IDF's
Gaza assault is to
control Palestinian gas, avert
Israeli energy
crisis
Israel's
defence minister has confirmed that military plans to 'uproot Hamas'
are about dominating Gaza's gas reserves
Nafeez
Ahmed
10
July, 2014
Yesterday,
Israeli defence minister and former Israeli Defence Force (IDF) chief
of staff Moshe
Ya'alon announced
that Operation Protective Edge marks the beginning of a protracted
assault on Hamas. The operation "won't end in just a few days,"
he said, adding that "we are preparing to expand the operation
by all means standing at our disposal so as to continue striking
Hamas."
This
morning, he said:
"We continue with strikes that draw a very heavy price from Hamas. We are destroying weapons, terror infrastructures, command and control systems, Hamas institutions, regime buildings, the houses of terrorists, and killing terrorists of various ranks of command… The campaign against Hamas will expand in the coming days, and the price the organization will pay will be very heavy."
But
in 2007, a year before Operation Cast Lead, Ya'alon's
concerns focused
on the 1.4 trillion cubic feet of natural gas discovered
in 2000 off the Gaza coast,
valued at $4 billion. Ya'alon dismissed the notion that "Gaza
gas can be a key driver of an economically more viable Palestinian
state" as "misguided." The problem, he said, is that:
"Proceeds of a Palestinian gas sale to Israel would likely not trickle down to help an impoverished Palestinian public. Rather, based on Israel's past experience, the proceeds will likely serve to fund further terror attacks against Israel…
A gas transaction with the Palestinian Authority [PA] will, by definition, involve Hamas. Hamas will either benefit from the royalties or it will sabotage the project and launch attacks against Fatah, the gas installations, Israel – or all three… It is clear that without an overall military operation to uproot Hamas control of Gaza, no drilling work can take place without the consent of the radical Islamic movement."
Operation
Cast Lead did not succeed in uprooting Hamas, but the conflict did
take the lives of 1,387
Palestinians (773 of whom were civilians) and 9 Israelis (3 of whom
were civilians).
Since
the discovery of oil and
gas in the Occupied Territories, resource competition has
increasingly been at the heart of the conflict, motivated largely by
Israel's increasing domestic energy woes.
Mark
Turner, founder of the Research Journalism Initiative, reported that
the siege of Gaza and ensuing military pressure was designed to
"eliminate" Hamas as "a viable political entity in
Gaza" to generate a "political climate" conducive to a
gas deal. This involved rehabilitating the defeated Fatah as the
dominant political player in the West Bank, and "leveraging
political tensions between the two parties, arming forces loyal to
Abbas and the selective resumption of financial aid."
Ya'alon's
comments in 2007 illustrate that the Israeli cabinet is not just
concerned about Hamas – but concerned that if Palestinians develop
their own gas resources, the resulting economic transformation could
in turn fundamentally increase Palestinian clout.
Meanwhile,
Israel has made successive
major discoveries in
recent years - such as the Leviathan field estimated to hold 18
trillion cubic feet of natural gas – which could transform the
country from energy importer into aspiring energy exporter with
ambitions to supply Europe, Jordan and Egypt. A potential obstacle is
that much of the 122 trillion cubic feet of gas and 1.6 billion
barrels of oil in the Levant Basin Province lies in territorial
waters where borders are hotly disputed between Israel, Syria,
Lebanon, Gaza and Cyprus.
Amidst
this regional jockeying for gas, though, Israel faces its own
little-understood energy challenges. It could, for instance, take
until 2020 for much of these domestic resources to be properly
mobilised.
But
this is the tip of the iceberg. A 2012 letter by two Israeli
government chief scientists – which the Israeli government chose
not to disclose – warned the government that Israel still had
insufficient gas resources to sustain exports despite all the
stupendous discoveries. The letter, according to Ha'aretz,
stated that Israel's domestic resources were 50% less than needed to
support meaningful exports, and could be depleted in decades:
"We believe Israel should increase its [domestic] use of natural gas by 2020 and should not export gas. The Natural Gas Authority's estimates are lacking. There's a gap of 100 to 150 billion cubic meters between the demand projections that were presented to the committee and the most recent projections. The gas reserves are likely to last even less than 40 years!"
As
Dr Gary Luft - an advisor to the US Energy Security Council - wrote
in the Journal
of Energy Security,
"with the depletion of Israel's domestic gas supplies
accelerating, and without an imminent rise in Egyptian gas imports,
Israel could face a power crisis in the next few years… If Israel
is to continue to pursue its natural gas plans it must diversify its
supply sources."
Israel's
new domestic discoveries do not, as yet, offer an immediate solution
as electricity
prices reach
record levels, heightening the imperative to diversify supply. This
appears to be behind Prime Minister Netanyahu's announcement in
February 2011 that it was now time to seal the Gaza gas deal. But
even after a new round of negotiations was kick-started between the
Fatah-led Palestinian Authority and Israel in September 2012, Hamas
was excluded from these talks, and thus rejected the legitimacy of
any deal.
Earlier
this year, Hamas
condemned a
PA deal to purchase $1.2 billion worth of gas from Israel Leviathan
field over a 20 year period once the field starts producing.
Simultaneously, the PA has held several meetings with the British
Gas Group to
develop the Gaza gas field, albeit with a view to exclude Hamas –
and thus Gazans – from access to the proceeds. That plan had been
the brainchild of Quartet Middle East envoy Tony Blair.
But
the PA was also courting Russia's
Gazprom to
develop the Gaza marine gas field, and talks have been going on
between Russia, Israel and Cyprus, though so far it is unclear what
the outcome of these have been. Also missing was any clarification on
how the PA would exert control over Gaza, which is governed by Hamas.
According
to Anais Antreasyan in the University of California's Journal
of Palestine Studies,
the most respected English language journal devoted to the
Arab-Israeli conflict, Israel's stranglehold over Gaza has been
designed to make "Palestinian access to the Marine-1 and
Marine-2 gas wells impossible." Israel's long-term goal "besides
preventing the Palestinians from exploiting their own resources, is
to integrate the gas fields off Gaza into the adjacent Israeli
offshore installations." This is part of a wider strategy of:
"…. separating the Palestinians from their land and natural resources in order to exploit them, and, as a consequence, blocking Palestinian economic development. Despite all formal agreements to the contrary, Israel continues to manage all the natural resources nominally under the jurisdiction of the PA, from land and water to maritime and hydrocarbon resources."
For
the Israeli government, Hamas continues to be the main obstacle to
the finalisation of the gas deal. In the incumbent defence
minister's words:
"Israel's experience during the Oslo years indicates Palestinian
gas profits would likely end up funding terrorism against Israel. The
threat is not limited to Hamas… It is impossible to prevent at
least some of the gas proceeds from reaching Palestinian terror
groups."
The
only option, therefore, is yet another "military operation to
uproot Hamas."
Unfortunately,
for the IDF uprooting Hamas means destroying the group's
perceived civilian
support base –
which is why Palestinian
civilian casualties massively outweigh that of Israelis.
Both are obviously reprehensible, but Israel's capacity to inflict
destruction is simply far greater.
In
the wake of Operation Cast Lead, the Jerusalem-based Public
Committee Against Torture in Israel (Pcati)
found that the IDF had adopted a more aggressive combat doctrine
based on two principles – "zero casualties" for IDF
soldiers at the cost of deploying increasingly indiscriminate
firepower in densely populated areas, and the "dahiya doctrine"
promoting targeting of civilian infrastructure to create widespread
suffering amongst the population with a view to foment opposition to
Israel's opponents.
This
was confirmed in practice by the UN fact-finding mission in Gaza
which concluded that the IDF had pursued a "deliberate policy of
disproportionate force," aimed at the "supporting
infrastructure" of the enemy - "this appears to have meant
the civilian population," said the UN
report.
The
Israel-Palestine conflict is clearly not all about resources. But in
an age of expensive energy, competition to dominate regional fossil
fuels are
increasingly influencing the critical decisions that can inflame war.
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