Showing posts with label survaillance. Show all posts
Showing posts with label survaillance. Show all posts

Monday, 8 February 2021

Big Brother in the 5G Age

There Are Spying Eyes 

Everywhere—and Now They 

Share a Brain

Security cameras. License plate readers. Smartphone trackers. Drones. We’re being watched 24/7. What happens when all those data streams fuse into one?




Wired

4 February, 2021


ONE AFTERNOON IN the fall of 2019, in a grand old office building near the Arc de Triomphe, I was buzzed through an unmarked door into a showroom for the future of surveillance. The space on the other side was dark and sleek, with a look somewhere between an Apple Store and a doomsday bunker. Along one wall, a grid of electronic devices glinted in the moody downlighting—automated license plate readers, Wi-Fi-enabled locks, boxy data processing units. I was here to meet Giovanni Gaccione, who runs the public safety division of a security technology company called Genetec. Headquartered in Montreal, the firm operates four of these “Experience Centers” around the world, where it peddles intelligence products to government officials. Genetec’s main sell here was software, and Gaccione had agreed to show me how it worked.

He led me first to a large monitor running a demo version of Citigraf, his division’s flagship product. The screen displayed a map of the East Side of Chicago. Around the edges were thumbnail-size video streams from neighborhood CCTV cameras. In one feed, a woman appeared to be unloading luggage from a car to the sidewalk. An alert popped up above her head: “ILLEGAL PARKING.” The map itself was scattered with color-coded icons—a house on fire, a gun, a pair of wrestling stick figures—each of which, Gaccione explained, corresponded to an unfolding emergency. He selected the stick figures, which denoted an assault, and a readout appeared onscreen with a few scant details drawn from the 911 dispatch center. At the bottom was a button marked “INVESTIGATE,” just begging to be clicked.

Citigraf was conceived in 2016, when the Chicago Police Department hired Genetec to solve a surveillance conundrum. Like other large law enforcement organizations around the country, the department had built up such an impressive arsenal of technologies for keeping tabs on citizens that it had reached the point of surveillance overload. To get a clear picture of an emergency in progress, officers often had to bushwhack through dozens of byzantine databases and feeds from far-flung sensors, including gunshot detectors, license plate readers, and public and private security cameras. This process of braiding together strands of information—“multi-intelligence fusion” is the technical term—was becoming too difficult. As one Chicago official put it, echoing a well-worn aphorism in surveillance circles, the city was “data-rich but information-poor.” What investigators needed was a tool that could cut a clean line through the labyrinth. What they needed was automated fusion.

Gaccione now demonstrated the concept in practice. He clicked “INVESTIGATE,” and Citigraf got to work on the reported assault. The software runs on what Genetec calls a “correlation engine,” a suite of algorithms that trawl through a city’s historical police records and live sensor feeds, looking for patterns and connections. Seconds later, a long list of possible leads appeared onscreen, including a lineup of individuals previously arrested in the neighborhood for violent crimes, the home addresses of parolees living nearby, a catalog of similar recent 911 calls, photographs and license plate numbers of vehicles that had been detected speeding away from the scene, and video feeds from any cameras that might have picked up evidence of the crime itself, including those mounted on passing buses and trains. More than enough information, in other words, for an officer to respond to that original 911 call with a nearly telepathic sense of what has just unfolded.

Gaccione turned to a second console, this one loaded with a program called Valcri. Where Citigraf is designed for relaying early leads to patrol officers rushing to the scene of a crime, Valcri is for the detectives working long cases at the precinct. Originally developed to root out sex-trafficking rings, its fusion algorithms hunt for subtler, more elaborate patterns that might stretch across years of unstructured data. Gaccione told me about one counterterrorism unit, which he wouldn’t name, that had used the system to build a detailed profile of “a middle-aged unemployed individual with signs of radicalization,” using “various databases, CCTV, phone records, banking transactions, and other surveillance methods.” If done manually, he estimated, this kind of investigatory grunt work would take a couple of weeks. In this instance, it took “less than a day.”

The market for fusion technology has been enjoying a quiet boom in recent years. Genetec says that Citigraf is deployed in “many cities.” A growing number of established tech giants, including CiscoMicrosoft, and Motorola, sell fusion systems globally, often in the guise of “smart city” modernization packages. (Cisco sometimes even sweetens the pot with no-interest financing.) Palantir, which bills itself as a “data integration” firm, reportedly counts among its clients the Central Intelligence Agency, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Anduril has built a “virtual wall” along parts of the border with Mexico, using fusion software to link together a network of surveillance towers. Last fall, the four-year-old company won a flexible contract, capped at $950 million, to contribute elements of the technology to the US military’s Advanced Battle Management System.

For all these customers, a central appeal of fusion is that it can scale to new sources of data. You can add fuel to your “correlation engine” by, say, hooking up a new network of sensors or acquiring a privately owned library of smartphone location data. (The Pentagon’s Special Operations Command was recently revealed to be a buyer of many such libraries, including those from a Muslim prayer app with tens of millions of users.) Organizations with their own coders can develop capabilities in-house. In New York, for instance, the police department’s analytics division created a custom plug-in for its fusion system. The feature, called Patternizr, draws on more than a decade’s worth of departmental data to match property crimes that could be related to each other. When a new report comes in, all the investigator has to do is click “Patternize,” and the system will return a list of previous incidents, scored and ranked by similarity.

Mind-bending new breakthroughs in sensor technology get a lot of buzzy press: A laser that can covertly identify you from two football fields away by measuring your heartbeat. A hack that makes your smartphone spy on anything nearby with a Bluetooth connection, from your Fitbit to your smart refrigerator. A computer vision system that will let the authorities know if you suddenly break into a run within sight of a CCTV camera. But it’s a mistake to focus our dread on each of these tools individually. In many places across the world, they’re all inputs for a system that, with each new plug-in, reaches a little closer to omniscience.

That idea—of an ever-expanding, all-knowing surveillance platform—used to be a technologist’s fantasy, like the hoverbike or the jetpack. To understand how this particular hoverbike will finally be built, I began by calling up the people who designed the prototype.

THE DEPARTMENT OF Defense was among the first organizations to face large-scale surveillance overload. By the decade after September 11, its arsenal of spy technologies had grown to galactic proportions. The department had experimented with computerized fusion since at least the 1970s, but the most advanced systems still couldn’t handle more than two or three data inputs. A modern intelligence unit had to contend with hundreds. According to Erik Lin-Greenberg, who ran an elite fusion team for the Air Force from 2010 to 2013, the old ways still ruled. Each human analyst was typically responsible for a single data stream. They compared their findings in chats and phone calls, or sometimes by yelling to one another across the room. In one case, Lin-Greenberg said, another team in his squadron identified an IED just in time to halt a convoy less than 500 feet up the road.

One of the people who was supposed to help fix intractable problems like this was Dan Kaufman, the director of information innovation at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Pentagon’s storied R&D hub. With his sunny manner and bowl of shimmering silver hair, Kaufman wasn’t cut from the camo-speckled cloth of the typical military-industrial denizen. In his previous life, he had run the video game developer DreamWorks Interactive, where he helped launch what would become the Medal of Honor series. Later, as a consultant, he had worked with the CIA’s venture capital fund, In-Q-Tel. At Darpa, Kaufman was known for championing complex computing projects with a distinct commercial flavor. He felt that the Pentagon’s fusion efforts were due for a shake-up.

In the winter of 2010, Kaufman was introduced to Ben Cutler, an experienced engineer and tech entrepreneur who was considering a tour of duty in government. Over the phone, Kaufman explained the problem to Cutler and outlined his vision for what to do about it: He wanted a software platform that could integrate all available intelligence in a single, consolidated interface and grow as new capabilities came online. For Cutler, who had spent the previous year working on a new operating system at Microsoft, the idea clicked right away. What the Pentagon needed, he realized, was an OS for surveillance.

Cutler was intrigued enough to write a pitch. The document, which he completed in a day, opens with a theatrical flourish: “A patrolling group of soldiers pursues a pickup into a village; it stops at a mosque.” At this point, in real life, the soldiers might have to wait for an old-fashioned fusion team to deliver its assessment. But in Cutler’s scenario, they would simply log their geographic coordinates and the pickup’s license plate number into a tablet. The operating system would then return a description of the neighborhood around the mosque (“known insurgent meeting area”), a profile of the imam (“has worked well with friendly forces”), and any records connecting the vehicle with known terrorist groups.

Weeks later, Cutler was offered the job. I asked him whether he believed at the time that he had the expertise to build what he had pitched. “No!” he said, laughing a bit wildly.

To be fair, nobody did. The project, officially called Insight, would depend on a science fiction novel’s worth of technical breakthroughs. A study commissioned the previous year by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency had concluded that many of the features that Darpa was now proposing were still far from feasible

Read the rest of the article HERE


Tuesday, 23 October 2018

New Zealand: the growth of the surveillance state


This comment appeared on Facebook today together with the article below.

Regards JLR being deemed a national security threat.

I set out looking for an item penned as fiction by Rodney Hide, and yes a strong argument can be made potential disclosures by Ross could harm what is deemed national security or economic interest of large corporations. Asian investors, or other suppliers of large donations.

In which case SIS and or GCSB can engage their tactics on him, no courts, trials involved , just destroy covertly until the end.
Which IMO will be happening

Yes that also suits National party perfectly, but they wont be the only ones with skeletons in the closet, Police, SIS and GCSB worked unlawfully under Keys instruction, knowingly so. That is overwhelming confirmed by the "sanitized" Kitteridge report.

Of course as you will see legislation when made up was sold to us as their having our interest at heart and we could trust them !! Collins being a prime participant. Dangerous stuff, whose donation decides what in national interest, or whose economic interest , or threat to National security? And yes all operations subject to strict secrecy, with anyone approached warned not to tell. Hence a person is accused and sentenced without having a clue. SIS and GCSB also have immunity from criminal prosecution.

The Rise and Rise of Daddy State: MSD blackmails NGOs for private data


Frank MacSkasy

25 March, 2017


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Nanny State takes a Shower

What do showers have to do with this issue?
Wait and see.

Spying, Spooks, and Silly Journos

Nearly five years ago, the highly controversial Search and Surveillance Act 2012 was passed by National. As reported at the time;
The Search and Surveillance Act, which was passed through Parliament in March, extends production and examination orders to the police and legalises some forms of surveillance.
It will let more government agencies carry out surveillance operations, allows judges to determine whether journalists can protect their sources, and changes the right to silence.
[…]
Police could complete some forms of surveillance and searches without warrants, but[Police Assistant Commissioner Malcolm] Burgess said the situations were pretty common sense.
Yes, indeed. Police surveillance and seizure powers were being massively extended. But according to the Police Commissioner, citizens could rely on the Police using “pretty common sense” to use them.
Then-Justice Minister, Judith Collins offered this excuse for the extension of police powers;
 The new Search and Surveillance Act 2012 brings “order, certainty, clarity and consistency” to messy, unclear and outdated search and surveillance laws.
(Interestingly, the fact that Collins felt the need to use irony-quotation-marks, in her Beehive statement, to enclose the phrase order, certainty, clarity and consistency is revealing.)
This is the same Judith Collins who, in 2009, passed personal phone numbers of a civil servantto far-right blogger, Cameron “Whaleoil” Slater.
A year later,  the Government Communications Security Bureau and Related Legislation Amendment Bill  was being hotly debated throughout the country.
Essentially, the Bill (since passed into law), would allow the GCSB to spy on New Zealand citizens which up to then had been the sole province of the NZ SIS.
National’s  ‘spinned message’ – constantly parroted by Dear  Leader Key – was;
In addition, the Act governing the GCSB is not fit for purpose and probably never has been.  It was not until this review was undertaken that the extent of this inadequacy was known
[…]
The advice we have recently received from the Solicitor-General is that there are difficulties interpreting the legislation and there is a risk some longstanding practices of providing assistance to other agencies would not be found to be lawful.
[…]
It is absolutely critical the GCSB has a clear legal framework to operate within.”
In fact, the law was clear with it’s wording and intent and Section 14 of the Act (since altered to reflect the Amendment) stated with crystal clarity;
14Interceptions not to target domestic communications
  • Neither the Director, nor an employee of the Bureau, nor a person acting on behalf of the Bureau may authorise or take any action for the purpose of intercepting the communications of a person (not being a foreign organisation or a foreign person) who is a New Zealand citizen or a permanent resident.
Some journalists were too lazy to fact-check Key’s lies;
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Journalists who failed to realise that Key was being disingenuous, and simply parroted the government’s official spin, did immense damage to public understanding of the issues involved.
Others, like Audrey Young and Tracy Watkins were sufficiently experienced and knowledgeable to recognise a government ‘stitch-up’ when they saw it;
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“ The GCSB Act 2003 expressly forbids it from spying on the communications of New Zealanders.  But, by a series of snakes and ladders through the stated functions and objectives of the act, it convinced itself it was allowed to help the SIS and police spy on New Zealanders.” – Audrey Young, 26 June 2013
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“ The GCSB’s interpretation of the law was so loose it managed to spy on 88 New Zealanders even though the law specifically stated it was not allowed to do so.” – Tracy Watkins, 3 August 2013
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National ignored strong public opinion wary of extending the GCSB’s surveillance powers. The Bill became law on 26 August 2013.
The Government Communications Security Bureau and Related Legislation Amendment Act was followed by the Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security) Act (TICS), made law on 11 November 2013.
The TICS law made it mandatory for all electronic communications companies (telcos) to comply with spy  agencies demands to  intercept and decrypt phone calls, txt-messages, and emails.
The excuse for this piece of intrusive legislation from Communications Minister, Amy Adams;
“ The fundamental reason that I have sought to introduce this bill is to safeguard New Zealand public safety and security. ”
The Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security) Act was, in turn, followed by the Countering Terrorist Fighters Legislation Bill (split into several Bills after it’s Second Reading in Parliament on  9 December 2014).
This Bill, covering  three existing laws, allowed the  SIS  to conduct surveillance on terrorist suspects without requiring a judicial a warrant for up to 24 hours; to conduct secret video surveillance on private property; gave SIS access to Customs Department data in relation to suspected terrorism, and allowed the  Minister of Internal Affairs increased  powers to arbitrarily suspend or  cancel a passport.
The Labour Party were so opposed to this law change  that they voted for it. (NZ First, the Maori Party, and the Greens,  to their credit, voted against it.)
Then Dear Leader  Key used the usual “defending Kiwis against terrorist” bogeyman to justify the State’s growing surveillance powers;
“ The threats faced by New Zealand have grown and it is important that we have the ability to respond to that. The Government has a responsibility to protect New Zealanders at home and abroad…”
Simultaneously in 2014, the IRD signed an agreement to share data with the Police;
Taxpayer information is required to administer New Zealand’s tax system effectively. This information can be supplied by taxpayers, or it can be collected by Inland Revenue during an audit.
Broadly, the government’s current legislative position is that this information is not shared with other government departments on the basis that it is ‘tax secret’.
However, there are instances where sharing taxpayer information relating to serious crime could bring offenders to justice, support the goals of other government departments, and offer the State broad efficiencies.
Up until that point, the IRD expected everyone who earned money – whether from legal or illegal mean – to pay tax. This meant that, for example, sex workers prior to 2003 would be expected to pay tax on their earnings regardless of the fact it was an illegal activity.
The tax department didn’t care where or how the money was earned – they just wanted their “fare share”.
After 2014, the IRD abandoned that policy, and data-sharing with Police was implemented. It means that taxing other illegal activities such as the production and sale of cannabis, is no longer feasible. This has unintentional consequences – such as the hoarding of cash; use of firearms to protect that cash; and violence.
This is part of an on-going wider process of government departments sharing private information with each other.
The Government Communications Security Bureau and Related Legislation Amendment Act, Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security) Act, and Countering Terrorist Fighters Legislation Bill all follow on from previous extensions of State power, notably  the  Terrorism Suppression Act 2002.
This poorly thought-out law was Labour’s contribution to George Bush’s ill-conceived “War on Terror”.
Throughout National’s three terms in office, it has extended Police powers; widened the scope for the GCSB and SIS to spy on New Zealanders; and created a vast data-sharing network amongst it’s bureaucracy.
MSD, NGOs, and Demands for Data
To date, New Zealanders have been mostly apathetic as the government build up it’s ability to spy and store personal information on us. Most of the government’s “targets” have been so-called “terrorists”, immigrants, criminals, student-debt defaulters, and those on welfare benefits or living in state houses.
Most of Middle New Zealand find it difficult to identify with these elements of our society.
Recently, however, Radio NZ has been running a series of stories and interviews on a disturbing development regarding state aquisition of personal information.
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On 2 March, on Radio NZ’s Nine To Noon programme, Kathryn Ryan interviewed Brenda Pilott, the chairperson  of ComVoices (an umbrella organisation for NGOs).
At issue was the disturbing revelation that the Ministry of Social Development (MSD), presumably under direction from National ministers,  was forcing NGOs to collect and pass  private information about their clients back to the Ministry,  in return for on-going funding. This proviso was to be written into new contracts set to take effect in July this year after negotiations had concluded after Easter.
Accordingly to Comvoices, NGOs were expected  to pass on;
  • names of clients
  • birth dates
  • ethnicity
  • other personal details such as dependent children’s names
NGOs that refused to share this information with MSD would forego funding. The result would be predictable;
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According to Brenda Pilot, the Ministry’s excuse to demand this data was;
“ They want to be able to find out what services are effective. And that this will provide information over time that will  allow sensible decisions to be made about government funding and where to apply that funding.”
Ms Pilot voiced concerns that private, identifiable  information would be used for tracking individuals who used NGO services. She said that vulnerable people needing to use services such as counselling, Women’s Refuge, Rape Crisis, etc, would be reluctant to engage those organisations and would “walk away”. Ms Pilot was concerned that passing personal, identifiable data to MSD would force NGOs to violate Privacy Laws.
Ms Pilot said that the Privacy Commissioner was also concerned at MSD’s intentions to obtain such data, and was investigating. She said the Commissioner would most likely report on the issue by the end of this month.
On 3 March, Radio NZ reported; grave concerns held by at least one NGO, Women’s Refuge;
Women’s Refuge chief executive Ang Jury said agencies would have to abide by the contract change if they wanted to keep their funding.
“If agencies choose not to share this information they won’t be contracting with the ministry. That’s pretty much where it sits.”
Dr Jury said it was not an ideal situation for the refuge but they were not in a position to say no.
“This is not something that we would happily go out and say, ‘yes, this is exactly what we want to do’.
“If it is going to happen, our job now is to make sure we get the sort of safeguards built around that information that we need to keep our women and children safe,” she said.
At least one privacy lawyer doubted the legality of MSD’s demands;
Privacy lawyer Kathryn Dalziel said the Ministry of Social Development (MSD) looked to be on shaky ground.
“This is a potential breach of privacy because they don’t appear to have identified, anywhere, the purposes for which they are collecting that information.
“There doesn’t seem to be any transparency around it … I also don’t think it’s fair,” she said.
“Principle 2 of the Privacy Act says that if you want to collect information from third party, you have to have a good reason.
“You also have to have … lawful and reasonable purposes for collecting that information in the first place. Now, none of that has been done.”
However, what really raised fears was Ministry of Social Development deputy chief executive, Murray Edridge’s responses to Kathryn Ryan’s  questions. His answers not only failed to reassure, but raised serious concerns as to MSD’s intentions regarding the storage and end-use of personalised, identifiable data.
Edridge parroted the usual monetarist rhetoric of  “the New Zealand public demands that government spend it’s money well”.
When Ms Ryan  put it to Edridge that MSD was attempting to track NGO service-users, he denied it;
“ No we’re not tracking them. What we’re doing is we’re saying to providers, look, for us to understand the effectiveness of services, to understand where the resources are best invested, where we will decide between priorities in terms of investment we need to understand who the people are and what value they get from the services. For some time we’d had concern that investment’s been made in social services where they’re not the most effective mechanism for the people that require them, and this is part of the mechanism by which we understand the clientele better and we understand how we can serve them better and invest in services that are going to support them.”
When Ms Ryan put it to Edridge that anonymised data would work just as well, Edridge kept referring back to needing to know “who these people are“.
Moments later, Edridge contradicted himself by admitting “we know who the clients are, we know all about them“. If that wasn’t creepy enough, Ms Ryan then asked Edridge why MSD demanded further information about NGO service-users. She asked why MSD needed to know who was approaching  (for example) Women’s Refuge for assistance..
Edridge’s response was further contradictory and throughout the twelve minute interview he could provide no satisfactory answer why MSD was requiring personalised data from NGOs. At one point he attempted to cloud the issue by stating that MSD required “demographic information”.
Ms Ryan dismissed that claim by remind Edridge that MSD was seeking names, addresses, ethnicities, children’s names and that was not simply “demographic information”.
When Ms Ryan suggested that NGO service-users might not want their details passed on to MSD or other ministeries, Edridge could only respond,
“ Well, we need to know where to get the money in the right place.”
Four days later, Rape Crisis draw a line in the sand and announced it would  flat out decline to sign contracts with MSD  in return for  passing private information about service-users in exchange for on-going funding.
>Rape Crisis reject “data-for-funding” contracts – 7 March<
By 16 March, pressure on MSD and Minister Tolley was such that the ministry caved, and was forced to step back from demanding personalised data from some NGOs dealing with sexual violence.
>Temporary reprieve over ‘private data for funding’ contracts – 16 March<
The “reprieve”, however, was only temporary, and would last for only one year until MSD “works out how to securely collect and store their clients’ private data”. It also did not apply to all NGOs.
The Creep of Big Brother and the Daddy State
Up till this point, data-collection has centered on those who come in contact with the Justice system; WINZ beneficiaries; and Housing NZ tenants. These are generally New Zealanders who are usually the most deprived and vulnerable socially and financially, and rely on State assistance to survive.
A person seeking help from WINZ and Housing NZ is forced to supply both ministeries their private data. To refuse means no help. Next stop; the street;
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A citizen in contact with the Justice system has even less option to refuse to provide private data.
MSD’s demand for personalised data from NGO service-users marks a new stage in National’s slow advancement in building a data-base on every person in the country.
NGO service users may not necessarily be unemployed beneficiaries or live in state houses or have broken the law in some way – but their details will still be required to be collected and supplied to the Ministry of Social Development.
The ministry has assumed the de facto role of collecting and storing data on New Zealanders who – up till this point – may never have come into contact with any governmental organisation such as Housing NZ, WINZ, or Police.
The implications of this are staggering.
The net to scoop up data on as many citizens as possible, has just widened considerably.
If you think you – the reader – may never need the services of Women’s Refuge or Rape Crisis, consider for a moment that there are thousands  of NGOs operating in this country and hundreds that are funded by the State.
Victim Support is just one state-funded NGO;
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So if you’ve just become a victim of a crime; Victim Support enters your life;  the State now has your personal data on file;
  • Client: Name, address, gender, date of birth, primary ethnicity, Iwi.
  • Dependents: Name, date of birth, relationship to client.
  • Service Level: Information Programme/service name, start date and end date.”
Middle-class New Zealanders who may never have had cause to have personal data collected on them may soon be on file with various ministeries.  With data-sharing, personal information from MSD can end up throughout other ministeries. Or on the desks of ministers;
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Never mind “Nanny State” – this is the muscular arm of Daddy State flexing it’s strength to reach out to grab more and more of our private information.
And it won’t end with this.
Not until we say “Enough is enough. No more“.
Back to Showers
Remember this?
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In the lead-up to the 2008 general election, National attacked the then-Labour Government for  “Nanny Statism”.
Following on from a disastrous drought in 2007 that cost the country’s economy  over $2.8 billion (in 2008/09 dollars), the then-Labour government sought out ways and means to  conserve water. The alternative was the possibility of further water-shortages or costly storage and irrigation systems. Labour opted for conservation. This included measures to save water in residential areas.
It could be  suggested that water-saving shower heads and energy-efficient light-bulbs are the least of our concerns.  National has surpassed anything that Labour envisaged, as this government  reaches further and further into our private lives.
If there is one thing that history has taught us – governments that spy on their own people do not trust their people, and are fearful of them.
National must be very frightened of us.
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References
Comvoices: HomePage
Additional
Other Blogs
Previous related blogposts
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This blogpost was first published on The Daily Blog on 20 March 2017.
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