Israel's realism creates irrational US policy against Russia in the Middle-East
US's
Middle-East policy benefits only Israel
Joaquin
Flores
The ''Yinon'' Plan for Greater Israe |
3
October, 2015
The
general public is thought to be often exposed to various printed
opinion pieces and editorials weighing the pros and cons of the
present international system, and the role of the US within it.
Many
editors and publishers believe that this general public needs to be
exposed to the conclusions of either various experts or popular
agitators and polemicists, but that the audience either would not
understand or appreciate an article based in the fundamentals and the
framework, on the theoretical or academic level, which frames these
debates.
A
different view, the one taken by the author, is that the general
public in fact does not read on this subject at all. The core
readership for writings on this subject are a different category of
citizen-activists, whose interest goes beyond passing, and whose
capacity to understand and appreciate the subject stands heads and
shoulders above the general public.
The
aim of this article is first to explain why the US's Middle-east
policy is a chauvinist/exceptionalist variation of irrational
idealism in the language of International Relations, and how this
policy can best be understood as originating from Israel, as it fits
the needs of this state quite well and to the exclusion of others
including the US itself. In order to explain to the readership why
this is so, we will necessarily explain the relevance of IR theory to
the subject at hand.
The
academic and institutional field of International Relations is what
provides us with several theories and working models
for explaining the 'world system'. It, tends to
indicate several things:
1.
The US's policy on the Middle-east is based in Chauvinist Irrational
Idealism. Understanding these terms and why this is so will
be most of the focus of this article. In summary, the chauvinism is
analogous to 'American exceptionalism'. The irrationalism is
based in the unwinnable/unworkable nature of the policy. The idealism
is the fetishization of the concept of 'alliances'. An alliance
becomes based in idealism when, for example, one state will destroy
itself out of fidelity to another.
2.
Israel has a dangerous influence on the US's Middle-east policy. This
will invariably lead the US to a confrontation with regional and
bordering hegemons like Iran and Russia. This influence is
extraordinary insofar as US policy seems to be directed by a foreign
state (Israel). It is extraordinary because a lack of sovereign
control over foreign policy is typically seen in the dependency
model and is normal for weaker states subject to control by
stronger states. The US is widely understood as a powerful state, so
it is extraordinary in this abnormality, that its policy would be
controlled by a foreign state.
The
present situation
Recent
statements by US officials and candidates for office are indeed not
only subjectively obnoxious but also objectively illegal by the
standards of international law.
Fortunately
this posturing - while serving a predictable and convenient political
purpose that supports spending on the military industrial complex,
and distracts from ongoing race and class related social crises in
the US - would actually result in catastrophic defeat for the Empire
in the Syrian theatre, if words were translated into actions.
Oddly,
US media attempts to paint Russia's publicly stated aim as if it is a
conspiracy; as if Russia is concealing its support for the legal
institutions in Syria and only using its campaign against ISIS as a
cynical cover for that.
But
the Russian president has not only made this clear publicly within
Russia, but went on US television on NBC's 60 minutes and - when
directly asked by the interviewer - confirmed that indeed Russia is
working to buttress the recognized government of Syria. These
actions are entirely consistent with international law.
The
US public has been largely led to take for granted that US activity
outside of its own borders is categorically different in essence from
those of other states. In the sense that the US focuses most of
its activities far outside of its natural sphere of influence (i.e.
North America and the Caribbean), this is correct. Also, that
the US undertakes its actions in contravention to international law
and standing accords and agreements between states, it is also
exceptional.
But
the ideology of American exceptionalism changes how these
'exceptions' are understood within the US: rather than being viewed
as problematic and evidence of a criminal system which stands outside
of the norms of international law and as established by the
international community, through various accords and standing bodies
such as the UN - American exceptionalism is viewed as
a providential right and an inherent good.
International
Relations theory is the international standard 'metric' by which
states understand each other and by which analysts understand states
The
United States, more than any other country - perhaps uniquely - is
the single state which repeatedly confuses the basic concepts and
terms in IR and international law - creating an incoherent mess out
of meaning, language, and internationally accepted standards. It
combines and mixes phrases and meanings, which produces a meandering
and self-referential combination of 'mumbo-jumbo' which categorically
can only be described as discoherence. It switches its own
internal and implied meanings and definitions for the consensus ones.
For
example, 'legitimacy' in International Relations deals with legality
and a positive description of existing states, and not a normative
one. A state in the world can be for example one or almost any
combination of these: theocratic, socialist, democratic, nationalist,
military-government, republican, monarchical, communist, fascist,
(and others).
The
founding principles of international law and, for example, the UN
recognize these both overtly and de facto in that governments of this
type represent states which have standing at the UN.
Human
rights is a factor both in international law and at the level of the
UN. However, it is important to understand here that in
principle a 'democratic state' can violate human rights while a
'fascist state' can be seen to observe them. The concept of human
rights is a normative one, and it is probably accurate to say that
all states fail this standard to some extent and indeed violate them.
A state that has violated human rights is not a state that has
lost legitimacy.
But
'legitimacy' in US language only refers to its friends and partners,
and vaguely though very inconsistently refers to concepts of
democracy, freedom, and human rights. It is confused and
inconsistent because it will refer to a democratic or republican
semi-dictatorship type state (e.g Syria) that has probably abused
human rights, as a dictatorship. Remember, the normative standard is
very high and on a case-by-case basis. But it will conclude
therefore that the Syrian government is not legitimate, while
simultaneously supporting democratic and monarchical human rights
abusing states in the same region (e.g Israel and Saudi Arabia,
respectively).
The
United States uses international platforms to threaten other states
and to communicate in this discoherent syntax to its own population.
But other states interpret their statements, indeed as threats,
but ones which are not rational and instead based in this
discoherence.
Russian
President Putin made this point very clear last week at the UN when
he said that the language used in the international arena should use
terms that are clear, consistent, and transparent in their meaning:
Every term in international law and international affairs (relations) should be clear, transparent and have uniformlyunderstood criteria. We are all different, and we should respect that. No one has to conform to a single development model that someone has once and for all recognized as the only right one. We should all remember what our past has taught us.
The
US in the Middle-east acts as a Chauvinist, and irrational idealist
state
These
are the most dangerous, historically. US policy in the
middle-east is largely irrational from the perspective of a standard
reading of classical 'international relations' (IR): from either a
realist or idealist perspective. From these perspectives, there is
little basis for intervention if the US does not want to face serious
set-backs in the global arena, or if it does not want to create a
global conflict which it is projected to lose.
Even
within the framework of the US's own 'best interests' defined
realistically within the framework of a corporatist-capitalist
Empire, it cannot be rationally justified from the perspective of
'realist' classical or basic IR theory.
While
the dominating US policy in the middle-east is rooted in idealism, it
is not rational. It cannot be justified within the classical
or basic IR category of rational
idealism. Also, its policies, whether rational or
irrational, are not rooted in an idealism based in conceptions of
peace, mutual respect, and stability - but rather in conceptions of
domination, chauvinism, exceptionalism, and the fetishization of
military solutions.
In
practical terms, this means that its self destruction will not be the
result of trying to save the world, but as a result of trying to
dominate it. In realist terms, these motivations are secondary
considerations. What is significant is its irrationalism. Its
motivations (domination) and justification (chauvinism as
'American exceptionalism') will however have an effect on
international perceptions of the US which will have a material
consequence in the willingness of other states to aid the US in the
aftermath of its self-immolation.
Conclusively
its policies can properly be located in the realm of irrational
idealism. The US cannot interact constructively with other world
players because it either employs or pretends to employ an "inherent
bad faith model in international relations and political psychology".
It justifies its
own irrationality on the basis that its opponents are irrational and
implacably hostile. It is a continuation of the orientation of
John Foster Dulles. It was the Dulles-based theories of nuclear
brinkmanship and the bad faith model which almost ended life on earth
during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
When
both Putin and Obama delivered their statements a few days ago to the
UN, they specifically referred to the language and theories of IR.
For these reasons and more, it is important to have some grasp
of what this international language is all about.
Background
and relevancy
It
is important to understand that despite whatever reasons are given
for any action, US plans are developed by experts not only in
economics, media/information and military - but are summarized and
standardized in their presentation by experts in IR.
In
other words, despite what the layman believes or thinks are the
reasons for decisions (and these opinions may be frequently right) at
the level of US policy formulation, the language and theories of IR
are used to explain, justify, and develop the actual plans.
IR
was founded a hundred years ago in England by David Davies at the
University of Wales, and within five years gained traction and was
founded by Philip Noel-Baker at the London School of Economics.
IR
is more than diplomacy, and more than agreements. In the US
school, it also involves security studies, geopolitics, and
geostrategy - the last two being the European schools of German
origin and closest to and most compatible to the US school of
'IR'. Frederick Lewis Schuman was the first American to take the
German school of 'War Geo-politics' and make and found the US school
of Geostrategy.
Superficially,
Geopolitics directly infers a relationship to spatial geographic
reality, and IR does not at least in its name. But IR must also
incorporate the same spatial realities when translating any general
theory into a specific set of policies or recommendations.
Geostrategy relies heavily on real, actual, existing, material
factors and tends to focus more on military matters, and as such is
most compatible with realist theory in IR. After all, there are no
such things as normative bullets, only real ones.
Indeed,
there are a number of IR theories, which are often categorized. Over
the course of the last century, any number of categories have been
developed and specialized. While there is little agreement
between the experts on the proper categorization of the theories, to
generalize it is useful as an introduction to view all of these as
either based in idealism (normative) or realism (positive).
Classical IR theory, as with geopolitics and geostrategy, uses
'States', typically nation-states in the Westphalian model, as the
basic subject and actor.
Basically,
idealism or normative theories explain that states either are or
should be motivated by ideas which relate to their core principles,
and either do or ought to interact with the world in a way which
furthers the vision-based interests of these ideals. States may act
rationally in pursuit of these ideals (they may have a realistic
assesment of their limitations), or in other theories the idealism
itself prevents rational execution of such policies (such as in
irrationalism theory).
Idealism
therefore combines normative and positive explanations for the world:
idealism can be used to describe the actual policies of a state as
ideal-driven, or can be used to proscribe policies for a state - that
they should be ideal-driven. That they 'should be' ideal driven often
pertains to theories about peace and stability. However, other
ideals may relate to the idealization of war and conquest.
Realism
theory explains that states either are consciously or unconsciously -
when successful - motivated by a realist assessment which places the
economic, material, strategic needs either ahead of others (i.e.
normative ones) or does not concern itself with others. Realism
theory also understands that states can be driven by ideals - but
would tend to view the resulting policies of those others states as
tending to be irrational more so than rational.
By
and large, most of these theories can be viewed either or both as
competing theories or complimentary theories. Today there are dozens
of sub-fields ranging from post-structuralism to neo-realism, and
more. There are also many combinations of both realism and
idealism, and other categories still which reject the utility of the
categories. Others moreover suggest that what are believed to be new
categories were not previously contemplated in the realism/idealism
schema.
Application
to the middle-east
To
generalize, the framework of US activities in the US will either be
justified and/or explained in terms of realism and/or idealism.
Both
Bush and Obama have used the language of realism and idealism - often
in the same speeches or statements - to justify US activities in the
middle-east.
For
example, justifications for military action or economic sanction
rooted in human rights and democracy - outside of the narrow
international, consensus understanding - are appeals to idealism.
Justifications
for military actions or sanctions rooted in security concerns, i.e.
terrorism - are appeals to realism or idealism. They are
idealist and even irrational when the threats are assessed by the
wants, stated aims, nature, verbiage, or tone of parties issuing
threats to the US as opposed to their actual capacity to project
force.
Justifications
for military actions or sanctions rooted in commitment to allies may
be rooted either in idealism or realism.
In
realist theory, overtures to idealist reasoning, when used by states
practicing realism, are seen as pragmatic methods of gaining popular
support, by appealing to emotions like altruism over reason and
rational self interest. In that sense, in realism theory, overtures
to idealism when used by a realist state are seen as cynical and not
really believed by those promoting them.
But
in actually looking at either the classical model of idealism or
realism, the US is not behaving in accordance with the rational
versions of either one. We can see this clearly.
From
idealism, there are a number of inconsistencies which reveal that the
US is not acting from the perspective of rational idealism:
1.)
The US has nowhere established the sort of stable,
developmentally oriented, bastions of human rights and democracies
which they claimed were their idealist motivations from the Bush II
administration onward.
The
countries they have attacked were stable, developmentally oriented
states that were secular, and scored high on the UN human development
index.
2.)
The US has not attacked countries much farther from its own
stated idealist vision - such as Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, or Jordan. These countries rank lower in the above
listed categories, and are operated as monarchies that suffer from
much greater disparities in the overall distribution of wealth,
resources, and rights.
From
realism - we can see two standards, neither of which are actually
realized through the actions taken.
1.)
From a realist security perspective of counter-terrorism -
the realist justification that was given simultaneously with the
idealist one at the same time - US activity has caused less stability
and has emboldened terrorism. Even if we consider that
terrorism is used as a US tool for destabilization, the utility of
destabilization as a strategy is itself highly problematic in
achieving the US's long term position.
The
destruction of institutions and destabilization, the internecine,
intra-tribal, and religious divisions which the US fostered and
manipulated in Iraq and Syria in the process of meeting their stated
aims, only resulted in the kinds of social conditions which give rise
to 'extremism'.
2.)
From a realist perspective of regional hegemony, the US
also does not meet its hegemonic goals in its creation of failed
states in the Middle-East. It has created the spectacle of
power vacuums and appearance of instability which by themselves would
be considered well developed, but for their obvious consequences.
Why?
US regional hegemony in the Middle-East is rationally concerned
chiefly with access to resources such as oil and natural gas. The
US does not exist in the Middle-East, and in the abstract has
relative freedom to choose its partners and allies. We are
often told that Iran is the US's main target in the Middle-East -
which is accurate - and we proceed to ascribe realism-based
interpretations to the US's stated goals, policies and actions. But
why, in the first place, is Iran the US's target?
While
Iran has publicly disapproved of the US's failure to recognize
Palestine or to act to pressure its regional allies to respect the
human rights of Palestinians - in pure realist terms, Palestine is
not a primary concern for Iran which supersedes all others.
Iran has shown a willingness to tackle joint 'problems'
with the US - the two most recent examples historically being first
in Yugoslavia and second in Iraq.
A
strong Iran as a US ally is the only power that could check Russian
power in the Caucuses without the US over-depending on Turkey. Such
an agreement would also aid in Afghanistan, and could work to
frustrate any Russian, Chinese, or Indian attempts to broker a potent
reconciliation of nuclear Pakistan and nuclear India.
A
genuinely realist policy for the US would necessarily be aimed at
competing with Russia and China for an improved standing with Iran,
and would be aimed at steering Iran, Turkey, Syria, and Egypt to
cooperate to jointly construct the infrastructure required for
extraction and transfer of natural resources.
Indeed,
part of this realism is seen at work in the de-escalation of tensions
with Iran. Rapprochement with Iran, and getting it to develop
one of several of the pre-sanctions pipeline plans which either (or
both) involved Syria and Turkey was critical to this.
In
a brief glimpse of rational realism, John Kerry explained to the
congress that the failure of the Iran deal would have a very negative
impact on the stability of the US dollar. This was indeed an
accurate assessment.
But
we continue to hear or read that the main US threat to the US in the
middle-east region is Iran.
We
have read and heard this so many times, that subsequent threats or
actions taken against Iran - and its ally Syria - are taken for
granted as being realist approaches to hegemony building or
maintenance.
But
Iran's position indeed is not objectively problematic for the US. In
terms of energy markets, they are a required player for any number of
US plans - whether this is Nabucco, as Azerbaijan cannot have a
sustainable policy which is simultaneously at odds with both Russia
and Iran, or the Southern Corridor, or the Persian pipeline (or
similar).
US's
policy, which cannot be explained either in realist or rational
idealist terms forces us to look at how and where this irrational
idealism stems from. It tends to mirror dependency theory, but as
stated above, it is extraordinary that a relatively weak state such
as Israel could have this kind 'controlling' relationship with a
strong state such as the US.
This
leaves us to focus on other facts which we have not yet considered.
It
is true that Iran's claim to hegemony has increased as a result of
the US destruction of the Ba'athist state in Iraq. In
particular, it has increased in a westward direction, towards the
Levant. Its influence in Lebanon with Hezbollah or through the
March 8th Alliance, and in Syria with the government, has grown.
We
must move past the 'inherent
bad faith model in international relations and political
psychology' projected
onto Iran. This is necessary because Iran has shown itself to
be a pragmatic player. Once we get past this we are left with an
unanswered question.
In
what way does Iran's growing power threaten the US's influence in the
region?
It
does not. It threatens Israel's.
The
US's Irrational Idealism is Israel's Realism
Israel
through AIPAC, and also through Neo-cons, controls much of US policy
formulation at the level of think tanks and advocacy, and
implementation at the congressional and executive level, for the
Middle-East.
IR
theory indicates that the US is not acting rationally, and is acting
out of a professed and irrational fidelity to Israel. Strangely, the
US acts rationally in other areas; which is seperate and distinct, as
discussed above from questions surrounding 'right' or 'wrong'.
The
alliance is irrational because the US is weaker and more vulnerable
as a result, and is pushed to take actions in the region against both
regional (Iran) and neighboring (Russia) hegemons. The US is
not projected to emerge successful in these confrontations in terms
of its own sovereign interests. It will result in a real (and not
simulated) power vacuum which is aimed at rolling back Iranian
hegemony in favor of Israeli.
The
aim is likely to create a single and large Israeli presence, whether
in state form or informal forms, situated between a friendly Saudi
Arabia and Turkey. The plan to achieve this is popularly termed the
''Yinon Plan''.
The
term "Yinon
Plan" refers to an article published in February 1982 in the
journal Kivounim ("Guidance" in Hebrew), published by the
World Zionist Organization, based in Jerusalem. The article,
entitled A
Strategy for Israel in
the 80's, is authored by Oded Yinon, an analyst and former official
of the Israeli Foreign Ministry. It considers that it is in the
interests of the Jewish state to foster the creation of a Greater
Israel in the collapsing of the Arab world. To achieve this
will mean the creation of weak and mutually antagonistic mini-states
too divided to effectively oppose it.
Of
course this term reflects a more public understanding of one of
several possible or likely Israeli plans. While it is most
definitely referred to something else within military and
intelligence circles in Israel, it is also likely to generally
reflect this basic concept of creating a large hegemonic sphere "From
the Brook of Egypt to the Euphrates."
A
nearly identical plan was submitted to Benjamin Netanyahu titled A
Clean Break : A New Strategy for Securing the Realm. This
Israeli policy paper was written by Richard Perle and the study group
on "A new Israeli strategy towards the year 2000"
(Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies) which also
included James Colbert, Charles Fairbanks Jr., Douglas Feith, Robert
Loewenberg, Jonathan Torop, David Wurmser and Meyrav Wurmser. It
was also published again in the journal the Institute
for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, in July 2006. It
argues both for a break with the philosophy behind the Oslo Accords
and for a regional hegemonic plan which mirrors the Yinon plan.
After
obtaining a genuine regional hegemonic status not reliant on US
support, Israel will be well positioned to resolve any
differences with prior global opponents, even along win-win lines. It
will place Israel chiefly in control of the water and energy
resources in all the lands west of Iran. To do this also means
breaking Iran into about five weaker and manageable states.
This will involve the devolution of the Iranian identity into
its constituent parts.
The
US will have mostly spent its capacity to project into the
middle-east, and instead will grapple with maintaining its NATO
hegemony over Europe. Other results from Israel's realist
strategy are difficult to project, and involve too many then-evolving
variables to accurately project or succinctly list.
What
is clear is that without Israeli control over the US's middle-east
policy, it would still be an Empire oriented power which would employ
a combination of idealist rhetoric and realist strategic planning to
maintain. But its policy in the middle-east region would be
quite different, and would likely see a different alignment of powers
aimed at checking Russia and China.
Along
its current course, the US is likely to lose to the Syria-Iran-Russia
alliance in the region. If Chinese efforts figure in, this
defeat is certain.
Israel's
realist goals may ultimately be poorly conceived, but they are
probably rooted in the realist school. Conversely, if there is
any religious fundamentalism - idealism - influencing Israel,
in its desire to create a larger Israel which mirrors the mythical
'promised land', they are using rational methods to obtain it.
Israel
is facing a series of internal crises and numerous analysts have
indicated that on its present course it is an unsustainable project.
Israel has probably correctly assessed that its survival will
be based upon its expansion; this means a weaker Iran. If they
use overtures to myth and religion to obtain this, it would be
considered a rhetorical use of idealism to obtain a
realist-determined position.
In
connection with this, Israeli analysts have also properly surmised
that the developing trend globally is multipolarity. Because the US
is the only guarantor of Israel in the region, it means that
presently Israel depends on the US to exist. But multipolarity
means a decreased role for the US, which itself threatens Israel. If
the US is projected to continue to lose its former (and short-lived)
uni-polar status, then it makes sense for Israel to attempt to steer
the still useful US military into a target of its own choosing. Time
is running out.
Israel's
work with Saudi Arabia and Turkey through the ISIS project has been
an invaluable component of this general plan for Greater Israel.
Israel's control of the US policy has effectively made it the prime
broker between other regional states like Turkey or the KSA and the
US.
The
remaining questions surround whether the US will rationally disengage
and continue its officially stated surrender ("deconfliction
talks") of the Syria position to Russia, and continue its new
agreement with Iran, or if the Israel lobby will succeed in pushing
the US towards an irrational cataclysm that breaks its spine on the
rock of Syria.
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