Report from Ukraine - 09/19/2014

As Poroshenko Gets Standing Ovations in Western Capitals, Ukraine Disintegrates

Dmitri Babich

Ukraine's President Petro Poroshenko addressing a joint meeting of Congress in the US Capitol in Washington

RIA Novosti,

18 September, 2014

MOSCOW, September 19 (RIA Novosti), Dmitry Babich - Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko is touring the United States and Canada, addressing legislatures and getting standing ovations. The problem is, however, that such an enthusiastic reception in North America and the West in general is usually seen as sort of a bad omen for political leaders from the former Soviet Union.

Nearly ten years ago, the anti-Russian former president of Ukraine, Viktor Yushchenko, was met with the same ovations and flowers on both sides of the Atlantic. Within four years, however, Yushchenko’s presidency had led to a chain of conflicts inside Ukrainian society and he lost the next election, getting a humiliating 4 percent of the vote. The last Soviet president, Mikhail Gorbachev, lost power in 1991 when his popularity in the West was at its peak: “Gorby-mania” culminated in his getting the Nobel Peace prize in late 1990, just as wars were being fought in Nagorno–Karabakh and Moldova.

So much for the kind of leaders who get praise in the modern West and for the “objectivity” of all sorts of committees and endowments (Nobel and otherwise) which lavish praise and prizes on these persons.

Perhaps, instead of listening to Poroshenko’s pronouncements on his “historic” achievements, it makes sense to look at what is going on inside Ukraine. There the situation is remarkably similar to the one which Mr. Gorbachev faced in his native Soviet Union in 1991. A united Ukraine is quickly becoming an impossibility. Mr. Poroshenko is to blame; after his not-quite-fair election in May of this year (the east of Ukraine did not take part in the vote), he became the first Ukrainian leader since the seventeenth century to dispatch Ukrainian troops to fight other Ukrainians. The civil war in the east of the country called the existence of a united Ukraine into question. The events of last week sealed the country’s fate: it became clear that Ukraine’s eastern regions will not be represented in the “big” Ukraine’s Verkhovaya Rada (legislature), and this sealed the fate of “united Ukraine.”

Why did this happen? While Mr. Poroshenko was in the West, his Prime Minister Arseny Yatsenyuk declared that was not going to finance the rebel-held territories in the East (And it is an axiom that the state ends when the money stops flowing). On the top of that, the Party of the Regions (Ukraine’s strongest party under former president Yanukovich, who was violently toppled in February 2014) was harassed into taking the decision not to participate in the parliamentary elections scheduled for October 26. The Communist party of Ukraine is now essentially banned; its faction was expelled from the last parliament. These two new developments mean that the east of Ukraine, the traditional constituency of the “regionals” and communists, simply won’t have even the theoretical opportunity to be represented in the new parliament, which is due to be dominated by the people like the Donbas-bombing military pilot Nadya Savchenko (number one on Yulia Tymoshenko’s Fatherland party list) or the commanders of Donbas-fighting National Guard battalions (two of them are in the top ten in Arseny Yatsenyuk’s People’s Front party).

Until 2014, Ukraine was held together by its democracy. Dysfunctional and corrupt as it was, this democracy allowed the East to elect presidents (Leonid Kuchma, Viktor Yanukovich) and Verkhovaya Rada deputies which promised to represent its interests. This allowed the East to hold the West of the country in check. Western Ukraine is much more active and sometimes violent; it is traditionally dominated by Ukrainian nationalists, who have a long history of grievances against Russia and Poland.

But the last parliament to represent a united Ukraine, which had been democratically elected by both East and West of Ukraine in 2012, was occupied and subdued by the so called “peaceful” Maidan activists in February of this year. Minutes after the Maidan activists entered the Rada building, the last Rada to represent a united Ukraine changed its voting patterns by 180 degrees. Even the liberal faction of the Ukrainian press (for example, Kommersant-Ukraina daily) had to acknowledge that this change hadn’t happened without the menacing influence of the Maidan activists. (For those who still believe these were “peaceful protesters”, a quick Internet search with the words “Kiev” “Molotov cocktails” and “policemen burnt alive” might be helpful.)

Policemen, however, were not the main object of this “peaceful” hatred. The main targets were the leaders and members of the Party of Regions (especially Yanukovich) and the members of the communist faction. The homes of several leaders of the Party of the Regions (Oleg Tsaryov, Vadim Medvedchuk, etc.) were set on fire; the party offices of communists were also routinely ransacked and burnt. The leader of the Communist party of Ukraine, Pyotr Simonenko, was physically assaulted inside the Rada by extremist nationalist deputies – without any legal consequences for them.

In this situation, the only way people in the east of Ukraine (in Donetsk and Lugansk, primarily) can preserve their rights and security is by declaring their own state and steering clear of Mr. Poroshenko’s “united Ukraine,” which has become an alien country for them during the last six months.

And this is the truth that Mr. Poroshenko will never tell his hosts in the US and Canada. Well, he is not the first. Gorbachev also “forgot to mention” during his visits in 1991 that the Soviet Union was finished.

Support For Ukraine's Pro-War Parties Keeps Plunging

Russia Insider,

18 September, 2014

This article originally appeared at Business Insider

Polling of Ukrainian voters since the ceasefire in the civil war was negotiated on September 5 reveals that large, growing majorities of Ukrainians throughout the country are in favour of keeping to the ceasefire terms and stopping hostilities.

The only political party Ukrainian voters say they support to do this is President Petro Poroshenko’s Solidarity bloc, an alliance with Vitaily Klitschko, Yury Lutsenko and Olga Bogomolets.

Ukrainian politicians, including the current Prime Minister Arseny Yatseniuk and former prime minister Yulia Timoshenko, are losing support, the voters say, because they favour war in the Donbass, sanctions against Russia, and military intervention of NATO on Ukrainian territory.

Yatseniuk and Timoshenko are leading blocs they are calling Patriots of Ukraine and Fatherland in the campaign for parliamentary seats to be decided on October 26. On current polling trends, their voters across the country will number less than 5%, the threshold for winning party seats in the new Verkhovna Rada.

Also tested in last week’s polling are figures from western Ukraine, who have dominated the military and police ministries in Kiev until recently, and who are calling for NATO arms and US sanctions to fight Russia until President Vladimir Putin is toppled. They include Oleg Lyashko and his Radical Party; Oleg Tyagnibok’s Svoboda (“Freedom”), and Dmitry Yarosh’s Pravy Sektor (“Right Sector”).

The new poll results show that voter support for them is evaporating since the ceasefire – in the case of Tyagnibok and Yarosh (Svoboda, Pravy Sektor) dwindling to single-digit numbers not larger than the pollster’s measure of statistical error. More than three-quarters of Ukrainian voters, including those who condemn the separatist movement in the Donbass, want a negotiated peace and end to war.

The latest polling has been conducted by the Centre for Social and Marketing Research (SOCIS) in Kiev. Polling by SOCIS ahead of the presidential election on May 25 can be re-read here. A second independent Ukrainian pollster, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS), reported on its survey of parliamentary party preferences two weeks before SOCIS, and can be read here. The KIIS poll sampled 2,040 respondents. The latest SOCIS survey covered 2,800 respondents across the country, except for the areas of fighting in Lugansk and Donetsk regions.

In a measure of general approval for Poroshenko’s performance as president, SOCIS reports that 46% register positive; 26%, negative; 24%, neutral. Asked how conditions in the country have changed for better or worse since Poroshenko’s election in May, 48.4% mentioned improvement in Ukraine’s relations with the US, 46% referred to improvement in relations with the EU. At the same time, 60% responded there has been no improvement in conditions of life. 24% said that corruption has become worse in the country since May.

Asked to identify the main priorities for Ukraine now, 49% opted for resolution of the conflict in Donbass; 38.5% said increased salaries and pensions; 36.6% picked control of inflation; and 33% put unemployment first.

In the SOCIS poll of voter preference, the Poroshenko bloc has more than a fourfold lead over its nearest competitor. Compared to the KIIS survey a fortnight earlier, the latest result shows a five-percentage point gain for Poroshenko among all respondents; and a near-9 point gain among decided voters.

Among the anti-Russian, war party figures, Lyashko’s Radical Party has already peaked and is now dropping, according to the SOCIS measurement. Since July Lyashko’s party preference has fallen by almost five points. Compared to the last KIIS poll at the start of this month, Lyashko’s support appears frozen.

Party preference for Yatseniuk, Timoshenko, and Tyagnibok is dwindling. The size of voter support for the extreme right parties – Svoboda, Pravy Sektor – has remained in the small single digits, so that declines are within the range of statistical error, but the direction is confirmed –their support too is shrinking, not growing.

TRAJECTORY OF PARTY SUPPORT, JANUARY TO SEPTEMBER 2014

Source: http://socis.kiev.ua/

SOCIS also attempted to measure how voters in different regions of the country are currently thinking about the outcome they favour for the civil war. The question asked was: “What do you think is the most appropriate way to resolve the situation in Donbass?” The following tabulation in Ukraine identifies three answers: the first is the war option, taking control of Donbass by military operations; the second is the peace option through granting special status to the Donbass; and the third option is to declare Donbass as occupied territory and seek international support for its return by Russia. The fourth response comprises those who said they were undecided or refused to say.

From left column to right the regional responses are reported from Kiev; the east; Donbass; west; central regions; north; south; and all-Ukraine.

Overall, voter preference for continuing the war is just 23.2%, with 38.2% in favour in Kiev; 34.8% in the western areas of the country; and just 5.8% in Donbass itself. Voters in favour of a peace settlement with special status for Donbass are more numerous, totalling 36.4%. Support for this option is greatest in Donbass (55.8%); 46.8% in the south; and 41.2% in the east. Least support for the peace option is registered in Kiev (22.5%) and the west (22%).

As for the 20.8% of the uncommitted or undecided voters overall, 30.8% are in Donbass; 29.2% in the central regions. In the parts of the country still keenest on war, the proportion of voters surveyed who aren’t sure is not less than 12% (Kiev) and as many as 19% (south). Even in the Catholic, Ukrainian-speaking western regions, almost one voter in five isn’t sure what outcome would be best. The strongest conviction that the war is paying off and worth continuing is concentrated in Kiev.

The Arithmetics of Diplomatic Theatre

Original Opinion – written by Gleb BazovCaveat: the views expressed herein do not necessarily match those of Slavyangrad.ORG

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Slavyangrad,

18 September, 2014

It is impossible to prove or disprove the existence of the divine plan. Russia’s cunning plan in Ukraine belongs to the same category. In analyzing the statements made by Sergei Lavrov in his interview with Russia Beyond the Headlines on September 17, 2014, some commentators have added a third concept—that of diplomatic theatre—to this duality. While it is generally bad form to overanalyze religious beliefs, let us apply some simple mathematics to understand the play behind the curtains of diplomatic theatre.

The concept of diplomatic theatre is understood differently by commentators. Many of the definitions are clearly wrong. Diplomatic theatre is not magic, mysticism, or sleight of hand. The language of diplomacy is far more akin to mathematics than commonly understood. As in mathematics, every word has its place, and no phrase is spoken out of context or frivolously.

The product of a diplomatic equation is directly dependent on the placement of definitions in a string of calculated statements. Like legal language, diplomatic language can be deciphered, broken down into components, and analyzed with precision. To a keen observer, there is nothing mysterious in what diplomats say. Bad diplomacy, on the other hand, is the opposite of this approach. And Lavrov is an excellent diplomat. Accordingly, let us parse out the meaning of Lavrov’s interview without resorting to magic or belief in the guiding hand that can do no wrong.

Setting Out the Equation

Lavrov’s interview contains a wealth of statements with respect to the crisis in Ukraine. Many of them have been made before—Russia’s steadfast commitment to investigating the Odessa massacre, the crash of the Malaysian Airlines Boeing MH17, and the war crimes and crimes against humanity being committed by the Ukrainian troops in Donbass. All of these remarks are laudable, praiseworthy and notable in and of themselves.

However, the immediate, short and medium term future of Novorossiya no longer depends on what happened in Odessa, Mariupol and Slavyansk. Far more important to the existence of the Donetsk and the Lugansk People’s Republics (respectively, “DRP” and “LPR”) is the document executed following consultations in Minsk on September 5, 2014—the Protocol of the Trilateral Contact Group, more commonly known as the Minsk Protocol. Perhaps even more important to the continued existence of the DPR and the LPR is Russia’s commitment to the Minsk Protocol, which Russia signed along with the other participants, and the forms such commitment takes.

For our purposes, the key statements in Lavrov’s interview, which evidence Russia’s understanding of the role and substantive impact of the Minsk Protocol, are excerpted for your convenience below:

1. Our position is absolutely clear: we want peace in Ukraine, which can only be attained through a wide-ranging national dialogue involving all of the country’s regions and political forces.
2. Russia has been actively assisting the emergence of favourable conditions for a peaceful solution to the serious problems confronting Ukraine.
3. … in Minsk on 26 August, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Pyotr Poroshenko stressed the need for an early end to the bloodshed and a transition to the political settlement of the entire set of problems in the country’s southeast.
4. On 3 September, Vladimir Putin proposed a seven-point action plan for stabilizing the Ukrainian crisis.
5. … in Minsk on 5 September, President Poroshenko’s representatives and the leaders of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and the Lugansk People’s Republic (LPR) signed a Protocol with regard to further joint steps aimed at, among other things, implementing the Russian President’s initiative.
6. This understanding is an important step in the process of peaceful crisis settlement in Ukraine and designed to serve as a fulcrum point in starting an internal Ukrainian political dialogue that would seek the way toward national accord.
7. We proceed from the assumption that all provisions of this document should be meticulously met.

We all want peace in Ukraine. While many of us differ in our opinions of the best means to achieve peace, most of Novorossiya’s supporters universally agree that the Minsk Protocol, as it stands, is tantamount to a betrayal of the struggle currently unfolding in the Donbass region. This note is not meant to elaborate on the writer’s opinion in this regard. Suffice it to say, for now, that a more extensive analysis of the Minsk Protocol is in the works. Nor does it matter, for the purpose of this analysis, if you believe that the Minsk Protocol is the solution to the Ukrainian crisis. As you will glean from what follows, so does Russia.

Understanding the Variables

What can we understand from Lavrov’s statements about Russia’s approach to achieving peace in Ukraine? Lavrov states:

“[peace] can only be attained through a wide-ranging national dialogue involving all of the country’s regions and political forces.”

Recalling our discussion of the mathematics of the diplomatic language, this statement is significant because it speaks of only one country, Ukraine, and of the dialogue between all the regions of that country and the political forces within it. Judging by Lavrov’s statement here, Russia considers Novorossiya to be but a union between two constituent and integral regions of Ukraine—the DPR and the LPR—and does not conceive of these entities (or of Novorossiya, for that matter) as sovereign states. Moreover, Russia deems the groups that have been leading the struggle of the Donbass people against the Kiev authorities to be forces internal to Ukraine, rather than leaders of an independent country—Novorossiya.

The same conclusions are inevitable when one considers statements such as “serious problems confronting Ukraine,” or “political settlement of the entire set of problems in the country’s southeast,” or “process of peaceful crisis settlement in Ukraine,” or “fulcrum point in starting an internal Ukrainian political dialogue that would seek the way toward national accord.” All these phrases irrevocably point to the same basic concept underlying Lavrov’s explanation of the Russian policy with respect to Novorossiya—the crisis is not a matter of self-determination of the Donbass people, nor is it evidence of the emergence of a new subject of international relations.

On the contrary, all that has been happening is an internal Ukrainian matter. It is for Ukraine and no one else to deal with. Problems that confront Ukraine ought to be resolved in order to preserve Ukraine’s integrity. Moreover, these problems are not nationwide, but localized issues affecting the country’s southeast. In Russia’s opinion, a Ukrainian national dialogue ought to be pursued to ensure the preservation of the Ukrainian nation as a single entity. Russia believes that a national accord in Ukraine is still possible, and the meaning of Lavrov’s words is clear—Moscow intends to make all the necessary efforts to ensure that such reconciliation is reached.

What has Russia done to secure this goal? Lavrov state that “Russia has been actively assisting the emergence of favourable conditions for a peaceful solution.” He further makes reference to the following specific events:

• the meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Pyotr Poroshenko in Minsk on 26 August, 2014;

• the seven-point action plan proposed by President Vladimir Putin on September 3, 2014; and,

• the execution, on September 5, 2014, of the Minsk Protocol with regard to further joint steps aimed at, among other things, implementing the Russian President’s initiative

In other words, Russia has engaged in a consistent pattern of diplomacy aimed at securing the kind of agreement that was signed in Minsk on September 5, 2014, i.e. the Minsk Protocol. Every statement made by Lavrov in this regard indicates that the Minsk Protocol is the apex of Russia’s diplomatic efforts in resolving the Ukrainian crisis, maintaining the integrity of Ukraine and ensuring the survival of Ukraine as a single national unit.

With so much preparation, effort and work put into the Minsk Protocol, it would be surprising if Russia was negligent in crafting this agreement together with the other participants of the Trilateral Contact Group. And we have no reason to think that she was. On the contrary, the clear implication from everything that Lavrov has said on the subject (including in the interview herein discussed) is that Russia supports each and every provision of the document. But there is no need to convince you with arguments—Lavrov indicated this position very clearly when he stated:

We proceed from the assumption that all provisions of this document should be meticulously met.

There can be no argument on the face of the record. Russia’s position, as elaborated by Lavrov could not be any clearer. The Minsk Protocol must be implemented, in each and every respect. However, this is precisely the point where the proponents of diplomatic theatre as a simulacrum of magic make their strongest case.

The Arithmetics of the Cunning Plan

In the argument of those who see a cunning plan at work behind Lavrov’s words, this statement is a trap carefully laid out for the bumbling Ukrainian halfwits. In fact, the argument goes, Russia expects Ukraine to fail in implementing the Minsk Protocol and is giving Poroshenko as much rope as he desires to hang himself, all the while slyly winking at the DPR and the LPR in a reassuring manner.

An ironclad argument. If there is anything we have learned about the Ukrainian leadership in the course of this conflict (and, in fact, since the early days of the Euromaidan) is that it has a lot of difficulty keeping its word and performing its obligations. Fear not, brave defenders of Novorossiya, you know and we know, and everybody knows that Ukraine will fail, and that is precisely when we will strike, this time—with impunity.

Leaving aside, for the moment, the doubtful assertion of the lack of punitive response (if anything, the West has been eminently clear that it will always take the side of the Ukrainian fascists, whatever happens, and the very instances that Lavrov discusses elsewhere in the interview—the horror of Odessa, the false flag of MH17, and the Ukrainian crimes in the Donbass region—are perfect examples of the West’s resolve to defend Ukraine at all cost), let us examine the likelihood that Ukraine could falter in the implementation of the Minsk Protocol. Even more importantly, let us consider what Russia thinks of Ukraine’s performance to date.

The Traps of Mice and Men

The Minsk Protocol consists of twelve separate measures aimed at resolving the conflict in the Donbass region, which can be grouped as follows:

Political and Legal Measures

3. Implement decentralization of power, including by means of enacting the Law of Ukraine “With respect to the temporary status of local self-government in certain areas of the Donetsk and the Lugansk regions” (Law on Special Status).

6. Enact a law prohibiting the prosecution and punishment of persons in connection with the events that took place in certain areas of the Donetsk and the Lugansk regions of Ukraine.

9. Ensure the holding of early local elections in accordance with the Law of Ukraine “With respect to the temporary status of local self-government in certain areas of the Donetsk and the Lugansk regions” (Law on Special Status).

12. Provide personal security guarantees for the participants of the consultations.

Economic and Social Measures

7. Conduct an inclusive national dialogue.

8. Adopt measures aimed at improving the humanitarian situation in Donbass.

11. Adopt a program for the economic revival of Donbass and the recovery of economic activity in the region.

Measures Aimed at the Cessation of Hostilities

1. Ensure the immediate bilateral cessation of the use of weapons.

2. Ensure monitoring and verification by the OSCE of the regime of non-use of weapons.

4. Ensure permanent monitoring on the Ukrainian-Russian state border and verification by the OSCE, together with the creation of a security area in the border regions of Ukraine and the Russian Federation.

5. Immediately release all hostages and unlawfully detained persons.

10. Remove unlawful military formations, military hardware, as well as militants and mercenaries from the territory of Ukraine.

Let us consider each group in turn in order to understand where Ukraine could go wrong, prompting Russia’s righteous indignation, allowing the Minsk Protocol to be rejected as a yet another agreement botched by the Ukrainian leadership, and triggering the cunning plan behind Lavrov’s masterful diplomatic theatre.

Political and Legal Measures

Political and legal measures are all clauses that Ukraine is responsible for. Moreover, their specific implementation appears to be in Ukraine’s absolute discretion. These clauses contain nothing into which Lavrov could sink the claw of “meticulous performance.”

By error or by design, the political and legal clauses do not provide the specifics of the laws to be enacted by Ukraine pursuant to the Minsk Protocol. Moreover, such laws have already been drafted. Both the Law on Special Status and the amnesty legislation already exist as documents that can be examined and critiqued. Going back to the basic arithmetics of diplomatic language, the interview given by Lavrov was a perfect opportunity for Russia to indicate, clearly and unequivocally, whether Ukraine was complying with its obligations of implementing the political and legal measures called for by the Minsk Protocol.

Not only did Lavrov not demonstrate even a hint of disagreement or displeasure with Ukraine’s steps in this regards, but he failed to even raise these issues. There is nothing left for us but to conclude that Russia is satisfied with Ukraine’s performance of its Minsk Protocol obligations pursuant to clauses 3, 6, 9, and 12.

Economic and Social Measures

The economic and social measures contained in clauses 7, 8, and 11 of the Minsk Protocol are even more lax than the preceding group. Not only are they entirely non-specific, and rather platitudinous, but also there is no explicit or implicit timeframe with respect to their implementation. We do not even need to refer to Lavrov’s interview in evaluating the potential for Ukrainian failure here. Other than an explicit and outright refusal to take these steps, nothing Ukraine does pursuant to these clauses is assailable.

We have already witnessed the kind of “inclusive national dialogue” that Ukraine is fond of the last time there was a ceasefire—it was neither inclusive, nor national. Any improvement over this standard would be lauded as a success and clear evidence of Ukraine’s liberal and progressive stance. It is even simpler with “improving the humanitarian situation in Donbass” and “adopting a program for [its] economic recovery.” It is entirely arguable that the last time Ukraine delivered humanitarian cargo to Slavyansk, which amounted to something like 200 grams of cereals and 100 grams of sugar per resident, it was improving the humanitarian situation in the beleaguered city. Just the same, reviving economic activity in the Donbass region does not necessarily need to result in the reconstruction of even one destroyed factory for the provisions of clause 11 to be satisfied.

Measures Aimed at the Cessation of Hostilties

The real crux of the argument made by the proponents of magical diplomatic theatre lies, of course, in the doubtful performance by Ukraine of the measures aimed at the cessation of hostilities. This is where Ukraine must and will fail. Keen observers of the conflict already know that the ceasefire has been breached, on numerous occasions, by Ukraine, and that it has failed to comply with its obligation to release hostages and unlawfully detained persons. That is the trap! There is no need to even look at the rest of Lavrov statements! Or is there?

Well, of course there is, otherwise this note would not have been leading up to this very moment in a very inelegant fashion. Lavrov states the following:

We note that the ceasefire has been generally observed, although there are isolated incidents in which both sides are blaming the other. The important thing is to prevent them from escalating and leading to renewed hostilities. We are concerned about reports that the Ukrainian siloviki have been concentrating heavy weapons in an area. The Kiev authorities are assuring us that they have no plans to disrupt the ceasefire. We will follow the developments closely. We support the DPR’s and the LPR’s proposal on the urgent deployment of an OSCE observer mission in areas where the conflicting sides are in contact.

The order of priority and modality of measures contained in the Minsk Protocol will be additionally coordinated by the sides. We hope that the effort to implement the document’s provisions will be supported by our foreign partners.

So, a couple of points: according to Russia, the ceasefire has been observed, despite isolated incidents. Moreover, unlike before, Lavrov did not come out in support of Novorossiya by arguing that these isolated incidents have been the fault of the Ukrainian armed forces and its punitive battalions. On the contrary, he takes a neutral stance by stating that “both sides are blaming each other” for these isolated incidents. This statement is solely to the benefit of Ukraine, which is to blame, at the very least, for the majority of ceasefire breaches, and represents a marked departure from the usual Russian policy of wholeheartedly supporting the people of Donbass.

With respect to Ukraine’s steps to concentrate troops and heavy weapons for a renewed assault on Novorossiya, Lavrov again departs significantly from Russia’s previous rhetoric in this conflict. Instead of, as before, referring to Ukraine’s pattern of failing to keep its word, he seems to take Kiev’s assurances that “they have no plans to disrupt the ceasefire” with a cold, but tacit acceptance. Finally, he applauds the DPR’s and the LPR’s “proposal” to deploy OSCE observers (he terms it a proposal even though it is a measure required by the Minsk Protocol), but does not criticize the lack of Ukrainian participation therein.

As for the other provisions of the measures aimed at the cessation of violence, Lavrov does not even mention them, and we are left to conclude that Russia has no grievance with the manner in which Ukraine has been complying with its obligations in this regard. In fact, there is absolutely nothing in Lavrov’s interview indicating that Moscow considers Kiev to be anything other than an obstinate, but still a trustworthy partner in the long journey toward the implementation of the Minsk Protocol and the achievement of lasting national peace.

For most of us, Lavrov’s failure to condemn Ukraine for the many dozens of victims that died at the hands of Kiev’s forces since the ceasefire came into effect is not only telling, but also monstrous. But it is not monstrous per se, it is simply an expression of Russian policy with respect to Ukraine and the implementation of the Minsk Protocol—Russia wants it to succeed, as written and executed. Russia is willing to overlook Kiev’s breaches. There is no hidden agenda, and there is no impenetrable political theatre.

Conclusion

The intentions of the Russian leadership are clear—unless Ukraine attacks again, Moscow will do whatever it takes to compel Novorossiya to comply with the Minsk Protocol. One could add “in order to bring about lasting peace,” but it should be clear to most of us that no lasting peace can be secured through the implementation of this agreement and that no reconstruction or revival of Donbass will ever come to pass if the Minsk Protocol is fulfilled.

If you intend to lay out a trap, do not hide it in the bag. A diplomatic trap is a matter of making your claims known. If you do not stake out the basis for a future argument, no one will ever hear it or agree with it. Nowhere in his interview does Lavrov give any indication that Russia is anything other than carefully confident in the success of the Minsk Protocol. Moreover, despite all manner of breaches of the ceasefire by Ukraine, Lavrov does not acknowledge them or set out a basis for later claiming that Ukraine was the culprit that destroyed its own chances for lasting peace. On the contrary, Lavrov’s words whitewash the atrocities that Ukraine has engaged in since the ceasefire came into effect. There is no cunning plan or sabotage here—Russia’s intentions are clear: the Minsk Protocol shall be.

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Postscriptum: 

There is one possibility that was not discussed in the analysis above—the possibility that Lavrov and Russia are simply being deceitful about their apparent acceptance of Ukraine’s conduct since the commencement of the ceasefire or about Russia’s acceptance of the Minsk Protocol in general. There is a reason why this possibility is discussed as a postscriptum. While diplomats are usually sly and misleading, such outright deception would do more damage to Russia’s international reputation than any fabricated evidence that the West has brought to the table to date. A diplomat who deceives is no diplomat at all. And, for that reason, I choose to believe that Russia is forthright in what it says.

Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania to form joint military force

Ukraine, Poland, and Lithuania have agreed to launch a joint military force which is expected to hold its first drill next year.

RT,

19 September, 2014

The defense ministers of the three states signed the agreement in Warsaw on Friday, in the presence of Polish President Bronislaw Komorowski.

Polish defense officials told Reuters that LITPOLUKRBRIG (Lithuanian–Polish–Ukrainian Brigade) could take part in peacekeeping operations or, if necessary, form the basis of a NATO battle group in the region.

Lithuania and Poland are NATO members, while Ukraine’s recent appeal for a special status outside the bloc was turned down by US president Barack Obama.

“I hope that it will be possible to hold the first [LITPOLUKRBRIG] exercises in one year," Komorowski said, adding that the creation of the unit “is part of a wider plan...to support Ukraine, among others, in the area of modernization.”

The Polish president stressed that the deal signing proves the trio's commitment to security in the region.

He also expressed regret that LITPOLUKRBRIG wasn’t formed earlier, and that the sides will now have to make up for lost time.

The newly formed brigade will have its headquarters in the eastern Polish city of Lublin, situated not far from the country’s border with Ukraine.

The size of the unit is yet to be determined, according to Polish Defense Ministry spokeswoman Anna Klissaid.

However, Interfax-Ukraine news agency reported that 545 Ukrainian troops, 3000-3800 Polish servicemen, and 150-350 soldiers from Lithuania will form the brigade.

According to Polish TVN21 channel, the subunits forming the brigade will remain at their usual dislocation points in Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine, and will only get together for exercises and military missions.

The idea to create LITPOLUKRBRIG was generated in 2007, when Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine decided to establish a joint battalion.

A year later, those plans were adjusted to a more ambitious project of putting together an entire brigade uniting Ukrainian, Lithuanian, and Polish troops.

The three states have been on high alert following Russia’s reunion with the Republic of Crimea in March and the start of Kiev’s military operation against Ukraine’s southeastern regions, which demanded federalization of the country.

Ukraine, Poland, and Lithuania blame Russia for masterminding the unrest and providing anti-Kiev rebels with weapons and troops.

However, no convincing proof has been provided to back the claims, which have been repeatedly denied by Moscow.

Verkhovny Sovet of the Donetsk People's Republic unanimously voted down the proposed memorandum on the implementation of the Minsk Protocol

---Vladimir Suchan

Both sides in Ukraine conflict sign treaty banning military action

Kiev and self-defense forces signed a memorandum aimed at effectively halting all fighting in eastern Ukraine after talks in Minsk. It creates a buffer zone, demands a pullback of troops and mercenaries, and bans military aviation flybys over the area.

RT,

19 September, 2014

READ MORE: Obama declines to give Ukraine 'lethal aid' despite Poroshenko's plea

The signed memorandum consists of nine points, former Ukrainian president Leonid Kuchma told journalists following peace talks in Minsk, Belarus.

“The first one is stopping the use of weapons by both sides, the second is terminating new formations of units on military bases as of September 19. The third is banning the use of all types of weapons and offensive action,” Kuchma said.

The agreement outlines a buffer zone of 30 km (18.6 miles) and bans all military aircraft from flying over part of eastern Ukrainian territory, except for the OSCE's aerial vehicles, Kuchma told RIA Novosti following the meeting.

Ukraine troops must pull back all heavy artillery by 15 kilometers from the conflict zone in eastern Ukraine, the treaty states.

Ukrainian servicemen ride on an armoured vehicle near the eastern Ukrainian town of Pervomaysk, September 17, 2014. (Reuters/David Mdzinarishvili)

All foreign mercenaries must be withdrawn from eastern Ukraine by both sides of the conflict, the signed Minsk memorandum states, according to Kuchma. 
“We have agreed on the withdrawal of all foreign mercenaries from both sides,” Kuchma said.

Both sides also vowed to continue the exchange of prisoners.

The OSCE has been tasked to monitor that both sides adhere to the memorandum’s conditions. The organization’s observers will be sent to observe the situation along the entire zone of the ceasefire, Itar-Tass reported.

Five hundred OSCE observers will be sent to monitor the ceasefire in eastern Ukraine, Lugansk People’s Republic representative Aleksey Karyakin said, adding that the meeting was quite difficult.

“We were able to substantially increase the number of OSCE observers in the conflict zone from 300 to 500,” he said.

The negotiations were also attended by Russia’s OSCE representatives.

Early on Saturday, the third convoy of Russian humanitarian aid has crossed the border into Ukraine, Itar-Tass reported. The convoy consists of around 200 vehicles carrying some two tons of aid to the residents of southeastern Ukraine – including cereals, canned food, generators, medicine, warm clothes, and bottled water.

Meanwhile, the prime minister of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic, Aleksandr Zakharchenko, declared that there will be “no Ukrainian election” in Donetsk, referring to one of the conditions set out in the September 5 Minsk protocol, which gave special status to the Donetsk and Lugansk regions, both located in eastern Ukraine.

Zakharchenko said he considers the special status as a declaration of independence of the self-proclaimed republics.

The memorandum follows a more general ceasefire agreement signed on September 5, which outlined a peace roadmap negotiated by Ukraine’s President Petro Poroshenko and representatives of the self-proclaimed republics of Donetsk and Lugansk.

READ MORE: Minsk protocol: Ukraine to be decentralized, special status for Lugansk, Donetsk

Despite the agreement, there have been numerous reports of truce violations since then. Both troops and anti-government fighters blame each other for sporadic shootings.

On Tuesday, the Ukrainian parliament approved laws on a special status for the Donetsk and Lugansk regions, as well as amnesty for those participating in the hostilities. Both points were originally outlined in the September 5 agreement.

READ MORE: Special status to E. Ukraine regions, amnesty to combatants - parliament

The law guarantees the right to use and study Russian or any other language in Ukraine. It also states that local elections are to take place in the regions on December 7.

The law will be valid for three years, but could be terminated in six months if order is not restored, according to the Ukrainian president’s advisor, Igor Gryniv.

Quite symbolic images of the opening of the new rounds of talks in Minsk: the world is big, then it comes down to relatively a few people holding in their hands the fates of so many. A big circle with lots of empty space all around. How many real people are in that room? And why "trilateral talks" exclude the fourth--the OSCE, the other EU and West proxy there

Message from Igor Strelkov

20.09.14 2:49 Message from Igor Ivanovich Strelkov

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"Actually came to pass then, "what has long been talked about by the Bolsheviks" - ukri overcame panic, reformed, prepared for new fights and clearly demonstrate that they agree on only one scenario - the complete capitulation of Russia in the new Russia. "Brilliant success peacekeepers" grouping Surkov-Lavrov-Zurabov again bring the President to the same choice that was a month ago: or decisive war (now with even greater losses and expenses), or shameful capitulation (hereinafter - the Crimea and the script Milosevic"). For the sake of it and stopped fighting. It remains only to ask the question: how long Surkov will be able to blatantly deceive GDP, revealing their "virtual success" for real achievements? And how long the President is confident that Surkov and To remain under his control? In his time the deposed Napoleon said at St. Helena (close to the text): "if I have hung Talleyrand and Fouche, I would now ruled France!" And this was a great statesman, who was also confident that easily "beat" mischief in their environment...

Who says that "everything is bad"? It will be bad only if the President will make a suicidal step, taking podsovyvaya as "the only solution" conditions of the Party of treason. And the last steps and rhetoric any rag-tag (starting from the buffoon of irica) suggests that one "pass" the new Russia is not going to. Only bad thing is that the new policy still trying to hold the "old hands" - that is, through people, which it organically otherwise. Accordingly, the results are no good, and instead of the brilliant success - continuous losses and ridiculous antics around a variety of "open secrets" (this is when the whole world knows, and its population is not)".

20.09.14 2:49 Сообщение от Стрелкова Игоря Ивановича

"Собственно, сбылось то, "о чем так долго говорили большевики" - укры преодолели панику, переформировались, подготовились к новым боям и ясно демонстрируют, что они согласны лишь на один вариант развития событий - полную капитуляцию России в Новороссии. "Блестящие успехи миротворцев" группировки Суркова-Лаврова-Зурабова вновь подводят Президента к тому же самому выбору, что стоял месяц назад: или решительная война (теперь с еще большими потерями и затратами), или позорная капитуляция (далее - Крым и "сценарий Милошевича"). Ради этого и останавливались боевые действия. Остается только задать вопрос: как долго еще Сурков сможет откровенно обманывать ВВП, выдавая свои "виртуальные успехи" за реальные достижения? И как долго Президент будет уверен в том, что Сурков и Ко остаются под его контролем? В своё время свергнутый Наполеон сказал на Святой Елене (близко к тексту): "если бы я вовремя повесил Талейрана и Фуше, я бы и сейчас правил Францией!" И это говорил великий государственный деятель, который тоже был уверен, что легко "переиграет" интриганов в своем окружении...

Кто говорит, что "всё плохо"? Плохо будет только в том случае, если Президент совершит самоубийственный шаг, приняв подсовываемые в качестве "единственного решения" условия Партии измены. А последние шаги и риторика всякой шушеры (начиная от скомороха Жирика) свидетельствуют о том, что никто "сдавать" Новороссию не собирается. Плохо только то, что новую политику все еще пытаются проводить "старыми руками" - т.е. через людей, которым она органически противна. Соответственно и результаты никуда не годятся и вместо блестящих успехов - сплошные потери и нелепые кривляния вокруг разнообразных "секретов полишинеля" (это когда весь мир знает, а собственное население - нет)".