Of facts, opinion and (mis)-interpretations
10
September, 2014
This
morning a reader brought to my attention a very interesting post by
Vladimir Suchan entitled "The
Minsk “Ceasefire” Protocol and Russian Diplomacy’s Masterful
“Sabotage”
which I recommend that you read in its entirety. Suchan quotes a
short note of mine where I said the following:
“Knowing the degree to which Russian diplomats are normally maniacally fastidious and pedantic with words, I can only conclude that they have deliberately sabotaged this agreement and that it’s sole use what to deflate the bellicose mood of the NATO summit.”
What
is missing is the preceding and following stance. The full section
reads like this:
What is certain is that this documents is imprecise, nebulous, ambiguous and otherwise vague to such a degree that I would argue that it is basically impossible to implement. Knowing the degree to which Russian diplomats are normally maniacally fastidious and pedantic with words, I can only conclude that they have deliberately sabotaged this agreement and that it's sole use what to deflate the bellicose mood of the NATO summit. But as a basis for a real ceasefire it is useless, nevermind a real negotiation for a final status agreement or peace treaty.
Same
difference? Let's see.
POLITICAL SITUATION:
At this point, I am going to have to post a lengthy quote of Suchan's analysis, I apologize for that in advance, but it is crucial to follow his logical flow: (crucial parts bolded out be me - the Saker)
POLITICAL SITUATION:
At this point, I am going to have to post a lengthy quote of Suchan's analysis, I apologize for that in advance, but it is crucial to follow his logical flow: (crucial parts bolded out be me - the Saker)
In other words, the implementation of Putin’s 7-point initiative was written so poorly and badly that Saker concluded not only that it must have been written by Russian diplomats, but that Russian diplomats must have composed the Minsk Protocol so terribly on purpose. For how could someone comparatively intelligent and reasonably well educated produce something so horrible and awful? One does not make something so bad by mistake. One has to be a master to be able to do that. And why would Russian diplomats deliberately sabotage the document and made it so poor and thus making themselves appear as bad as the document they made? According to Saker, this was not because they had any intention to sabotage Novorossiya or its struggle, but because they wanted to sabotage “the bellicose mood” of NATO by appeasing NATO and its bellicosity with the sabotage of the ceasefire agreement. And why exactly would NATO, receiving such awful provisions for Novorossiya, find its “bellicose mood deflated”? Because of being in awe of the horrible work of the Russian diplomats? Or just being stunned by it? Or because in some way this sabotage made their “bellicose mood” much happier and relaxed? So does this mean that we have at last found the secret for deflating NATO and its aggressiveness–by sabotaging our own work, by promising to keep Novorossiya dissolved into several “special regions” for which the Nazis might at some point write their “Law” and run their “new elections”? Is it really by sabotaging genuine peace and actual principles that friends of Russia and Putin can appease, deflate and defeat NATO’s intelligence and plans, which were decades in making, as Avakov said the other night? Does this mean that the worse their work Russian diplomats do, the more they “sabotage,” the more NATO will be deflated and the better and more effective Russian diplomacy is actually going to be?
Now
let' take the key parts one by one:
"In other words": this is the crucial introductory opening - it indicates that what will follow is not what I actually said, but what Suchan thinks I said and what will be concluded from that is, unsurprisingly, not what I meant, but what Suchan thinks I meant. In plain English - a strawman.
"they wanted to sabotage “the bellicose mood” of NATO by appeasing NATO": actually that is not at all what I meant. Notice the missing part of my quote now put together into one:
"In other words": this is the crucial introductory opening - it indicates that what will follow is not what I actually said, but what Suchan thinks I said and what will be concluded from that is, unsurprisingly, not what I meant, but what Suchan thinks I meant. In plain English - a strawman.
"they wanted to sabotage “the bellicose mood” of NATO by appeasing NATO": actually that is not at all what I meant. Notice the missing part of my quote now put together into one:
What is certain is that this documents is imprecise, nebulous, ambiguous and otherwise vague to such a degree that I would argue that it is basically impossible to implement. But as a basis for a real ceasefire it is useless, nevermind a real negotiation for a final status agreement or peace treaty.
Now
let us not confuse goals and means. In the sentence above I am
looking at the means: to create a useless
document impossible to implement.
That is the means. The goal is not
to "appease NATO" as such but
to create enough friction insideNATO and
the EU to prevent what was supposed to be a "historical summit"
come up with anything useful. As far as that goal is
concerned, I would say that it has been fully achieved. All
that this so-called "historical summit" produced was hot
air. Some might say that NATO could not have come up with real
actions, but if we recall the various predictions before this summit
that is "Monday morning quarterbacking".
Expectations ranged from overtly anti-Russian ABM deployments, to
massive assistance to the Junta, to actual troops deployments into
the Ukraine, to a the adoption of a "special ally status"
for the Ukraine to economic sanctions on Russia. None of that
happened. Why? We now know that a number of states
blocked that or demanded a "delay" in implementation
(which is a diplomat's way of taking something off the table).
So this part of the "plan" worked.
Now let's look at the two key words I used:Useless: in other words, it could not be used as a basis to do or achieve anything, it was designed to have no effect, to prevent any meaningful change in the circumstances on the ground.Impossible to implement: again, that indicates that even if both parties wanted to do something with it, on the basis of it, theycould not have done so.
What is the key feature of something useless and impossible to implement? That it collapses on it's own. Neither the Novorussians or Russia could be blamed for its inevitable and almost immediate collapse.
So we have three characteristics spelled out now:
1) The plan was designed to create friction inside NATO. That worked.
2) The plan was designed to prevent changes on the ground. That worked.
3) The plan was designed to rapidly collapse on its own. That worked.
To suggest, as Suchan does, that this plan could in any way form the basis for a final status agreement ("promising to keep Novorossiya dissolved into several “special regions” for which the Nazis might at some point write their “Law” and run their “new elections”?") is, at best, mistaken.
Here is the key point which is so often overlooked or misunderstood: the ceasefire agreement was not a strategic move, but a tactical one. It was never designed to achieve anything more than a short term effect on one specific event: the NATO summit.The real contradiction
Still, those who are upset by the Agreement have, I think, a very valid point. They say that this agreement was not good for Novorussia. I think that they right, but I also think that they very much overestimate its magnitude. Let me explain what I mean.
MILITARY SITUATION
It is true that the Novorussian Armed Forces (NAF) were on the offensive and that the Junta Repression Forces (JRF) were in full retreat on all fronts. And it is true that in Mariupol the panic was such that most Ukies were on the run. I don't think that the NAF was about to retake Debaltsevo, but I will accept that Mariupol was within reach. The strategy chosen to take Mariupol was to envelop it from the north and surround it. Some (not in the NAF, but commentators who were clearly civilians) even spoke of going all the way along the coast to "open a land bridge to Crimea". Now let me ask this: does "creating a long but narrow advance along a barrier" remind you of something? Did we not see something like that tried out pretty recently?
Sure did.
That is what the Ukies did earlier this Spring with the ill-conceived attempt to encircle Novorussia along the Russian border. The NAF let them walk in, then they stopped them, then the cut their supply route, then the cut them into sectors and then the finished them off. And they achieved all that with numerical inferiority on their side. Now let's look at the situation around Mariupol. Here are the latest figures for the NAF forces surrounding it:About 6'000 soldiers, 28 tanks, 90 armored vehicles, 60 mortars, 60 artillery guns, 20 MLRS. 2'500 of these 6'000 soldiers are needed to occupy the towns around Mariupol and to keep the ONLY highway connecting the NAF forces to their rear bases in Novorussia.
What does the JRF have inside Mariupol? The same source provides the following figures: 3200 soldiers, 50 tanks, 150 armoredvehicles, 120 mortars, 140 artillery guns, 70 MLRS. True, the NAF has much better morale and tactical combat skills. And the population is massively on the NAF side. But consider this: just north of Mariupol the JRF also has 3000 soldiers, 100 tanks, 200 armored fighting vehicles, 150 mortars, 140 artillery guns, 100 MLRS. So, in the operational vicinity of Mariupol the NAF is literally sandwiched in between no less then 6'200 soliders (vs 6'000 for the NAF), 150 tanks (vs 28 for the NAF), 350 armored vehicles (vs 90 for the NAF), 270 mortars (vs 60 for the NAF), 280 artillery guns (vs 60 for the NAF) and 170 multiple rocket launchers (vs20 for the NAF). There are three very important things to keep in mind here:
1) the NAF force around Mariupol is most definitely the best and most powerful one in the NAF.
2) the figures above do only include the JRF in the operational vicinity of Mariupol and do not include the other JRF available to the Junta from it's strategic depth.
3) there is only one highway connecting the NAF force around Mariupol to the rest of the NAF controlled Novorussia. This is why the NAF has had to put 2'500 of 6'0000 of its soldiers in protection of the rest of the NAF force available to attack or blockade Mariupol.
Are you starting to see where I am going here? If not, I will put in plainly even though I know that the amount of hate-mail is going to spike after I post this.
The attack on Mariupol was an extremely dangerous operation and those who believe that it would have been a first step towards smashing the JRF, going to Crimea or even to Kiev simply don't realize how weak the NAF really is.
[I believe that the Russian General Staff fully understood that and that one of the factors in favor of the otherwise "useless and impossible to implement" was that it made it possible to a) stop the advance of the NAF beyond Mariupol b) talk to the NAF leadership and make them realize the risks of this move and c) probably to provide enough time to get the hell out of there before it is too late. I have no evidence for this and this is purely my guess. Hence I will put this in brackets].
What evidence do I have for the (relative) weakness of the NAF?
Now let's look at the two key words I used:Useless: in other words, it could not be used as a basis to do or achieve anything, it was designed to have no effect, to prevent any meaningful change in the circumstances on the ground.Impossible to implement: again, that indicates that even if both parties wanted to do something with it, on the basis of it, theycould not have done so.
What is the key feature of something useless and impossible to implement? That it collapses on it's own. Neither the Novorussians or Russia could be blamed for its inevitable and almost immediate collapse.
So we have three characteristics spelled out now:
1) The plan was designed to create friction inside NATO. That worked.
2) The plan was designed to prevent changes on the ground. That worked.
3) The plan was designed to rapidly collapse on its own. That worked.
To suggest, as Suchan does, that this plan could in any way form the basis for a final status agreement ("promising to keep Novorossiya dissolved into several “special regions” for which the Nazis might at some point write their “Law” and run their “new elections”?") is, at best, mistaken.
Here is the key point which is so often overlooked or misunderstood: the ceasefire agreement was not a strategic move, but a tactical one. It was never designed to achieve anything more than a short term effect on one specific event: the NATO summit.The real contradiction
Still, those who are upset by the Agreement have, I think, a very valid point. They say that this agreement was not good for Novorussia. I think that they right, but I also think that they very much overestimate its magnitude. Let me explain what I mean.
MILITARY SITUATION
It is true that the Novorussian Armed Forces (NAF) were on the offensive and that the Junta Repression Forces (JRF) were in full retreat on all fronts. And it is true that in Mariupol the panic was such that most Ukies were on the run. I don't think that the NAF was about to retake Debaltsevo, but I will accept that Mariupol was within reach. The strategy chosen to take Mariupol was to envelop it from the north and surround it. Some (not in the NAF, but commentators who were clearly civilians) even spoke of going all the way along the coast to "open a land bridge to Crimea". Now let me ask this: does "creating a long but narrow advance along a barrier" remind you of something? Did we not see something like that tried out pretty recently?
Sure did.
That is what the Ukies did earlier this Spring with the ill-conceived attempt to encircle Novorussia along the Russian border. The NAF let them walk in, then they stopped them, then the cut their supply route, then the cut them into sectors and then the finished them off. And they achieved all that with numerical inferiority on their side. Now let's look at the situation around Mariupol. Here are the latest figures for the NAF forces surrounding it:About 6'000 soldiers, 28 tanks, 90 armored vehicles, 60 mortars, 60 artillery guns, 20 MLRS. 2'500 of these 6'000 soldiers are needed to occupy the towns around Mariupol and to keep the ONLY highway connecting the NAF forces to their rear bases in Novorussia.
What does the JRF have inside Mariupol? The same source provides the following figures: 3200 soldiers, 50 tanks, 150 armoredvehicles, 120 mortars, 140 artillery guns, 70 MLRS. True, the NAF has much better morale and tactical combat skills. And the population is massively on the NAF side. But consider this: just north of Mariupol the JRF also has 3000 soldiers, 100 tanks, 200 armored fighting vehicles, 150 mortars, 140 artillery guns, 100 MLRS. So, in the operational vicinity of Mariupol the NAF is literally sandwiched in between no less then 6'200 soliders (vs 6'000 for the NAF), 150 tanks (vs 28 for the NAF), 350 armored vehicles (vs 90 for the NAF), 270 mortars (vs 60 for the NAF), 280 artillery guns (vs 60 for the NAF) and 170 multiple rocket launchers (vs20 for the NAF). There are three very important things to keep in mind here:
1) the NAF force around Mariupol is most definitely the best and most powerful one in the NAF.
2) the figures above do only include the JRF in the operational vicinity of Mariupol and do not include the other JRF available to the Junta from it's strategic depth.
3) there is only one highway connecting the NAF force around Mariupol to the rest of the NAF controlled Novorussia. This is why the NAF has had to put 2'500 of 6'0000 of its soldiers in protection of the rest of the NAF force available to attack or blockade Mariupol.
Are you starting to see where I am going here? If not, I will put in plainly even though I know that the amount of hate-mail is going to spike after I post this.
The attack on Mariupol was an extremely dangerous operation and those who believe that it would have been a first step towards smashing the JRF, going to Crimea or even to Kiev simply don't realize how weak the NAF really is.
[I believe that the Russian General Staff fully understood that and that one of the factors in favor of the otherwise "useless and impossible to implement" was that it made it possible to a) stop the advance of the NAF beyond Mariupol b) talk to the NAF leadership and make them realize the risks of this move and c) probably to provide enough time to get the hell out of there before it is too late. I have no evidence for this and this is purely my guess. Hence I will put this in brackets].
What evidence do I have for the (relative) weakness of the NAF?
- The Donetsk airport is still not taken
- There are several "cauldrons" deep inside NAF controlled territory which have still not been cleared up
- Not only has Debaltsevo not been re-taken, it is under huge pressure
- The NAF offensive towards Schiastie is, so far, going nowhere.
- There is a dangerous NAF offensive from Telmanovo which puts the NAF forces in the south at great risk
I
know that some will say "yes, precisely, if not for that
idiotic ceasefire all these problems would have been solved by
now". Except that these "problems" have not
been solved for *weeks*, not days.
I will spell out again in clear what I am trying to demonstrate with all this:
1) The ceasefire did not have a significant impact on the military situation on the ground
I will spell out again in clear what I am trying to demonstrate with all this:
1) The ceasefire did not have a significant impact on the military situation on the ground
2) The ceasefire might well have frozen a disaster in the making
I am sorry that it took such a long way to address a topic which, apparently, Suchan does not feel needs addressing at all (he does not say a single word about the military situation on the ground) and which I feel is crucial.
The impact of the Agreement on the military situation has been twofold: it gave the JRF time to regroup and to bring in reinforcements. From that point of view it is a negative impact for the NAF and Novorussia. Let me be clear here, I AGREE that this is bad for the NAF and Novorussia. But I also think that the negative consequences of this indisputable drawback of this Agreement are dwarfed by the problems which the NAF is facing right now which have nothing to do with this Agreement. In fact, I am not even sure that the negative consequences of this Agreement are worse than one would have happened if the NAF had pushed further or attempted to take Mariupol, which I think they were about to do, and successfully so, but at the cost of creating a cauldron for themselves in fact cutting off the best and most capable part of the NAF from the rest of the NAF forces in Novorussia at a time when the Ukies were threatening from at least three directions (Schastie, Debaltsevo, Volnovakha).
Now let me ask you this: let's suppose just for a second that I am correct and that the NAF forces in and around Mariupol would be "cauldroned-off" by a JRF counter-offensive along the Mariupol-Novoazovsk highway or an attack from Telmanovo towards Novoazovsk. Can you imagine what would happen to the rest of Novorussia if at the same time the (very large) Ukie force north of Lugansk would have gone on the offensive or if Gorlovka would have been surrounded?
So, again, I will clearly spell-out my concern: the tactical offensive towards Mariupol (unless Mariupol is taken this would not be an operational one) potentially puts at risk the very survival of Novorussia.
Am I correct? At this point I don't know for sure. Maybe not.
But if we see a NAF withdrawal from Mariupol then this will be a sign that I might be. Besides, according to Russian sources, Mariupol is not fully surrounded anyway and the Ukies are reinforcing their garrison there through corridors on the northeast of the city. If that is true, the NAF will have to withdraw.
IN CONCLUSION
"Lasciate ogni speranza"
But here is the really nasty thing: IF the NAF withdraws from Mariupol the Putin-bashers will immediately blame the ceasefire agreement for this instead of realizing that this was the only way to avoid a strategic disaster. I have concluded that no amount of facts or logic will in any way affect this group. In their minds Putin has betrayed, period, Novorussia has been backstabbed and sold-out and the Kremlin is firmly controlled by Russian oligarchs. Frankly, I have given up any hope of even marginally affecting their certitudes or to make them doubt. Every time I try, I just get more hate mail or even full posts on other blogs explaining that I am either a complete idiot or a Putin groupie. Fine, I will plead guilty to both charges and I will go on writing for those who prefer facts and logic over strawmen and ad hominems :-)
For the rest of you
I will admit that I am worried. I have already spelled out what my main concern in my Q&A/FAQ+RFC, but I will repeat here that the main danger to Novorussia is:
"political infighting. I don't know if this is possible right now, but I would like to see the emergence of an undisputed Novorussian leader who would have the official and full support of Strelkov, Zakharchenko, Borodai, Mozgovoi, Kononov, Khodakovski, Tsarev, Bolotov, Gubarev and all the other political and military leaders. This has to be a truly Novorussian leader, not just a "Putin proconsul", a person capable of negotiating with Putin for the interests of the people of Novorussia. (...) Until that happens, I will always be worried for the future of the people of Novorussia"
I
have always said that the interests of Russia and Novorussia are not
the same. For one thing, Putin was not elected to fix the
Ukraine or, much less so, start a war with NATO. My personal
sympathies go to both the people of Russia and the People of
Novorussia, whom I see as one and the same, really. But the
fact is that Novorussia is not part of Russia
(yet?) and that the people of Novorussia have not elected
Putin to represent or, even less so, defend them. The Russian
people have. Putin clearly has his first priority the
interests of Russia and the Russian people who have elected him, and
this is how it should be. To expect him to have a higher
loyalty to the Novorussian people would be simply foolish. But
these self-evident facts do not mean that Putin does not care or
wants to "sell out" Novorussia. Guys, now please pay
attention here, if Putin had wanted to "sell out"
Novorussia he had the *perfect* opportunity to do so earlier this
Spring. And if anybody seriously believes that the immensely
successful NAF offensive last month happened without Putin's full
support - I have a bridge to sell to you!
Where do we go from here?
I don't know except for one thing: this will be a very long struggle. Barring a successful JRF offensive in the next week or so, the frontlines will probably stabilize and freeze up. The "military action" will be replaced by the "economic and social" action as the Junta-run Banderastan collapses on its face and serious turmoil begins.
Do I think that the JRF is about to launch a counter-offensive? Yes. Or, should I say, I know I would if I was in their position. Do I think that their counter-offensive will be successful? Probably not or, at least, not much. The NAF forces around Mariupol can probably fight their way back to their rear, they might even preempt the need to do that and withdraw before any such counter-attack (that is what I would do in their place). I think that the best the JRF can hope for are a few tactical successes, but I think that by and large the NAF forces will hold. And if that is not the case, Russia will make sure that it does (as she did earlier this year). This is not about Putin, this is much bigger than him, and the Russian people or "Russia" as a nation will not allow Novorussia to be run-over by Nazis. They stopped that one this Spring and, if needed, they will do it again. And after that, they will again seek a negotiated agreement. As far as I know, not a single person in position of authority in Russia supports the idea of a "move to Kiev", not by Russian forces, not by NAF. So two things will not happen: the Nazis will not overrun Novorussia and the (Novo)russians will not invade/liberate Banderastan. That is something the Ukrainian people will have to do themselves.
The Saker
Where do we go from here?
I don't know except for one thing: this will be a very long struggle. Barring a successful JRF offensive in the next week or so, the frontlines will probably stabilize and freeze up. The "military action" will be replaced by the "economic and social" action as the Junta-run Banderastan collapses on its face and serious turmoil begins.
Do I think that the JRF is about to launch a counter-offensive? Yes. Or, should I say, I know I would if I was in their position. Do I think that their counter-offensive will be successful? Probably not or, at least, not much. The NAF forces around Mariupol can probably fight their way back to their rear, they might even preempt the need to do that and withdraw before any such counter-attack (that is what I would do in their place). I think that the best the JRF can hope for are a few tactical successes, but I think that by and large the NAF forces will hold. And if that is not the case, Russia will make sure that it does (as she did earlier this year). This is not about Putin, this is much bigger than him, and the Russian people or "Russia" as a nation will not allow Novorussia to be run-over by Nazis. They stopped that one this Spring and, if needed, they will do it again. And after that, they will again seek a negotiated agreement. As far as I know, not a single person in position of authority in Russia supports the idea of a "move to Kiev", not by Russian forces, not by NAF. So two things will not happen: the Nazis will not overrun Novorussia and the (Novo)russians will not invade/liberate Banderastan. That is something the Ukrainian people will have to do themselves.
The Saker
Here is Vladimir's article
The Minsk “Ceasefire” Protocol and Russian Diplomacy’s Masterful “Sabotage”
10
September, 2014
If
Flaubert achieved for me his acme with three or four simple words
“She pretended to think,” Saker reached his peak with this
marvellous description of the politically and diplomatically
atrocious “Minsk
ceasefire protocol“:
“Knowing the degree to which Russian diplomats are normally
maniacally fastidious and pedantic with words, I can only conclude
that they have deliberately sabotaged this agreement and that it’s
sole use what to deflate the bellicose mood of the NATO summit.”
(Link to the original article at The
Vineyard of the Saker)
In
other words, the implementation of Putin’s 7-point initiative was
written so poorly and badly that Saker concluded not only that it
must have been written by Russian diplomats, but that Russian
diplomats must have composed the Minsk Protocol so terribly on
purpose. For how could someone comparatively intelligent and
reasonably well educated produce something so horrible and awful? One
does not make something so bad by mistake. One has to be a master to
be able to do that.
And
why would Russian diplomats deliberately sabotage the document and
made it so poor and thus making themselves appear as bad as the
document they made? According to Saker, this was not because they had
any intention to sabotage Novorossiya or its struggle, but because
they wanted to sabotage “the bellicose mood” of NATO by appeasing
NATO and its bellicosity with the sabotage of the ceasefire
agreement.
And
why exactly would NATO, receiving such awful provisions for
Novorossiya, find its “bellicose mood deflated”? Because of being
in awe of the horrible work of the Russian diplomats? Or just being
stunned by it? Or because in some way this sabotage made their
“bellicose mood” much happier and relaxed?
So
does this mean that we have at last found the secret for deflating
NATO and its aggressiveness–by sabotaging our own work, by
promising to keep Novorossiya dissolved into several “special
regions” for which the Nazis might at some point write their “Law”
and run their “new elections”? Is it really by sabotaging genuine
peace and actual principles that friends of Russia and Putin can
appease, deflate and defeat NATO’s intelligence and plans, which
were decades in making, as Avakov said the other night?
Does
this mean that the worse their work Russian diplomats do, the more
they “sabotage,” the more NATO will be deflated and the better
and more effective Russian diplomacy is actually going to be?
I
am just simply getting overwhelmed. So, in a situation like this, I
think I need a drink or one or two. And after few more drinks, I must
start to understand at last that the best strategy, writing, and
thought, when it comes to such serious matters as the fate of
Novorossiya and Russia, might be, as Saker teaches, that very bad and
awful is better and even good!
Drunken
with tears,
Yours
Vlad, Czechmate
The Minsk Protocol as Brilliant Short-Term Sabotage and Achievement of the Impossible
Vladimir Suchan
http://vladimirsuchan.blogspot.co.nz/2014/09/the-minsk-protocol-as-brilliant-short.html?spref=fb
1. What were originally just few paragraphs inspired 8-10 pages of Saker’s piece on “facts and opinions.” I will just try to see what new key points or arguments that rebuttal or apology for the Minsk dead offers.
2.
Saker: the Minsk Protocol sabotaged by Russian diplomacy meant
to “to create enough friction inside NATO and the EU to prevent
what was supposed to be a "historical summit" come up with
anything useful.”
3.
Did the Protocol do that? Did the might alliance ‘s ability to
“come up with anything useful” because of how supposedly Russian
diplomacy worded the Protocol? Simple answer with no evidence to the
contrary is No.
4.
But Saker thinks otherwise:”As far as that goal is concerned,
I would say that it has been fully achieved. All that this so-called
"historical summit" produced was hot air.” Do we know
that? And all that because of the “sabotaged” Minsk Protocol?
5.
Saker: the Minsk Protocol is “something useless and impossible
to implement.” Why did Putin and Poroshenko in their telephone
conversations agreed on the need of implementing the supposedly
“impossible to implement”? Lavrov, moreover, clearly said:
“Russia is AGAINST ALL that may hinder the implementation of the
Minsk accords. … We hope the ceasefire regime will be consolidated
in the coming days.” http://en.itar-tass.com/russia/748713 Do then
both Putin and Lavrov insist on implementing the impossible and the
useless? One can also try to explain away the signature of the
Russian Ambassador on the Minsk Protocol and the text of the Protocol
as sabotage or trick, but international obligations do matter and to
declare one’s text and signature as a trick or sabotage just few
days after one forces the leadership of Novorossiya to commit
themselves to it does not help. To say the least. It does help even
the argument.
6.
Saker: “The plan was designed to prevent changes on the
ground. That worked.” Empirically, this is wrong. Just review the
situation on the ground and its changes as they transpired since
Friday 5. I recommend militarymaps.info and reviews of the battle
maps for those days by Vadim Petrov at
https://www.youtube.com/user/MrVadimpetrov/videos
7.
Saker: “The plan was designed to rapidly collapse on its own.
That worked.” No evidence of this. There is no evidence of the
“rapid collapse” of the Protocol—not so much with respect to
ceasefire--fighting has deescalated, but not ceased, but mainly with
respect to the actually politically most serious demands of the
Protocol such as keeping Novorossiya merely at a level of some
regions inside Nazi and oligarchic Ukraine, etc. On these political
demands prejudicial to Novorossiya see, for example, Mikhail
Belyayev, “The Twelve Clauses of Betrayal,” at slavyangrad.org.
One of these provisions stipulates that the Kiev regime will be
making a “Law on the special status” of the regions within
Ukraine currently under the people’s republics.
8.
Saker: “What does the JRF have inside Mariupol? The same
source provides the following figures: 3200 soldiers, 50 tanks, 150
armored vehicles, 120 mortars, 140 artillery guns, 70 MLRS.”
What
is missing here is the fact that, before the ceasefire and the Minsk
Protocol, the junta had only about one third of this manpower with
hardly any heavy weapons. The beefing up of this force took place
after the ceasefire.
9.
Saker: “Agreement are worse than one would have happened if
the NAF had pushed further or attempted to take Mariupol, which I
think they were about to do, and successfully so, but at the cost of
creating a cauldron for themselves in fact cutting off the best and
most capable part of the NAF from the rest of the NAF forces in
Novorussia at a time when the Ukies were threatening from at least
three directions (Schastie, Debaltsevo, Volnovakha).” Fact: before
the ceasefire, it was the Ukrainian army that had a portion of its
troop encircled in the so-called Elenovka pot, which, thanks to the
ceasefire, was transformed from a cauldron to a salient now
threatening the army of Novorossiya with having its Mariupol group
cut off and encircled. At that point, Novorossiya even controlled the
highway going through Volnovakha and the town too. Not anymore.
10.
Saker: “Now let me ask you this: let's suppose just for a second
that I am correct and that the NAF forces in and around Mariupol
would be "cauldroned-off" by a JRF counter-offensive along
the Mariupol-Novoazovsk highway or an attack from Telmanovo towards
Novoazovsk.” Fact: Right upon concluding the ceasefire, the
Ukrainian troops went and occupied Telmanovo. A portion of their
convoy had to be destroyed to push them out again. But Telmanovo and
the highway there too are now vulnerable.
11.
Saker: “Mariupol is not fully surrounded anyway and the Ukies are
reinforcing their garrison there through corridors on the northeast
of the city.” Fact: this is the situation now, after the ceasefire.
Before the Minsk ceasefire was introduced, the army of Novorosiya did
take Mariupol into a ring from the east, the north, and the west.
Once the ceasefire came into force, the army of Novorossiya lost or
ceded the territory west and north of Mariupol, thus, without fight,
creating for itself a precarious new situation.
The Twelve Clauses of Betrayal
9
September, 2014
Original: Mikhail
Belyayev LiveJournalTranslation
Gleb Bazov / Edited by @GBabeuf
Have
you ever wondered how complete and unconditional betrayal looks? How
a knife looks when it is stuck by a steady hand right between the
shoulder blades during a friendly embrace? How poison looks when it
is mixed into a glass of water given to a man dying of thirst? As it
turns out, all this looks far more ordinary and prosaic than even the
most meagre and impoverished human imagination could portray. As it
turns out, betrayal is simply two sheets of paper with a row of
signatures at the end of a column of dry, numbered paragraphs.
The
publicized text of the ceasefire agreement that was signed in Minsk
is what this very real betrayal looks like. The betrayal of
everything that the Novorossiya Militiamen fought and died for. The
betrayal of Novorossiya itself, because, based on the text of this
agreement, there is no place envisioned for Novorossiya, nor for the
Militia and nor even for any “special status” for the People’s
Republics.
All
that this so-called ceasefire agreement provides for is a temporary
status of local self-government in certain areas of the Donetsk and
the Lugansk regions. Even that is conditional on the complete
elimination of the Militia and the release of all Ukrainian prisoners
of war; moreover, the Militiamen are obliged not only to lay down
arms, but also to leave the territory of Ukraine. In return, Ukraine
promises amnesty to the parties to the conflict, a national dialogue,
and certain measures aimed at improving the humanitarian situation in
the Donbass. The LPR and the DPR are not even mentioned in the text
of the agreement, and their representatives have signed it without
any titles or ranks.
Independence
and statehood? Novorossiya? A temporary special status in certain
areas of the Donetsk and the Lugansk regions—here is all you have
of independent Novorossiya. Here is all your freedom and sovereignty.
You can write out these words a thousand times, print them on paper,
and then shove them deep down your throat. In any event, death by
strangulation is better than death through shame. Ukraine does not
even intend to give autonomy to the People’s Republics. She did not
even deign to mention these very Republics in the agreement.
Temporary self-government in certain areas—that is the extent of
Ukrainian generosity for the rebellious Donbass.
The
Militiamen? According to this agreement they are now exiles and must
leave the Donbass. Forever. Yes, the merciful Ukrainian side
undertakes to pardon and not to criminally prosecute them. But only
after they lay down arms and remove themselves from the territory of
Ukraine. After all, according the agreement, all the unlawful
military formations (meaning the Militia) must immediately be
withdrawn beyond the boundaries of Ukraine.
Prisoners
of war? Only the Militia is obligated to release them. The text of
the agreement refers only to hostages and unlawfully detained
persons, and, from the standpoint of Ukrainian law, the detention of
Militiamen is perfectly legal. Like with terrorists. After all, this
is the label that the Ukrainian state has applied to them.
This
is not even the new Khasavyurt. At least pursuant to the Khasavyurt
Accord,
Russia did not promise to become part of the Chechen
Republic of Ichkeria and
did not agree to expel its own army from the country. This agreement
is something incomprehensible and beyond the pale; it remains a
mystery as to how the representatives of Novorossiya could have
signed this masterpiece of Ukrainian arrogance and conceit.
To
abide by this agreement is to spit—lasciviously and with great
relish—in the face of every Militiaman and civilian murdered in the
conflict; to spit in the face of those who were burned alive in the
Odessa House of the Trade Unions; to spit in the face of the “Madonna
of Gorlovka”
and her murdered child; to spit in the face of all those left
disabled, all those who—in their prime—were left without arms,
without legs, without eyes, all those who until the end of their days
will now be crippled because of this war. And then, it is to spit in
the face of those who lived in homes devastated by Ukrainian
artillery and air power. All those who lost their livelihood, the
roof above their heads and their familiar lives. All those who lost
everything and through several long months buried friends, relatives
and loves ones—buried their husbands and their sons. Those who no
longer lived, but survived, after war burst into their land.
Yes,
peace is needed. It is needed both by Novorossiya and by Ukraine.
This war has already claimed too many lives and brought too much
suffering. But what is needed is a real peace treaty and a subsequent
divorce into two separate states. And the papers that were signed in
Minsk do not represent a peace treaty. They contain an act of
unconditional surrender that has no analogue in the world other than
an agreement of annexation of the defeated party.
So
we very much hope that this agreement will simply be ignored on the
front-lines—that it will be dismissed as one would with a
nightmare, and that Novorossiya will continue its struggle. A fight
for a real Peace, until true freedom and independence are secured.
After all, by honouring this agreement Novorossiya will itself, by
its own hands, commit suicide.
Ukrainian border guards start building wall
The border with Russia is 2,295 km long, Ukrainian border guard authorities says
KIEV, September 10. /ITAR-TASS/. Ukrainian border guards have started building a "wall" on the border with Russia, the Ukrainian military’s press service for the operation in eastern Ukraine said on Facebook.
Under
President Petro Poroshenko's order, construction of fortifications
began on Wednesday, military sources said.
Construction
of two defense lines is planned. Ukraine plans to dig about 1,500 km
of ditches and passageways, more than 8,000 trenches for vehicles and
4,000 dugouts and build 60 km of a “blast-resistant” fence.
Prime
Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk on September 5 said that government had
prepared a draft plan named “Wall” to build fortifications to
protect the Ukrainian border. The plan envisaged at the first stage
to equip the border outside the conflict zone, where it is possible
to immediately begin engineering work - the Chernigov, Sumy, Kharkiv
and the north of the Luhansk regions.
The
border with Russia is 2,295 km long, Ukrainian border guard
authorities said.
A
senior Ukrainian border guard official said, when presenting the
plan, that it was necessary to immediately close the border.
The
plan called for starting engineering work immediately to dig a
four-metre wide and two-metre deep ditch and equip it with electronic
systems. The border in the sea is also planned to be under full
electronic monitoring.
Yatsenyuk
said the government would apply to the EU for financial aid to
impalement the project, adding the government had funds to implement
the first stage.
A
Russian senator said in this connection that bridges, not walls and
ditches, should be built between Russia and Ukraine.
“Yatsenyuk’s
statement about construction of a moat or a wall or mining of the
border is quite an inadmissible move of history planned by Kiev
authorities,” Yuri Vorobyov, deputy chairman of the Russian
parliament’s upper house Federation Council, said on Thursday,
commenting on the Ukrainian prime minister’s statement about
construction of a wall on the border with Russia.
“Such
statements cause dissonance against the background of the Russian
president’s peace plan. A way to be separated by walls and ditches
is a way to nowhere,” the senator said, adding that such statements
were purely propagandistic.
“I
do not think it is possible to build such a wall... but the course of
political developments is alarming,” he said, adding that “The
two fraternal nations certainly sooner or later will be close
brothers as it has been since ancient times.
Gas wars and the coming winter
Gas wars and the coming winter
NOOSE
ON UKRAINE TIGHTENS AS REVERSE FLOW FAILS
Via Facebook
I
reported in passing a few days ago that the Russians were quietly
threatening to reduce gas flows to any EU states involved in the
bogus and illegal "reverse flow" scheme for sending gas to
Ukraine (illegal because if the gas is Russian then its resupply to
the Ukraine undoubtedly breaches the supply contracts under which
Gazprom supplied it to the EU states in question).
The
Russian threats are working. Poland has confirmed it is suspending
reverse flow, Slovakia has indicated it may follow suit and reverse
flow from Hungary has slowed to a trickle. Only a fraction of the gas
the Ukraine needs to get through the winter is coming its way. Once
again the Ukraine's EU "friends" have shown the limits of
their friendship. A cold winter beckons.
---
Alexander Mercoulis
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