There
is a good definition of the ideas of Hyman
Minsky (and the Minsky moment) here
MAULDIN:
We're Headed For An Economic Black Hole
John
Mauldin, Thoughts From The Frontline
16
October, 2012
"Concern
about politics and the processes of international co-operation is
warranted but the best one can hope for from politics in any country
is that it will drive rational responses to serious problems. If
there is no consensus on the causes or solutions to serious problems,
it is unreasonable to ask a political system to implement forceful
actions in a sustained way. Unfortunately, this is to an important
extent the case with respect to current economic difficulties,
especially in the industrial world.
"While
there is agreement on the need for more growth and job creation in
the short run and on containing the accumulation of debt in the long
run, there are deep differences of opinion both within and across
countries as to how this can be accomplished. What
might be labelled the 'orthodox view' attributes much of our current
difficulty to excess borrowing by the public and private sectors,
emphasises the need to contain debt, puts a premium on credibly
austere fiscal and monetary policies, and stresses the need for
long-term structural measures rather than short-term demand-oriented
steps to promote growth.
"The
alternative 'demand support view' also recognises the need to contain
debt accumulation and avoid high inflation, but it pushes for steps
to increase demand in the short run as a means of jump-starting
economic growth and setting off a virtuous circle in which income
growth, job creation and financial strengthening are mutually
reinforcing. International economic dialogue has vacillated between
these two viewpoints in recent years."
– Lawrence
Summers, The
Financial Times, October
14, 2012
There
is indeed considerable disagreement throughout the world on what
policies to pursue in the face of rising deficits and economies that
are barely growing or at stall speed. Both sides look at the same set
of realities and yet draw drastically different conclusions. Both
sides marshal arguments based on rigorous mathematical models
"proving" the correctness of their favorite solution, and
both sides can point to counterfactuals that show the other side to
be insincere or just plain wrong.
Spain
and Greece are both examples of what happens when there is too much
debt and austerity is applied to deal with the problem. One side
argues that the cure for too much debt is yet more debt, while the
other side seemingly argues that the cure for a lack of growth is to
shrink the economy. It is as if one side argues that the cure for a
night of drunken revelry is a fifth of whiskey while the other side
prescribes a very-low-calorie diet of fiber and veggies.
Both
sides have arguments that are intellectually appealing, yet both
cannot be right at the same time. What I think we need to consider is
the possibility that there is something that is happening outside of
traditional economic theories, which will mean that following either
traditional policy solution could lead to disaster.
But
is there a third alternative? If we want to find one, the first thing
we need to do is to properly diagnose the problem. In today's letter
we begin to explore why the models aren't working. Sometimes the best
way to understand a complex subject is to draw an analogy. So with an
apology to all the true mathematicians among my readers, today we
will look at what I will call the Economic Singularity. And maybe
we'll have a little fun on the way. Let's jump right in.
The Economic Singularity
Singularity was
originally a mathematical term for a point at which an equation has
no solution. In physics, it was proven that a large enough collapsing
star would eventually become a black hole so dense that its own
gravity would cause a singularity in the fabric of spacetime, a point
where many standard physics equations suddenly have no solution.
Beyond
the "event horizon" of the black hole, the models no longer
work. In general relativity, an event horizon is the boundary in
spacetime beyond which events cannot affect an outside observer. In a
black hole it is "the point of no return," i.e., the point
at which the gravitational pull becomes so great that nothing can
escape.
This
theme is an old friend to readers of science fiction. Everyone knows
that you can't get too close to a black hole or you will get sucked
in; but if you can get just close enough, you can use the powerful
and deadly gravity to slingshot you across the vast reaches of
spacetime.
One
way that a black hole can (theoretically) be created is for a star to
collapse in upon itself. The larger the mass of the star, the greater
the gravity of the black hole and the more surrounding space-stuff
that will get sucked down its gravity well. The center of our galaxy
is thought to be a black hole with the mass of 4.3 million suns.
I
think we can draw a rough parallel between a black hole and our
current global economic situation. (For physicists this will be a
very rough parallel indeed, but work with me, please.) An economic
bubble of any type, but
especially a debt bubble, can
be thought of as an incipient black hole. When the bubble collapses
in upon itself, it creates its own black hole with an event horizon
beyond which all traditional economic modeling breaks down. Any
economic theory that does not attempt to transcend the event horizon
associated with excessive debt will be incapable of offering a viable
solution to an economic crisis. Even worse, it is likely that any
proposed solution will make the crisis more severe.
The Minsky Moment
Debt
(leverage) can be a very good thing when used properly. For instance,
if debt is used to purchase an income-producing asset, whether a new
machine tool for a factory or a bridge to increase commerce, then
debt can be net-productive.
Hyman
Minsky, one of the greatest economists of the last century, saw debt
in three forms: hedge, speculative, and Ponzi. Roughly speaking, to
Minsky, hedge financing occurred when the profits from purchased
assets were used to pay back the loan, speculative finance occurred
when profits from the asset simply maintained the debt service and
the loan had to be rolled over, and Ponzi finance required the
selling of the asset at an ever higher price in order to make a
profit.
Minsky
maintained that if hedge financing dominated, then the economy might
well be an equilibrium-seeking, well-contained system. On the other
hand, the greater the weight of speculative and Ponzi finance, the
greater the likelihood that the economy would be what he called a
deviation-amplifying system. Thus, Minsky's Financial Instability
Hypothesis suggests that over periods of prolonged prosperity,
capitalist economies tend to move from a financial structure
dominated by (stable) hedge finance to a structure that increasingly
emphasizes (unstable) speculative and Ponzi finance.
Minsky
proposed theories linking financial market fragility, in the normal
life cycle of an economy, with speculative investment
bubbles endogenous to
financial markets. He claimed that in prosperous times, when
corporate cash flow rises beyond what is needed to pay off debt, a
speculative euphoria develops; and soon thereafter debts exceed what
borrowers can pay off from their incoming revenues, which in turn
produces a financial crisis. As the climax of such a speculative
borrowing bubble nears, banks and other lenders tighten credit
availability, even to companies that can afford loans, and the
economy then contracts.
"A
fundamental characteristic of our economy," Minsky wrote in
1974, "is that the financial system swings between robustness
and fragility and these swings are an integral part of the process
that generates business cycles." (Wikipedia)
But
a business-cycle recession is a fundamentally different thing than
the end of a Debt Supercycle, such as much of Europe is tangling
with, Japan will soon face, and the US can only avoid with concerted
action in the first part of the next year.
A
business-cycle recession can respond to monetary and fiscal policy in
a more or less normal fashion; but if you are at the event horizon of
a collapsing debt black hole, monetary and fiscal policy will no
longer work the way they have in the past or in a manner that the
models would predict.
There
are two contradictory forces battling in a debt black hole: expanding
debt and collapsing growth. Without treading again on ground covered
in many past letters, let's take it as a given that if you either cut
government spending or raise taxes you are going to reduce GDP over
the short run (academic studies suggest the short run is 4-5
quarters). To argue that raising taxes or cutting spending has no
immediate effect on the economy flies in the face of mathematical
reality. Note that I'm not arguing for one approach or the other,
just simply stating that there will be consequences, either way. The
country might be better off with higher taxes and/or more spending,
or the opposite. But those choices are going to have consequences in
both the short and long term.
Second,
there is a limit to how much money a government can borrow. That
limit clearly varies from country to country, but to suggest there is
no limit puts you clearly in the camp of the delusional.
The Event Horizon
In
our analogy, the event horizon is relatively easy to pinpoint. It is
what Rogoff and Reinhart call the "Bang!" moment, when a
country loses the confidence of the bond market. For Russia it came
at 12% of debt-to-GDP in 1998. Japan is at 230% of debt-to-GDP and
rising, even as its population falls – the Bang! moment approaches.
Obviously, Greece had its moment several years ago. Spain lost
effective access to the bond market last year, minus European
Central Bank intervention.
Other countries will follow.
As
an aside, it makes no difference how the debt was accumulated. The
black holes of debt in Greece and in Argentina had completely
different origins from those of Spain or Sweden or Canada (the latter
two in the early '90s). The Spanish problem did not originate because
of too much government spending; it developed because of a housing
bubble of epic proportions. 17% of the working population was
employed in the housing industry when it collapsed. Is it any wonder
that unemployment is now 25%? If unemployment is 25%, that both
raises the cost of government services and reduces revenues by
proportionate amounts.
The
policy problem is, how do you counteract the negative pull of a black
hole of debt before it's too late? How do you muster the "escape
velocity" to get back to a growing economy and a falling deficit
– or, dare we say, even a surplus to pay down the old debt? How do
you reconcile the competing forces of insufficient growth and too
much debt?
The
problem is not merely one of insufficient spending: the key problem
is insufficient income. By definition, income has to come before
spending. You can take money from one source and give it to another,
but that is not organic growth. We typically think of organic growth
as only having to do with individual companies, but I think the
concept also applies to countries. The organic growth of a country
can come from natural circumstances like energy resources or an
equable climate or land conducive to agricultural production, or it
can come from developing an educated populace. There are many sources
of potential organic growth: energy, tourism, technology,
manufacturing, agriculture, trade, banking, etc.
While
deficit spending can help bridge a national economy through a
recession, normal business growth must eventually take over if the
country is to prosper. Keynesian theory prescribed deficit spending
during times of business recessions and the accumulation of surpluses
during good times, in order to be able to pay down debts that would
inevitably accrue down the road. The problem is that the model
developed by Keynesian theory begins to break down as we near the
event horizon of a black hole of debt.
Deficit
spending is a wonderful prescription for Spain, but it begs the
question of who will pay off the deficit once Spain has lost the
confidence of the bond market. Is it the responsibility of the rest
of Europe to pay for Spain or Greece? Or Italy or France, or whatever
country chooses not to deal with its own internal issues?
Deficit
spending can be a useful tool in countries with a central bank, such
as the US. But at what point does borrowing from the future (and our
children) constitute a failure to deal with our own lack of political
will in regards to our spending and taxation policies? There is a
difference, as I think Hyman Minsky would point out, between
borrowing money for infrastructure spending that will benefit our
children and borrowing money to spend on ourselves today, with no
future benefit.
In
my mind I am playing reruns of old Star
Trek episodes
with Capt. Kirk shouting, "Dammit, Scotty, you've got to give me
more power!" as they try to escape a looming black hole. Except,
in our national version it's Paul
Krugman playing
Capt. Kirk (badly), demanding that Ben
Bernanke provide
even more QE and Congress more stimulus spending. (I should note that
Paul Krugman, like myself, is a science fiction aficionado. That may
be the one philosophical point, a singularity if you will, that we
agree on.) Of course, the Republicans (Romney) are playing the part
of Scotty, yelling back at Kirk, "Captain, I can't give you any
more power! The engines are going to blow!"
The
deficit has to be controlled, of course. To continue on the current
path will only feed our Black Hole of Debt even more "mass,"
making it that much harder to escape from. But to try and power away
(cutting the deficit radically) all at once will blow the engines of
the economy. Suddenly reducing the deficit by 8% of GDP, either by
cutting spending or raising taxes, is a prescription for an almost
immediate depression. It's just basic math.
As
I outline in my book Endgame (shameless
plug), each country has to find its own path. But it's clear that
Spain, like Greece, is simply going to have to default on part of its
debt. So will Ireland and Portugal. Japan will resort to printing
money in amounts that will boggle the imagination and terrify the
world as they finally come to grips with the fact that they must deal
with their deficit spending.
The Glide Path
The
US still has the chance to pursue what I call the "glide path"
option. We can reduce the deficit slowly, by say 1% a year, while
aggressively pursuing organic growth policies such as unleashing the
energy and biotechnology sectors, providing certainty to small
businesses about government healthcare policies, reducing the
regulatory burden on small businesses and encouraging new business
startups, creating a competitive corporate tax environment (a much
lower corporate tax with no deductions for anything, including
oil-depletion allowances), implementing a pro-growth tax policy, etc.
We
can balance the budget within five years. If the bond market
perceived that the US was clearly committed to a balanced budget,
rates would remain low, the dollar would be stronger, and we would
steam away from the black hole. I would like to see something like
Simpson-Bowles, with an even more radically restructured tax policy.
Healthcare is clearly the challenge, but a compromise can be crafted,
as has been demonstrated by the several bipartisan proposals that
have been sponsored by conservative Republicans and liberal
Democrats. The key word is compromise.
The
crucial outcome in the wake of the upcoming election will not be
whether we end up with a Republican or a Democratic budget, but
whether we can achieve the compromise that will be needed to get us
on a glide path to a balanced budget.
If
a compromise is not crafted in 2013, how will one be crafted in 2014,
which is an election year? 2015 may be too late, as the bond market
will watch Europe and Japan implode and wonder why the US is any
different. Remember, the event horizon is determined by the
confidence of the bond market in the willingness and ability of a
country to pay its debts with a currency that has a value that can be
maintained. Trillion-dollar deficits for the next three years will
call into question the value of the dollar. That will mean higher
interest rates, which will mean a much bigger, more deadly black
hole.
I
should note that something similar to the glide path was tried during
the Clinton administration. Spending growth was controlled, and the
economy was allowed to grow its way out of debt. While the US economy
is fundamentally weaker today than it was then, it should be possible
for the US free-market economy to once again become an engine of
growth.
I
think the analogy of an Economic Singularity is a good one. The Black
Hole of Debt simply overwhelms the ability of current economic
theories to craft solutions based on past performance. Each country
will have to find its own unique way to achieve escape velocity from
its own particular black hole. That can be through a combination of
reducing the debt (the size of the black hole) and fostering growth.
Even countries that do not have such a problem will have to deal with
the black holes in their vicinity. As an example, Finland is part of
the eurozone and finds itself gravitationally affected by the black
holes of debt created by its fellow eurozone members. And China has
recently seen its exports to Europe drop by almost 12%. I would
imagine that has been more or less the experience of most countries
that export to Europe.
In
science fiction novels, a spaceship's straying too close to a black
hole typically results in no spaceship. There are also hundreds of
examples of what happens to nations that drift too close to the Black
Hole of Debt. None of the instances are pretty; they all end in
tears. For countries that have been trapped in the gravity well of
debt, there is only the pain that comes with restructuring. It is all
too sad.
Speaking on Alternatives
If
I am right about there being an Economic Singularity, it will mean a
rather uncertain market environment for the foreseeable future. I
frequently speak on behalf of Altegris Investments at various
investment conferences around the country. A week ago I was on an
"alternatives" panel at the UBS National
Conference in Orlando. In front of several hundred UBS advisors, I
shared my expectations of prolonged market uncertainty and reinforced
the importance of finding different sources of returns that have a
low correlation to traditional investments. Many advisors are
shifting more and more away from traditional stock and bond
allocations towards alternative strategies. Others are just getting
their feet wet.
I
encourage advisors and individual investors to leverage off of
Altegris's years of due diligence and ability to bring the very best
active money managers to you and your clients, within one simple
managed account and/or mutual fund. If you want to know more, you can
visit the Altegris Academy at www.altegris.com.
The Altegris Academy is a leading educational platform on
alternatives, full of useful information for individuals and
professionals alike.
I Was So Much Older Then, I'm Younger Than That Now
This
weekend I went to my 40th class reunion at Rice University. It
was good to catch up with old friends and hear how they are doing. I
have to confess, I was surprised at the number of my contemporaries
who have either retired or plan to do so soon. I had not personally
confronted the idea of retirement, but the experience really got me
to thinking about what will happen "after."
My
40th reunion coincided with the 100th anniversary of Rice
University. There was a rather large celebration within a monster
temporary building in front of the quadrangle. Inside the quadrangle
(which is easily larger than a football field, surrounded by
four-story Mediterranean-style buildings) a very impressive laser
light and sound show was replayed every hour. About 9:30, I wandered
over to the quadrangle from our private class party to take in the
light spectacle. It was every bit as impressive as I had heard, but
to see and hear the 100-year history of the university in 15 minutes
compounded my sense of aging.
I
wandered back to the party, only to find everyone gone. I had rather
assumed we would be talking long into the night! Rather than walking
back to my hotel, I decided to join the rather large party going on.
I grabbed a Diet Coke, and seeing no one I knew, I sat down and
simply observed the goings-on. While I recognized the dance music
(although none of it was from the watershed decade of the '60s), I
couldn't help but notice the different dance styles of the various
generations present. Those in their 20s were clearly discernible from
those in their 40s. And my generation was generally sitting it out on
the sidelines or had evidently retreated to their hotels. This
experience, along with seeing the frailty of my 95-year-old mother
this past week, put me in a rather contemplative mood about time and
life for the rest of the evening. Could my life be compressed into a
five-minute light show? It all seems to happen so fast.
But
then I woke up the next morning, jumped on a plane to go have lunch
with my kids back in Dallas, and then sat down to write this letter.
There's just too much to do to worry about getting older. That will
happen soon enough, whether I worry about it or not. "Do not go
gentle into that good night" seems to be an appropriate motto.
Tomorrow
(which is already this afternoon) I am off to Chicago, where I will
again speak for Jim Bisenius and Common Sense Investments (based in
Portland). Jim was a gracious host in Portland last week, and as I
noted in Outside the Box, the day spent hunting and fishing at his
ranch was a very special time. I hope to repeat it again.
I
should note that some of you might not have received Outside the Box
as usual. We migrated servers and there were evidently a few
glitches. If you did not get to read Dr. Gary Shilling's latest
thoughts on deflation and my introduction to them, I encourage you to
do so
at mauldineconomics.com/outsidethebox/a-little-chronic-deflation.
Late
Tuesday afternoon I fly to Atlanta to speak for Hedge Funds Care, at
their annual charity event that benefits local children. I'll bet you
can still get tickets, and I would love to see you there.
(http://www.hedgefundscare.org/event.asp?eventID=74)
.
Then
Thursday I'm back home for 10 days – which will seem like R&R
to me – before I head off to South America for two weeks. I will be
speaking at three CFA events, in Sao Paulo, Montevideo (Uruguay), and
Buenos Aires, with my South American partner, Enrique Fynn of Fynn
Capital (http://www.fynncapital.com/).
I'll also be meeting clients. Enrique always ensures that I have a
good time and get to see a few things here and there.
Care
to join me election night, November 6 ... in Argentina? As part of
the trip, I'm stopping by for the season-opening celebration,
November 5-10, of friend and partner Doug Casey's lifestyle and
sporting estate, La
Estancia de Cafayate,
where I'll host the group at a café on the scenic town plaza and
watch the election results roll in. If you'd like to join me and a
group of interesting folks from around the world in what promises to
be a unique experience, drop Dave Norden a note at .(JavaScript
must be enabled to view this email address). David Galland has
promised nonalcoholic beers for me for the evening. The recent polls
suggest I might want something stronger, but I think I can hold out.
The
run of bad news from the family seems to be shifting for the better
lately, and I am about ready for nothing but good news for a very
long time.
For
the record, the term singularity was
also used back in 1969 by my friend and Science Fiction Hall of Famer
Vernor Vinge to refer to that moment in the future when our computers
will take over their own programming and generally look after
themselves (and us?). Beyond that point, we have really have no model
for what will happen. Ray Kurzweil thinks the moment will arrive
around 2045. It should be a fascinating ride.
Have
a great week and enjoy the great fall weather.
Your
ready for this singularity thing analyst,

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