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What
Does Putin Want? A Major Analysis by a Prominent Russian Commentator
-- a Foreword by The Saker
Ishchenko
explains Russia and the U.S. are locked in a mortal struggle, and why
neither side can afford to back down
Rostislav
Ishchenko
The
analysis below is, by far, the best I have seen since the beginning
of the conflict in the Ukraine. I have regularly posted
analyses by Ishchenko on this blog before, because I considered him
as one of the best analysts in Russia.
This
time, however, Ishchenko has truly produced a masterpiece: a
comprehensive analysis of the geostrategic position of Russia and a
clear and, I believe, absolutely accurate analysis of the entire
“Putin strategy” for the Ukraine.
I
have always said that this conflict is not about the Ukraine but
about the future of the planet and that there is no “Novorussian”
or even “Ukrainian” solution, but that the only possible outcome
is a strategic victory of either Russia or the USA which will affect
the entire planet.
Ishchenko
does a superb overview of the risks and options for both sides and
offers the first comprehensive “key” to the apparently
incomprehensible behavior of Russia in this conflict.
Finally,
Ishchenko also fully understands the complex and subtle dynamics
inside Russian society. When he writes “Russian power is
authoritative, rather than authoritarian” he is spot on, and
explains more in seven words than what you would get by reading the
billions of useless words written by so-called “experts” trying
to describe the Russian reality.
We
all owe a huge debt of gratitude to Denis, Gideon and Robin for
translating this seminal text, which was difficult to translate.
The only reason why we can read it in such a good English is because
the innumerable hours spent by these volunteers to produce the high
quality translation this analysis deserves.
I
strongly recommend that you all read this text very carefully.
Twice. It is well worth it.
The Saker
What
does Putin want?
Translated
from the Russian by Denis, Gideon, and Robin
It’s
gratifying that “patriots” did not instantly blame Putin for the
failure to achieve a full-scale rout of Ukrainian troops in Donbass
in January and February, or for Moscow’s consultations with Merkel
and Hollande.
Even
so, they still are still impatient for a victory. The most radical
are convinced that Putin will “surrender Novorossiya” just the
same. And the moderates are afraid that he will as soon as the next
truce is signed (if that happens) out of the need to regroup and
replenish Novorossiya’s army (which actually could have been done
without disengagement from military operations), to come to terms
with the new circumstances on the international front, and to get
ready for new diplomatic battles.
In
fact, despite all the attention that political and/or military
dilettantes (the Talleyrands and the Bonapartes of the Internet) are
paying to the situation in Donbass and the Ukraine in general, it is
only one point on a global front: the outcome of the war is being
decided not at the Donetsk airport or in the hills outside
Debaltsevo, but at offices on Staraya Square1 and
Smolenskaya Square,2 at
offices in Paris, Brussels and Berlin. Because military action is
only one of the many components of the political quarrel.
It
is the harshest and the final component, which carries great risk,
but the matter doesn’t start with war and it doesn’t end with
war. War is only an intermediate step signifying the impossibility of
compromise. Its purpose is to create new conditions whereby
compromise is possible or to show that there is no longer any need
for it, with the disappearance of one side of the conflict. When it
is time for compromise, when the fighting is over and the troops go
back to their barracks and the generals begin writing their memoirs
and preparing for the next war, that is when the real outcome of the
confrontation is determined by politicians and diplomats at the
negotiating table.
Political
decisions are not often understood by the general population or the
military. For example, during the Austro-Prussian war of 1866,
Prussian chancellor Otto Von Bismarck (later chancellor of the German
Empire) disregarded the persistent requests of King Wilhelm I (the
future German Emperor) and the demands of the Prussian generals to
take Vienna, and he was absolutely correct to do so. In that way he
accelerated peace on Prussia’s terms and also ensured that
Austro-Hungary forever (well, until its dismemberment in 1918) became
a junior partner for Prussia and later the German Empire.
To
understand how, when and on what conditions military activity can
end, we need to know what the politicians want and how they see the
conditions of the postwar compromise. Then it will become clear why
military action turned into a low-intensity civil war with occasional
truces, not only in the Ukraine but also in Syria.
Obviously,
the views of Kiev politicians are of no interest to us because they
don’t decide anything. The fact that outsiders govern the Ukraine
is no longer concealed. It doesn’t matter whether the cabinet
ministers are Estonian or Georgian; they are Americans just the same.
It would also be a big mistake to take an interest in how the leaders
of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and the Lugansk People’s
Republic (LNR) see the future. The republics exist only with Russian
support, and as long as Russia supports them, Russia’s interests
have to be protected, even from independent decisions and
initiatives. There is too much at stake to allow [Alexander]
Zakharchenko or [Igor] Plotnitzky, or anyone else for that matter, to
make independent decisions.
Nor
are we interested in the European Union’s position. Much depended
on the EU until the summer of last year, when the war could have been
prevented or stopped at the outset. A tough, principled antiwar
stance by the EU was needed. It could have blocked U.S. initiatives
to start the war and would have turned the EU into a significant
independent geopolitical player. The EU passed on that opportunity
and instead behaved like a faithful vassal of the United States.
As
a result, Europe stands on the brink of frightful internal upheaval.
In the coming years, it has every chance of suffering the same fate
as the Ukraine, only with a great roar, great bloodshed and less
chance that in the near future things will settle down – in other
words, that someone will show up and put things in order.
In
fact, today the EU can choose whether to remain a tool of the United
States or to move closer to Russia. Depending on its choice, Europe
can get off with a slight scare, such as a breakup of parts of its
periphery and possible fragmentation of some countries, or it could
collapse completely. Judging by the European elites’ reluctance to
break openly with the United States, collapse is almost inevitable.
What
should interest us is the opinions of the two main players that
determine the configuration of the geopolitical front and in fact are
fighting for victory in the new generation of war – the
network-centric Third World War. These players are the United States
and Russia.
The
U.S. position is clear and transparent. In the second half of the
1990s, Washington missed its only opportunity to reform the Cold War
economy without any obstacles and thereby avoid the looming crisis in
a system whose development is limited by the finite nature of planet
Earth and its resources, including human ones, which conflicts with
the need to endlessly print dollars.
After
that, the United States could prolong the death throes of the system
only by plundering the rest of the world. At first, it went after
Third World countries. Then it went for potential competitors. Then
for allies and even close friends. Such plundering could continue
only as long as the United States remained the world’s
undisputed hegemon.
Thus
when Russia asserted its right to make independent political
decisions – decisions of not global but regional import – , a
clash with the United States became inevitable. This clash cannot end
in a compromise peace.
For
the United States, a compromise with Russia would mean a voluntary
renunciation of its hegemony, leading to a quick, systemic
catastrophe – not only a political and economic crisis but also a
paralysis of state institutions and the inability of the government
to function. In other words, its inevitable disintegration.
But
if the United States wins, then it is Russia that will experience
systemic catastrophe. After a certain type of “rebellion,”
Russia’s ruling classes would be punished with asset liquidation
and confiscation as well as imprisonment. The state would be
fragmented, substantial territories would be annexed, and the
country’s military might would be destroyed.
So
the war will last until one side wins. Any interim agreement should
be viewed only as a temporary truce – a needed respite to regroup,
to mobilize new resources and to find (i.e., to poach)
additional allies.
To
complete the picture of the situation, we only need Russia’s
position. It is essential to understand what the Russian leadership
wants to achieve, particularly the president, Vladimir Putin. We are
talking about the key role that Putin plays in the organization of
the Russian power structure. This system is not authoritarian, as
many assert, but rather authoritative – meaning it is based not on
legislative consolidation of autocracy but on the authority of the
person who created the system and, as the head of it, makes it
work effectively.
During
Putin’s 15 years in power, despite the difficult internal and
external situation, he has tried to maximize the role of the
government, the legislative assembly, and even the local authorities.
These are entirely logical steps that should have given the system
completeness, stability, and continuity. Because no politician can
rule forever, political continuity, regardless of who comes to power,
is the key to a stable system.
Unfortunately,
fully autonomous control, namely the ability to function without the
president’s oversight, hasn’t been achieved. Putin remains the
key component of the system because the people put their trust in him
personally. They have far less trust in the system, as represented by
public authorities and individual agencies.
Thus
Putin’s opinions and political plans become the decisive factor in
areas such as Russia’s foreign policy. If the phrase “without
Putin, there is no Russia” is an exaggeration, then the phrase
“what Putin wants, Russia also wants” reflects the situation
quite accurately in my opinion.
First,
let’s note that the man who for 15 years has carefully guided
Russia to its revival has done so in conditions of U.S. hegemony in
world politics along with significant opportunities for Washington to
influence Russia’s internal politics. He had to understand the
nature of the fight and his opponent. Otherwise, he wouldn’t have
lasted so long.
The
level of confrontation that Russia allowed itself to get into with
the United States grew very slowly and up to a certain point went
unnoticed. For example, Russia did not react at all to the first
attempt at a color revolution in the Ukraine in 2000-2002 (the
Gongadze case,3 the
Cassette Scandal,4 and
the Ukraine without Kuchma protest5).
Russia
took an opposing position but did not actively intervene in the coups
that took place from November 2003 to January 2004 in Georgia and
from November 2004 to January 2005 in the Ukraine. In 2008, in
Ossetia and Abkhazia, Russia used its troops against Georgia, a U.S.
ally. In 2012, in Syria, the Russian fleet demonstrated its readiness
to confront the United States and its NATO allies.
In
2013, Russia began taking economic measures against [Victor]
Yanukovych’s regime, which contributed to his realization of the
harmfulness of signing an association agreement [with the EU].
Moscow
could not have saved the Ukraine from the coup because of the
baseness, cowardice, and stupidity of the Ukraine’s leaders – not
only Yanukovych but all of them without exception. After the armed
coup in Kiev in February 2014, Russia entered into open confrontation
with Washington. Before that, the conflicts were interspersed with
improved relations, but at the beginning of 2014 relations between
Russia and the United States deteriorated swiftly and almost
immediately reached the point where war would have been declared
automatically in the prenuclear era.
Thus
at any given time Putin engaged in precisely the level of
confrontation with the United States that Russia could handle. If
Russia isn’t limiting the level of confrontation now, it means
Putin believes that, in the war of sanctions, the war of nerves, the
information war, the civil war in the Ukraine, and the economic war,
Russia can win.
This
is the first important conclusion about what Putin wants and what he
expects. He expects to win. And considering that he takes a
meticulous approach and strives to anticipate any surprises, you can
be sure that when the decision was made not to back down under
pressure from the United States, but to respond, the Russian
leadership had a double, if not a triple, guarantee of victory.
I
would like to point out that the decision to enter into a conflict
with Washington was not made in 2014, nor was it made in 2013. The
war of August 8, 2008, was a challenge that the United States could
not leave unpunished. After that, every further stage of the
confrontation only raised the stakes. From 2008 to 2010, the United
States’ capability – not just military or economic but its
overall capability – has declined, whereas Russia’s has improved
significantly. So the main objective was to raise the stakes slowly
rather than in explosive fashion. In other words, an open
confrontation in which all pretences are dropped and everyone
understands that a war is going on had to be delayed as long as
possible. But it would have been even better to avoid it altogether.
With
every passing year, the United States became weaker while Russia
became stronger. This process was natural and impossible to arrest,
and we could have projected with a high degree of certainty that by
2020 to 2025, without any confrontation, the period of U.S. hegemony
would have ended, and the United States would then be best advised to
think about not how to rule the world, but how to stave off its own
precipitous internal decline.
Thus
Putin’s second desire is clear: to keep the peace or the appearance
of peace as long as possible. Peace is advantageous for Russia
because in conditions of peace, without enormous expense, it obtains
the same political result but in a much better geopolitical
situation. That is why Russia continually extends the olive branch.
Just as the Kiev junta will collapse in conditions of peace in
Donbass, in conditions of world peace, the military-industrial
complex and the global financial system created by the United States
are doomed to self-destruct. In this way, Russia’s actions are
aptly described by Sun Tzu’s maxim “The greatest victory is that
which requires no battle.”
It
is clear that Washington is not run by idiots, no matter what is said
on Russian talk shows or written on blogs. The United States
understands precisely the situation it is in. Moreover, they also
understand that Russia has no plans to destroy them and is really
prepared to cooperate as an equal. Even so, because of the political
and socioeconomic situation in the United States, such cooperation is
not acceptable to them. An economic collapse and a social explosion
are likely to occur before Washington (even with the support of
Moscow and Beijing) has time to introduce the necessary reforms,
especially when we consider that the EU will have to undergo reform
at the same time. Moreover, the political elite who have emerged in
the United States in the past 25 years have become accustomed to
their status as the owners of the world. They sincerely don’t
understand how anyone can challenge them.
For
the ruling elite in the United States (not so much the business class
but the government bureaucracy), to go from being a country that
decides of the fate of inferior peoples to one that negotiates with
them on an equal footing is intolerable. It is probably tantamount to
offering Gladstone or Disraeli the post of prime minister of the Zulu
Kingdom under Cetshwayo kaMpande. And so, unlike Russia, which needs
peace to develop, the United States regards war as vital.
In
principle, any war is a struggle for resources. Typically, the winner
is the one that has more resources and can ultimately mobilize more
troops and build more tanks, ships, and planes. Even so, sometimes
those who are strategically disadvantaged can turn the situation
around with a tactical victory on the battlefield. Examples include
the wars of Alexander the Great and Frederick the Great, as well as
Hitler’s campaign of 1939-1940.
Nuclear
powers cannot confront each other directly. Therefore, their resource
base is of paramount importance. That is exactly why Russia and the
United States have been in a desperate competition for allies over
the past year. Russia has won this competition. The United States can
count only the EU, Canada, Australia, and Japan as allies (and not
always unconditionally so), but Russia has managed to mobilize
support from the BRICS, to gain a firm foothold in Latin America, and
to begin displacing the United States in Asia and North Africa.
Of
course, it’s not patently obvious, but if we consider the results
of votes at the UN, assuming that a lack of official support for the
United States means dissent and thus support for Russia, it turns out
that the countries aligned with Russia together control about 60% of
the world’s GDP, have more than two-thirds of its population, and
cover more than three-quarters of its surface. Thus Russia has been
able to mobilize more resources.
In
this regard, the United States had two tactical options. The first
seemed to have great potential and was employed by it from the early
days of the Ukrainian crisis.
It
was an attempt to force Russia to choose between a bad situation and
an even worse one. Russia would be compelled to accept a Nazi state
on its borders and therefore a dramatic loss of international
authority and of the trust and support of its allies, and after a
short time would become vulnerable to internal and external pro-U.S.
forces, with no chance of survival. Or else it could send its army
into the Ukraine, sweep out the junta before it got organized, and
restore the legitimate government of Yanukovych. That, however, would
have brought an accusation of aggression against an independent state
and of suppression of the people’s revolution. Such a situation
would have resulted in a high degree of disapproval on the part of
Ukrainians and the need to constantly expend significant military,
political, economic, and diplomatic resources to maintain a puppet
regime in Kiev, because no other government would have been possible
under such conditions.
Russia
avoided that dilemma. There was no direct invasion. It is Donbass
that is fighting Kiev. It is the Americans who have to devote scarce
resources to the doomed puppet regime in Kiev, while Russia can
remain on the sidelines making peace proposals.
So
now the United States is employing the second option. It’s as old
as the hills. That which cannot be held, and will be taken by the
enemy, must be damaged as much as possible so that the enemy’s
victory is more costly than defeat, as all its resources are used to
reconstruct the destroyed territory. The United States has therefore
ceased to assist the Ukraine with anything more than political
rhetoric while encouraging Kiev to spread civil war throughout
the country.
The
Ukrainian land must burn, not only in Donetsk and Lugansk but also in
Kiev and Lvov. The task is simple: to destroy the social
infrastructure as much as possible and to leave the population at the
very edge of survival. Then the population of the Ukraine will
consist of millions of starving, desperate and heavily armed people
who will kill one another for food. The only way to stop this
bloodbath would be massive international military intervention in the
Ukraine (the militia on its own will not be sufficient) and massive
injections of funds to feed the population and to reconstruct the
economy until the Ukraine can begin to feed itself.
It
is clear that all these costs would fall on Russia. Putin correctly
believes that not only the budget, but also public resources in
general, including the military, would in this case be overstretched
and possibly insufficient. Therefore, the objective is not to allow
the Ukraine to explode before the militia can bring the situation
under control. It is crucial to minimize casualties and destruction
and to salvage as much of the economy as possible and the
infrastructure of the large cities so that the population somehow
survives and then the Ukrainians themselves will take care of the
Nazi thugs.
At
this point an ally appears for Putin in the form of the EU. Because
the United States always tried to use European resources in its
struggle with Russia, the EU, which was already weakened, reaches the
point of exhaustion has to deal with its own long-festering problems.
If
Europe now has on its eastern border a completely destroyed Ukraine,
from which millions of armed people will flee not only to Russia but
also to the EU, taking with them delightful pastimes such as drug
trafficking, gunrunning, and terrorism, the EU will not survive. The
people’s republics of Novorossiya will serve as a buffer for
Russia, however.
Europe
cannot confront the United States, but it is deathly afraid of a
destroyed Ukraine. Therefore, for the first time in the conflict,
Hollande and Merkel are not just trying to sabotage the U.S. demands
(by imposing sanctions but not going too far), but they are also
undertaking limited independent action with the aim of achieving a
compromise – maybe not peace but at least a truce in the Ukraine.
If
the Ukraine catches fire, it will burn quickly, and if the EU has
become an unreliable partner that is ready if not to move into
Russia’s camp then at least to take a neutral position, Washington,
faithful to its strategy, would be obliged to set fire to Europe.
It
is clear that a series of civil and interstate wars on a continent
packed with all sorts of weapons, where more than half a billion
people live, is far worse than a civil war in the Ukraine. The
Atlantic separates the United States from Europe. Even Britain could
hope to sit it out across the Channel. But Russia and the EU share a
very long [sic] border.
It
is not at all in Russia’s interests to have a conflagration
stretching from the Atlantic to the Carpathian Mountains when the
territory from the Carpathians to the Dnieper is still smoldering.
Therefore, Putin’s other objective is, to the extent possible, to
prevent the most negative effects of a conflagration in the Ukraine
and a conflagration in Europe. Because it is impossible to completely
prevent such an outcome (if the United States wants to ignite the
fire, it will), it is necessary to be able to extinguish it quickly
to save what is most valuable.
Thus,
to protect Russia’s legitimate interests, Putin considers peace to
be of vital importance, because it is peace that will make it
possible to achieve this goal with maximum effect at minimum cost.
But because peace is no longer possible, and the truces are becoming
more theoretical and fragile, Putin needs the war to end as quickly
as possible.
But
I do want to stress that if a compromise could have been reached a
year ago on the most favorable terms for the West (Russia would have
still obtained its goals, but later – a minor concession), it is no
longer possible, and the conditions are progressively worsening.
Ostensibly, the situation remains the same; peace on almost any
conditions is still beneficial for Russia. Only one thing has
changed, but it is of the utmost importance: public opinion. Russian
society longs for victory and retribution. As I pointed out above,
Russian power is authoritative, rather than authoritarian; therefore,
public opinion matters in Russia, in contrast to the
“traditional democracies.”
Putin
can maintain his role as the linchpin of the system only as long as
he has the support of the majority of the population. If he loses
this support, because no figures of his stature have emerged from
Russia’s political elite, the system will lose its stability. But
power can maintain its authority only as long as it successfully
embodies the wishes of the masses. Thus the defeat of Nazism in the
Ukraine, even if it is diplomatic, must be clear and indisputable –
only under such conditions is a Russian compromise possible.
Thus,
regardless of Putin’s wishes and Russia’s interests, given the
overall balance of power, as well as the protagonists’ priorities
and capabilities, a war that should have ended last year within the
borders of the Ukraine will almost certainly spill over into Europe.
One can only guess who will be more effective – the Americans with
their gas can or the Russians with their fire extinguisher? But one
thing is absolutely clear: the peace initiatives of the Russian
leaders will be limited not by their wishes but their actual
capabilities. It is futile to fight either the wishes of the people
or the course of history; but when they coincide, the only thing a
wise politician can do is to understand the wishes of the people and
the direction of the historical process and try to support it at
all costs.
The
circumstances described above make it extremely unlikely that the
proponents of an independent state of Novorossiya will see their
wishes fulfilled. Given the scale of the coming conflagration,
determining the fate of the Ukraine as a whole is not excessively
complicated but, at the same time, it will not come cheap.
It
is only logical that the Russian people should ask: if Russians, whom
we rescued from the Nazis, live in Novorossiya, why do they have to
live in a separate state? If they want to live in a separate state,
why should Russia rebuild their cities and factories? To these
questions there is only one reasonable answer: Novorossiya should
become part of Russia (especially since it has enough fighters,
although the governing class is problematic). Well, if part of the
Ukraine can join Russia, why not all of it? Especially as in all
likelihood by the time this question is on the agenda, the European
Union will no longer be an alternative to the Eurasian Union [for
the Ukraine].
Consequently,
the decision to rejoin Russia will be made by a united federated
Ukraine and not by some entity without a clear status. I think that
it is premature to redraw the political map. Most likely the conflict
in the Ukraine will be concluded by the end of the year. But if the
United States manages to extend the conflict to the EU (and it will
try), the final resolution of territorial issues will take at least a
couple of years and maybe more.
In
any situation we benefit from peace. In conditions of peace, as
Russia’s resource base grows, as new allies (former partners of the
United States) go over to its side, and as Washington becomes
progressively marginalized, territorial restructuring will become far
simpler and temporarily less significant, especially for those
being restructured.
Notes:
3 Georgiy
Gongadze was a Georgian-born Ukrainian journalist and film director
who was kidnapped and murdered in 2000.
4 The
Cassette Scandal erupted in 2000 with the release of audiotapes on
which Leonid Kuchma allegedly discussed the need to silence Gongadze
for reporting on high-level corruption.
5 As
a result of the Cassette Scandal, a mass anti-Kuchma protest took
place in the Ukraine in 2000-2001.
CrossTalk: Putin's 15 Years
Fifteen years ago Vladimir Putin assumed the Russian presidency and no one can doubt that he has left his mark on the country since then. Widely popular at home and demonized in the West, Putin has presided over Russia’s transformation from a country on its knees to a renewed global power. What is left on his agenda?
CrossTalking with Edward Lozansky, John Laughland, and Mary Dejevsky.
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