Putin
And Merkel Tango In Moscow, Gazprom Stirs Up Old Ghosts, But Deals
Are Signed
17
November, 2012
Last
week, the German Parliament passed a resolution that asked Chancellor
Angela Merkel to needle Russian President Vladimir Putin about the
resurgence of repressive, antidemocratic tendencies in Russia. It did
not go unnoticed at the Kremlin. And it paved the way, so to speak,
for her trip to Moscow on Friday—to re-cement their “strategic
partnership.”
Complaints
about the resolution filtered back to the point where Foreign
Minister Guido Westerwelle, just before departing for Moscow, warned
his countrymen not to overdo their criticism of Russia. It’s in the
interests of Germany, he mused, to expand the “strategic
partnership”; Russia was needed as a geopolitical and economic
partner.
Indeed.
Merkel arrived in Moscow with her entourage that included eight
ministers and corporate chieftains by the planeload—she doesn’t
leave home without them. With Merkel and Putin looking on, these
chieftains and their Russian counterparts signed contracts for
billions of euros, a ritual that German chancellors have to perform
when abroad. It’s part of Germany’s mercantilist foreign policy.
Siemens CEO Peter Löscher bagged perhaps the biggest deal, a
declaration of intent to deliver 695 electric locomotives for €2.5
billion ($3.2 billion) to Russian Railways (RZD), an elephantine
state-owned company with 950,000 employees.
That’s
what really mattered. Criticism of Russia—carefully calibrated and
range-bound—would be for consumption at home, where anti-Russian
sentiment has been rising. With elections coming up next year,
Merkel, the consummate political animal, is treading a fine line:
deliver a bland rebuke that would barely satisfy voters in Germany
and help arrange deals that would fully satisfy German industry.
The
initial meeting was at the concluding session of the annual
Petersburg Dialogue, a four-day forum, this year titled ominously,
“Russia and Germany: the Information Society Facing the Challenges
of the 21st Century.” So the first question from the audience was
posed by a Russian participant: what about the recent deterioration
in the Russian-German relationship—a reference to the
resolution—and its consequences on economic cooperation?
A
government had to be able to digest criticism, Merkel said in
response. Yes, some of the recent laws the State Duma had passed
“irritated” her. “I cannot see that they further freedom,”
she said. “We ask ourselves if that is good for the development of
Russian society or not.” But that didn’t change the intense
relationship between both countries. “If I were offended every time
I opened the paper at home, I couldn’t be chancellor for three
days,” she said. Putin smiled.
It
kicked off a bizarre tangle of questions and answers, comments,
attacks, and counterattacks, fact-based or not, that carried over
into a panel discussion and press conference. Putin claimed that
Germany had been criticized by human rights groups because some of
its states didn’t have laws for the protection of information.
Which baffled attendees. And about Merkel’s
statement—incomprehensible, given current conditions—that Europe
always tried to speak with one voice, Putin retorted: “That’s
called a cartel.” Even the Pussy Riot case came up.
A
representative from Gazprom, the giant state-owned Russian natural
gas company without which no German-Russian meeting is complete, and
on which Germany depends for much of its natural gas, complained
about the “gloomy atmosphere” in the relations between both
countries that was hindering making deals.
The
meeting was a far cry from when Gerhard Schröder was still
Chancellor. He’d raised the “strategic partnership” to new
heights through his close personal and political relationship with
Putin. For example in November 2004, he described Putin as a
“flawless democrat,” which stirred up a ruckus even in Germany.
He also championed the Nord Stream gas pipeline that would pump gas
from Russia directly to Germany via the Baltic Sea, without crossing
other countries, a very costly project. Gazprom controlled the Nord
Stream consortium. A deal was signed in October 2005. It included a
loan guarantee by the German government of €1 billion. That’s how
close German-Russians relations were.
On
November 22, 2005, Schröder got kicked out of office. Days later,
Gazprom appointed him Chairman of Nord Stream AG, causing another
ruckus in Germany; it was clear what his intentions had been all
along, now that he was on the lavish payroll of the Russian
government. Turns out, the Baltic pipeline would allow Russia to cut
off gas to countries its other pipelines crossed on their way to
Germany, while still supplying Germany—a powerful political weapon
against those countries. The “strategic partnership” had made it
possible.
Gazprom
is deeply involved in the rest of Europe as well. For example, why
would France suddenly prohibit shale gas exploration? Sure, there are
environmental issues. But French governments have had, let’s say,
an uneasy relationship with environmentalists. Its spy service DGSE,
sank Greenpeace’s flagship, the Rainbow Warrior, killing one
person. No, there must have been another reason. Read... Russia’s
Gazprom Tightens Its Stranglehold On Europe: The Natural Gas War Gets
Dirty.
With
the euro debt crisis came absurdities. Now the currency is creating
artificial problems between peoples. And by being “irreversible,”
as ECB President Mario Draghi had said, it has become a curse—and a
religious dictum that must not be questioned regardless of how much
havoc it may ultimately wreak. Read... The Curse Of The
“Irreversible” Euro.

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