What
Makes Strelkov Feel "Melancholy" - Military-Political
Situation Report, July 20, 2014
Note:
this article is dated July 20th because it took 2 days to translate
it. I think that this is a *must read* for all those who wonder about
the nature of the ugle behind-the-scenes infighting between various
Russian groups about the future of Novorussia. A huge "thank
you!!!" to all those who helped translate this most interesting
text.
The
Saker
-------
What
Makes Strelkov Feel "Melancholy" - Military-Political
Situation Report, July 20, 2014
by
Boris Rozhin aka "Colonel Cassad"
Some
genuinely do not understand why, for some time now, along with his
usual military briefings, Strelkov has been making fairly pessimistic
statements. In reality, the reasons here are fairly transparent.
The
Change in the Russian Political Line
In
May-June, when the political line that changed in April (the question
of military intervention was taken off the agenda on April 24)
progressively started to influence the operational-tactical situation
on Donbass, the hostilities also gradually gained momentum, leading
to a scenario in which an irregular militia was forced to fight
against a regular army. At the stage when the seizure of power in
Donetsk, Lugansk and Slavyansk occurred, this scenario was not
initially planned for – everyone was betting on the recognition by
the Russian Federation and the intervention by the Russian army.
After
the commencement of hostilities and the change in the political line,
the agenda became dominated by the question of tacit assistance. So
you can understand it from Strelkov’s example, all he had during
the three months of fighting in Slavyansk was 2-2.5 thousand men
(wielding light arms and heavy machine guns, automatic grenade
launchers, ATGMs (many of them non-functional), a few MANPADS, and so
on), only 3 tanks, as well as an IS-3 monument taken off the
pedestal, several BMPs and BMDs, 4 or 5 Nonas, and several 12.7mm and
23mm calibre antiaircraft guns. This is about the size of one column
from the Voyentorg “military supplies store” that the Junta now
records almost daily.
That
is about all that Strelkov received sitting in Slavyansk for 3
months, and the meager size of this aid was apparent from the amount
of equipment that was taken out of Slavyansk at the end and by the
very modest trophies that the Junta was able to demonstrate [after
taking Slavyansk] (1 BMD, a batch of inoperative ATGMs, a few
automatic rifles, and several mortar shells). That is about all that
kept Slavyansk, Kramatorsk, Nikolayevka, Semyonovka, Krasniy Liman,
and other settlements from falling into the hands of the enemy,
despite the manpower ratio of 1 to 3.5-4.5 in favour of the Ukrainian
army. In other words, it must be understood that, from the standpoint
of weaponry, aid was coming in, but in the amounts entirely
insufficient to fight an enemy grouping totaling up to 10-12 thousand
men, even without taking into account the tanks, the artillery and
the air force.
Strelkov's
Appeals for Assistance That is why, with the development of
hostilities and the outpacing rate of the enemy’s concentration of
its forces, Strelkov started openly to make complaints, the general
sense of which could be boiled down to the message that the aid was
insufficient. Nevertheless, the curators of Russian policies in
Donbass (and this was, first and foremost, Surkov, who was given
partial reigns of control over Russian policies in Donbass, while, at
the same time, Volodin was pushed to the side) fairly calmly
contemplated how the Junta slowly, but surely enveloped Slavyansk,
closing the ring of the operational encirclement.
Equally
as calmly, they contemplated the enclave in Soledar (which has been
defended by the Junta spetsnaz forces – 150-200 men – since the
beginning of March), where over 1 million units of light arms were
kept, making their way into the hands of the Militia for money (the
trade started approximately at the end of April – beginning of May,
when the sides of the conflict were noted massively to be armed with
old weaponry). In fact, Strelkov himself wrote in the spring that
they were forced to buy weapons from the Junta officers.
Also,
over the 3 months period, no intelligible assault was organized on
the tank base in Artymovosk, despite the fact that even pessimistic
estimates suggested that there were 20-25 battle-worthy tanks,
without even taking account the possibility of repairing other
more-or-less preserved units at the expense of the non-functional
ones. Over the months, no one bothered to take the base, let alone
create a group to de-blockade Slavyansk by conducting strikes against
the columns of the Junta enveloping the city, which would have
enabled the Militia to continue to retain Slavyansk, Kramatorsk and
so forth.
Despite
the fact that Slavyansk was being encircled and was, finally,
encircled, no one in Donetsk moved a muscle to assist. Sheer heresy
was started to be written about Strelkov’s briefings, to wit “if
Strelkov is melancholic, success is not far behind,” even though,
looking at his briefings now, they objectively reflected the
worsening situation near Slavyansk. The reasons why Strelkov was
ignored are fairly obvious – while he fought in Slavyansk,
negotiations between Surkov’s people and Akhmetov’s people were
being conducted through Donetsk. Moreover, in the city itself, a
conspiracy to surrender the city to the Junta was developing. You can
read about the political underpinnings of these processes here, where
they are covered in greater details: Colonel Cassad LiveJournal.
Strelkov's
Breakout from Slavyansk and Its Significance
On
July 2nd, the battles for Nikolayevka commenced, leading to the loss
of control over the last significant highway that enabled supplies to
flow to Slavayansk. Strelkov grew more “melancholic,” as it
became obvious that Slavyansk, along with him and the garrison, were
written off, and that no one was going to come to their aid. On July
2nd-3rd, when street battles still persisted in the surrounded
Nikolayevka, where Motorola’s unit continued their heroic
resistance (even despite the betrayal of two field commanders who
stripped the irflank of defences), a decision to break out of the
encirclement was adopted in Slavyansk; it must be understood that
this decision had both a military and a political component –
Strelkov was warned from Moscow that a surrender of Donetsk was being
prepared.
In
the night of July 4th-5th, the Militia effected a successful
breakout, sustaining only minimal casualties. In doing this, Strelkov
thwarted the secret negotiations being conducted between Surkov’s
people and the people of Akhmetov and Kolomoiskiy (through
Kurginyan’s people). The gist of these negotiations was an attempt
by near-Kremlin circles to coordinate with the Ukrainian oligarchs
the question of a “large Transnistria,” to be fashioned out of
the Lugansk and the Donetsk Republics, at the head of which would
have been Oleg Tsaryov, with a part of the financing flows feeding
the South-East being locked on him.
In
these contacts were implicated the mayor of Donetsk, Lukjanchenko
(who has since fled to Kiev), the speaker of the Novorossiya
Parliament, Pushilin (since dismissed from his position of his own
volition), DPR minister of State Security, Khodakovskiy (since
dismissed from his position as a minister, with Batallion Vostok
having been transformed into a brigade and operationally subordinated
to Strelkov’s staff), and police general Pozhidayev (the local
command of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was purged almost
immediately after the arrival of Strelkov’s brigade in Donetsk).
All these people were, in one way or another, connected to Akhmetov.
Antjufeev was sent to cleanse the upper echelons of DPR, following
which a series of dismissals took place.
The
Secret Collusion is Thwarted and the Hostilities Explode
As
soon as Strelkov’s retreat from Slavyansk scuttled the secret
negotiations, hostilities across the entire front sharply activated –
Ukrainian oligarchs, who were contact with Moscow, immediately became
the targets of a mass media campaign. Following contacts between
Kolomoiskiy’s deputy, Korban, and a person from Kurginyan’s
circles, the campaign against Kolomoiskiy in the Ukrainian mass media
took on wide-scale proportions, including even traditional SBU
[Ukrainian Security Service] leaks, such as the discussion about the
preparation of a harassment campaign against Lyashko, the goal of
which was to turn the Nazi radicals against one of their sponsors.
At
the same time, open declarations by Kolomoiskiy, Filatov and Korban
that time had come to confiscate Akhmetov’s property were no longer
finding support in the mass media. The Junta mass media en masse
defended Akhmetov, who had already given up Mariupol to the Junta and
was preparing the groundwork for Donetsk to be surrendered. After the
negotiations were thwarted, the Junta completely ceased to have any
scruples about destroying cities and the infrastructure (there was no
longer any chance that they could be obtained without battle through
a collusion with the curators of Kurginyan and co.), as control over
Donbass could only be established in a military manner.
Immediately
following this, almost right away, the Militia gained access to a
fairly significant number of tanks, BMPs, artillery (D-30 howitzers
and Govzdika self-propelled artillery systems), and MLRS. To make the
point clear, in one week the Militia obtained more heavy armour and
military equipment than over the entire preceding three months. This
immediately led to operational successes – the “Southern
Cauldron” was formed, and the Junta offensive that began on July
1st, became bogged down on all directions by July 13th-14th. It is
quite obvious that if the aid that has been provided in July had come
in May, in the same quantities, then the battles would have now been
taking place somewhere in the vicinity of Izyum, rather than near
Donetsk.
Insufficient
Piecemeal Military Assistance
At
the same time, even despite the ongoing material and technical
assistance, which was provided, and continues to be provided, the
Junta’s rates of accumulating manpower and military equipment are
still higher (without even taking into account the material,
technical and organizational assistance from the United States and
from NATO). That is why, due to the overall numerical superiority in
manpower and military equipment, the Junta regrouped and continued
its offensive despite the defeat, attacking the weaker sections of
the front (the Militia simply has insufficient manpower and military
equipment to defend everything equally well).
For
clarity – Strelkov broke through to Donetsk from Slavyansk with 1
tank, 3 Nonas and several BMDs/BMPs. To his aid came 4 tanks, 3
Gvozdika self-propelled artillery units and several BTRs/BMPs;
somewhat earlier a few Grad MLRS turned up near Donetsk. All this
equipment is spread over the wide front that stretches from
Snezhnoye, through Donetsk, to Gorlovka, and, from there, to
Mozogovoi’s zone of responsibility. Whatever Strelkov could spare
for Mozgovoi, he has sent off to him. At this time, his military
equipment is tied up in the battles for Marinovka (DPR) and the
airport, while also ensuring the defence of Donetsk and Gorlovka. He
just does not have sufficient forces for anything more.
In
fact, his continuing pessimistic statements arise from an objective
assessment of the real balance of forces at the front. Fantasies of
the “a bullet is dumb, but a bayonet is true” and “so what if
the enemy has a lot of tanks and aircraft, we will break them with
our fighting spirit and prayers” kind naturally can have no effect
on the difficult operational situation. And that is why Strelkov’s
“melancholy” is essentially a way to convey through the public
(where he enjoys widespread support) to the government that he needs
more weaponry and military equipment. It is understood that requests
like this are also passed on through closed channels – in a more
objective and less emotional manner. But this is just one aspect of
the problem.
The
Political Dimensions of Strelkov's "Melancholy"
The
second aspect of Strelkov “melancholic” statements is a political
one. The failure of the defeatists’ faction in the conspiracy to
surrender Donetsk did not at all lead to their elimination. It is not
difficult to glean from the continuing informational campaign against
Strelkov that his presence in Donetsk obviously inhibits the plans of
the collusion with the oligarchs and the Junta with respect to the
future of Novorossiya.
Strelkov
wants to continue fighting and to advance on Kiev, but to do this he
requires men and arms, which he receives in insufficient quantities.
And because this idea enjoy widespread public support, it is not
possible to conduct open negotiations about the future of the “larger
Transnistria” with the Junta and the oligarchs. In essence,
Strelkov is not allowing to die the idea of the “larger
Novorossiya” – an idea which Surkov and co. already wrote off,
for the most part, in the spring.
In
other words, Strelkov is a political hindrance in the way of the
attempts to effect a political exchange of Ukraine for DPR and LPR.
And that is why he will continue to be blamed for all mortal sins
(today, the provocateur Kurginyan, in Dorenko’s best style, gave
birth to the idea that Strelkov allegedly wanted to shoot down Putin,
and, if we follow his reasoning, ended up hitting the Boeing), so as
to clear the scene for a future collusion with the Nazi Junta about
the future of DPR and LPR.
At
the same time, military aid to DPR will be apportioned so as to keep
the resistance from collapsing entirely (the version of complete
abandonment of DPR and LPR appears to the Kremlin to be too
burdensome), while simultaneously trying to chop off the assistance
channels organized by the public – resources of informational
support for DPR and LPR are being blocked, accounts are being closed,
including through collusion between Russian banks and SBU and its
curators. Junta’s provocation with the Boeing has already been
picked up by the Russian faction of defeatists, who are, in effect,
playing into the hands of the Junta propaganda machine by floating
suppositions that Strelkov and the Militia stand behind the downing
of the aircraft.
The
Attack on DPR - from Without and from Within
In
other words, the attack on DPR is, essentially, two-fold – on the
one hand, there is the United States, its satellites and the Junta,
and, on the other hand, the Russian comprador-defeatists and their
mass media servants, such as Kurginyan. The floating of the idea
about Putin, whom Strelkov allegedly attempted to kill, is necessary
to create the conditions for someone in the highest echelones to give
the go-ahead for the cessation of support to Strelkov. In other
words, the necessary picture is being painted for the highest
leadership of the Russian Federation, equally as much as for the
public.
The
gist of the operation is the following: (1) discredit Strelkov in the
mass media (start taking note of those who participate in this
campaign – by considering this wave you will be able easily to
determine which of the talking heads are tied to Surkov and those who
are preparing the groundwork for collusion with the Nazi Junta –
they are the ones who constitute the mass media infrastructure of the
real fifth column, and not the liberal buffoons who are usually
represented as such); and (2) prepare the groundwork for his
replacement.
If
to implement this plan it would require the surrender of Mozgovoi or
a part of the territory around Donetsk, this possibility cannot be
excluded because it was exactly in this manner that, very recently,
they tried to prepare the groundwork for the “heroic death of
Strelkov in Slavyangrad.” The “heroic death of Mozgovoi in
Lisichansk” might become a very convenient opportunity to continue
attacks on Strelkov, who, they would argue, was unable to support him
– with all of his 4 tanks.
Their
ideal option is to subordinate the military command of DPR to Surkov
and Co., so as to preclude any independence, and then to start
negotiations with the Junta. While Strelkov, and such field commander
as Mozgovoi, are alive, these plans have plainly stalled, and the
defeatists are forced to spend time and political capital on
Strelkov’s elimination. For Strelkov, the attack is obvious, and
that is why, same as he did before, he continues to communicate to
the society and the government, through public means, the simple idea
that it will be impossible to backstab him that easily (i.e. that he
will not go gentle into that good night [Note: original – he will
not go silently to be sacrificed]) and that to win this war real aid
is required, therebu appealing to the “war faction”, which
provides real (rather than token PR) deliveries of aid and which is
interested in spreading the insurrection beyond the boundaries of
Donbass.
The
Fork in the Road Demands Decisive Action
Understandably,
he is not a lone wolf and that there are structures in Moscow that
support him – otherwise, he would long ago have been buried
somewhere near Slavyansk. And the generalized essence of all this
fuss in Moscow consists in the fact that the options proposed by
Strelkov are simple and clear, and Strelkov formulates them
pessimistically – either the war is conducted more actively on the
territory of Ukraine, or a capitulation and the transfer of the
hostilities onto the territory of the Russian Federation will follow.
And over the backdrop of the “all is lost, all has been given
up”-style hysterics, this evaluation indicates a realistic fork in
the road, which has been obvious since May.
Strelkov
does not say “all is lost” – he says that the trend is
unfavourable. And the development of the situation continues to
confirm his conclusions. The defeatists’ faction, which increased
its influence following the decision in April not to intervene
militarily, is still trying to occupy two diverging chairs of war and
capitulation, in the hopes of achieving an agreement with the Nazi
Junta (which Strelkov is preventing) and the Ukrainian oligarchs.
They hope, in the end, to secure an outcome that can be represented
over the backdrop of the declarations made in February-March 2014 as
something other than a complete surrender.
In
this scenario, Strelkov, whatever his own views may be, has long ago
become a symbol for those who wish to continue the fight either for
the entirety of Ukraine or at least for a part of it. Strelkov’s
opponents, on the other hand, have long ago written off Ukraine and
are now attempting to find a way to escape this situation, so as not
to cause unrest in Russia proper, even if, over the long term, the
surrender of Ukraine will have the most catastrophic consequences for
Russia itself.
And
while this confrontation continues, Strelkov will continue to feel
“melancholic” and “sad” until the moment when the choice
between the two obviously unpleasant decisions is made. Or until the
moment of his death, when both unpleasant decisions will be realized
at once.
July
22nd combat SITREP by Juan
1.
Donetsk, Lugansk and surrounding towns and villages being bombarded
ceaselessly by Uke forces using every weapon in their possession,
Grad, Hurricane, Tornado and Smerch MLRS and arty up to 20.3 cm.
2.
In last 4 days over 300 civilians in the aforementioned areas have
been killed and a like number and more wounded. Civilian and
industrial areas completely devoid of any Army of Novorossiya
facilities and troops are targeted as is infrastructure such as gas,
water and electric services.
3.
Shoot down of MH17 has focused all world eyes on the aircraft. The
Ukes are using this to unleash an assault on the civilians of
Novorossiya with unprecedented savagery. Entire MLRS volleys are
being fired in to cities, towns and villages away from the prying
eyes of the press.
4.
The Cauldron has not been reduced. Although the remaining two
battalions of airborne and armor troops have been decimated and have
lost most of their equipment and transport both are still dangerous.
5.
The Ukes are pressing Army of Novorossiya very strong. There has been
a noticeable change of tactics in some areas of fighting by the Ukes,
obviously a change of command or advisors.
6.
Heavy fighting around both Lugansk and Donetsk Aerodromes. Neither
side seems to have an advantage.
7.
Situation in and around Slavyansk and Kramatorsk is grave. Little
food and water, some electric in certain areas. Many roads blocked by
Uke block posts. Military age men and some women are still being
arrested.
8.
The fate of the Militsiya detachments from Slavyansk and Kramatorsk
arrested after Strelkov withdrew are still unknown. No information or
contact to any of their families since 05 July afternoon.
9.
Travel by private vehicle in areas of Novorossiya from the Kherson
Oblast/Novorossiya border is dangerous. In the countryside at some
small road intersections there are one, two or three civilian cars
and trucks with the occupants shot dead.
10.
At one intersection of two country dirt roads two cars are shot.
Lying beside one of the cars are three local villagers, one man and
two women, obviously shot to death while trying to either help the
wounded occupants of a car or trying to remove the bodies. Locals are
terrified and rarely leave their villages. Crops are untended.
11.
One small natsgardia/right sector unit of 8 was ambushed in
Kherson/Novorossiya Border area by unknown assailants and their
bodies left neatly arranged along the forest path, weapons and
equipment removed by unknown personnel. Near the ambush sight a young
woman was found dead. She had been outraged and murdered.
12.
Civilian travel in east and southern areas of Kherson Oblast can be
dangerous. In the areas north of the Krimea/Kherson Oblast border
numerous patrols of natsgarda/right sector.
13.
Vehicles and the few trains coming to Krimea from Kherson Oblast are
searched for valuables and most of the military age men detained and
taken 'to the office'. They either pay a large bribe to be allowed to
continue to Krimea or are press ganged in to Uke service and sent to
the fronts.
14.
The refugee situation in Krimea is difficult. No one is left without
succor that need it. As in reports from Cassad and Strelkov there are
many entire families of refugees fleeing to Krimea, arriving in cars
and vans packed with personal belongings, food and drink, vehicles
often with the tell tale 'special' license number arrangements.
Russia tells all they will be moved to other oblasti in Russia. Many
of this category of refugees demand to be housed 'near the beaches',
demand refugee status and demand services.
15.
35000 refugees are in Krimea alone, over 300000 refugees have fled to
Rostov Oblast and many moved to other oblasti. It is estimated that a
like number of refugees are staying with family and friends in
Russian Federation. Another 50000 have fled west to Ukeland.
16.
In the area around the MH17 crash scene the Ukes are using the local
truce for the crash investigation to move and gather units for an
assault designed to split Donetsk from Lugansk. OSCE and foreign
press on sight fail to see armored columns gathering in the general
area.
I
hope this is nothing, but am passing on what I picked up on Facebook
Graham
Phillips missing at Donetsk airport
Пропал
английский журналист Грэм Филлипс.
Обстоятельства - выехал с группой
журналистов в район аэропорта Донецк.
Журналисты, что были с ним, отказались
ехать дальше, ибо это было чрезвычайно
опасно.
Журналист "пресс-службы ДНР" Вадим убедил Грэма пойти дальше (метров 100 до аэропорта), после чего связь с ними пропала. Через определенное время этот Вадим С ТЕЛЕФОНА Грэма позвонил журналистам и попросил вновь подъехать к аэропорту.
Варианты. Или Грэм попал в плен, а при помощи русскоговорящего журналиста туда выманивают остальных журналистов, или все совсем плохо.
Очень надеюсь, что с журналист жив и все нормально, но в таких ситуациях лучше перетруханить.
Журналист "пресс-службы ДНР" Вадим убедил Грэма пойти дальше (метров 100 до аэропорта), после чего связь с ними пропала. Через определенное время этот Вадим С ТЕЛЕФОНА Грэма позвонил журналистам и попросил вновь подъехать к аэропорту.
Варианты. Или Грэм попал в плен, а при помощи русскоговорящего журналиста туда выманивают остальных журналистов, или все совсем плохо.
Очень надеюсь, что с журналист жив и все нормально, но в таких ситуациях лучше перетруханить.
British
journalist that he went with a group of journalists to Donetsk
airport . The journalists who were with him, refused to go on, for it
was extremely dangerous.
The journalist of "the press service DND" Vadim convinced Graham to go further (100 metres to the airport), after which they were lost. Over time, this Vadim PHONE Graham called the journalists and asked again to drive to the airport.
Options:
The journalist of "the press service DND" Vadim convinced Graham to go further (100 metres to the airport), after which they were lost. Over time, this Vadim PHONE Graham called the journalists and asked again to drive to the airport.
Options:
Either
Graham was captured, and with the help of a professional journalist
there entice other journalists, or it's that bad.
I hope that he is alive and everything is OK, but.....?
An update - 20.00 NZT (12.00 Moscow time)I hope that he is alive and everything is OK, but.....?
А
Грэма так и не вижу, еще и мои пропали.
Достала эта вонючая война
I
still haven't seen Graham as well as some of my own people. This war
stinks.
Graham's latest video -
Shells fired from the territory of explode in the Rostov region
Выпущенные с территории Украины снаряды разорвались в Ростовской области
http://russian.rt.com/article/42040#ixzz38GLtrM4aThree of ammunition issued by Ukraine, exploded in the territory of the farm Primisskiy in the Rostov region. Two shells landed on the territory of the village, at 20:10 GMT, the third - bit later, said the representative of the southern customs Ryan farukshin.
Employees of the customs post Kujbyshevo were evacuated, according to RIA Novosti. At the moment specialists, where it exploded shells, and does damage.
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