Israel, no doubt sees an opportunity to collapse the Iranian economy – and, no doubt will be doing their utmost to lend a helping hand.
On
the one hand this represents good news – as it indicates that a
suicidal attack on Iran would seem to be off the cards. On the
other, Iran represents (or respresented) a real challenge to US and
Israeli petrodollar hegemony.
Does
this represent a victory for the bad guys? We'll have to wait and
see.
A
win for the opposition in Venzuela would have another, similar
effect.
Israeli
attack on Iran this fall is no longer in the cards
Israel,
which for months downplayed the impact of sanctions, has recently
done an about-face and become a significant contributor to the new
discourse.
Iranian workers protest in front the Industrial Ministry building in Tehran, Iran, demanding their delayed salaries.Photo by AP
7
October, 2012
The
wave of demonstrations in Tehran over the last few days, sparked by
the plummeting value of the Iranian rial and the consequent rise in
the price of staple products, has significantly changed the nature of
the international discourse on Iran. The harsh international
sanctions that took effect in July are now being felt with increasing
force. Thus the question of whether continued economic pressure could
bring about regime change in Iran has once again become legitimate.
Israel,
which for months downplayed the impact of sanctions, has recently
done an about-face and become a significant contributor to the new
discourse. Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman has spoken publicly
about the possibility that the ayatollahs' regime could collapse in
2013, and his ministry has been stressing the impact of sanctions.
There has also been much speculation that June's presidential
election in Iran could prompt a repeat of the Green Revolution: the
massive - but ultimately unsuccessful - demonstrations that followed
the 2009 election.
So
far, Lieberman's prediction still appears excessively optimistic. Nor
is there any evidence that Iran's leadership is willing to halt its
nuclear program to ease the international pressure. Yet this debate
over the possibility of regime change would clearly never have
reemerged had Israel carried out its threat to attack Iran's nuclear
facilities this fall.
Public
opinion, like the media, has a short attention span. But it's worth
recalling that from early July to early September, the possibility
that Israel would attack Iran's nuclear facilities before the U.S.
elections on November 6 topped the agenda of both the Israeli and the
foreign media.
Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu completed his descent from that tree in
his speech to the UN General Assembly 10 days ago. While his drawing
of a bomb attracted the most public attention, he also made it
crystal-clear that he had extended his deadline to the international
community from this autumn to the spring or summer of 2013. Only if
all other efforts to halt Iran's nuclear program had failed by then
would Israel decide to attack Iran on its own, Netanyahu implied.
It
is, of course, necessary to consider another possibility: That
Netanyahu and the man who until recently was his closest ally,
Defense Minister Ehud Barak, are now engaged in a brilliant campaign
of deception, which will culminate in Israeli planes taking off to
attack just when the international community is expecting it least.
But at the moment, that looks like a highly unlikely scenario.
For
most of the year, Iran has been at the forefront of our concerns, the
explanation for every political move - from Netanyahu's announcement
of early elections this summer through his decision to postpone them
and bring Kadima into the government instead, to Kadima's abrupt
departure from the coalition. Now, a new agenda has come to the fore,
a traditional political one. Iran seems less urgent.
Was
an attack imminent?
What
happened this fall was an exact repeat of the two previous autumns,
in 2010 and 2011. Then, too, there were various assessments
suggesting a possible Israeli attack. How close were we to really
doing it this time? The degree of concern broadcast by both the Obama
administration and President Shimon Peres - who deviated from his
usual custom by publicly voicing opposition to an attack that wasn't
coordinated with Washington - seem to indicate that an Israeli attack
really wasn't far off.
From
the prime minister's speech to the AIPAC conference in March until
sometime in June, it seemed as if the public statements by Netanyahu
and Barak had fulfilled their purpose: spurring the international
community to impose tougher sanctions on Iran. But then, Israel
turned the screws one notch too far and sparked genuine worry in
Washington, prompting a constant stream of visits by senior
administration officials.
When
chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey warned
publicly in August that a solo Israeli attack couldn't deal Iran's
nuclear program a significant setback, it was clear that America had
pulled out all the stops in its effort to prevent such an attack.
American officials have sensitive antennae when it comes Israel's
leadership, and an effort of this magnitude indicates real fear.
Opposition
at home
But
it wasn't just American opposition that kept Netanyahu from military
action; domestic opposition did as well. Warnings by senior army and
Mossad officials against any attack that wasn't coordinated with
America, which were leaked to the press at critical moments, tied the
premier's hands.
Another
important factor was Barak's last-minute u-turn. Until the summer,
Barak had been the leading supporter of an Israeli attack. But after
he said an Israeli attack would delay Iran's nuclear program by only
a year or two, warned against a rift with the United States and
objected to trying to force U.S. President Barack Obama to set "red
lines," it was clear that Netanyahu had been left alone at the
front.
Now,
officials in Jerusalem are pointing out that Iran has used some of
the uranium it enriched to a 20 percent level for medical research -
meaning it isn't all being earmarked for a nuclear bomb. But that
fact was already known back in August. Israeli officials are also
highlighting reports of the protests over inflation in Iran.
Before
this about-face, Israel had invested some NIS 10 billion in
preparations for an attack. It's quite possible this was necessary to
rouse the world to action. But it also had many negative side
effects, from panicking the Israeli public to causing some foreign
investors to flee.
Netanyahu
hasn't abandoned the idea of attacking Iran; the issue will likely be
back on the agenda in the spring of 2013 if the ayatollahs show no
signs of buckling by then. But an attack on Iran this fall - which
had until recently been viewed as an almost sure bet in light of
Israeli leaders' public rhetoric - is no longer in the cards.

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