Yanis
Yaroufakis is currently lecturer in economics at the University of
Athens prior to which he taught at the University of Sydney in
Australia
Greece’s
Choice: Bargaining versus pleading
When
two sides bargain, their interaction reflects a potential mutual
benefit but also a measure of conflict. For instance, when a firm and
its supplier reach a deal, there is often more than one price where
both will benefit. The high end of the range favours the supplier
while the lower advantages the firm. So, when bargaining leads them
to an agreement on the final price, they unlock a mutual benefit and
resolve a potential conflict.
Yanis
Yaroufakis
26
April, 2012
Now,
bargaining only makes sense if both sides enjoy a modicum of
bargaining power. And what determines that? The simple answer is: a
readiness to draw a ‘line in the sand’ and credibly resolve to
walk away from the negotiations if that ‘line’ is crossed. Thus,
a buyer determines a maximum price, and the seller a minimum price,
and commits to scuttle the deal if the opposite side refuses to grant
at least this minimalist demand. If one of the two bargainers cannot
envision circumstances under which she will prefer to reject the
other’s offer, and this is transparent, negotiations are pointless.
The party that cannot imagine
saying ‘no’ should desist from bargaining and simply plead with
the other side, appealing to its kindness, generosity and, in
desperate cases like Greece’s, sense of mercy.
Today,
Greek voters are going to the polling stations torn by the momentous
choice that they must make. Should they vote for a party (Syriza)
promising to bargain
with Europe for better terms and conditions or for parties (primarily
conservative New Democracy and/or the socialist PASOK) that are,
effectively, proposing to plead
with Europe for better terms and conditions? Ostensibly, both sides
of the argument are promising to negotiate with the troika (the
European Central Bank, the European Union and the International
Monetary Fund). However, in truth, the so-called pro-bailout parties
(ND and PASOK) are running on a platform that any
deal
with Greece’s official creditors is better than no
deal.
So, in view of the preceding definition of genuine bargaining, they
are ruling genuine negotiations out, courtesy of their determination
not to draw a ‘line in the sand’
The
voters’ dilemma gets worse because of the risks involved e.ither
way. Pro-bailout parties argue against the ‘line in the sand’
strategy because they believe that such a ‘line’, if it must be
adhered to (e.g. following a tough negotiating line by the troika),
will lead Greece out of the euro, thus costing Greece more than
toeing the troika’s ‘line’ (i.e. Greece is doing as it is
told). In sharp contrast, Syriza is arguing (drawing upon the sorry
experience of kowtowing to the troika’s every whim during the past
two years) that the greatest risk facing Greece is sticking to the
present course of precipitous degeneration which inexorably, and
speedily, leads Greece… out of the euro.
In
the background of this dilemma, lies another fundamental difference
of Greek opinion regarding Europe’s handling of the Crisis in
countries other than Greece. On the one hand, the pro-bailout parties
maintain a touching faith in Europe’s powerful nations to ride the
present storm. While they concede that the past two years have been
replete with a sequence of errors on the part of Berlin, Paris,
Brussels and Frankfurt, pro-bailout parties are clinging on to the
‘theory’ that “this is how Europe makes progress”; to the
optimistic view that Europe will,
in the final analysis, manage to do what is necessary in order to
save the euro and, with it, snatch the European
Ideal
from the jaws of the unfolding disintegration. Based on this muted
optimism, they argue that Greece’s optimal strategy today is to do
what it is told (even if what it is told makes little rational sense)
so as to maximise its chances of staying within the European fold
until Europe’s long-awaited ‘final solution’ to the Crisis
arrives. Their nightmare scenario would see Greece fall out of the
Eurozone just before the Eurozone is ‘fixed’ through a
combination of fiscal transfers, federal moves, debt mutualisation
etc.
On
the other side of the argument (which has, incidentally, been my own
viewpoint for a long while now), a completely different view of what
Europe is up to dominates. It is the view of European elites engulfed
in a spectacular coordination failure that cannot resolve itself
endogenously. They resemble American Pentagon generals of the early
1970s, who could see that the Vietnam War could not be won and was a
train wreck in slow motion, but who had no means of combining this
realisation into a coordinated attempt to change course. Similarly in
the corridors of power in Northern Europe today, everyone can see
that the Eurozone is heading for a major defeat, in the hands of this
vicious Crisis, but no one dares speak the words that might lead to a
collective, a European, re-set that will avert the inevitable
disaster. In this view of developments in the European Metropoles, we
need a circuit-breaker. Something must ‘give’. Some discontinuity
is necessary, to interrupt the unfolding train wreck of the Eurozone.
A Greek vote for a party, like Syriza, that is prepared to bargain
(i.e. a party that is prepared to draw a ‘line in the sand’) may
provide this circuit-breaker. Through this prism, a Greek ‘no’ to
the troika is not in the slightest anti-European. Indeed, it is the
only good service Greek voters can perform on behalf of the European
Project.
If
the essence of tragedy is essentially good people being caught up in
a vicious dilemma that make it impossible for them clearly to
distinguish the virtuous from the disastrous choice, Greek voters
are, today, experiencing a very real, very personal tragedy. For my
part, I have little doubt what the virtuous choice is: Bargaining is
infinitely more sensible than pleading, particularly when the troika
is terribly bad at knowing where its own interests lie. Greek voters
today have a unique opportunity to jolt Europe out of a complacency
that is leading our Continent to a despicable peripeteia.
On
Ponzi austerity
Interview
with Max Keiser
"We
discuss the European short change con in which debt and debt
facilities are created and swapped at ever increasing speeds in order
to defraud the population. In the second half of the show Max talks
to economist Yanis
Varoufakis about
the ponzi austerity screwing Europeans right down to the ground with
more debt
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