Read
about the forgotten history of the relationship between Russia and
Hamas - the one Israel would like you to forget.
Today,
it seems hard to imagine that Israel would harbor any generosity
towards Hamas. As its tanks, planes, and ships pound Gaza, and its
governing powers respond with volleys of rockets, their enmity's
tragic cost is rising by the hour.
Image
Credit: Getty Images. Palestinians carry the bodies of the Abu Jarad
family, killed during the Israeli assault.
With
a harsh war of words taking place between Israeli officials and Hamas
leadership, it is difficult to imagine that Israel actually helped
create Hamas.
It's
a complex and long relationship that calls for a history lesson.
The
story goes back to the 1960s and 70s, when Hamas was founded as an
offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, under the leadership and
guidance of a cleric named Sheikh Ahmed Yassin.
A
quadriplegic who was nearly blind, Yassin was not regarded as a
threat when he set up an Islamic charity in Gaza, Mujama el-Islamiya,
in 1973. In fact, he was embraced by Israel, which now had military
control over Gaza after seizing it from Egypt in the Six Day War of
1967.
Image
Credit: AP. Sheikh Ahmed Yassin (center), meets with members of
Hamas, 1997.
As
well as recognising Mujama el-Islamiya formally as a charity, Israel
allowed it to set up schools, mosques and clubs, sent officials to
meet Sheikh Yassin, and even arranged for him to travel to Israel for
hospital treatment. Some former intelligence officers claim support
extended to directly funding the emerging Islamist organisation, but
they're claims both parties stridently deny.
So
why did Israel tolerate, even encourage, an organization that would
eventually pledge its destruction? At the time, officials believed
that religious groups like Yassin's could be helpful tools against
what it believed were its real enemies. The biggest threat to Israel,
leaders then thought, were secular Palestinian resistance movements:
groups like Yasser Arafat's Fatah, which dominated the Palestinian
Liberation Organization (PLO).
Image
Credit: AP. Yasser Arafat in 1974.
During
the 1970s and 1980s, these groups did not recognize Israel as
legitimate, and embraced violent means as a way to achieve
Palestinian liberation. It was these movements that Israel feared –
and in the face of a secular, left-wing threat, they believed
Islamism might be an attractive alternative.
The
benign division of resistance, it seems, did not work out as planned.
While the PLO gradually laid down its arms, after the beginning of
the first Intifada in 1987 Mujama el Islamiya developed into what we
now know as Hamas.
That
didn't mean an immediate end to ties with Israel: even after the
publication of the group's charter, a document filled with
anti-semitism and which pledges the destruction of the Jewish state,
Israeli officials still communicated with them, apparently in
ignorance of the extremist shift. But after Hamas abducted and killed
two soldiers in 1989, the game was up. Israel arrested Sheikh Yassin,
and sentenced him to life imprisonment.
Image
Credit: AP. Sheikh Yassin in an Israeli jail cell, 1992.
It
was too, late, however, to halt the growth and popularity of the new
organization. Hamas continued to employ bloody tactics toward Israel,
including a wave of suicide bombings which, in 1996, killed nearly 60
people. In 2006, Hamas won a democratic election, which legitimized
its power.
Image
Credit: Getty Images. Supporters of Hamas, 2006.
So
where does the story end? If Hamas' past depended on Israel, then so
does its future. The savage bombardment and ground incursion that's
now underway in the Gaza Strip will of course take out Hamas
operatives and important infrastructure, striking a blow to the
organization in the short term. But further in the future it might
just increase their strength: both the wounds of war suffered by
Gazans and the militant response of Hamas is likely to boost its
popularity in the Gaza Strip.
And
so the cycle will continue. The strategizing and bombing of both
sides has brought no end to the violence so far: it seems unlikely
that it will stop the bloodshed any time soon.
Hamas
History Tied To Israel
By
Richard Sale
UPI
Terrorism Correspondent
18
June, 2002
In
the wake of a suicide bomb attack Tuesday on a crowded Jerusalem city
bus that killed 19 people and wounded at least 70 more, the Islamic
Resistance Movement, Hamas, took credit for the blast.
Israeli
officials called it the deadliest attack in Jerusalem in six years.
Israeli
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon immediately vowed to fight "Palestinian
terror" and summoned his cabinet to decide on a military
response to the organization that Sharon had once described as "the
deadliest terrorist group that we have ever had to face."
Active
in Gaza and the West Bank, Hamas wants to liberate all of Palestine
and establish a radical Islamic state in place of Israel. It is has
gained notoriety with its assassinations, car bombs and other acts of
terrorism.
But
Sharon left something out.
Israel
and Hamas may currently be locked in deadly combat, but, according to
several current and former U.S. intelligence officials, beginning in
the late 1970s, Tel Aviv gave direct and indirect financial aid to
Hamas over a period of years.
Israel
"aided Hamas directly -- the Israelis wanted to use it as a
counterbalance to the PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization),"
said Tony Cordesman, Middle East analyst for the Center for Strategic
Studies.
Israel's
support for Hamas "was a direct attempt to divide and dilute
support for a strong, secular PLO by using a competing religious
alternative," said a former senior CIA official.
According
to documents United Press International obtained from the
Israel-based Institute for Counter Terrorism, Hamas evolved from
cells of the Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt in 1928. Islamic
movements in Israel and Palestine were "weak and dormant"
until after the 1967 Six Day War in which Israel scored a stunning
victory over its Arab enemies.
After
1967, a great part of the success of the Hamas/Muslim Brotherhood was
due to their activities among the refugees of the Gaza Strip. The
cornerstone of the Islamic movements success was an impressive
social, religious, educational and cultural infrastructure, called
Da'wah, that worked to ease the hardship of large numbers of
Palestinian refugees, confined to camps, and many who were living on
the edge.
"Social
influence grew into political influence," first in the Gaza
Strip, then on the West Bank, said an administration official who
spoke on condition of anonymity.
According
to ICT papers, Hamas was legally registered in Israel in 1978 by
Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the movement's spiritual leader, as an Islamic
Association by the name Al-Mujamma al Islami, which widened its base
of supporters and sympathizers by religious propaganda and social
work.
According
to U.S. administration officials, funds for the movement came from
the oil-producing states and directly and indirectly from Israel. The
PLO was secular and leftist and promoted Palestinian nationalism.
Hamas wanted to set up a transnational state under the rule of Islam,
much like Khomeini's Iran.
What
took Israeli leaders by surprise was the way the Islamic movements
began to surge after the Iranian revolution, after armed resistance
to Israel sprang up in southern Lebanon vis-a-vis the Hezbollah,
backed by Iran, these sources said.
"Nothing
provides the energy for imitation as much as success," commented
one administration expert.
A
further factor of Hamas' growth was the fact the PLO moved its base
of operations to Beirut in the '80s, leaving the Islamic organization
to grow in influence in the Occupied Territories "as the court
of last resort," he said.
When
the intifada began, Israeli leadership was surprised when Islamic
groups began to surge in membership and strength. Hamas immediately
grew in numbers and violence. The group had always embraced the
doctrine of armed struggle, but the doctrine had not been practiced
and Islamic groups had not been subjected to suppression the way
groups like Fatah had been, according to U.S. government officials.
But
with the triumph of the Khomeini revolution in Iran, with the birth
of Iranian-backed Hezbollah terrorism in Lebanon, Hamas began to gain
in strength in Gaza and then in the West Bank, relying on terror to
resist the Israeli occupation.
Israel
was certainly funding the group at that time. One U.S. intelligence
source who asked not to be named said that not only was Hamas being
funded as a "counterweight" to the PLO, Israeli aid had
another purpose: "To help identify and channel towards Israeli
agents Hamas members who were dangerous terrorists."
In
addition, by infiltrating Hamas, Israeli informers could only listen
to debates on policy and identify Hamas members who "were
dangerous hard-liners," the official said.
In
the end, as Hamas set up a very comprehensive counterintelligence
system, many collaborators with Israel were weeded out and shot.
Violent acts of terrorism became the central tenet, and Hamas, unlike
the PLO, was unwilling to compromise in any way with Israel, refusing
to acquiesce in its very existence.
But
even then, some in Israel saw some benefits to be had in trying to
continue to give Hamas support: "The thinking on the part of
some of the right-wing Israeli establishment was that Hamas and the
others, if they gained control, would refuse to have any part of the
peace process and would torpedo any agreements put in place,"
said a U.S. government official who asked not to be named.
"Israel
would still be the only democracy in the region for the United States
to deal with," he said.
All
of which disgusts some former U.S. intelligence officials.
"The
thing wrong with so many Israeli operations is that they try to be
too sexy," said former CIA official Vincent Cannestraro.
According
to former State Department counter-terrorism official Larry Johnson,
"the Israelis are their own worst enemies when it comes to
fighting terrorism."
"The
Israelis are like a guy who sets fire to his hair and then tries to
put it out by hitting it with a hammer."
"They
do more to incite and sustain terrorism than curb it," he said.
Aid
to Hamas may have looked clever, "but it was hardly designed to
help smooth the waters," he said. "An operation like that
gives weight to President George Bush's remark about there being a
crisis in education."
Cordesman
said that a similar attempt by Egyptian intelligence to fund Egypt's
fundamentalists had also come to grief because of "misreading of
the complexities."
An
Israeli defense official was asked if Israel had given aid to Hamas
said, "I am not able to answer that question. I was in Lebanon
commanding a unit at the time, besides it is not my field of
interest."
Asked
to confirm a report by U.S. officials that Brig. Gen. Yithaq Segev,
the military governor of Gaza, had told U.S. officials he had helped
fund "Islamic movements as a counterweight to the PLO and
communists," the official said he could confirm only that he
believed Segev had served back in 1986.
The
Israeli Embassy press office referred UPI to its Web site when asked
to comment.
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