Checking my Facebook newsfeed I found an item from Eric Draitser of stopimperialism.com that made me realise that he has become almost invisible in recent months.
It is not so many months since he was a regular-as-clockwork contributor to RT and Press TV and a regular guest in conversations with Don DeBar and Mark Sleboda on CPR News which I used to listened to without fail.
He has always been a person who is supremely confident in his own prognostications (and he covered every situation under the sun) but in recent times seems to have specialised in threats to excommunicate "fascists" who disagreed with his views on the very polarising figure of Donald Trump.
This piece that he placed on his timeline yesterday made me ask questions about where Eric Draitser is at and of whether he might have fallen out with erstwhile friends (I can't confirm this). If he has I can now understand why that might be the case.
I've
recently spoken with colleagues from Russia, two of whom are in
Moscow/St. Petersburg and two of whom are in other parts of the
country, who have confirmed the essential points of this article. The
economic situtation in Russia is dire with even middle class people
foregoing basic purchases such as new shoes.
You
certainly won't hear such information from RT, but you'd be wise not
to ignore it. Russia may be fashioning for itself an international
image as political rival and counterweight to US foreign policy, but
in real economic terms Russia remains predictably weak.
---------
"Incomes
are declining, and poverty is on the rise. The economic slump that
started in 2014 hit those least protected. Since 2013, the number of
people living below the official poverty line has grown from 15.5
million to 21.4 million this year — 14.6 percent of the population.
The official threshold of poverty currently stands at 9,889 rubles a
month ($160). If a European formula for poverty measurement (60
percent of median income) were used, the figure would be much higher.
"Behind
Russia’s recession, which is slowly morphing into stagnation, are
the weakened price of oil in recent years and some longer-term
factors, like the state’s growing role in economic matters and an
unwelcoming business climate. The decline started long before Moscow
went into Ukraine or Syria. The systemic nature of the current crisis
is underscored by the fact that even with the oil price hovering at
$50 a barrel, the Russian Finance Ministry does not project the
country’s economy growing faster than 1.5 percent annually, all the
way to 2030.
"This
is a man-made situation, not destiny. Central control of what Mr.
Putin calls strategic economic assets and a heavily controlled social
order have been his priorities since he took power in 2000. He
dismantled the fledging competitive political scene Russia had in the
late 1980s and the 1990s, got rid of most independent institutions
and renationalized the economy. The share of state-owned and
state-controlled companies contributing to gross national product
increased from 35 percent in the early 2000s to 70 percent now. The
number of state and municipal unitary enterprises tripled just from
2013 to 2015. “Russia now has the kind of state monopoly capitalism
that troubled Vladimir Lenin so much more than a century ago,”
Boris Grozovsky, a prominent writer about the Russian economy,
concluded recently in an article for The Russia File."
*** My question is WHY he is quoting an article published in the NY Times, not necessarily the facts of recession in the country hitting the poor This NYT makes NO reference to continuing (and now growing) sanctions imposed on it or of economic warfare being waged by the Americans and the Saudis in an effort to bring Russia down. It would surprise me if there were no consequences as a result of actions against Russia and indeed Russia has been in recession since 2015 although the situation has been far from the economic collapse so gleefully predicted by western pundits. The author of the article seems to look back with some longing to the Yeltsin years ("He dismantled the fledging competitive political scene Russia had in the late 1980s and the 1990s, got rid of most independent institutions and renationalized the economy") . Is there no one who remembers the chaos of the Yeltsin years, the gangland wars waged on the streets of Moscow where the show was run by the Russian mafia and corrupt oligarchs like Berezovsky, Khodorovsky et al? These were the years when Russia's industry was dismantled and everything tht could be moved was stolen and sold off at rockbottom prices. Putin's contribution has been to get rid of the worst of the excesses of the 90's, essentially bringing the country back from the brink and delivering higher living standards to the population. As for the The manipulation of the election of 1996 that put an unelectable Yeltsin back in power to top the Communists from winning, is so well-known that a movie was made about it.
As
for "“Russia now has the kind of state monopoly capitalism
that troubled Vladimir Lenin so much more than a century ago,” it
seems very strange to evoke Lenin and his polemics - as if he was
"troubled" (sic) by "state monopoly capitalism"
and wanted a "free market" instead.
I really have to wonder why he is quoting this inaccurate opinion piece from the NYT.
There is a war being waged against Russia with evidence that the Americans are acting to send Russians home in bodybags and Eric Draitser is essentially identifying with the enemies of Russia (i think of Mike Ruppert's characteristion of InfoWars as 80% facr and 20% disinformation) - in times of war the 20% disinfo takes on special importance.
I looked back at stopimperialism.com and noticed that there has been nothing of Mr. Draitser's previous commentaries for about 6 months. It all comes to a screaching halt earlier in 2016.
Except for an article from October which seems to offer a clue:
"To
the pro-Assad Syria fetishists, I ask: Will you continue to pretend
that the only crimes and atrocities being committed are those veiled
behind Old Glory? Are you comfortable in the knowledge that this war
will continue on indefinitely so long as all outside actors continue
to use Syria as merely a square on their respective geopolitical
chessboards? Will you continue to delude yourselves by refusing to
accept the plainly obvious truth that no state or group has the best
interests of Syrians at heart? Will you allow yourselves to be the
useful idiots of carefully calculated political maneuvering?"
In
times like now this sort of “reasoning” is at best disingenuous.
Are
the journalists on the ground like Venessa Beely just “useful
idiots”?
Perhaps
the question that needs to be asked is: has Eric Draitser become the
“useful idiot” of American imperialism?
This
week Eric sits down with economist, and former Greek finance
minister, Yanis Varoufakis to discuss the shifts in the political
landscape of both Europe and the US, and what they mean for political
activism and progressive politics.
Eric and Yanis discuss the nature
of the EU and whether it can be reformed or democratized, as well as
the forces at play within it.
The conversation also touches on the US
election as Yanis and Eric debate the utility of "lesser evil"
politics, while also examining the ascendance of the fascist right in
Europe and the US, with particular attention to the Brexit vote and
its implications.
The bond bubble and potential economic collapse,
the long view of the 2008 crisis, the importance of addressing
climate change, the necessity of internationalism, and many other
topics are discussed in this wide-ranging interview with one of the
best economic minds in the world today.
Turkey's
Failed Coup: The Players, the History, and the Geopolitical
Chessboard
Eric
Draitser of http://StopImperialism.org provides
his analysis (July 24, 2016) of the failed coup in Turkey, and the
implications both for Turkish society and on the international scene.
Draitser explains the relaitonship between the CIA and Turkish
military coups in the past, the connections between US-NATO
intelligence and the Gulenist network, and the broader strategy for
the region. He also places the latest developments in the context of
a shifting political landscape where Turkey's loyalties to the West
and NATO are increasingly in question. All this and more in this in
depth conversation.
There
was a real, home-grown coup being plotted against Erdoğan. It
probably combined Gülenist and Kemalist elements. While these two
seem unlikely allies, coup alliances – especially ones planning to
assassinate the leader – are animated more by what they are against
than by what they are for. The plotters often cannot think past The
Deed: Brutus and Cassius expected that with Caesar gone, the
“republic” would re-appear; the killers of Sadat imagined that
with “Pharaoh” gone, all would be well. But all they got was
another Caesar and another “Pharaoh”. Thus a temporary coming
together of Gülenists and Kemalists to overthrow the “Sultan” is
not impossible. This
coup had been in preparation for some time and Turkish security got
wind of it (“received information” is the phrase being used) in
time to warn Erdoğan to get out just ahead of the assassins. The
story that Russian intelligence had picked up the clues and
forewarned him is very believable. Russian signals intelligence has
always been very good and Moscow would have been monitoring
communications in Turkey because of the fighter plane shoot-down. It
is very plausible – especially if, as Ankara now says, the
shoot-down was orchestrated by the plotters – that Russian
intelligence would have come across the plot. If so, it would
immediately be wondered – and I’m sure is being wondered in what
we should probably get used to calling the Sublime Porte again –
whether US intelligence had also got wind of it but didn’t warn
Erdoğan. Despite
earlier speculation, this coup was much more serious and came much
closer to success than was thought at the time. If Erdoğan had been
killed and if the people had not come out in the streets, we’d
today be looking at something completely different. (It is time to
abandon the speculation that Erdoğan orchestrated it himself.) Washington
and the coup. I said that this question was murky and I expect that
it will remain so. And the principal reason for this is simply “which
Washington”? The CIA? Some faction inside the CIA? The neocon cabal
that infests the State Department? The humanitarian bombers who
populate Obama’s retinue? Some faction in the US military? Somebody
in the US staff at the İncirlik airbase? The US Ambassador? Would
these/some/other American officials have given active encouragement
to the coup plotters or a (deniable) misstatement that was taken as
encouragement? Did US intelligence get wind of it and not pass the
message on? Did they pass it up to the political level and it didn’t
pass it on? I strongly suspect that neither President Obama nor US
Secretary of State Kerry could answer the question either: nobody
seems to be in charge in today’s USA. So, the extent of US
involvement at some level or other to some degree of activity or
encouragement will probably not be know for decades. But see below. Whatever
the reality may be, Erdoğan and his people are blaming Washington.
There have been enough direct and indirect statements to make that
plain. The demand – and demand it is – to hand over Gülen is
being presented as a test. I expect Washington to “fail” the test
if for no other reason than the fact that decision-making is too
fractured. Evidence of US involvement will be looked for and will be
found or invented. Washington’s support for the Kurdish People’s
Protection Units just strengthens Ankara’s hostility. Erdoğan
has used the coup as an opportunity to accelerate and widen the purge
that he was already doing. Enough of the actual plotters and
potential sympathisers have been neutralised that he is coup-proof
for the foreseeable future. He is fully in charge and has
demonstrated his substantial street power, Added to which he can now
blame any past foolish decisions (like the Russian fighter plane
shoot-down) on the plotters. So, he is free to re-tell the past, he
has proved his power and he may now do what he wants. Atatürk
made a kind of compact with the population: adopt European behaviours
and, eventually, Europe will accept you as “European”. For years
I have wondered what would happen when Ankara finally understood that
that was never going to happen. We will now find out. Kemalist Turkey
is gone. My guess is that what will replace it will be something that
could be called “neo-Ottomanism” – authoritarian but with a
degree of popular support, predominantly Islamic but with a degree of
tolerance, looking much more to the south and east. But the future
structure will take time to evolve and, at the end of the day, it
might cover a smaller territory and it may get rather violent. The
Turkish Armed Forces have been severely weakened and, with the
emphasis on domestic security now predominant, to say nothing of
extensive purges of the high command, the time of military adventures
in Syria is over. The war against the Kurds will also likely have to
wind down. I
believe that Erdoğan and his people began a sort of cost-benefit
analysis recently and, just before the coup, we saw the first moves
with his overtures to Israel and Russia. First, the cost side of the
ledger. Turkey is never going to be admitted into the EU (not that
that is so attractive these days); following Washington’s lead in
the Middle East has brought it disaster and defeat; rightly or
wrongly, Ankara believes Washington has betrayed it. The Western
orientation is mostly on the cost side of the ledger. On the benefit
side, Ankara has learned how much Russia’s enmity can cost it (and,
if its true that Moscow tipped Erdoğan off to the coup, what
Russia’s friendship can give). Then there are the future benefits:
tangible in the shape of becoming Russia’s gas spigot to southern
Europe and the potentially enormous gains from China’s “One Belt,
One Road” strategy. Therefore, a simple cost-benefit calculation
shows that a Eurasian turn has many benefits for Turkey while the
status quo has about paid out. A
more brutal calculation would have Erdoğan & Co considering the
correlation of forces. Who’s winning? Which is the side to bet on?
In 2000 the USA was by far the most powerful country on Earth; most
powerful in every measurable way. But it’s been at war ever since
and it’s losing these wars; it has outsourced the manufacturing
power that was the foundation of its power last century; its foreign
activities are fumbling and incoherent. As to the other Western
standard-bearer, no one could possibly pretend that the future of the
EU is bright. The power of the West is fading and what remains is
incompetently managed. Since 2000, on the other hand – although the
consumer of Western media absurdities would be unaware of it –
under very capable management, Russia has grown in wealth and power.
The same goes for China – steady economic and military growth
combined with intelligent and wise leadership. If you were running
Turkey, with which would you throw in your fate? Especially when your
Western “allies” have so frequently spurned you? And may just
have tried to kill you? Moscow
will accept the turn but will demand behavioural change. No more
backdoor support to Daesh through oil smuggling; no more safe havens
for Daesh fighters; no more interference in Syria. But it will
continue its patient approach and allow a certain amount of
dissimulation from Ankara. Moscow will pretend to believe (and maybe
it’s true) that the fighter was shot down by coup plotters and
other face-saving statements from Ankara as Erdoğan rewrites the
past. Turkey
will leave NATO. What is not clear is the timing and the optics. I
can easily imagine a gradual pulling back that doesn’t quite ever
formally leave. But, if the Eurasian turn is indeed happening, then
NATO is gone. It no longer brings Ankara advantages and that goes
doubly given the apparent use of İncirlik base as a location of some
of the coup plotters. Washington is starting to understand that
İncirlik is, in fact, changing from an asset into a liability and it
will be interesting to see what it does: certainly it’s time to
move the nuclear weapons out. (Vide the New Yorker piece: “How
secure are the American hydrogen bombs stored at a Turkish
airbase?“.) Things
could get rather violent. It’s too early to tell. Erdoğan’s call
to take to the streets to stop the coup was bravely answered and that
may be enough. His purge is very extensive and may eliminate the
fifth column (as well as many innocents). It all depends on how
strong the internal glue of the country is and that we cannot know –
the distance between stability and bloody chaos in any society is
shorter than most people like to think. And the American regime
changers, who have brought so much destruction in such a short time
to Turkey’s neighbours, have a new target, albeit with greatly
restricted access and levers with which to do it.
(What
follows is sheer off-the-wall speculation. The Ottoman Empire was an
extremely multi-ethnic and multi-confessional enterprise. Through the
millet system, the Sultans allowed and managed these differences.
Atatürk tried to create a European-style country inhabited by an
ethnicity he invented called “Turks”. Descendants of the people
of Göbekli Tepe, the Trojans, Bithynians and Miletians, Caucasians,
surviving Greeks and Armenians, Seljuks and Kurds would now all
officially be “Turks” just as Bretons, Burgundians and
Occitan-speakers were officially “French”. To a considerable
degree this fiction succeeded (as it has for that matter in France,
Spain, Italy, Germany and so on) but the Kurds never accepted being
called “Turks” or “Mountain Turks”. In a neo-Ottoman Turkey,
however, they can again become “Kurds” (but never separatists).
But, if the Kurds really want independence, this is probably the best
chance they have ever had to take it.)
Why
the US Almost Certainly Was Not Involved in the Turkish Coup
Alexander
Mercouris
All
the indications suggest the US had no part in the coup. However
Erdogan and the Turkish government think otherwise and it is their
opinion which matters.
As
relations between Turkey and Russia improve following the coup,
relations between Turkey and its erstwhile Western allies – the US
and EU – are deteriorating rapidly, with claims in Turkey that the
US was involved in the recent coup. That in turn opens up
the question of whether the US was actually involved in the coup and
if so to what degree.
Before
discussing the question it is important to say that the answer so far
as Turkey itself is concerned may no longer matter. The
conviction appears to be taking hold in Turkey – including amongst
some members of its government and with Erdogan himself – that the
US was in some way behind the coup. That in itself will be
enough to cause relations between the US and Turkey to become
strained. In international politics very often it is what
people believe rather than what is true that most matters.
Was
the US however behind the coup?
The
first thing to say is that at this stage we simply do not know. The
information that would enable us to say for sure is simply not
there. The investigation of the coup is still at a very
early stage. Coup plotters are still being rounded up and
questioned, and paper and electronic trails are still being followed
up. It will take months or even years before trials follow
– if they ever do – and before we start to get definite answers
to the questions like the one about the extent, if any, of US
involvement in the coup.
The
second thing to say is that when people talk about a coup being US
backed they are using a blanket term that covers different
things. There are coups in which the US is not initially
involved but which it backs after they succeed (eg. the coup which
overthrew the Argentinian dictator Juan Peron in 1955). There
are coups of which the US has foreknowledge and to which it gives the
green light (eg. the Vietnamese coup against President Diem of 1963,
the Brazilian coup of 1964 and the Turkish coup of 1980); and lastly
there are the coups which the US actively orders and organises (eg.
the coup in Iran in 1953 and – despite continued US denials – the
coup against President Allende of Chile in 1973). All these
coups are in a sense “US backed” but they clearly fall into
different categories.
There
is no doubt that if the coup against Erdogan had succeeded the US
would have backed it after the event, just as in 1955 it backed after
the event the coup that overthrew Peron, and to that extent it is
legitimate to say that if the coup had succeeded it would have been
US backed.
The
US has no love of Erdogan, who is far too independent minded for its
tastes, and would certainly not have regretted his passing. Besides
the US would not want to sacrifice its longstanding relationship with
the Turkish military and compromise its position in Turkey – a key
NATO ally – by refusing to back a Turkish military government
installed by a coup that had succeeded. After a few
muffled statements of concern and some token sanctions the US would
have quickly come to terms with the new coup-installed government,
whilst the Western media would by now be full of stories of what an
unbalanced, authoritarian, corrupt and dangerous leader Erdogan was
and why it was a blessing – and a true expression of democracy –
that the Turkish military had acted to remove him.
What
evidence however is there that the US either gave the green light for
the coup or actually ordered it? Briefly, at this stage there
is none, and everything we know about the situation in Turkey before
the coup and about US policy towards Turkey makes it very unlikely.
The
US has very extensive and very longstanding links with the Turkish
military. Some of the military officers who were involved
in the coup were based at the giant air base in Incirlik, which is
the single most important US military facility in Turkey. It
seems that even the Turkish commander of the base was involved in the
coup. It would therefore have been easy for the coup plotters
to tip the US off about their plans for a coup, presumably in order
to make sure the coup had US backing, and that is what many people
think happened. What evidence is there however that it actually
did? Again the answer is that there is none, and the facts show
that it is very unlikely.
The
coup plotters would presumably only have tipped the US off if they
had been confident of US support. As it happens in every case I
know where the US has given the green light for a coup there have
been weeks or even months of intense discussions between the US and
the military officials discussing the coup before it takes
place. That was true in Vietnam in 1963, in Brazil in 1964 and
in Turkey in 1980.
In
all of those cases the US was willing to support the coup because it
was reasonably confident it would succeed. Would the US have
been equally sure the recent coup attempt in Turkey would succeed
given Erdogan’s popularity with so many of Turkey’s people and
with its business community, and given that Erdogan has the powerful
support of the Mosque and of Turkey’s intelligence agencies and of
most of its police? Would the US not rather be worried
that if the coup failed – as it might easily do – its whole
position in Turkey (a key NATO ally with by far the biggest army in
NATO after the US) would be disastrously compromised if it became
known it was involved? Would the US be willing to take
that sort of risk by colluding in a coup which might easily fail?
It
is not as if the reasons for backing a coup look particularly
compelling. It is true that in the days immediately prior
to the coup Erdogan had taken steps to patch up his relations with
Russia. However, as I have explained previously, there
would simply not have been enough time to organise a coup in the time
available since those steps were taken.
Besides
would Erdogan’s fence mending moves towards Russia really have
sufficed to make the US want to overthrow him? If there is
one thing one can say about Erdogan it is that he is
unpredictable. He has at various times been Putin’s
friend and Putin’s enemy, just as he was once Assad’s best friend
only to become Assad’s greatest and most dangerous enemy. He
was also once Israel’s enemy but is now becoming Israel’s
friend.
Only
a few months ago there was worried talk of an armed clash between
Turkey and Russia, with credible reports of the Russians warning they
would use
tactical nuclear weapons if
Erdogan ordered the Turkish military to attack their forces in
Syria.
How
in light of this record could the US be sure that any rapprochement
between Erdogan and Russia would be for real? Given the
history of bad blood between Erdogan and Russia, would it not have
made far better sense for the US to wait until Erdogan and Russia
fell out again – as many before the coup expected them to do –
rather than take the extraordinary risk of backing a coup to remove
him when there was a serious risk that it might fail?
Whatever
view the US has of Erdogan, he was hardly before the coup a disloyal
ally, and it is difficult to see why his very tentative moves to
patch up relations with Russia would in themselves have made the US
want to overthrow him. On the contrary, if it is true that
the conflict between Turkey and Russia over Syria during the winter
became so bad that the Russians felt obliged to give Erdogan a
nuclear warning, then the US might well have looked upon the
limited rapprochement underway between Turkey and Russia
with a measure of relief.
Last
but not least, would a coup in Turkey, even if it had succeeded,
really serve US interests? Would it not be far more likely
to destabilise Turkey further, with much of the population bitterly
resenting the overthrow of a democratically elected and popular
President? Turkey already faces multiple security threats
from violent jihadists, from its large Kurdish majority and –
potentially – from its large Alevi community, which is known to be
unhappy with Turkey’s role in the war in Syria. Is this a good
time to add to the instability by overthrowing the country’s
democratically elected, constitutional and popular government? Might
that not risk a civil conflict or even a civil war in a country whose
cohesion and stability is vital to the Western alliance?
I
would add at this point that any US decision to give the green light
to the coup would definitely have needed Obama’s approval. Given
the stakes involved it is inconceivable that any US official or
agency would have acted without the President’s approval. In
all the previous US backed coups which I have discussed US officials
were careful to keep the President informed and to consult him in
advance. Would Obama in the last months of his Presidency,
at a time when he gives every impression of wanting to avoid an
international crisis so as to secure his legacy and give Hillary
Clinton a clear run to the White House, really risk a colossal crisis
in a country like Turkey? Would he not have acted instead
immediately to squelch the whole crazy idea, just as he has acted to
squelch far less crazy ideas for interventions in places like Syria
and Ukraine?
Overall,
despite what some say, I simply do not see in Erdogan’s moves
towards the Russians grounds for the US to take the gigantic –
indeed existential – risk of backing a coup to remove him. Those
moves were tentative and carried out within definite limits and did
not compromise the US’s position in any fundamental way, whilst the
risks involved in backing a coup against him were so enormous as to
make it crazy to have done it.
In
summary, though it would have been possible for the coup plotters to
tip the US off about the coup on balance I think it is very unlikely
that they did, precisely because if they had I am sure the US would
have told them that it strongly opposed it. In that case it
would surely have been impossible for the coup to have taken place.
I
suspect the coup plotters knew this perfectly well, which is why they
almost certainly did not tell the US about the coup before it
happened.
All
the same arguments obviously hold true to an even greater degree
against any scenario that involves the US actually instigating the
coup. Would the US really have taken the extraordinary
risks of planning a coup against the popular leader of a key NATO
ally when there were no compelling reasons to do so? Would
Turkish army officers really have put their lives and reputations on
the line to carry out US orders in such a case? I can
certainly see why they might have risked everything in a coup against
someone like Erdogan if they thought they were doing it for their own
reasons. Would they however have done it simply because
the US ordered them to?
Before
leaving this subject there are two further points I do however want
to make.
The
first is that my whole case obviously depends on the assumption of at
least a measure of rationality on the part of Obama and his
officials. Against that I have to accept that US policy in
recent years has become increasingly detached from reality. Indeed
I have written about this at length. However if US policy
makers really are now so detached from reality that they took the
frankly crazy step of instigating or colluding in a coup against
Erdogan in Turkey, then they are much crazier and more dangerous, and
the situation in the world is far worse and far more dangerous, than
up to now I or I suspect anyone else has suspected. It really
would be a case in that case of us needing to reach for our fallout
shelters. Fortunately everything we know about the coup
suggests otherwise.
My
second point concerns the Gulen movement. Erdogan and his
government blamed the Gulen movement for the coup whilst it was
actually underway, and have continued to do so since.
I
have previously expressed my
doubts about this. The
statements of the coup plotters suggest a Kemalist secular ideology
far removed from that of the Gulen movement. I frankly
doubt that the Gulen movement’s penetration of the Turkish state
and military can have been so extensive as to enable it to carry out
a coup of this sort.
Discussion
of the Gulen movement’s exact role in the coup has however diverted
attention from the far more interesting question of what it actually
is. No-one so far as I know has explained how Fetlhullah
Gulen, a self-exiled scholar and cleric, has managed single-handedly
to create the massive organisation that the Gulen movement has
become.
Whilst
it seems that Gulen does enjoy some support from the Turkish business
community and from Turkey’s Deep State, the most obvious
explanation is that he has been able to build up his organisation
because he has US backing. The US after all is the country where
he is based and where he lives. The ideology of the Gulen
movement makes it appear rather like the sort of religious based
anti-communist pro-business and pro-free market movements the US
actively sponsored in order to defeat Communism during the Cold
War. It would not surprise me if the US as part of its
“soft power” policies used Gulen to set up that sort of
organisation in Turkey to mould opinion there, and possibly also in
other neighbouring states under Turkish influence.
If
that is correct then it is at least possible that Gulen is a US
intelligence asset, in which case that fact is likely to be well
known amongst political insiders in Turkey.
In
that case Erdogan’s constant criticisms of the “parallel state”
Gulen supposedly runs in Turkey should be understood as coded
criticism of the US and its role in Turkey. Certainly that
is how they look to me.
If
so, then going back to my original point, it hardly matters anymore
in relation to the situation within Turkey whether the US really was
involved in the coup or not. Whilst I think it is very
unlikely it was, Erdogan’s comments about the Gulen movement show
he thinks it was. Needless to say it is what Erdogan
thinks not what I think that matters, irrespective of which of us is
right.
That
does not mean that the question of whether or not the US was involved
in the coup is not important. On the contrary it is very
important because its likely non-involvement will effect the way the
US responds to whatever Erdogan is now going to do. The nature
of that reaction will however depend on Erdogan’s moves, which will
become clear over the course of the next few weeks.
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