The un-submersible US-Iran stalemate
4 July, 2019
A
thick veil of mystery surrounds the fire that broke out in a state of
the art Russian submersible in the Barents Sea, leading to the death
of 14 crew members poisoned by toxic fumes.
According
to the Russian Defense Ministry, the submersible was conducting
bathymetric measurements, as in examining and mapping deep sea
conditions. The crew on board was composed of “unique naval
specialists, high-class professionals, who conducted important
research of the Earth’s hydrosphere.” Now the – so far unnamed
– nuclear-powered vessel is at the Arctic port of Severomorsk, the
main base of Russia’s Northern Fleet.
A
serious, comprehensive military investigation is in
progress. According
to the Kremlin,
“the Supreme Commander-in-Chief has all the information, but this
data cannot be made public, because this refers to the category of
absolutely classified data.”
The
submersible is a Losharik. Its
Russian code is AS-12 (for “Atomnaya
Stantsiya” or “Nuclear
Station“). NATO
calls it Norsub-5. It’s been in service since 2003. Giant Delta III
nuclear submarines, also able to launch ICBMs, have been modified to
transport the submersible across the seas.
NATO’s
spin is that the AS-12/Norsub-5 is a “spy” sub, and a major
“threat” to undersea telecommunication cables, mostly installed
by the West. The submersible’s operating depth is one thousand
meters and it may have operated as deep as 2,500 meters in the Arctic
Ocean. It may be comparable to, or be something of an advanced
version of, the US deep submergence vessel NR-1 (operating depth
910m) famous for being used to search for and recover critical parts
of the space shuttle Challenger, lost in 1986.
It’s
quite enlightening to place the Losharik within the scope of the
latest Pentagon
report about
Russian strategic intentions. Amid the proverbial demonization
terminology – “Russia’s gray zone tactics,” “Russian
aggression.” Russian “deep-seated sense of geopolitical
insecurity” – the report claims that “Russia is adopting
coercive strategies that involve the orchestrated employment of
military and nonmilitary means to deter and compel the US, its allies
and partners prior to and after the outbreak of hostilities. These
strategies must be proactively confronted, or the threat of
significant armed conflict may increase.”
It’s
no wonder that, considering the incandescence of US-Russia relations
on the geopolitical chessboard, what happened to the Losharik fueled
frenetic speculation including totally unsubstantiated rumors
it had been torpedoed by a US submarine in a firefight – on top of
it, in Russian territorial waters.
Connections
were made between US Vice-President Mike Pence’s suddenly being
ordered to return to the White House while the Europeans were also
huddled in Brussels, as President Putin had an emergency meeting with
Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu.
In
the end, it was nothing but mere speculation.
Submersible incident
The
submersible incident – complete with the speculative plot line of a
US-Russia firefight in the Arctic – did drown, at least for a
while, the prime, current geopolitical incandescence: the US economic
war on Iran.
Expanding
on serious discussions at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
summit in Bishkek – which included Iran’s President Rouhani –
and the Putin-Xi meetings in Moscow and St. Petersburg and at the G20
in Osaka, both Russia and China are fully invested in keeping Iran
stable and protected from the Trump administration’s strategy of
chaos.
Both
Moscow and Beijing are fully aware Washington’s divide-and-rule
tactics are geared towards stopping the momentum of Eurasia
integration – which includes everything from bilateral trade in
local currencies and bypassing the US dollar to further
interconnection of the New Silk Roads, or Belt and Road Initiative,
the Eurasia Economic Union (EAEU) and the International North-South
Transportation Corridor (INSTC).
Beijing
plays a shadow game, keeping very quiet on the de facto US economic
blockade against one of its key Belt and Road allies. Yet the fact is
China continues to buy Iranian crude, and bilateral trade is being
settled in yuan and rial.
The
Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX), the mechanism set
up by the EU-3 (France, UK and Germany) to bypass the US dollar for
trade between Iran and the EU after the US unilaterally abandoned the
nuclear deal, or JCPOA, may finally be in place. But there’s no
evidence INSTEX will be adopted by myriad European companies, as it
essentially covers Iranian purchases of food and medicine.
Plan
B would be for the Russian Central Bank to extend access to Iran as
one the nations possibly adopting SPFS (System for Transfer of
Financial Messages), the Russian mechanism for trade sanctioned by
the US that bypasses SWIFT. Moscow has been working on the SPFS since
2104, when the threat to expel Russia from SWIFT became a distinct
possibility.
As
for Iran being accused – by the US – of “breaching” the
JCPOA, that’s absolute nonsense. To start with, Tehran cannot
possibly “breach” a multinational deal that was declared null and
void by one of the signatories, the US.
In
fact the alleged “breach” is due to the fact the EU-3 were not
buying Iran’s low-enriched uranium, as promised, because of the US
embargo. Washington has de facto forced the EU-3 not to buy it.
Tehran duly notified all JCPOA parties that, as they are not buying
it, Iran will have to store more low enriched uranium than the JCPOA
allows for. If the EU-3 resumes buying it that automatically
means Iran is not “breaching” anything.
Cliffhanger
Iranian
foreign minister Javad Zarif is correct; INSTEX, already too little
too late, is
not even enough, as
the mechanism does not allow Tehran to continue to export oil, which
is the nation’s right. As for the “breach,” Zarif says it’s
easily “reversible” – as long as the EU-3 abide by their
commitments.
Russian
energy minister Alexander Novak concurs: “As regards restrictions
on Iranian exports, we support Iran and we believe that the sanctions
are unlawful; they have not been approved by the UN.”
Still,
Iran continues to export crude, by all means available, especially to
Asia, with the National Iranian Oil Co (NIOC) predictably shutting
off satellite tracking on its fleet. But, ominously, the deadline set
by Tehran for the EU-3 to actively support the sale of Iranian
crude expires this
coming Sunday. That’s a major cliffhanger. After that, the
stalemate won’t be submersible anymore.
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