refers to the fact that printed money in the U.S. and Europe
hasn’t flowed through to economies as banks have sat on the money
rather than lent it out.
And
if Shirakawa wasn’t clear with the above, he was with the
following:
“If
there was one single measure that would have resolved the problem,
just like clearing a fog, then we wouldn’t have been in this state
for the past 15 years.”
The
new BoJ chief, Haruhiko Kuroda, wasted little time trampling on his
predecessor’s legacy. Though couched in economic jargon, his
statements were clear enough: Shirakawa was part of a failed era of
central banking and something new needed to be done:
“It’s
very important for the BoJ to make itself responsible for the 2%
[inflation] target by a certain period … We should not make excuses
that it wasn’t our responsibility if we fail to achieve it.”
And:
“In
the long term, the correlation between money supply and inflation is
high.”
In
other words, if we print enough money, inflation will come. And we’ll
do whatever it takes to get the job done.
Is
it the right path?
The
sparring between the two central bankers isn’t just an arcane
discussion. It’s part of a much larger debate about the
effectiveness of stimulus policies. And it matters because Japan is
the world’s third-largest economy and it’s about to pursue these
policies on a grander scale.
What’s
amazing is the extent to which those advocating stimulus in the
slow-growth developed world now dominate public debate. Consider a
recent article by Financial Times columnist Martin Wolf, entitled
“The sad record of fiscal austerity”. In it, Wolf takes Europe to
task for enforcing spending cuts while their economies were in dismal
shape:
“By
adopting [outright monetary transactions], the [European Central
Bank] could have prevented the panic which drove the [credit] spreads
that justified the austerity. It did not do so. Tens of millions of
people are suffering unnecessary hardship. It is tragic.”
He
goes on to recommend a mix of stimulus, increased public spend and
structural reforms to help Europe’s plight. And he finishes with
this:
“In
the long run, the fiscal deficit must close. In the short run, the UK
has the chance to pursue growth. It should take it. So should the
US.”
The
arguments of Wolf and others of his ilk can be crudely summarised by
three facts, which most of them would regard as beyond dispute.
Fact
1: The U.S. recovery proves stimulus works and the recovery will
happen faster if there’s more aggressive QE.
Fact
2: Europe remains in the doldrums because it’s pursued spending
cuts which have failed to repair economies.
Fact
3: Japan has never tried aggressive stimulus to overcome its
long-term deflation problem and it needs to follow in U.S. footsteps
immediately.
Given
these are “facts” beyond dispute, let me dispute them.
Fact
1: It is far too early to tell whether U.S. stimulus policies have
worked. They have propped up the economy in the short-term, but
whether that’s sustainable in the long run is open to question.
Even in the short-term though, the recovery has been slow and
unimpressive. Consider: 2012 GDP growth of 2.2% vs a post World War
Two average of 3.2%, a current unemployment rate at 11.3% if you
include that have dropped out of the workforce since 2008, real
household incomes are still 10% below levels in 2000 and the velocity
of money (M2) is the lowest in more than 50 years (indicating printed
money hasn’t circulating into the real economy).
Fact
2: Europe hasn’t pursued austerity. Anyone who says it has is
lying. But it makes for a nice political argument in favour of
stimulus. European total debt has kept climbing, now at 390%, as the
private sector hasn’t paid down any debt, while governments have
increased their debt portions. No cutbacks here!
And
for the curious, unlike QE, there is some historical evidence that
austerity can actually work. In my neighbourhood of Asia, the
financial crisis of 1997-1998 brought tremendous pain to many Asian
countries, but through austerity and sweeping economic reforms, they
recovered relatively quickly and in much better shape.
Fact
3: Those that claim that Japan has never pursued aggressive stimulus
are talking rubbish. But again, it’s nice propaganda for Keynesian
advocates. From 2001-2006, Japan embraced large-scale stimulus, with
its monetary base increasing by a mammoth 36% year-on-year at its
peak. During the period, the monetary base rose 82% in total. But
economic growth was never revived, the currency rose rather than fell
and inflation continued to decline. QE in Japan was dropped because
it was seen as failing.
So
the question must be asked: will the conventional wisdom advocating
enormous stimulus be Japan’s saviour or its noose?
Why
Japan will fail
The
subtitle indicates where I stand on the matter. Given its
over-indebtedness, Japan has few good options left. But the policies
being pursued by Shinzo Abe will fast-forward a major debt and
currency crisis. It’s a matter of when, not if.
Government
debt to GDP in Japan is now 245%, far higher than any other country.
Total debt to GDP is 500%. Government expenditure to government
revenue is a staggering 2000%. Meanwhile interest costs on government
debt equal 25% of government revenue.
There’s
no way that Japan will ever repay this debt. It has two main options:
either go through extraordinary pain by cutting back on government
expenditure or print substantial money to inflate some of the debt
away.
Japan
is choosing the second option, as are most governments around the
world. It would rather print money than cut spending and doom the
economy to a substantial contraction. The choice to print money
though will result in an even more painful and drawn-out outcome.
It’s
inevitable that the yen will fall further from here, potentially much
further. I’ve previously said that the yen at 200 or 300 on the
dollar would not surprise. This could prove optimistic.
It
also seems inevitable that Japanese interest rates will rise and
bonds will sell off. Yields have to rise to just 2% for interest
costs on government debt to take up 80% of government revenue. The
jig will be up well before that though.
Those
that argue this won’t happen as 91% of Japanese government bonds
are held by domestic investors are missing some key points. Foreign
ownership of bonds is rising as domestic investors need more money to
fund their retirements (Japan’s rapidly ageing population).
Foreigners will demand higher yields for the risks that they’re
taking on. And even domestic investors aren’t going to sit by
earning 0.6% on a 10-year bond as hyperinflation takes hold and the
currency tanks.
Currency
wars to begin in earnest
Talk
of currency wars has been on the backburner for a few months. Expect
that talk to heat up and become a reality as Japan ramps up stimulus
in the next two weeks.
The
likes of South Korea and Taiwan are already suffering from the sharp
fall of the yen. They, and many others such as Germany and emerging
countries, aren’t going to sit by and watch their exporters get
priced out of the market by the Japanese. They’ll retaliate with
currency depreciations of their own and the currency wars will be on
in earnest. But the question is whether these countries will be able
to keep up with a hyper-inflating Japan. I highly doubt it.
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