The
euro crisis no one is talking about: France is in free fall
The
euro zone's second-largest economy is suffering more than any other
member from a shocking deterioration in competitiveness. And it's
doing nothing to stop it.
CNN,
26
April, 2012
FORTUNE
-- Given investors' confidence in its sovereign debt, and its image
as Germany's principal partner in the sturdy, sensible "northern"
eurozone, you'd think that France endures as the co-guardian of the
endangered single currency. Indeed, the rate on France's ten-year
government bonds stands at just 2%, just a few ticks above Germany's.
From a quick look at the headline numbers, France doesn't appear
nearly as stressed as the derisively titled "PIIGS,"
Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain. So far, the trajectory of
its debts and deficits isn't as distressing as the figures for the
PIIGs, or even the U.K. and the U.S.
France's
vaunted role in the creation and initial success of the euro enhances
its aura of solidity. It was President Francois Mitterrand who in
1989 persuaded Chancellor Helmut Kohl to back monetary union in
exchange for France's support for German reunification. In fact,
France and Germany, along with the Netherlands, dramatized their
commitment by effectively uniting the franc and deutschemark in a
currency union that held their exchange rates in a narrow band, and
heralded the euro's birth in 1999. In the boom years of the
mid-2000s, France virtually matched Germany as the twin growth engine
of the thriving, 17-nation eurozone.
A
deeper look shows that France is mired in no less than an economic
crisis. The eurozone's second-largest economy (2012 GDP: 2 trillion
euros) is suffering more than any other member from a shocking
deterioration in competitiveness. Put simply, France's products --
its cars, steel, clothing, electronics -- cost far too much to
produce compared with competing goods both from Asia and its European
neighbors, including not just Germany but even Spain and Italy.
That's causing a sharp and accelerating fall in its exports, and a
significant decline in manufacturing and the services that support
it.
The
virtual implosion of French industry is overlooked by analysts and
pundits who claim that the eurozone had dodged disaster and entered a
new, durable period of stability. In fact, it's France -- not Greece
or Spain -- that now poses the greatest threat to the euro's
survival. France epitomizes the real problem with the single
currency: The inability of nations with high and rising production
costs to adjust their currencies so that their products remain
competitive in world markets.
So
far, the worries over the euro have centered on dangerously rising
debt and deficits. But those fiscal problems are primarily the result
of a loss of competitiveness. When products cost too much to make,
the economy stalls or actually declines, so that even modest
increases in government spending swamp nations with big budget
shortfalls and excessive borrowings. In this no-or-negative growth
scenario, the picture is usually the same: The private economy
shrinks while government keeps expanding.
That's
already happened in Italy, Spain and other troubled eurozone members.
The difference is that those nations are adopting structural reforms
to restore their competitiveness. France is doing nothing of the
kind. Hence, its yawning competitiveness gap will soon create a
fiscal crisis. It's absolutely astonishing that an economy so large,
and so widely respected, can be unraveling so quickly.
The
world's investors and the euro zone optimists should awaken to the
danger posed by France. La crise est arivée.
France's
decline is best illustrated by the rapid deterioration in its foreign
trade. In 1999, France sold around 7% of the world's exports. Today,
the figure is just over 3%, and falling fast. The same high costs
that are pounding exports draw an ever rising flow of goods from
Germany, China and even southern Europe. Those imports are taking an
increasing share of sales from pricier French-made products. In 2005,
France's trade balance was a positive 0.5% of GDP. Today, it stands
at minus 2.7% of national income, meaning imports now far exceed
exports, turning trade from a growth-generator into a major drag. An
excellent illustration of the competitiveness gap is the chasm
between German and French exports to China. Germany sends $70 billion
in cars, machine tools and other products to China each year, seven
times the figure for France.
Even
tourism is suffering because of the France's high prices. France is
now struggling clientele from a surging, bargain-seeking tranche of
the market, travelers from Asia, Brazil, India and Russia. In the
mid-2000s, foreigners spent 15 billion euros more visiting the Champs
Elysees and the Riviera than the French paid to vacation abroad. That
surplus has since fallen by one-third, to around 10 billion euros.
The
main reason for France's cost disadvantage is the burden of labor, a
factor that typically accounts for around 70% of all corporate
expenses worldwide. In France, the problem comprises a both high wage
and social costs, and rigid laws, including a 35-hour work week that
allows French employees the lowest number of working hours in the
developed world. An astounding 86% of all wage earners enjoy
"contrats a durée indéterminées," permanent contracts
that make layoffs extremely expensive and time-consuming.
In
France, 42 euros for every 100 euros in total expenses go to social
charges, versus 34 euros in Germany, 26 in the UK, and 20 in the US.
Obviously,
the restrictive laws and hostile unions are nothing new. What's
causing the crippling malaise is the recent rapid rise in labor costs
when rivals are lowering or moderating the weight of weight of their
workforces.
Since
2005, France's unit labor costs -- the expense of producing a single
car or steel beam, for example -- has jumped 17% compared with 10%
for Germany, 5.8% for Spain, and 2% for Ireland. Today, French
workers earn an average of 35.3 euros per hour, compared with 25.8 in
Italy, 22 in the UK and Spain.
The
result is a steep fall in French manufacturing and the services that
support it, everything from consulting to logistics. Corporate
profits have plunged to 6.5% of GDP, about 60% of the euro zone
average. That's because French exporters are losing market share, and
the ones that survive must lower margins to charge competitive
prices. As a result, they lack the funds to invest in new plants and
technologies. France now has half as many exporting companies as
Germany and, amazingly, Italy. German industry benefits from 19,000
robots, five times the number in France. As for R&D spending,
it's dropped 50% in the past four years.
Remarkably,
the Hollande government is raising revenue by heightening the burden
on business. In September, France announced new laws that limit
deductions for interest payments and loss carry-forwards, effectively
heaping higher taxes on business. Those measures will shrink already
meager profits, and crimp future investment.
The
cost-gap wouldn't be so damaging if France specialized in
sophisticated, high-margin products. Indeed, the nation remains
strong in fashion, luxury goods, and pharmaceuticals. But though
those offerings symbolize France's economic élan, the nation is
heavily dependent on autos, textile, steel, telecom equipment and
other mid-to-low margin products that are extremely price sensitive
on world markets. "France has never been strong in high-end,
sophisticated products like machine tools or high-end computer
equipment," says Jean-Christophe Caffet of Flash Economics in
Paris. "And even in the high-end, it's lost a lot of market
share to Germany."
Germany,
for example, specializes in fancy cars, Audis, Mercedes and BMWs that
folks are willing to keep buying if prices rise a bit. By contrast,
France makes cheaper Renaults and Peugeots that risk losing sales to
Ford or Fiat unless manufacturers hold down prices -- or settle for
puny or non-existent profits.
Nor
is France reacting to the looming crisis by following its neighbors'
campaign to lower labor costs. Germany made big strides in the
mid-2000s with its Hartz IV reforms that lowered the social charges
on businesses. Spain recently raised the retirement age for full
pensions from 65 to 67 and allows wage negotiations at the company
level, a departure from the centralized system of imposing mandatory
nationwide increases in pay. Italy is gradually raising the
retirement age for women from 60 to 66 over the next six years.
But
Francois Hollande, elected president in May, is taking far more tepid
steps. The government is pledging to modestly lower social charges on
businesses, but the reforms don't start until 2014, and last just two
years.
It's
the prospect of a future without growth, a direct legacy of the
competitiveness problem, that could unleash a fiscal crisis. It's
remarkable that in the mid-1990s, France had a lower unemployment
rate than Germany, smaller deficits, less debt to GDP, and
approximately the same growth rate. All of those measures have now
totally reversed.
In
2012, the French economy expanded at just 0.2%, and its real growth
rate for the past three years averaged 1.2%, less than half Germany's
2.7% performance. For 2013, France's ODDO Securities makes a
persuasive case that the economy will actually shrink. The
unemployment rate stands at a 14-year high of 10.9% and rising,
compared 6.7% for Germany. Debt to GDP is nearing the danger zone of
90%, and could hit 97% in 2013.
It's
not that France has been raising government spending at an outrageous
rate. The issue is that a nation with already high spending levels
and no growth has run out of room to keep lifting spending, and debt,
at all. It's extraordinary that from 2004 to 2012, the private sector
in France showed no growth whatsoever, adjusted for inflation. The
entire rise in GDP, a mere 7.3% over eight years, came from
government spending. It's the private economy that supports that
spending, and it will keep dwindling, driving France further and
further into debt.
Government
spending now accounts for 57% of GDP and increasing, 12 points higher
than Germany. By the way, Germany's private sector is growing briskly
as public expenditures drop as a share of national income. The
opposite dynamic is plaguing its long-time partner.
It's
totally implausible to blame "austerity" for France's poor
growth. Austerity is generally defined as large reductions in budget
deficits, mainly driven by falling government spending. But France's
spending has increased in real terms, and its deficits have been
remained at a substantial 5% or so of GDP in 2011 and 2012, with the
same figure likely for this year.
It's
unclear when the crisis that's going mostly unacknowledged by
investors and the Hollande government will erupt into a panic. The
chance that France will lower labor costs by the 20% to 30% needed to
restore growth is practically zero.
Reforms can only happen when the
economy is expanding and citizens feel good about the future, the
antithesis of the gloom now enveloping France.
France
is heading towards an economic Bastille. The longer it stays on that
path, the more possible that the eurozone regime it labored so hard
to create will crumble.

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