Erdogan
Calls Putin as Russia Seethes at Turkey’s Syrian Incursion
Note
by the Saker: I
have to admit that I still am rather puzzled by the Turkish
“invasion” of Syria. There are several hypotheses about
what the Turks are really up to and what their real goal is.
Since my friends Alexander Mercouris and Mark Sleboda seem
to have a much better understanding of what is happening than I, I
submit to your attention their analysis rather than to exposes you to
my confused guesses.
The
Saker
——-
Russia
furious at Turkish move to set up rebel “safe zone” inside Syria
to assist Jihadi rebels there, putting the recently announced
“normalisation of relations” between Russia and Turkey in
jeopardy.
In
the immediate aftermath of the Turkish capture of Jarablus in Syria
Turkish President Erdogan telephoned his “friend Putin” on Friday
27th August 2016.
The
Kremlin’s account of
the conversation is remarkable even by its standards for its
terseness
“The
two leaders discussed the development of Russia-Turkey trade and
political and economic cooperation in keeping with the agreements
reached in St Petersburg on August 9. Vladimir Putin and Recep
Tayyip Erdogan exchanged opinions on developments in Syria and
pointed out the importance of joint efforts in fighting terrorism.
They agreed to continue their dialogue on the issues of the
bilateral and international agenda.”
The
true subject of the discussion will in fact have been the Turkish
capture of Jarablus in northern Syria.
Whilst
it seems the Turks did inform the Russians of this move in advance,
it is clear that the Russians are to put it mildly unhappy about
it. Though the Turks appear to have tried to arrange talks
with the Russian military leadership presumably to discuss this move
– even announcing a visit to Turkey by General Gerasimov, the Chief
of the Russian General Staff – no such talks are taking place, with
the Russians denying that a visit to Ankara by their Chief of General
Staff was ever agreed, and the Turks now saying that the visit has
been postponed.
The
Russian media meanwhile is carrying articles making clear the extent
of Russian anger. An article in the Russian newspaper
Kommersant, which is clearly based on official briefings, is accusing
Turkey of “going further than promised in Syria”. That
this article reflects official thinking in Moscow is shown by the
fact that the semi-official English language Russian news-site
“Russia Beyond the Headlines” hasrepublished
it in English.
The
article makes it clear that Turkey did not coordinate the Jarablus
operation with Moscow or Damascus, and that it was much bigger than
Moscow was led to expect. The Russians are also clearly
annoyed by the extent to which the operation has been coordinated by
Turkey with the US, which is providing air support.
“For
Moscow, Ankara’s operation was an unpleasant surprise,
demonstrating that the
expectations for a convergence of
the countries’ positions on Syria that emerged after the meeting
between Putin and Erdogan were premature. In deciding
about the operation in Jarabulus, the
Turkish leader has sent a signal that relations with the U.S. remain
a priority for
him, and he
prefers to act in the framework of the antiterrorist coalition led
not by Moscow, but Washington.”
(Bold
italics added)
I
have repeatedly warned against over-high expectations that the recent
rapprochement between Turkey and Russia amounted to any sort of
realignment. I have also said that despite Turkish
annoyance with the US over the recent coup attempt, Turkey remains a
US ally, continues to be committed to regime change in Syria, and is
not going to throw the US out of Incirlik or allow Russia to use the
base. My only surprise is that judging from this comment
it appears there were some people in Moscow who thought otherwise.
The
Kommersant article then continues ominously
“According
to Kommersant’s information, in case of aggravation of the
situation, the Russian military and diplomats are ready to
employ bilateral
channels of communicationwith
their Turkish counterparts, as well as express their concerns to the
U.S. if necessary. According to Vladimir Sotnikov, director of
the Moscow-based Russia-East-West centre,Ankara’s
actions could seriously affect the process of normalisation of
bilateral cooperation that
was agreed by presidents Putin and Erdogan in St. Petersburg”.
(Bold
italics added)
That
suggests that behind the mild public language strong complaints have
been made in private by Moscow to Ankara. Erdogan’s call
to Putin looks like an attempt to assuage Russian anger, to reassure
Moscow about Turkey’s intentions in Syria, and to keep the “process
of normalisation” between Turkey and Russia on track. The
terse Kremlin summary of the conversation suggests that Putin in
response made Russian feelings and concerns perfectly clear, and that
there was, in the diplomatic language of the past, “a full and
frank exchange of views” ie. a row.
Why
are the Russians so angry about the Jarablus operation?
Here
I acknowledge my heavy debt to the geopolitical analyst Mark Sleboda
who over the course of a detailed and very helpful discussion has
corrected certain errors I have previously made about the Jarablus
operation and has greatly enlarged my understanding of it.
In
my two previous articles discussing the Jarablus operation I said
that it looked to be targeted principally at the Kurds, whose
militia, the YPG, has over the last year significantly expanded the
area in north east Syria under its control. I also
discounted the possibility that the Turkish seizure of Jarablus was
intended to affect the course of the battle for Aleppo by providing
supplies to the Jihadi fighters trying to break the siege there. In
my latest article I
said the following
“…..
it is not obvious that the rebels actually need a “safe zone” in
this area. They already have a corridor to send men
and supplies to Aleppo through Idlib province, which they already
control. Why add to the problems of setting up a “safe
zone” much further away in north east Syria when the rebels already
control territories so much closer to Aleppo?”
Mark
Sleboda has explained to me that the principal corridor to supply the
rebels in Syria has always been through the area of north east Syria
around Jarablus. In his words
“Idlib
is not an acceptable supply route from Turkey to forces in Aleppo
province because the Turkish-Syrian border in Idlib is mountainous
terrain – small and bad roads and then long routes all the way
through Idlib past SAA held territory into Aleppo province. The
Jarablus Corridor north of Aleppo is and has always been absolutely
vital for the insurgency,. That’s why Turkey, Brookings, etc have
always placed so much priority on a no fly zone there. Now its come
to realisation.”
In
other words the Turkish capture of Jarablus before it could be
captured by the YPG was not primarily intended to prevent the linking
together of two areas within Syria under Kurdish control – though
that may have been a secondary factor – but was primarily intended
to secure the main supply route (or “ratline”) Turkey uses to
supply the Jihadi fighters attacking Aleppo.
Beyond
that it is now clear that Turkish ambitions go much further than
Jarablus. Various Turkish officials have over the last two
days been speaking to the Turkish media of Turkey establishing a
large rebel controlled “safe zone” in this area of Syria.
Moreover – as Mark Sleboda says – they have now secured US
support for it, as shown by the very active role the US air force is
taking in supporting the Turkish move on Jarablus.
As
Mark Sleboda has also pointed out to me, creating this rebel “safe
zone” within Syria has been a declared Turkish objective for over a
year. The Turks have up to now been prevented from
realising it because of US reluctance to provide the necessary
support, and because of concern in Washington and Ankara about a
possible Russian military reaction. With the move to
Jarablus and beyond now carried out with US support and through
Russian acquiescence obtained by stealth, the Turks have now achieved
it.
What
implications does this have for the war in Syria and for the
continuation of the Russian – Turkish rapprochement?
Going
back to the war in Syria, my own view remains that this will not in
the end decide the outcome of the battle of Aleppo, where reports
suggest that the Syrian army is continuing to gain ground despite the
uninterrupted – and in fact increasing – flow of supplies to the
Jihadi fighters across the Turkish border. My longer term view
also remains that if the Syrian government succeeds in recapturing
the whole of Aleppo and eventually Idlib, then it will have won the
war. However what this episode shows is that the war is
far from won, and that the Turks and their US backers are still
prepared to go on escalating it in order to prevent the Syrian army
winning it.
Beyond
that I think the British reporter Patrick Cockburn may turn out to be
right, that by trying to establish a “safe zone” within Syria
Turkey is overplaying
its hand and
is taking a step that
“….would
embroil Turkey in the lethal swamp lands of the Syrian-Iraqi war.”
Already
there are indications that the Turkish move is provoking a local
reaction from the YPG and the Kurds. Despite earlier
reports that the YPG was withdrawing all its forces back across to
the eastern bank of the Euphrates, there are now credible reports of
scattered resistance to the Turkish move by Kurdish militia aligned
with the YPG, and there are also reports of mobilisation against the
Turkish move in the Kurdish areas of Syria.
In
my recent article I made
the following point about
the potential ability of the YPG to wreck any scheme to set up a
rebel “safe zone” in this part of Syria
“North
east Syria is a bitterly contested area in which the dominant force
is not the rebels but the YPG. It does not look like a
credible “safe zone” for the rebels or a credible launch area
from which to launch attacks on Aleppo. On the contrary an
attempt to create a rebel “safe zone” in this area would
antagonise the YPG, and would restore the alliance between the Syrian
government and the YPG to full working order, leading to constant
fighting in the area of the so-called “safe zone” between the
Syrian rebels and the YPG. That would surely defeat the
whole purpose of the “safe zone”, rendering it unsafe and
effectively worthless as a “safe zone”. Of
course the Turkish military could try to garrison the area to defend
whatever “safe zone” it created inside it. That would
however require an incursion into Syria that went far deeper than the
one to Jarablus, and which would risk the Turkish army becoming
bogged down in a lengthy guerrilla war on Syrian territory with the
YPG. I doubt Erdogan, the Turkish military or the US would
want that.”
In
his article discussing
the Turkish incursion Patrick Cockburn makes essentially the same
point
“Turkey
may be able to prevent the Kurds permanently extending their rule
west of the Euphrates, but it would be a very different and more
dangerous operation to attack the de facto Syrian Kurdish state,
which has spread itself between the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers
since the Syrian Army largely withdrew from the region in 2012.”
Setting
up a rebel “safe zone” inside Syria in the teeth of the
opposition of the YPG is however what Erdogan and the Turks –
backed by the US – have now decided to do.
In
recent days there has been some renewed talk of Russia becoming
bogged down in the war in Syria. In my opinion the country that
runs by far the greatest risk of getting bogged down in Syria is not
Russia but Turkey, which already has to deal with an Islamist
terrorist campaign and a Kurdish insurgency on its own territory –
both in large part consequences of the war in Syria – and which
cannot afford to add a war between the Turkish army and the
potentially Russian backed YPG in Syria to its mounting problems.
That however is what Turkey by its latest move now risks.
There
remains the outstanding puzzle of US policy. The US
actively encouraged the YPG to capture the town of Manbij – which
lies west of the Euphrates – from ISIS, and provided heavy air
support for the YPG operation to the capture Manbij. It is
now demanding that the YPG withdraw from Manbij and from all areas
west of the Euphrates, and is providing air support for a Turkish
military operation that is at least in part targeted against the YPG.
It
is impossible to see any logic in these moves. As I said
in my previous article
“It
is impossible to see any coherent strategy here. Rather it
looks as if CIA and military officials on the ground in Syria have
been going their own way, encouraging the YPG to expand as fast as it
can, heedless of the larger consequences. The political
leadership in Washington, when it finally woke up to what was
happening, then had to take disproportionate steps to bring the
situation back under control.”
Regardless
of this, the Turkish move into Syria should bury once and for all any
idea that Turkey is in the process of undertaking a geopolitical
realignment away from the West and towards the Eurasian powers. Not
only is Turkey still a US and NATO ally, but it is now
conducting an illegal military operation against Russian opposition
in Syria with US military support. That is not the action
of a country in the process of carrying out a realignment and
preparing to switch alliances from the West to Beijing and Moscow.
The
Russians and the Turks are now talking to each other, which for
several months they had stopped doing. The Kremlin’s
summary of Friday’s conversation between Putin and Erdogan shows
that they are still talking about improving their trade links and
economic ties. However, as the Kommersant article shows,
even that limited progress now appears to be in jeopardy as the two
countries’ conflicting stances in the Syrian war once again
threaten to pull them apart.
In
other words Turkey remains, as it has always been, an ally not of
Russia and the Eurasian powers, but of the US and the West, and its
actions in Syria are a clear demonstration of that.
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