The Real Cyprus Template (The One You're Not Supposed To Notice)
Charles
Hugh Smith
8
April, 2013
The
Real Cyprus Template reveals the core-periphery
Neocolonial-Financialization Model in all its predatory glory.
Much
has been said about "the Cyprus Template" (the
so-called bail-in, where deposits are expropriated to recapitalize
the insolvent banks), but virtually nothing has been written
about the Real Cyprus Template.
Longtime
correspondent David P. (proprietor of Market
Daily Briefing)
charted some very interesting data that enables us to follow
the money--specifically, Eurozone money in the "foreign deposit
sources" (deposits in Cyprus banks that originated from outside
Cyprus).
It
appears the key preliminary step of the Real Cyprus Template is that
money-center banks in Germany and other "core" Eurozone
nations pull their money out of the soon-to-implode "periphery"
nation's banks before the banking crisis is
announced.
As
David observed, "I think this explains a lot about
something that has always puzzled me: why the delay in resolving
Cyprus after the Greek haircut?"
Here
is David's explanation and two key charts:
"The
Cyprus situation had been simmering for at least a year when in March
of 2013 it finally broke; Cyprus had a week to take care of its
banking situation or else face a cutoff of access to the eurosystem
by the ECB. This brought matters to a head; the Cyprus Bail-In was
finally settled upon, where uninsured depositors in the two largest
banks in Cyprus took major haircuts, and must wait for return of
their money until the assets of the banks are run down.
The
banking problems in Cyprus had their roots in the Greek Sovereign
Default, and were known by the general public for about a year prior
to the recent default; a New
York Times article dated
April 11, 2012 lays out the particulars.
Looking
at Cyprus bank security assets in data provided by the ECB, the
problems were visible earlier - right after the first Greek haircut
in mid 2011, and a second haircut finalized in early 2012. This was a
11 billion euro hole in a system with 100 billion in assets total,
centered upon two banks that held half the deposits in the system.
Greek Crisis Timeline
|
Date
|
Event
|
|---|---|
|
April
2010
|
Greek Sovereign
Bonds Declared Junk |
|
May
2010
|
110 Euro bailout,
no haircut |
|
July
2011
|
"Private
Sector Involvement" decided at EU Summit |
|
Oct
2011
|
130 Euro bailout,
53% face value haircut |
|
Mar
2012
|
Haircuts take
effect; actual haircut 85% |
You
can see the effects of the increasing haircuts in the chart below.
The chart lists all types of bonds owned by all the banks on Cyprus.
The red line is the important one. It shows "all off-island
Eurozone Government Bonds."
Put
more simply, that red line represents Greek Government debt owned by
the two banks on Cyprus that failed. It went from a 12 billion euro
value in mid 2011, down to a 1 billion euro value in early 2012.
That's an 11 billion haircut - all due to the Greek Default.
So
why did the eurozone wait so long to resolve the problematic Cypriot
banks with their 11 billion euro hole that was clearly serious in the
middle of 2011, and becoming blindingly obvious by 2012? Therein lies
a story - it has to do with banking, and how banks make money. The
explanation is a bit complicated, but bear with me.
Bank
deposits are grouped into 3 primary categories: deposits from
households, from corporations, and from other banks. Households and
corporations typically have a long standing relationship with their
bank; they only move their deposits slowly, and most of this sort of
depositor uses time deposits to maximize their interest income.
Deposits from other banks are what we might term "hot money."
They arrive quickly, and depart just as fast. But why would a bank
deposit money with another bank? The simple explanation is: interest
rate spreads.
Let's
imagine you ran a German bank, and you paid very low rates to your
overnight depositors. You have a great deal of really cheap money on
your hands. What are your options to make money? You can either loan
money to German homeowners one by one, but there are only so many
German homeowners, and they only want to borrow so much money. So
after loaning all you can loan, you search the world to try and find
another bank that is advertising high rates for deposit money, and
you stumble on the banks in Cyprus.
|
Rate
|
Deposit
Type & Location
|
|---|---|
|
0.55%
|
German Overnight
Deposit |
|
1.1%
|
Cyprus Overnight
Deposit |
|
2.8%
|
Cyprus Savings
Deposit (1 year) |
|
4.9%
|
Cyprus Time
Deposit (1 year) |
Now
then, if the Bank of Cyprus doesn't go under, this is free
money. How much are we talking about? Subtract the rate for the
overnight deposit in Germany from the time deposit on Cyprus (4.9 -
0.55) then multiply by 60 billion euros. That ends up being 2.61
billion euros in profit. Per year! Cost? One guy at a computer
hitting the "transfer" button on his keyboard in
Dusseldorf!
This
sure beats trying to loan money to a bunch of German homeowners one
by one! But the key to this free money is, your bank must be able to
get its money out of Cyprus prior to any trouble.
And
the barrier to getting the bank's money back is those Time Deposits
(the deposits paying the most interest) are stuck in Cyprus for a
year. So in order to avoid loss, you have to see into the future one
year and stop rolling your bank's time deposits one year before those
Cyprus banks go under. Otherwise you will have collected that 4.9%,
then suffered a 30-60% uninsured depositor haircut.
And a haircut is
not a good way to ensure your banker bonus for the year.
So
with this hypothetical strategy in mind and being mindful of the
dangers of default and the timeline of when things occurred, take a
look at the following chart of "foreign deposit sources"
(deposits in Cyprus banks that originated from outside Cyprus) and
see for yourself how well each foreign participant did in
anticipating the eventual banking system crisis.
- Black: Eurozone [German & French] Banks
- Red: Cyprus people and businesses
- Blue: Cyprus Banks
- Green: Banks outside the Eurozone
- Orange: Russian "Mobsters" & Brits
Looking
at the timeline, even as late as the end of 2011, when it was clear
Greece would default and the banking regulator had to know the banks
in Cyprus were doomed, the amount of Eurozone-bank derived deposits
in Cyprus was over 20 billion euros, a good portion of which would be
subject to massive losses if the Cyprus Template were to be applied
at that moment.
[Note
that 20 billion euros was - at that time - the same size as the
"Russian Mobster" Money.]
But
at that moment, as a result of the "collecting the spread"
strategy, some big chunk of that money were likely in time deposits,
unable to be withdrawn. That money couldn't flee, not just yet.
But
as time passed, those Eurozone bank deposits were slowly reduced down
to 10 billion euros, a reduction of 50%. Presumably, as the time
deposits expired, the money was brought back to the fatherland.
And
then suddenly the President of Cyprus was informed he had 1 week to
solve the banking situation that had been pending for more than a
year.
In
looking at the movement of capital prior to the default, we can give
a grade to each participant, as a result of their apparent ability to
assess the the danger to their deposits.
The
clear winner: Eurozone Banks. Those guys were geniuses. They
were the only participant to seriously reduce holdings prior to the
default.
|
Participant
|
Grade
|
|---|---|
|
Eurozone
[German & French] Banks
|
B+/A-: almost
perfect |
|
Cyprus
People & Businesses
|
F: completely
unaware |
|
Cyprus
Banks
|
C-: slightly more
aware |
|
Banks
Outside Eurozone
|
F: completely
unaware |
|
Russian
Mobsters
|
F: completely
unaware |
So
it is expected (and a bit sad) that households and businesses don't
leave their banks readily, so its not surprising they stayed on board
right up until the end.
What
is fascinating to me is that the banks that were NOT in the eurozone
clearly had no idea what was coming, and the banks actually ON Cyprus
only had an inkling, and that only at the last minute. Given both
the timing and the form of the
Cyprus bank resolution was in the hands of the ECB, as well as French
and German politicians, is this astounding ability of the Eurozone
banks to avoid losses truly a surprise?
One
question that might be asked is, if the Eurozone banks knew what was
going to happen, why not withdraw all their money from the banks on
Cyprus?
First,
only half the banking deposits on Cyprus were involved in the
bail-in. Perhaps the 10 billion euros in remaining Cyprus-EZ bank
deposits are in other healthy Cyprus banks. Another explanation is
that only a subset of the eurozone banks were well-connected enough
to receive advance information.
One
last point. Since now we understand how perfectly the well-connected
eurozone banking establishment identifies issues in member nation's
banks, and how adept it is at avoiding uninsured depositor haircuts,
we might find it useful to watch deposit flows of these Eurozone
banks going forward.
They
might well provide us insight as to where the next set of banking
issues might arise, and perhaps more importantly, what the timing of
these issues."
Thank
you, David, for sharing your finding with us. We can now see
there are two Cyprus Templates:
1.
The public-relations/propaganda model
2.
The real one, that enables "core" eurozone banks to pull
their deposits out of periphery banks before the deposit
expropriation and capital controls kick in.
Why
are we not surprised the entire charade and expropriation is rigged
to benefit the core banks? For
more on the core/periphery structure of the Eurozone, please read The
E.U., Neofeudalism and the Neocolonial-Financialization Model (May
24, 2012)
To
fully understand the Eurozone's financial-debt crisis, we must dig
through the artifice, obfuscation and propaganda to the real dynamics
of Europe's "new feudalism," the
Neocolonial-Financialization Model.

No comments:
Post a Comment
Note: only a member of this blog may post a comment.