Please
read the article SPIES
HACKED COMPUTERS THANKS TO SWEEPING SECRET WARRANTS, AGGRESSIVELY
STRETCHING U.K. LAW, which
I have included in the blog with great difficulty
As
soon as I started posting it strange things have started happening
with formatting, and with the computer
London's
parks 'could become inaccessible to the public'
London's
parks could become inaccessible to the public as a lack of funding
makes it increasingly likely they will be sold to private companies,
a committee chair has warned.
BBC,
21
June, 2015
Councillor
Julian Bell said "horrendous" cuts put the parks at risk if
councils are forced to sell them.
His
comments come as the organisation warns boroughs' spending on parks
has fallen by 18% in the past four years.
The
government said councils should work with communities to ensure
access.
Although
the royal parks would be protected from any privatisation, the
capital is around 40% green space, according to the City of London.
'Fantastic
assets'
London
Councils, which represents 32 boroughs and the City of London, said
budget cuts had put local services, such as social care, under
pressure.
It
warned funding for community groups and volunteers who maintain the
parks is under threat, as they prioritise other services, such as
looking after homeless people.
If
the cuts continue, councils may be unable to stop the parks being
sold off and run privately by 2025, it warned.
Councillor
Julian Bell, chair of London Councils' Transport and Environment
Committee, said: "We have got to do everything we can to protect
our parks for our future generation."
He
speculated that one scenario could see health clubs buy the spaces up
as they are considered "fantastic assets", in which case
the public could have no access, as they could be reserved solely for
members.
A
Department for Communities and Local Government spokesman said: "All
councils should work in partnership with local communities to ensure
they have access to excellent parks and green spaces."
100,000
March in London - Media Covers It Up
Here’s
how the media works: as thousands march against austerity, the BBC
focuses instead on new-age rituals
Author
of the article below, relying on a Guardian estimate says 50 thousand
people marched in London. Other
estimates vary
between 70 and 150 thousand and the organizers have said
the number was 250 thousand. - That’s in London alone, there were
also demonstrations in Glasgow, Liverpool, Bristol and
elsewhere across Britain.
There’s
going to be a protest march in London today. You might not hear about
it on the news, but that doesn’t mean it isn’t happening.
This
is the strange thing about the modern MSM, they seem to have
collectively signed up to the Karl Rove doctrine. The Republican
political strategist, and possible candidate for most evil man in the
world, once famously told journalist Ron Suskind: “We’re an
empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality.”
As
much as this sounds like the crazy ramblings of a conservative
zealot, when you apply it to the way the modern media-machine works,
everything seems to suddenly make more sense. The media is an Empire
now, too. A sprawling mass of influence from one side of the
“democratic” world to the other – hundreds of television
companies, newspapers, magazines, radio stations and movie studios
all owned by six – just six – mega-corporations.
That’s an Empire for the modern age, an Empire with logos and
slogans in place of flags and anthems, but an Empire none the less.
And this Empire agrees with Mr Rove: That people in “reality based
communities” are somewhat behind the times. That they can create
their own reality, and make us live in it.
That’s
the reason I mentioned that protest tomorrow. It’s going to happen,
but whether or not the media will acknowledge this is very much up
for question. There was a march last year too, you know, but nobody
seemed to want to cover it.
On
the 21st of June 2014 50,000 people marched through the streets of
London protesting austerity, cuts to welfare, the possible break-up
of the NHS and, generally speaking, the state of the country. Nobody
covered it in the news. They didn’t smear it, or criticise it, or
misrepresent it…they just didn’t mention it.
Now,
I grew up in a household where “awareness” was prized – don’t
believe the news, think about hidden agendas, what does this really
mean? – I knew, from a young age, that a headline was usually a
just a bold lie. But that the news-media, as a collective entity,
could simply ignore something that happened shocked me.
It was just so…dishonest. But they did it – they tried to enforce their created reality….and they failed miserably. Because the news media isn’t the all-controlling force it once was…there’s new media in town. Often times, when the MSM is embarrassed or shown up, it is the alternate media that is responsible but in this instance it was social media.
It was just so…dishonest. But they did it – they tried to enforce their created reality….and they failed miserably. Because the news media isn’t the all-controlling force it once was…there’s new media in town. Often times, when the MSM is embarrassed or shown up, it is the alternate media that is responsible but in this instance it was social media.
How
do you pretend a march isn’t happening when every one of the 50,000
people marching have cell phones and facebook? How do cover up a
protest when people can tweet their slogans to a million followers?
How do you quash a story when the alternate media not only cover
the story themselves,
but then cover
your lack of coverage as well.
Well, to put it simply, you don’t. What followed was one of the
most embarrassing volte-faces in media history.
The
Guardian finally
ran a story covering the protest….at 8.45 pm, well after it was all
over. And then proceeded the moderate the hell out of the comments
section, removing anybody that dared comment on their
editorial tardiness.
“Cut
war not welfare”
The
BBC were in even more trouble – the march had been cannily planned
to go right past television centre. There was even a tweet about it
from a BBC employee…which
was soon removed.
Their official “report”
came out the next day. It was a paragraph long. People that
complained were treated to a form
letter full of corporate double-talk and nonsense.
The
New Statesman delivered
a delightful piece, deciding to defend the media en-masse by
declaring the march “not important”. Which is disingenuous to the
point of madness – 24 hour news channels and feeds and the ever
increasing need for non-stories simply to host advertising space has
made it so EVERYTHING is interesting. A glance over the New Statesman
front page today shows me headlines like “Why we buy shoes we’re
never going to wear” and
“What porn actors don’t talk about”. Both of which, I assume, are considered more important than whether or not pensioners can afford to heat their houses.
“What porn actors don’t talk about”. Both of which, I assume, are considered more important than whether or not pensioners can afford to heat their houses.
Travelling
back through time to last June, the BBC front page hosted a story
about thousands of Druids
meeting at Stonehenge for
the summer solstice – but didn’t cover twice that many chanting
right outside television centre. Because it wasn’t important.
The
Guardian is trigger happy when it comes to BIG RED LETTERS and LIVE
FEEDS and BREAKING NEWS. They love to have rolling comment and minute
by minute updates. 20,000 people protesting government spying in
Macedonia makes the front page (the larger, pro-government march a
few days later was never even mentioned, but that’s another issue).
7000 people attending Boris Nemstov’s funeral in Moscow got a live
feed. Smaller marches, in foreign countries, more important and more
interesting than people – including Russel Brand, Caroline Lucas MP
and Owen Jones, their employee – giving speeches in
Parliament Square.
The
MSM are trying to control what we see and hear. Trying to dictate to
the masses the very nature of their reality. It is not working, and
it will never work as long as people have eyes that see and ears that
hear and thumbs that text. The shameful backwards step the
news-sources took last June demonstrates this perfectly. The Media,
and the army of people it employs, need to realise just how
impossible their chosen task is, and just how out of touch they are
with their own obsolescence – and obsolescence is surely what
it is.
It
has never, in human history, been so easy to communicate. Cell-phones
and e-mail have effectively, in huge stretches of the world, made it
more difficult to be out of touch than in contact. Cheap web-space
and blog templates mean that, if no one will print what you’re
saying, you can just say it yourself. The very web-site you’re
reading is proof of this.
There’s
a reason RT
is listed along side terrorist organisations and
dissenting comments are moderated to oblivion on the Guardian.
There’s a war being fought. A war between the MSM and the “reality
based communities” that people like Karl Rove deride. And, right
now, the MSM are losing. You might not hear about it on the news, but
that doesn’t mean it isn’t happening.
SPIES
HACKED COMPUTERS THANKS TO SWEEPING SECRET WARRANTS, AGGRESSIVELY
STRETCHING U.K. LAW
22
March, 2015
British
spies have received government permission to intensively study
software programs for ways to infiltrate and take control of
computers. The GCHQ spy agency was vulnerable to legal action for the
hacking efforts, known as “reverse engineering,” since such
activity could have violated copyright law. But GCHQ sought and
obtained a legally questionable warrant from the Foreign Secretary in
an attempt to immunize itself from legal liability.
GCHQ’s
reverse engineering targeted a wide range of popular software
products for compromise, including online bulletin board systems,
commercial encryption software and anti-virus programs. Reverse
engineering “is essential in order to be able to exploit such
software and prevent detection of our activities,” the electronic
spy agency said in a warrant renewal application.
But
GCHQ’s hacking and evasion goals appear to have led it onto dubious
legal ground and, at times, into outright non-compliance with its own
procedures for staying within the bounds of the law. A top-secret
document states that a GCHQ team lapsed in following the agency’s
authorization protocol for some continuous period of time. Meanwhile,
GCHQ obtained a warrant for reverse engineering under a section of
British intelligence law that does not explicitly authorize — and
had apparently never been used to authorize — the sort of copyright
infringement GCHQ believed was necessary to conduct such activity.
The
spy agency instead relied on the Intelligence Services Commissioner
to let it use a law pertaining only to property and “wireless
telegraphy,” a law that had never been applied to intellectual
property, according to GCHQ’s own warrant
renewal application.
Eric King, deputy director of U.K. surveillance watchdog Privacy
International said, after being shown documents related to the
warrant, “The secret reinterpretation of powers, in entirely novel
ways, that have not been tested in adversarial court processes, is
everything that is wrong with how GCHQ is using their legal powers.”
GCHQ
may have also circumvented a restriction on using the type of warrant
it obtained for domestic purposes; the agency said in one memo that
it has used reverse engineering to support “police operations”
and the domestic policing-focused National Technical Assistance
Centre.
The
agency also described efforts to cozy up to dozens
of government staffers it believed could help obtain
further warrants.
The
agency’s slippery legal maneuvers to enable computer hacking call
into question U.K. government assurances about mass surveillance. To
assuage public concern over such activity, the government frequently
says spies are subject to rigorous oversight, including an obligation
to obtain warrants. As it turns out, such authorizations have, at
times, been vague and routine, as demonstrated by top-secret memos
prepared by GCHQ in connection with the reverse engineering warrant.
The
controversial path GCHQ took to authorize reverse engineering also
seems likely to lend momentum to an ongoing push to reform the way
surveillance warrants are issued in the U.K. Earlier this month, the
U.K.’s independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, David
Anderson, issued areport recommending
that “all warrants should be judicially authorised” and
describing the current regulatory system as “undemocratic,
unnecessary and — in the long run — intolerable.”
This
story is based on 22 documents from NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden,
linked below. None have been published before. One was briefly
described in a January story in The Guardian.
Widely used commercial software is targeted
One
document describing the warrant, a 2008 warrant renewal application,
identifies numerous commercially available products in which GCHQ
identified vulnerabilities through reverse engineering. These include
widely used encryption software such as Exlade’s CrypticDisk and
Acer’s eDataSecurity. Exlade’s products are used by “thousands
of companies and government agencies,”
including tech giants IBM, Intel, GE, HP and Seagate, according to the company’s website. Also successfully targeted were popular web forum services vBulletin and Invision Power Board. VBulletin says its users include Sony Pictures, NASA, Electronic Arts and Zynga. Invision Power Services, the maker of Invision Power Board, saidaround the time of the warrant renewal application that its users included Yahoo, AMD and Sony. GCHQ also targeted CPanel, software used by large hosting companies like GoDaddy for configuring servers, and PostfixAdmin, used to manage Postfix, popular email server software.
including tech giants IBM, Intel, GE, HP and Seagate, according to the company’s website. Also successfully targeted were popular web forum services vBulletin and Invision Power Board. VBulletin says its users include Sony Pictures, NASA, Electronic Arts and Zynga. Invision Power Services, the maker of Invision Power Board, saidaround the time of the warrant renewal application that its users included Yahoo, AMD and Sony. GCHQ also targeted CPanel, software used by large hosting companies like GoDaddy for configuring servers, and PostfixAdmin, used to manage Postfix, popular email server software.
Invision
Power Services said in a written statement that it monitors its
software and external sources closely for information on
vulnerabilities and issues fixes quickly. “There are currently no
open vulnerabilities in our software of which we are aware,” it
added. vBulletin and Acer did not provide comment by press time.
The maker of CPanel did not respond to a request for comment.
The maker of CPanel did not respond to a request for comment.
Particularly
important to GCHQ was the ability to hack anti-virus programs, an
offensive operation that would typically come after using reverse
engineering to discover vulnerabilities. Interfering with such
programs would allow the opportunity to breach a computer’s
defenses in order to exploit the computer without detection. GCHQ
cited as a particular target Kaspersky Labs, a prominent Moscow-based
maker of anti-virus software that claims more than 270,000 corporate
clients. (For details on the targeting of Kaspersky, see this
accompanying piece by
Andrew Fishman and Morgan Marquis-Boire.)
“Personal security products such as the Russian anti-virus software Kaspersky continue to pose a challenge to GCHQ’s CNE [computer network exploitation] capability and SRE [software reverse engineering] is essential in order to be able to exploit such software and to prevent detection of our activities,” the 2008 document says.
Also
targeted by the agency’s warrants are hardware products such as
large computer network routers, critical pieces of infrastructure.
Hacking Cisco routers “has been good business for us and
our 5-eyes partners
for some time now,” boasts a 2012
NSA document previously
published by The
Intercept.
The warrant memo describes GCHQ’s “capability against Cisco routers,” specifically that “GCHQ’s [hacking] operations against in-country communications switches (routers) have also benefited from SRE.” That has enabled the agency not only to access “almost any user of the internet” inside the entire country of Pakistan — but also “to re-route selective traffic across international links toward GCHQ’s passive collection systems.” The Guardian previously described, but did not publish, this memo.
Cisco
did not comment specifically on the warrant document, saying in a
written statement only that its products are securely developed and
tested, that the company has a “robust” process for handling
vulnerabilities, and that “Cisco does not work with any government,
including the U.K. Government, to weaken or compromise our products.”
Stretching the law
To
support its efforts to probe and compromise software systems, GCHQ
appears to have aggressively stretched Britain’s Intelligence
Services Act, failed to comply with its own guidelines based on that
law for a continuous period, and even intentionally cozied up to
staff in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, or FCO, to get warrants
approved. The apparent success of these efforts highlights the
illusory nature of surveillance oversight, despite repeated
government statements that the U.K. spy machine is tightly
controlled.
GCHQ
needed warrants, according the documents, to protect itself from
potential claims of copyright infringement or of breaching a
licensing agreement. The practice of reverse engineering is
frequently barred in the terms and conditions attached to the copying
and use of particular software by the makers of that software.
“In
2008, there was no real authority on this issue in the EU or the
U.K.,” says Indra Bhattacharya, a U.K. solicitor with the firm
Jones Day who specializes in intellectual property law. A 2012
EU court ruling and
a related 2013
U.K. court ruling allow
greater latitude toward specific reverse engineering practices as
long as there is no copying of code, he explains, but case law is
“very fact-specific” and “deals mostly with commercial
situations,” making it difficult to determine how it might apply to
a government agency and whether it would obviate the need for
GCHQ’s warrant.
But
at the time of the warrant renewal application, GCHQ was clear on its
legal position. “Reverse engineering of commercial products needs
to be warranted in order to be lawful,” one
agency memo states.
“There is a risk that in the unlikely event of a challenge by the
copyright owner or licensor, the courts would, in the absence of a
legal authorisation, hold that such activity was unlawful.” Even if
warrants shielded GCHQ from domestic law, the agency believed the
warrant would not protect it under international law, noting that
such warrant-based immunity would be “limited,” given that “it
only covers us under U.K. law.”
GCHQ
obtained its warrant under section 5 of the 1994 Intelligence
Services Act, which covers interference with property and “wireless
telegraphy” by the Security Service (MI5), Secret Intelligence
Service (MI6) and GCHQ. Section 5 of the ISA does not mention
interference in intellectual property, which the intelligence agency
believed was necessary to reverse engineer software, but a top-secret
memo states that the intelligence services commissioner approved such
use in 2005.
This
stretching of the law was dubious, says King, of Privacy
International.
“It
is not the Commissioner’s function to provide the authoritative
interpretation of any law,” King says.
GCHQ
did not need to go to an independent court or focus the scope of the
warrant on a specific target to obtain the reverse engineering
authorization. The warrant, like many surveillance warrants in
the U.K., was granted by a cabinet minister, a practice harshly
criticized in a just-issued
report by
the U.K.’s “terrorism watchdog.”
The
warrant renewal request for reverse engineering published today was
addressed to the official that oversees GCHQ, the foreign secretary,
then David Miliband, as well as two other FCO officials. The warrant
is subject to renewal twice a year.
Cozying up to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
While
it was trying to hack software, GCHQ actually had efforts targeting
FCO as well. Documents reveal the spy agency made a concerted effort
tobuild
personal relationships with
key FCO staff with the goal of getting GCHQ warrants approved. One
GCHQ document marked “Restricted” stated, under the heading
“FCO,” that “top five objectives in 08-09” included moves to
provide a “greater level of routine contact between GCHQ and FCO
seniors, and map members of FCO SLF [Senior Leadership Forum] to
their SI/IA [Signals Intelligence/Information Assurance] interests.”
Another objective was to “ensure that GCHQ and FCO warrantry and
submission procedures are fit for purpose given increasing complexity
and need for pace in our work.”
Then
followed a list of dozens of named FCO staff members and a
corresponding list of “major issues and targets for 09-10” for
each, with goals like “win confidence by following his diary and
briefing at key times,” “build strong relationship with
successor,” “Positive about intelligence, build relationship,”
“Colin is new — Build relationship,” and “Generally
supportive of submissions but could be more so.”
Oversight
issues
For
all its efforts to win aggressive warrants clearing its reverse
engineering as legal, GCHQ may well have failed to stay even with the
broad boundaries it was given. When Snowden first came forward, he
said part of his motivation was that there was so little monitoring
of the searches NSA analysts could conduct, ensuring that abuse would
often go undetected. GCHQ documents indicate there are similar
problems of oversight at the British agency.
One
agency memo about the reverse engineering warrants notes that, for a
length of time that can’t be ascertained from the document,
internal authorization procedures were not adhered to by the
Intrusion Detection team. When the error was discovered, the
actions were simply retroactively approved.
Previously
published news accounts have
shown that the intelligence services commissioner works only
part-time, and as of last year, had a staff of one. It was the
ISC who approved the stretching of the Intelligence Services Act
section 5 for use in GCHQ’s software reverse engineering warrant.
The ISC is also responsible for “independent external oversight” of
the intelligence community. The current ISC, Sir Mark Waller, told
the House of Commons’ Home Affairs Committee that in 2012 he saw
approximately 6 percent of more than 2,800 total warrants, with the
percentage rising to roughly 12 percent the following year.
In
a detailed and scathing 2014
report,
the committee challenged the rigor of the ISC’s oversight,
citing as evidence Waller’s own words:
The
committee’s report concluded, in boldface type: “We do not
believe the current system of oversight is effective and we have
concerns that the weak nature of that system has an impact upon the
credibility of the agencies accountability, and to the credibility of
Parliament itself.”
Did GCHQ improperly use the warrant to “enable police operations?”
GCHQ
may have improperly used the reverse engineering warrant for certain
police-related activities, judging from language in the renewal
document.
The
reverse engineering warrant appears to have been used by GCHQ to
support domestic law enforcement agencies and also appears to mirror
existing authorizations for “activities where the effect is
overseas,” as one GCHQ memo put it.
The
GCHQ warrant renewal application states that a number of the software
exploitation efforts conducted “under the terms of this warrant …
enable police operations.”
The
application also indicates that the warrant was used to subvert
software on behalf of the National Technical Assistance Centre, or
NTAC. NTAC is much more focused on domestic and law enforcement
matters than on GCHQ’s wider intelligence and security mission. The
application says that GCHQ, on behalf of NTAC, reverse engineered
Acer eDataSecurity encryption and unlocked “material relating to a
high profile police case.” It says it similarly thwarted
CrypticDisk for NTAC, “allowing for the decryption of material
relating to a child abuse investigation.”
The
GCHQ memo on the warrant renewal states:
The
full extent of how GCHQ has applied the section 5 warrant
authority to “enable police operations” is unknown. But the
limitations of ISA are clear: GCHQ and MI6 cannot directly use a
section 5 warrant to interfere with “property in the British
Islands” if their function is “in support of the prevention or
detection of serious crime,” which falls under the purview of
traditional law eŠ¹nforcement.
“GCHQ should not be obtaining section
5 warrants if the purpose of the warrant is to prevent serious crime
domestically,” says King. The citation of police cases right
in the application to justify renewal of the warrant would seem to
make it difficult for GCHQ to argue that use by the police is
incidental.
GCHQ
refused to comment on the record about any of these matters, instead
providing its boilerplate response about how it complies with the
law.____
Documents
published with this article:
- U.K. Ministry Stakeholder Relationships Spreadsheets (13 documents merged)
- TSI — Legal Authorisation Flowcharts: Targeting & Collection (2 documents merged)
No comments:
Post a Comment
Note: only a member of this blog may post a comment.