This
should resonate for us here in New Zealand given the revelations
about the GCSB in the Kim Dotcom case.
Australia:
'Be careful, she might hear you'
Attorney-General
Nicola Roxon wants unprecedented access to the private lives of
Australians, writes Philip Dorling.
25
September, 2012
AUSTRALIA'S
security and law enforcement agencies are world leaders in
telecommunications interception and data access and like most
successful industries, they want more. Federal Attorney-General
Nicola Roxon is canvassing a further expansion of surveillance
powers, most controversially a requirement that telecommunications
and internet service providers retain at least two years of data for
access by government agencies.
Security
and privacy are in the balance as the Federal Parliament's secretive
joint committee on intelligence and security considers Australia's
future digital surveillance regime.
Australia
was slow to get into the business of telecommunications interception.
Alexander Graham Bell's invention was nearly 70 years old before
Australian security authorities took advantage of the telephone as a
surveillance device. But since then they've never looked back.
David
Forbes Martyn was a highly accomplished Scottish physicist who
brought radar technology to Australia in 1939. He was the first chief
of CSIRO's radiophysics laboratory at Sydney University, a fellow of
the Royal Society and a founder of the Australian Academy of Science.
He delivered the first ABC Boyer Lectures.
Martyn
also had the unfortunate distinction of being a target of the first
telephone tapping and bugging operation by an Australian security
agency nearly seven decades ago.
Despite
playing key roles in Australian defence science in World War II, his
loyalty came under suspicion owing to his friendship with two women,
one of whom was suspected by military intelligence, on little more
than gossip, of being a Nazi sympathiser, if not an actual spy.
In
early 1944, Brigadier Bill Simpson, director-general of the wartime
Commonwealth Security Service, ordered the interception of Martyn's
phone, the phone of his fiancee, Margot Adams, and installation of
listening devices in the Sydney apartment of their close friend,
Shanyi Maier, the Chinese wife of a German internee and alleged femme
fatale.
By
today's standards, the operation was incredibly primitive. There were
no recordings. Security officers would take a trip to the local
telephone exchange, sit with a switchboard operator who inserted a
special plug to enable them to hook into the phone line and take
notes as they listened in on the conversation.
Other
agents sat in a room above Maier's apartment and listened through
headphones to two microphones, one placed in the living room, the
other in her bedroom.
For
five months the Security Service listened to conversations such as
''I'm going down to the wine shop, should I get one or two bottles of
red?'' and tried to work out if a word such as ''red'' was some sort
of code. They eavesdropped as Martyn and Adams discussed their
wedding plans. They also listened intently to Maier's love life and
most intimate moments, filling voluminous files with verbatim
transcripts.
But
she was no spy. Six decades later the files were transferred to the
National Archives and made publicly available. Long divorced,
remarried and widowed, Shanyi Balogh, as she was then, was still
alive and well, and living in the same apartment. She read some of
the transcripts with deep distress, indeed broke down and cried at
the violation of her privacy.
Australia's
first technical surveillance operation was judged a success, even
though nothing of security significance was uncovered. Brigadier
Simpson thought the exercise had been ''first class from a technical
viewpoint''.
There
was no espionage, either. However, Martyn's career was severely
damaged by suspicions that the Security Service never thought
necessary to dispel. Many years later, embittered and in
deteriorating mental health, he was consumed by constant fears that
he was under surveillance and took his own life.
The
Security Service's successor, the Australian Security Intelligence
Organisation, quickly turned to telephone interception in its
post-war investigations of Soviet spies in Australia. There was no
legal authority for what were called ''special facilities'', but
Labor prime minister Ben Chifley gave the go ahead in July 1949 for
ASIO to tap the phone of Walter Clayton, an Australian Communist
Party operative suspected, rightly, of being involved in Soviet
espionage.
Within
a year ASIO was phone-tapping 14 people. By the end of a decade they
had tapped 174 telephones, mainly belonging to Soviet diplomats and
Australian communists.
Anxious
to put this growing surveillance activity on a legal footing,
attorney-general Sir Garfield Barwick presented a top-secret
submission to the cabinet of Sir Robert Menzies in February 1960.
''The
usefulness of interception of telephones by the Security Service is
undoubted,'' Barwick wrote. ''[T]he obtaining of factual evidence of
subversion, espionage and sabotage is one of the most difficult
aspects of investigation … One of the most vulnerable points in so
far as the detection of these activities is communication …
Telephone and mail interception, therefore, become of paramount
importance.''
Barwick
referred to the ''natural disfavour, not to say aversion, with which
people regard this form of assault on the privacy of the telephone'',
but concluded that interception was ''indispensable to the security
of the nation.''
There
were to be legislative safeguards. Subject to authorisation by
warrant from the attorney-general, intercept operations were only to
be carried out by ASIO for national security purposes. ''In my
opinion, it is quite clear that the Commonwealth cannot carry the
responsibility of providing telephone [intercept] facilities for
state purposes - even for the detection of crime,'' Barwick added.
One
hundred and sixty warrants were issued for interception operations,
codenamed ''Bugle'', over the next 12 years. When the Whitlam Labor
government took office in December 1972, 52 warrants were in force,
mainly covering the USSR embassy in Canberra, Soviet bloc diplomats
and Australia's feuding communist and socialist parties. Labor
parliamentarians often featured in intercept transcripts thanks to
their contact with communist union officials and Soviet diplomats.
ASIO tapped the phone of Labor Senate leader Lionel Murphy's
secretary who was having an affair with a Soviet diplomat who was a
senior KGB officer.
Prime
minister Gough Whitlam revoked all warrants and, after a review,
attorney-general Murphy approved 29 new warrants for Soviet bloc
diplomats, Croatian nationalist extremists and pro-Palestinian groups
supportive of terrorist activity.
Under
prime minister Malcolm Fraser, ASIO interception operations were
extended to again cover Australian communist party members, anti-US
alliance protesters, as well as Bill Hartley, a prominent member of
Labor's socialist-left faction, a pro-Palestinian activist and paid
agent of the Iraqi intelligence service.
More
significant in the longer term was the Fraser government's
legislation in 1979 to allow interception by the Commonwealth Police,
now the Australian Federal Police, to cover the narcotics trade and
wider criminal activity.
Revelations that the NSW Police had for many
years conducted numerous illegal phone taps eventually led the Hawke
Labor government to legislate to empower state police to undertake
lawful interception operations.
Aside
from ASIO and the AFP, 15 police, anti-corruption and police
integrity agencies now conduct telecommunications interception under
warrants from judges or members of the Administrative Appeals
Tribunal.
In
1996-97, law enforcement agencies carried out 675 phone taps. By
2001-02 the annual number had grown to 2157. The most recently
published figures show the number of warrants had risen to 3488 in
2010-11 - a five-fold increase since the beginning of the Howard
government. (Figures for ASIO's intercepts are classified and will
only become available from the National Archives after more than 20
years.)
Also,
588 federal listening and tracking device warrants were issued in
2010-11 - a 43 per cent increase on the figure two years earlier.
This
is an Australian growth industry. Telephone tapping and bugging have
become routine investigative tools. Indeed, published statistics show
that Australian law enforcement telecommunications interception
activity is greater both in absolute and relative terms than that
undertaken in the United States.
American
federal and state judges issued only 1491 wiretap authorisations for
law enforcement purposes in 2001. By 2011 the US figure had risen to
2732 warrants. Taking into account the difference in population
between Australia and the US, the per capita rate of law enforcement
telephone interception in Australia is 18 times greater than that in
the US.
Australian
law enforcement and government agencies are also accessing vast
troves of phone and internet data without warrant. Indeed, they did
so more than 250,000 times during criminal and revenue investigations
in 2010-11. Comparative statistics suggest this is a far greater
level of telecommunications data access than that undertaken in the
US, Britain or Canada.
Data
accessed includes phone and internet account information, outwards
and inwards call details, internet access, and details of websites
visited, though not the actual content of communications.
Federal
government agencies gaining access to such data include ASIO, AFP,
the Australian Crime Commission, the Tax Office, the departments of
Defence, Immigration and Citizenship and Health and Ageing, and
Medicare. Data is also accessed by state police and anti-corruption
bodies, state government agencies, local government bodies and even
the RSPCA.
Telecommunications
data now accessible without warrant also includes location data,
which can be accessed both historically and in real time. Few
Australians would have agreed two decades ago to carry a
government-accessible tracking device, but that is precisely what
they do when carrying a modern mobile phone or tablet.
It
is against this background of a world-class surveillance regime that
Attorney-General Roxon recently echoed her conservative predecessor,
Sir Garfield Barwick, saying further expansion of surveillance and
data access is required to ensure national security and community
safety.
According
to Roxon, action is required to ensure that ''vital investigative
tools are not lost as telecommunications providers update their
business practices and begin to delete data more regularly and more
Australians communicate online in a wider variety of ways''.
''The
loss of this capability would be a major blow to our law enforcement
agencies and to Australia's national security.''
The
Attorney-General says she hasn't made up her mind on all the latest
proposals, and her referral of the matter to a parliamentary
committee is likely to delay a decision and implementation until next
year, probably after the next federal election.
But
in nearly 70 years, Australia's surveillance industry has never taken
a step backwards.
In
today's world of email, text and internet chat, Facebook and Twitter,
electronic business transactions and ever wider CCTV coverage of
business premises and public spaces, almost every aspect of people's
daily lives will soon be recorded electronically in one medium or
another.
With
the costs of data collection and storage continuously falling,
all-encompassing surveillance will be achievable at the touch of a
button.
The
pull of technology and push of security will continue to radically
diminish the realm of privacy. In some ways we will be ''safer'', but
privacy will be at the discretion of law enforcement, security and
bureaucrats. With that will come a profound, qualitative change in
the relationship between citizens and government that is yet to be
considered by Parliament or the public.
All
this is a long way from the first, primitive surveillance operation
directed against David Martyn, Margot Adams and their friend Shanyi
Maier nearly seven decades ago. From little things big things grow.
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