Think
Your Money is Safe? Think Again: The Confiscation Scheme Planned for
US and UK Depositors
Confiscating
the customer deposits in Cyprus banks was not a one-off. It could
happen here.
By
Ellen Brown
28
March, 2013
Confiscating
the customer deposits in Cyprus banks, it seems, was not a one-off,
desperate idea of a few Eurozone “troika” officials scrambling to
salvage their balance sheets. A joint paper by the US Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation and the Bank of England dated December 10,
2012, shows that these plans have been long in the making; that they
originated with the G20 Financial Stability Board in Basel,
Switzerland (discussed earlier here);
and that the result will be to deliver clear title to the banks of
depositor funds.
New
Zealand has a similar directive, discussed in my last article here,
indicating that this isn’t just an emergency measure for troubled
Eurozone countries. New Zealand’s Voxy
reported
on March 19 th:
The
National Government [is] pushing a Cyprus-style solution to bank
failure in New Zealand which will see small depositors lose some of
their savings to fund big bank bailouts . . . .
Open
Bank Resolution (OBR) is Finance Minister Bill English’s favoured
option dealing with a major bank failure. If
a bank fails under OBR, all depositors will have their savings
reduced overnight to fund the bank’s bail out.
Can
They Do That?
Although
few depositors realize it, legally the bank owns the depositor’s
funds as soon as they are put in the bank. Our money becomes the
bank’s, and we become unsecured creditors holding IOUs or promises
to pay. (See here
and here.)
But until now the bank has been obligated to pay the money back on
demand in the form of cash. Under the FDIC-BOE plan, our IOUs will be
converted into “bank equity.” The bank will get the money
and we will get stock in the bank. With any luck we may be able to
sell the stock to someone else, but when and at what price? Most
people keep a deposit account so they can have ready cash to pay the
bills.
The
15-page FDIC-BOE document is called “ Resolving
Globally Active, Systemically Important, Financial Institutions.”
It begins by explaining that the 2008 banking crisis has made
it clear that some other way besides taxpayer bailouts is needed to
maintain “financial stability.” Evidently anticipating that the
next financial collapse will be on a grander scale than either the
taxpayers or Congress is willing to underwrite, the authors state:
An
efficient path for returning the sound operations of the G-SIFI to
the private sector would be provided by exchanging or converting a
sufficient amount of the unsecured debt from the original creditors
of the failed company [meaning the depositors] into equity [or
stock]. In the U.S .,
the new equity would become capital in one or more newly formed
operating entities.
In the U.K., the same approach could be used, or the
equity could be used to recapitalize the failing financial company
itself—thus,
the highest layer of surviving bailed-in creditors would become the
owners of the resolved firm. In either country ,
the new equity holders would take on the corresponding risk of being
shareholders in a financial institution.
No
exception is indicated for “insured deposits” in the U.S.,
meaning those under $250,000, the deposits we thought were protected
by FDIC insurance. This can hardly be an oversight, since it is the
FDIC that is issuing the directive. The FDIC is an insurance company
funded by premiums paid by private banks. The directive is
called a “resolution process,” defined
elsewhere as
a plan that “would be triggered in
the event of the failure of an insurer
. . . .” The only mention of “insured deposits” is in
connection with existing UK legislation, which the FDIC-BOE directive
goes on to say is inadequate, implying that it needs to be modified
or overridden.
If
our IOUs are converted to bank stock, they will no longer be subject
to insurance protection but will be “at risk” and vulnerable to
being wiped out, just as the Lehman Brothers shareholders were in
2008. That this dire scenario could actually materialize was
underscored by Yves Smith in a March 19th post titled When
You Weren’t Looking, Democrat Bank Stooges Launch Bills to Permit
Bailouts, Deregulate Derivatives. She
writes:
In
the US, depositors have actually been put in a worse position than
Cyprus deposit-holders, at least if they are at the big banks that
play in the derivatives casino. The regulators have turned a blind
eye as banks use their depositaries
to fund derivatives exposures.
And as bad as that is, the depositors, unlike their Cypriot
confreres, aren’t even senior creditors. Remember Lehman? When the
investment bank failed, unsecured creditors (and remember, depositors
are unsecured creditors)
got eight cents on the dollar. One big reason was that derivatives
counterparties require collateral for any exposures, meaning they are
secured creditors. The 2005 bankruptcy reforms made derivatives
counterparties senior to unsecured lenders.
One
might wonder why the posting of collateral by a derivative
counterparty, at some percentage of full exposure, makes the creditor
“secured,” while the depositor who puts up 100 cents on the
dollar is “unsecured.” But moving on – Smith writes:
Lehman
had only two itty bitty banking subsidiaries, and to my knowledge,
was not gathering retail deposits. But as readers may recall, Bank of
America moved most of its derivatives from its Merrill Lynch
operation [to] its depositary in late 2011.
Its
“depositary” is the arm of the bank that takes deposits; and at B
of A, that means lots and lots of deposits. The deposits are now
subject to being wiped out by a major derivatives loss. How bad could
that be? Smith quotes Bloomberg:
. .
. Bank of America’s holding company . . . held almost $75 trillion
of derivatives at the end of June . . . .
That
compares with JPMorgan’s deposit-taking entity, JPMorgan Chase Bank
NA, which contained 99 percent of the New York-based firm’s $79
trillion of notional derivatives, the OCC data show.
$75
trillion and $79 trillion in derivatives! These two mega-banks alone
hold more in notional derivatives each
than the entire global GDP (at $70 trillion). The “notional value”
of derivatives is not the same as cash at risk, but according to a
cross-post on Smith’s site:
By
at least one estimate, in 2010 there was a total of $12 trillion in
cash tied up (at risk) in derivatives . . . .
$12
trillion is close to the US GDP. Smith goes on:
. .
. Remember the effect of the 2005 bankruptcy law revisions:
derivatives counterparties are first in line, they get to grab assets
first and leave everyone else to scramble for crumbs. . . .
Lehman failed over a weekend after JP Morgan grabbed collateral.
But
it’s even worse than that. During the savings & loan crisis,
the FDIC did not have enough in deposit insurance receipts to pay for
the Resolution Trust Corporation wind-down vehicle. It had to get
more funding from Congress. This move paves the way for another
TARP-style shakedown of taxpayers, this time to save depositors.
Perhaps,
but Congress has already been burned and is liable to balk a second
time. Section 716 of the Dodd-Frank Act specifically prohibits public
support for speculative derivatives activities. And in the Eurozone,
while the European Stability Mechanism committed Eurozone countries
to bail out failed banks, they are apparently having second thoughts
there as well. On March 25 th,
Dutch Finance Minister Jeroen Dijsselbloem, who played a leading role
in imposing the deposit confiscation plan on Cyprus, told reporters
that it would be the
template for any future bank bailouts,
and that “ the
aim is for the ESM
never to have to be used.”
That
explains the need for the FDIC-BOE resolution. If the anticipated
enabling legislation is passed, the FDIC will no longer need to
protect depositor funds; it can just confiscate them.
Worse
Than a Tax
An
FDIC confiscation of deposits to recapitalize the banks is far
different from a simple tax on taxpayers to pay government expenses.
The government's debt is at least arguably the people’s debt, since
the government is there to provide services for the people. But when
the banks get into trouble with their derivative schemes, they are
not serving depositors, who are not getting a cut of the profits.
Taking depositor funds is simply theft.
What
should be done is to raise FDIC insurance premiums and make the banks
pay to keep their depositors whole, but premiums are already high;
and the FDIC, like other government regulatory agencies, is subject
to regulatory capture.
Deposit insurance has failed, and so has the private banking system
that has depended on it for the trust that makes banking work.
The
Cyprus haircut on depositors was called a “wealth tax” and was
written off by commentators as “deserved,” because much of the
money in Cypriot accounts belongs to foreign oligarchs, tax dodgers
and money launderers. But if that template is applied in the US, it
will be a tax on the poor and middle class. Wealthy Americans don't
keep most of their money in bank accounts. They keep it in the
stock market, in real estate, in over-the-counter derivatives, in
gold and silver, and so forth.
Are
you safe, then, if your money is in gold and silver? Apparently not –
if it’s stored in a safety deposit box in the bank. Homeland
Security has reportedly told banks
that it has authority to seize the contents of safety deposit boxes
without a warrant when it’s a matter of “national security,”
which a major bank crisis no doubt will be.
The
Swedish Alternative: Nationalize the Banks
Another
alternative was considered but rejected by President Obama in 2009:
nationalize mega-banks that fail. In a February 2009 article titled "
Are
Uninsured Bank Depositors in Danger?",
Felix Salmon discussed a newsletter by Asia-based investment
strategist Christopher Wood, in which Wood wrote:
It
is . . . amazing that Obama does not understand the political appeal
of the nationalization option. . . . [D]espite this latest setback
nationalization of the banks is coming sooner or later because the
realities of the situation will demand it. The result will be
shareholders wiped out and bondholders forced to take debt-for-equity
swaps, if not hopefully depositors.
On
whether depositors could indeed be forced to become equity holders,
Salmon commented:
It’s
worth remembering that depositors are unsecured
creditors of any bank; usually, indeed, they’re by far the largest
class of unsecured creditors.
President
Obama acknowledged that bank nationalization had worked in Sweden,
and that the course pursued by the US Fed had not worked in Japan,
which wound up instead in a "lost decade." But Obama
opted for the Japanese approach because, according
to Ed Harrison,
“Americans will not tolerate nationalization.”
But
that was four years ago. When Americans realize that the alternative
is to have their ready cash transformed into “bank stock” of
questionable marketability, moving failed mega-banks into the public
sector may start to have more appeal.
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