Five
Differences between Russian and Western actions in Syria
Translated
by Russian Bear
6
October, 2015
The
first week of engagement of the Russian aerospace forces against ISIL
in Syria is behind us. And the first thing that catches the eye is
the effectiveness of combat application of Russian aviation. It may
seem that Russia started fighting abruptly, or as they say in the
Navy: "all of the sudden".
But
even the first raids of the Russian warplanes on the positions of
ISIS have shown that we are not dealing with the unexpected decision
of the Kremlin, taken under the pressure of momentary circumstances.
The Russian operation in Syria was prepared for a long time, at least
since the beginning of this summer, and this is evidenced by the
variety of circumstances. First of all, the impact of the Russian
strikes.
Shooting
"bullseye"
Literally
in the first day, from 15:00 on September 30 to 15:00 on 1 October,
28 combat sorties were conducted, eight of them –nocturnal. The
result was at least 12 of the planned objectives were completely
destroyed. Given that some of the sorties were reconnaissance and
support, aimed to cover the strike groups, we see a rare modern
aviation efficiency. And what is remarkable, without a single loss or
damage on the Russian side.
In
the remaining days the strikes on the terrorists were also effective,
and again the Russian air group didn’t suffer losses. But the units
of ISIL, which today with help and support the U.S. have turned into
a regular army, have quite effective anti-aircraft weapons captured
from the Iraqi Army.
Shooting
"in milk"
As
they say: everything is relative. Russia didn’t start the war in
Syria, it had quite tangible predecessors, who also conducted the
"air operation" against the "Islamic state"
(banned in Russia by the decision of the Supreme court). And what is
the result?
The
US-led anti-terrorist coalition, which also included Bahrain, Jordan,
United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, attacked the positions of the
Islamic state during the whole year. By strange coincidence, the
coalition launched an air operation in late September, but in 2014.
During
this time, according to a report by U.S. military, coalition aircraft
has made more than 2000 sorties, mostly in Iraq. Through incredible
efforts, the coalition managed to push the militants away from
Baghdad, which was separated from the vanguards of the Islamic state
just 200 miles away, and to win about a third captured Iraqi
territory from ISIS.
Losses
of the ISIS army during this time are estimated up to 20 thousand
people and about a hundred tanks, self-propelled guns and armored
vehicles. Simply put it, no more than two soldiers and 0.05 of a
combat vehicle per one sortie. Each of which, by the way, is no less
than 50 thousand dollars. Not a single significant object of
terrorists and none of their leaders were destroyed.
A
time of contrasts
So,
what's the difference? Why the actions of the coalition allies, led
by the country with the world's largest army, the main force of which
is aviation, were so ineffective? 1. The USA negotiated the creation
of the anti-terrorist coalition for quite long with their future
allies.
There
was a lot of rhetoric, a lot of loud statements, and combat was
commenced within one week after signing the relevant documents.
However. From the first hours of operation it became clear that
coalition forces do not have any detailed plan of operation, poorly
coordinated, and most importantly very vaguely know who they are
dealing with.
The
bet was made rather for psychological effect, an attempt to
demoralize the fighters of the "Islamic state" and not to
cause them any significant loss. As a result of poor intelligence the
lion's share of "coalition" air strikes occurred on a
small, insignificant objects, sometimes even "missed". This
leads to losses among civilians.
Actually
this is the usual handwriting of the USA and its allies. For example,
on October 3 "surgical strike" of the NATO forces in
Afghanistan has destroyed the hospital of "Doctors without
borders" near the town of Kunduz.
A
“success” can be called destruction of 2 bulldozers obviously
belonging to the troops of the "Islamic state” by an American
drone. The Russian army long and carefully prepared the operation,
focusing primarily on the military, rather than advocacy-political
parts of it.
First
of all, it concerns intelligence activities. Russia has expanded
military contacts with all its allies, has acquired extensive
intelligence network, as evidenced by the precise character of the
strikes with a high efficiency. The Russian side in advance, long
before the beginning of combat amounted to a list of goals and
assessed the degree of importance, priority and possible negative
effect for the militants. In the event of their destruction.
2.
If you assess the tactics of the American army since the first
"operation desert Storm", we will not see many changes. Bet
continues to be placed on massive air strikes from high distances,
often even without entering the zone of enemy air defenses with the
use of expensive precision weapons. Recently popular was the "war
of drones". Both leads to low efficiency and frequent mistakes
in identifying targets.
The
same applies to new equipment and weapons. Bet on "wonder
weapons" in the form of a F-22 Raptor and F-35 Lightning II is
not justified. Super-expensive in development and operation machines
were "raw" and incomplete. In addition, they are intended
rather for action against the enemy equivalent, and not groups of
terrorists, super-expensive weapons for which there is simply no
targets in anti-terrorist operations.
More
precisely, there is a target, but they need to look and these targets
are not on the battlefield. But to this we shall return. And in fact
the anti-terrorist coalition fighting with the weapons and technology
of the 70-s. That is, the Americans and their allies failed to adapt
to the tactics of terrorists, and they hope to wage war "by
other hands".
Entering
a second time into Iraq, they, with manic sequence, repeated all the
mistakes of the first times, and then repeated them in Afghanistan.
And again resorted to the same tactics in Iraq, Libya and Syria. This
is colloquially called "the rake walking". The Russian army
has shown itself quick to learn, to learn the lessons of past
campaigns and make appropriate conclusions.
It
is enough to remember the August war of 2008 in South Ossetia. When
the Russian air force lost six combat jets: three Su-25, two Su-24
and one Tu-22M3. If the Su-25 is an attack aircraft, has a subsonic
speed and is forced to operate with low altitudes, which already puts
it in a very vulnerable position, Su-24 and Tu-22 are supersonic
bombers, with great potential for overcoming enemy air defenses. For
a war that lasted only 5 days, such a loss — a real disaster.
However,
now the Russian air force, specifically the Aerospace forces,
approached the issue much more seriously and took into account not
only their mistakes, but mistakes of "Western partners".
There are new machines in service such as striking front-line bomber
Su-34, Su-35 and Su-25 were considerably modified. For the latest
ammunition developed for them, and the emphasis is not on their
expensive high-tech "stuffing", but at optimal efficiency,
reasonable cost and adaptability to modern wars "of low
intensity".
It
is these that are now in the Middle East. In addition, a special
attention in the Russian army now paid to communication means of
radio electronic warfare and intelligence. The weakness which,
incidentally, was detected in South Ossetian conflict in 2008, when
military commanders often negotiated with mobile phones. Now the
possibility of radio interception of negotiations on the part of ISIS
is taken into account already during the planning of sorties.
3.
The Western coalition is not particularly sensitive to choice of
goals, and generally does not "bother" with this question.
In the end, the pilots shoot at everything that moves, trying to
quickly get rid of ammunition and to get out of combat zone "away
from sin". Pilots don't like to risk, analytics and intelligence
- to think, and the generals - to report the loss. And the Pentagon
prefers "the path of least resistance": to record facts for
the use of firearms, to find a crowd of people, preferably in
turbans, and if lucky, screaming "allahu akbar", and
strike.
To
such tactics, and to losses in general, the terrorists are extremely
insensitive, and it does not bring tangible results. That’s what we
see in practice. Russian military rightly judged that to chase for
single soldiers with guns, as does the coalition aviation, is stupid
and pointless. Another tactics was chosen - find a "weak spot"
of the army of the "Islamic state". As with any army that
has the features of organized regular forces, the main role is played
by the infrastructure, on which depends the supply, intelligence,
communication and control (they are, incidentally are at a very high
level in the army of the "Islamic state").
That's
why the first strikes were targeted at the control bunkers, depots of
weapons, the spots of contact. In particular, the plant manufacturing
explosives in North of Homs was destroyed one of the first , and then
a communication node and a command post of the terrorists in the same
province, as well as a parking of disguised T-55 tanks. Now this led
to panic and increased the number of deserters among the terrorists.
And
now government troops are preparing to storm Palmyra controlled by
the "Islamic state". Prior to this ISIS positions were
unsuccessfully bombed by the aircraft of anti-terrorist coalition for
almost a month.
4.
Every foreign policy action by the U.S. and its allies is accompanied
with powerful, and most importantly - a long promotional "hype".
So, by the time when the United States decided to finally start
fighting even the Zulus in KwaZulu-Natal know about their intention.
It
is a fact. Russia did not make a show of its military operations and
they were not accompanied by fanfare about the global terrorist
threat. That is why the decision of Russia to carry out air strikes
on ISIS positions in Syria has produced a bombshell.
Both
literally and figuratively. On the morning of October 1, less than a
day after the start of the operation, the world's media literally
erupted a stream of indignant screams of Western countries – the
demand to Russia to stop it and not to touch "the poor moderate
terrorists".
5.
Well, finally, and most importantly. The coalition forces simply
don't want any decisive action against ISIS, which they actually
raised, nor against others. The Middle East crisis is beneficial for
Russia. Especially it is beneficial for Russia to return to the
Middle East as an influential player. Time and place are chosen very
successfully.
This is Russian Bear (the translator) a week or so ago
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