I am simply providing all (but the Empire's) arguments. I do not have the knowledge to decide one way or the other although my inclination is to give Varoufakis far more the benefit of the doubt than Mercouris does, although I am sure he wanted to keep Greece in the EU and did not countenance a Grexit.
BEWARE THE TALL TALES COMING OUT OF GREECE
BEWARE THE TALL TALES COMING OUT OF GREECE
Alexander
Mercouris
Via Facebook
Ever
since the latest bailout agreement misinformation to justify it has
been pouring out of Greece.
Much
of this centres on the impracticability of supposed plans for a
Grexit and of the “revolutionary” nature of the individuals who
hatched them.
Varoufakis
has claimed authorship of some of these plans. Others are attributed
to the former Energy Minister and leader of Syriza’s Left Platform,
Panagiotis Lafantzanis.
Varoufakis’s
plan, which he claims to have presented to Tsipras at the last moment
as the referendum results were coming in, was for the Greek
government to start handing out electronic IOUs in place of a
currency. This would have been accompanied by capital controls, the
nationalisation of the banks and the seizure of the government’s
revenue office and of the Bank of Greece.
Varoufakis
claims that this plan was prepared by the five man group based within
the Finance Ministry he set up back in February. Apparently this
group carried out its work in total secrecy and - in a bizarre twist
- even hacked into the Finance Ministry’s own computers in order to
prepare its plans.
Meanwhile
the Financial Times has published a lurid account of a semi-secret
meeting arranged by Lafantzanis and Syriza’ s Left Platform in an
Athens hotel, where there was supposedly wild talk of having the
governor of the Bank of Greece arrested and of seizing the hoard of
euros supposedly stashed away in the Athens mint in order to keep the
economy going and to pay for essential imports until a new currency
was set up.
No
doubt in the desperate situation caused by the Syriza government’s
failure to undertake proper and timely preparations for the launch of
a new currency all sorts of wild ideas were in circulation.
Not
all these ideas were wild. It is constantly overlooked that because
the Greek banks were bailed out by the Greek government in 2008 (a
major reason why its debt burden became so catastrophically and
insupportably high) they are already 80% state owned. “Nationalising”
the banks would not therefore have been an act of revolutionary
confiscation or of appropriation of private property. It would have
simply meant the state taking operational control of the banks by
replacing their managements by new managements appointed by and
accountable directly to the government.
Implementing
extreme steps such as seizing the Bank of Greece and the mint and
issuing IOUs would nonetheless have provoked a major crisis in
Greece. The economy would have been thrown into turmoil, with much of
the population and the business community refusing to accept the IOUs
of a bankrupt government as a credible substitute for actual money.
Acting
in such a way would also have completely antagonised the EU leaders,
who would have been bound to construe such steps as a declaration of
economic war, and who would undoubtedly have responded by suspending
the Greek government’s participation in the EU’s central
institutions on the grounds that it was in breach of the fundamental
provisions of Article 2 of the Treaty of the European Union.
Putting
all that aside, what no one has explained is why any of these schemes
were necessary.
Implicit
in Varoufakis’s various “plans” and in the scheme the Financial
Times attributes to Lafantzanis is the strange idea that preparing a
new currency was something that needed to be done in secret and which
would have had to be improvised at the last moment.
Nothing
could be further from the truth. Far from the introduction of a new
currency being something that would have been resisted across Greece
and Europe, we know it would have had the backing of the German
Finance Ministry, of Wolfgang Schauble and of the IMF.
According
to the British writer Tariq Ali, as long ago as February Schauble was
offering Varoufakis 50 billion euros and help with an orderly Grexit.
Tariq Ali describes the offer in this way:
“It
is now known that Schäuble offered an amicable, organised Grexit and
a cheque for 50 billion euros. This was refused on the grounds that
it would seem to be a capitulation. This is bizarre logic. It would
have preserved Greek sovereignty, and if Syriza had taken charge of
the Greek banking system a recovery could have been planned on its
terms. The offer was repeated later. ‘How much do you want to leave
the Eurozone?’ Schäuble asked Varoufakis just before the
referendum. Again Schäuble was snubbed. Of course the Germans made
the offer for their own reasons, but a planned Grexit would have been
far better for Greece than what has happened.”
No
one in Greece is denying this story and in fact I am told it is true.
I
recently wrote a piece for Russia Insider in which I said that the
claim that Putin rejected a request from Tsipras for $10 billion is -
as the Russians say - pure fantasy. We now have indirect confirmation
of this from what must ultimately be a Greek source (the one that
gave the story to Tariq Ali). Why would Tsipras ask Putin for $10
billion to fund a Grexit when Schauble was offering him 50 billion
euros to do the same?
Even
as late as the latest EU summit the option of an orderly Grexit was
on the table. Schauble - with Merkel’s (alas temporary) backing -
actually proposed it. If the Greeks had agreed to it, it would have
happened. The IMF, which has made known its complete lack of belief
in the viability of the latest bailout, would have backed it.
Greece
would have got its 50 billion euros to help it support the new
currency, Schauble and the Germans would have ensured that the ECB
provided the necessary liquidity to the banks to keep the banks
operating until the new currency was ready, the banks could have been
nationalised by mutual agreement - there being as I have said nothing
revolutionary about this - capital controls would have been imposed
until the new currency was ready (the Germans agreed to this when
Cyprus imposed them, so why would they refuse it if sought by
Greece?) and control of the Bank of Greece, the mint and the revenue
service would have been transferred back to the Greek government as
an indispensable element in an orderly and agreed Grexit. Meanwhile
the Russians, as I reported previously, were prepared to help with
essential imports of energy and (probably) food.
The
Financial Times in its hit piece says the process of introducing a
new currency would have taken 6-8 months, which is much less than the
18 months Varoufakis has claimed.
Actually
that is far too pessimistic. The former British cabinet minister John
Redwood has guesstimated it would have taken no more than 3 months.
In my opinion, given financial help from the EU and the IMF and
technical support e.g. from Russia, the whole process could have been
carried out from beginning to end in the space of a few weeks.
Once
Greece was out of the eurozone it could have agreed - if it wanted -
a formal restructuring as part of a package negotiated with the IMF
(the alternative of a default on the entire debt might have done
irreparable damage to relations with the creditor countries). The
conditions would doubtless have been tough but they would hardly have
amounted to the psychopathic agreement we have now. With Greece
outside the eurozone and able to regain competitiveness through a
devaluation there would have been a real chance that whatever was
agreed would succeed.
However
one spins the ball, the reality has to be faced: a Grexit did not
happen not because it was difficult to do but because the Syriza
government didn’t want it.
All
claims to the contrary are fairy tales, whilst the malicious
spreading of stories about the various plans that were hatched in the
desperate final hours before Greece’s final capitulation is being
done purposefully by those who want to discredit the idea of a Grexit
and those who support it.
As
for the perennial claim that the Greek people want to cling on to the
euro no matter what, I have previously said why since the referendum
I no longer believe that claim despite what the opinion polls are
alleged to say.
In
my opinion far too many people go on giving Tsipras and Syriza the
benefit of the doubt even though the extent of their incompetence and
of their double-dealing is becoming simply impossible to ignore.
Varoufakis
has in fact now admitted that the real Plan B if the negotiations for
a debt write-off failed was not a Grexit - his claims to have
prepared for one is so much smoke and mirrors - but a resignation of
the government and the formation of a “government of national
unity” consisting of the old oligarchic pro-EU parties to sign a
bailout package in place of Syriza. In Varoufakis’s own words
“We
are going to do all it takes to bring home a financially viable
agreement. We will compromise but not be compromised. We will step
back just as much as is needed to secure an agreement-solution within
the Eurozone. However, if we are defeated by the catastrophic
policies of the memorandum we shall step down and pass on the power
to those who believe in such means; let them enforce those measures
while we return to the streets.”
No
word here of any plan for a Grexit.
This
by the way surely provides final confirmation that my previous
statement - doubted by some - that the Ambrose Evans-Pritchard story
that Tsipras called the referendum in expectation of a Yes vote so as
to give himself political cover to resign is true.
In
my opinion such a resignation of a government elected just a few
months before to bring an end to austerity would have been an
extraordinary act of abdication of responsibility.
Regardless
it is not what Tsipras and Syriza did.
Instead
of resigning when they failed to secure a debt write-off they chose
to remain in power and negotiated for Greece an even worse deal than
the one they had previously rejected.
Instead
of admitting that Schauble offered him a dignified way out,
Varoufakis is now also busy spreading a fantastic story that Schauble
was throughout plotting to expel Greece from the eurozone so that he
could terrorise France to accept the economic medicine he suoposedly
wants to impose on it. Varoufakis is actually claiming that Schauble
told him as much.
Varoufakis’s
precise words are:
"Schauble
believes that the eurozone is not sustainable as it is. He believes
there has to be some fiscal transfers, some degree of political
union. He believes that for that political union to work without
federation, without the legitimacy that a properly elected federal
parliament can render, can bestow upon an executive, it will have to
be done in a very disciplinary way,”
"And
he said explicitly to me that a Grexit is going to equip him with
sufficient terrorising power in order to impose upon the French, that
which Paris has been resisting: a degree of transfer of budget making
powers from Paris to Brussels.”
Does
anybody seriously believe that if Schauble really did have such a
plan he would have shared it with Varoufakis of all people?
The
reality, as I have always said, is that Schauble adamantly opposes a
debt write-off for Greece whilst it remains part of the eurozone not
because he wants to terrorise France into submission but because of
the disastrous precedent such a write-off might provide to other
heavily indebted and bailed out eurozone states like Portugal, Spain,
Cyprus and Ireland.
Obviously
that is not sinister enough for Varoufakis - who has never shown the
slightest understanding of Schauble’s position - which is why he
attributes this bizarre plan to him.
Sad
to say it seems Varoufakis was already spreading his fable about
Schauble’s wicked plan to use Greece in order to terrorise France
whilst the negotiations were actually underway - one reason surely
why Schauble came to dislike him so much.
It
could be that Varoufakis misunderstood something Schauble said to
him. However I have to say that it also looks rather like an attempt
by Varoufakis to play the French and the Germans off against each
other - in much the same way that Tsipras was trying to play the
Russians and the Europeans (and Americans) off against each other.
Needless to say the ploy failed.
In
fairness to Tsipras, Varoufakis and Syriza, though their tactics were
manipulative and duplicitous, their objective was always what they
said it was: to keep Greece in the eurozone whilst securing an end to
austerity and a debt write-off.
Most
people - including me - assumed that as it became clear this was
impossible they would drop the euro in order to end austerity and
secure the debt write-off.
In
fairness to him, that is the position, when all else failed, that
Varoufakis eventually adopted, though the plan he came up with is
testament to his failure to prepare for a Grexit properly, as he
should have done.
In
Tsipras’s case however it is now clear he always intended the
opposite - to drop the plan to end austerity and get a debt write-off
so as to hang on to the euro.
I
still come across from time to time a strange idea that Tsipras iand
Syriza are agents of Soros and of the CIA.
Nothing
they have done in power is consistent with that theory, which my
sources insist is untrue.
By
contrast I am slowly coming round to what anyone who knows Greece
well would judge an altogether more plausible theory - that Tsipras
and the Syriza government were a device cooked up by a part of the
oligarchy to scare the Germans into granting Greece a debt write-off
whilst keeping Greece in the Eurozone. The calculation was that a
“pro-Russian”, “ultra left” leader, who “might fall into
Putin’s embrace” was more scary and would have a better chance of
securing a debt write-off than a more conventional conservative. Once
it became clear that the scare wasn’t going to work, the Syriza
project was shelved.
To
those who say this is too complicated, my response is that for the
Greek oligarchy nothing is too complicated.
This
will be my working hypothesis from now on. I am planning to visit
Greece soon and whilst there I will undertake certain enquiries to
see if I can find out whether or not this hypothesis is true.
In
the meantime I would ask people to keep a cool head in the face of
all the nonsense that is now coming out of Greece. I am afraid that
it is not without good reason we are known as the land of myths,
legends and wondrous tales. There are far too many of those
circulating over the last few days and people should be careful
before they fall for them.
Reports
Of Secret Drachma Plots Leave Tsipras Facing Fresh Crisis
26
July, 2015
According
to FT, Former Greek Energy Minister and maverick among mavericks
Panayotis Lafazanis convened a "secret" meeting at the
Oscar Hotel in Athens on July 14 at which he attempted to convince
Syriza hardliners (including, in FT’s words, "supporters of
the late Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez [and some] old-fashioned
communists") to storm the Greek mint, seize the country’s
currency reserves, and, if necessary, arrest central bank governor
Yannis Stournaras.
(Lafazanis)
Obviously,
the plan was never implemented, but if the story is even partly true
it betrays the degree to which Greece teetered on the edge of social
upheaval and even civil war in the days that followed PM Alexis
Tsipras’ decision to concede to creditors’ demands and abandon
not only Syriza’s election mandate but the very referendum outcome
he had himself campaigned for just days prior.
Now
that Tsipras has succeeded in compelling Greek lawmakers to cede the
country’s sovereignty to Brussels in exchange for the right to use
the euro, tales of unrealized redenomination plots have come out of
the woodwork so to speak, and now, in addition to the scheme
described above and rumors that a return to the drachma was nearly
financed by a loan from the Kremlin, we get a glimpse at yet another
plan hatched behind the scenes, this time courtesy of a recorded
conference call between Yanis Varoufakis and "members of
international hedge funds."
Former Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis has claimed that he was authorized by Alexis Tsipras last December to look into a parallel payment system that would operate using wiretapped tax registration numbers (AFMs) and could eventually work as a parallel banking system, Kathimerini has learned.
In a teleconference call with members of international hedge funds that was allegedly coordinated by former British Chancellor of the Exchequer Norman Lamont, Varoufakis claimed to have been given the okay by Tsipras last December – a month before general elections that brought SYRIZA to power – to plan a payment system that could operate in euros but which could be changed into drachmas "overnight" if necessary, Kathimerini understands.
Varoufakis worked with a small team to prepare the plan, which would have required a staff of 1,000 to implement but did not get the final go-ahead from Tsipras to proceed, he said.
The call took place on July 16, more than a week after Varoufakis left his post as finance minister.
The plan would involve hijacking the AFMs of taxpayers and corporations by hacking into General Secretariat of Public Revenues website, Varoufakis told his interlocutors.This would allow the creation of a parallel system that could operate if banks were forced to close and which would allow payments to be made between third parties and the state and could eventually lead to the creation of a parallel banking system, he said.
As the general secretariat is a system that is monitored by Greece’s creditors and is therefore difficult to access, Varoufakis said he assigned a childhood friend of his, an information technology expert who became a professor at Columbia University, to hack into the system. A week after Varouakis took over the ministry, he said the friend telephoned him and said he had “control” of the hardware but not the software "which belongs to the troika."
Apparently,
Varoufakis planned to take control of the computers first, then hack
into the ministry’s software, steal the code, and design the
parallel payments system. Here are excerpts from the call, again from
Kathimerini, quoting Varoufakis:
"The prime minister before he became PM, before we won the election in January, had given me the green light to come up with a Plan B. And I assembled a very able team, a small team as it had to be because that had to be kept completely under wraps for obvious reasons. And we had been working since the end of December or beginning of January on creating one.
"What we planned to do was the following. There is the website of the tax office like there is in Britain and everywhere else, where citizens, taxpayers go into the website they use their tax file number and they transfer through web banking monies from the bank account to their tax file number so as to make payments on VAT, income tax and so on and so forth.
“We were planning to create, surreptitiously, reserve accounts attached to every tax file number, without telling anyone, just to have this system in a function under wraps. And, at the touch of a button, to allow us to give PIN numbers to tax file number holders, to taxpayers.
"That would have created a parallel banking system while the banks were shut as a result of the ECBs aggressive action to deny us some breathing space.
"This was very well developed and I think it would have made a very big difference because very soon we could have extended it, using apps on smartphones and it could become a functioning parallel system and of course this would be euro denominated but at the drop of a hat it could be converted to a new drachma.
"But let me tell you - and this is quite a fascinating story - what difficulties I faced. The General Secretary of Public Revenues within my ministry is controlled fully and directly by the troika. It was not under control of my ministry, of me as minister, it was controlled by Brussels.
Ok, so problem number one: The general secretary of information systems on the other hand was controlled by me, as minister. I appointed a good friend of mine, a childhood friend of mine who had become professor of IT at Columbia University in the States and so on. I put him in because I trusted him to develop this.
"At some point, a week or so after we moved into the ministry, he calls me up and says to me: 'You know what? I control the machines, I control the hardware but I do not control the software. The software belongs to the troika controlled General Secretary of Public Revenues. What do I do?'
"So we decided to hack into my ministry’s own software program in order to be able break it up to just copy just to copy the code of the tax systems website onto a large computer in his office so that he can work out how to design and implement this parallel payment system.
"And we were ready to get the green light from the PM when the banks closed in order to move into the General Secretariat of Public Revenues, which is not controlled by us but is controlled by Brussels, and to plug this laptop in and to energize the system.
In
short, Varoufakis claims Tsipras had pre-approved the creation of
secret accounts for every tax filer (which, knowing Greece, might
have left Varoufakis short on accounts for quite a few citizens).
Greeks would be made aware of the accounts' existence in the event
the banking system ceased to function altogether, and Athens would
effectively facilitate payments through the new system in defiance of
the EMU. Clearly, this would not have been well received by Brussels
- especially the bit about hacking their software - but ultimately,
because the new system would be entirely controlled by Varoufakis'
finance ministry, it could be converted to the drachma immediately.
Kathimerini
goes on the quote Varoufakis as saying that German FinMin Wolfgang
Schaeuble intended to use Grexit as leverage to force France into
supporting a system that ceded fiscal decision making to Brussels
(which would of course mean giving Berlin more say over EMU
countries' finances):
"Schaeuble has a plan. The way he described it to me is very simple. He believes that the eurozone is not sustainable as it is. He believes there has to be some fiscal transfers, some degree of political union. He believes that for that political union to work without federation, without the legitimacy that a properly elected federal parliament can render, can bestow upon an executive, it will have to be done in a very disciplinary way. And he said explicitly to me that a Grexit is going to equip him with sufficient bargaining, sufficient terrorising power in order to impose upon the French that which Paris has been resisting. And what is that? A degree of transfer of budget making powers from Paris to Brussels."
The
new revelations raise serious concerns for Alexis Tsipras. The deep
divisions within Syriza are by now well publicized, but reports of
covert plans to establish parallel banking systems using tax filers'
IDs and the idea that elements within the ruling party plotted to
seize billions in currency reserves and take control of the central
bank have left some lawmakers demanding answers. Here's Reuters:
The center-right New Democracy party and the centrist To Potami and the Socialist Pasok parties, which all backed Tsipras in parliamentary votes on the bailout this month, demanded a response to the reports.
"The revelations that are coming out raise a major political, economic and moral issue for the government which needs in-depth examination," it said in a statement.
"Is it true that a designated team in the finance ministry had undertaken work on a backup plan? Is it true they had planned to raid the national Mint and that they prepared for a parallel currency by hacking the tax registration numbers of the taxpayers?"
Tsipras
thus finds himself in an extraordinarily difficult spot. Passing two
sets of prior bailout actions through parliament cost him dearly on
the political front as more than 30 Syriza MPs defected on both
votes. This means he'll be forced to rely on the support of
opposition lawmakers to govern going forward or at least until he can
call for elections and get a "clean start" after the third
troika program is formally in place.
If
Syriza's political opponents come to believe that their efforts to
back Tsipras on the way to keeping Greece in the euro are being
subverted in secret by members of Tsipras' own party, their support
could dry up quickly leaving the PM with no support from either side
of the aisгle.
Given
all of this, it's easy to see why many analysts and commentators
still belive that Grexit - and everything that comes with it both for
Greece and for the EMU - is still the most likely outcome.
Europe's
New Colonialism: ECB Rejects Greek Request To Reopen Stock Market
26
July, 2015
It
has been one month since Greek capital controls were imposed, and as
we explained earlier, Greece is nowhere closer to having its deposit
limits lifted. In fact, with several more months of capital controls
at least, the Greek banks are likely to suffer ongoing balance sheet
impairments which will ultimately result in depositor bail-ins, with
Germany already pushing for haircuts on deposits over €100,000.
However,
when it comes to banks there is at least still the illusion that
Greece has some residual sovereignty. The reality is that it does
not, as Greece is no longer an independent nation, and as of July 15,
the Greek "In
Dependence"
day, every Greek decision needs to get pre-approval from both the
ECB, Brussels and, naturally, Berlin.
This
was made very clear earlier today when Reuters
reported that
the Greek stock exchange will remain closed on Monday but might
reopen on Tuesday after a one-month shutdown which started on June
29. "It's certain that it will not open on Monday, maybe on
Tuesday," a spokesperson for the Athens Stock Exchange told
Reuters on condition of anonymity.
A spokesman for the Athens Stock Exchange said on Friday a proposal to reopen the bourse had been submitted to the European Central Bank for an opinion before a decision on the matter is made by the Greek finance ministry.
Another person with direct knowledge of the matter confirmed that Greek authorities aimed to reopen the bourse on Tuesday.
However,
to understand what really happened, one should read the Bloomberg
explanation, according
to which it was the ECB which rejected proposals
by Greek authorities to
reopen country’s financial markets with no restrictions in place
for both Greek and foreign traders, citing an Athens Exchange
spokeswoman.
Ministerial
decree is now expected, setting some restrictions in use of money
from Greek bank accounts for trading.
And
just like that, we wave goodbye to the Hellenic Republic, and greet
the Mediterranean Vassal Province of Mario and Merkel. Because as of
this moment, no Greek decision can be taken without the direct or
indirect express prior approval of either the ECB and/or Berlin.
Oh,
and incidentally, Greece may be better off leaving its markets closed
indefinitely because since the day Greece was "fixed", the
GREK ETF, which has been the only equity way to trade Greece, has
sunk 15%.
It
has also managed to drag down the S&P 500 with it despite the
Greek can having supposedly been kicked for at least a few more
months.
And
once the locals can finally cash out of the local banks which as we
explained are an assured "doughnut" for existing
equity investors pending
either bankruptcy or massive dilution which will wipe out all
existing stakeholders (the fate of depositors depends on whether a
€25 billion source of liquidity can be found in very short notice)
they will, which in turn will lead to another market closure for
Greek stocks, only this time it will most likely be permanent.
This
Is the End of the Line for Syriza
25
July, 2015
Greek
banks have reopened after
weeks of closure. The patient and orderly way customers queued
outside to use ATMS during the big shut down was an impressive sight,
especially for those people who are fond of considering Greek people
as somehow incapable of doing things right.
But
nothing is harmonious. The queues outside the job centres are as long
as ever, while many of the shops that shut down at the same time as
the banks, still haven’t reopened. Anti-austerity and
anti-governmental protests have started to take place for the first
time since Syriza came to power. Dozens were arrested as the Greek
parliament voted to accept a new bailout deal from Europe, based on
the very terms that were rejected just days earlier in a national
referendum.Fresh
riots took
place as the parliament passed a law that allows the confiscation
of people’s homes.
As
Syriza burns its bridges with the general public, life for the
majority of people has returned to hopeless normality – indeed,
many people have spent more time talking about the wildfires that
have broken out around the country than the troika in the past few
days.
Greece’s
ruling party might be called the coalition of the radical left but it
seems to be rejecting a basic argument put forward by activists at
that end of the political spectrum for years: It is impossible to
transform this unequal, structurally and physically violent world
into a better place if you try to do it via the institutional route.
State governance, the parliamentary system, prime ministerial
meetings and the rest are all the enemies of meaningful change.
Perhaps
to a certain extent Syriza’s leaders were aware of the risks they
were taking when they sought to continue negotiating with Europe.
They could end up crossing the political spectrum to join the rest of
the austerity governments or, less likely, be overthrown for failing
to comply with the requests of creditors and international bankers.
Players
in the neoliberal system have never been afraid of drawing blood –
and Greek history has quite a few examples. The left has often been
brutalised in order to protect capitalist forms of governance. This
is what happened during the military
coup of
1967. And although such extremes are unlikely these days, the bailout
debacle has introduced Syriza’s leadership to real politics.
Just
after prime minister Alexis Tsipras agreed to the terms presented to
him by Greece’s international creditors, the IMF, itself part of
the deal, spoke
out against what
was on offer. Greece, it argued, would never be able to pay its debts
under the terms being put forward. Very soon followed the German
minister of finance who made
it publicly known that
he does not think the programme proposed by his own government will
work.
And
yet this was the route taken by EU leaders. Syriza argues that the
Greek government chose these new catastrophic terms and conditions
instead of a much more catastrophic option. This is precisely how
high-level politics works behind closed doors. There is blackmail and
there are threats. One can only wonder why Syriza would have expected
anything else.
Many
believe Tsipras was forced into agreeing to the terms but Syriza is
not innocent in this situation. It continues to glorify the eurozone
and still prioritises paying back a supposedly national debt that
ends up bailing out the Greek and European banking sector.
Moreover,
Syriza’s belief in national unity also reflects the mistakes long
made by the Greek left. The Greek population includes both massively
impoverished social classes and a corrupted few who get richer every
day. The latter group has no interest in an even slightly fairer
system than extreme austerity for the poor and state generosity for
the rich.
At
least amid all the confusion there is clarity in one respect. Voters
are seeing that Syriza’s parliamentary victory does not mean the
end of austerity and poverty. Even Syriza’s own youth
group publicly
denounced the
new loan agreement.
The
deep division between the government and people is opening again.
Since Syriza’s election in January 2015, significant parts of the
grassroots movement that opposed austerity – from solidarity and
protest groups to immigrant support initiatives and unions – had
remained somewhat inactive. They had slipped into a lethargic state,
expecting a smoother state of affairs with Syriza at the helm of the
austerity-ridden country. But the scales have fallen and those who
were sympathetic to this new government are losing again faith in
politics from above.
*Dimitris
Dalakoglou is
a Professor of Social Anthropology at VU
University Amsterdam. This
article first appeared on The
Conversation.
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