Lest our attention be diverted...
Israeli
War Game Does Not See Attack Of Iran Starting World War III
4
November, 2012
It
would appear, based on the latest war games from Israel's
Institute of National Security Studies, that we should all go
back to sleep and not worry about the impact of an Israeli strike on
Iran's nuclear infrastructure. The reason not to worry is simple -
either it ignites World War III (which we presume means it will be
all over very rapidly and we will be blissfully unaware until its too
late to be capable of achieving anything) or - as they suspect (and
gamed out) - there will be a focus on 'containment and restraint'
with Iran unable to ignite the Middle East. The result is predicated
on 'actors' motivated by rational considerations; which seems
entirely irrational. All the gory details below...
The
Policies of the Actors and Principal Insights
The
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) held a war game
(simulation) focusing on the first 48 hours after an Israeli aerial
attack on Iran’s nuclear infrastructures.
The
Scenario
After
midnight on November 9, al-Jazeera reports that Israeli airplanes
have attacked Iran’s nuclear facilities in three waves of attack.
As reports multiply, Israel officially announces it has attacked
Iran’s nuclear sites because it had no other choice. According to
the scenario, Israel did not coordinate the attack with the United
States in advance, and only informed the US once the planes were
already en route to the Iranian targets. Initial assessments estimate
that the Iranian nuclear program has been set back by nearly three
years.
Following
the successful attack, Iran decides to react with maximal force,
launching radical elements – to attack Israel. Nonetheless, it is
careful to avoid attacking American targets. Israel attempts to
contain the attacks and works to attain a state of calm as rapidly as
possible. The international community is paralyzed, largely because
Russia tries to exploit the situation for its own strategic
objectives. At the end of the first 48 hours, Iran continues to
attack Israel, as do their proxies, albeit to a lesser extent. At
this point in the simulation, the crisis does not seem to be close to
a resolution.
Main
Policies of the Various Actors
Israel:
After achieving its operational goals, Israel showed restraint in the
face of provocations and reactions by the radical players spurred by
Iran. In parallel, Israel conducted an additional aerial attack to
complete destruction of one of the major targets in Iran. Israel’s
strategic objective focused on preventing regional escalation and
achieving as fast as possible a level of events that was controllable
and of low intensity.
The
United States: Although not informed before the event, the United
States clearly stood by Israel’s side and did not expose its
differences of opinion with Israel, in order to present a united
front against any possible regional escalation. The United States
demonstrated willingness to return to the negotiating table and even
relax the sanctions, provided Iran showed restraint and in exchange
for an Iranian declaration it was ending its military nuclear
program. The United States decided it would take military action
against Iran only if Iran were to close to the Strait of Hormuz or
attack American allies and assets in the Gulf. Similarly, the United
States activated economic measures to control the rise in oil prices.
Iran:
In light of the outcome of the Israeli attack, Iran felt it had no
choice but to react strongly and militarily against Israel, launching
some 100 Shehab missiles right away (and another 100 in round two) at
Tel Aviv, the Negev Nuclear Research Center in Dimona, and various
cities. Iran also pressured its proxies to act against Israel and
launch rocket and missiles at Israeli targets, as well as engage in
multi-front acts of terrorism. At the same time, Iran appealed to the
international community to grant legitimacy to its enrichment program
and revoke the sanctions against it. At first, Iran chose not to
attack American targets and assets to keep the United States from
joining the fight against it. But the more Iran felt it was cornered
and its freedom of action was curtailed, it realized that its
strongest card lay in acting against America’s allies in the Gulf
and closing the Strait of Hormuz.
Russia
chose to promote its objectives in the Caucasus and Europe. Russia
also viewed the attack as an opportunity to position itself as the
leading actor in the international community because of its ability
to communicate with all the actors involved. However, the gap between
the US and the Russian positions led to a paralysis of the
international community’s ability to act. In turn, and in the
absence of American leadership, China, with access to all the
relevant actors, became a key player on the international field.
Syria preferred to focus on its domestic upheaval, maintain a low
profile, and not be dragged into combat against Israel.
Hizbollah
found itself in a quandary. On the one hand, Hizbollah came under
heavy Iranian pressure to begin a massive launch of missiles and
rockets at Israel, this being the “day of reckoning” for which
Iran had furnished Hizbollah with 50,000 missiles and rockets. On the
other hand, Hizbollah was wary about causing heavy damage in Lebanon
yet again. It therefore chose to respond to Iran’s demands
selectively by launching rockets at Israeli military targets,
especially airfields and active anti-missile defense systems.
Israel’s restrained response intensified Hizbollah’s dilemma and
supported its decision to attack to a relatively limited degree and
focus on military targets.
Hamas
chose to walk a fine line by demonstrating some commitment towards
Iran, while making sure not to provide Israel with an excuse for a
large scale attack in the Gaza Strip. Hamas’ limited ability to
control rogue and radical elements in Gaza was evident, and Hamas was
forced to ask the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt for help in restraining
the rogue elements it lacked the power to control. The other actors
– Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, Turkey, and the
international community: Each chose to operate on the basis of its
own particular interests, distance itself from the events, and
prevent widespread regional escalation.
Insights
from the War Game
a.
The war game staged the first 48 hours after the attack. The
intention was not to predict developments, rather to examine the
significance and implications of one possible scenario. The players
acted very rationally, demonstrating preventive policies and
motivated by crucial interests alone, and ignored domestic and
external constraints.
b.
The Israeli actor assessed that the Israeli public possesses the
stamina and fortitude to absorb the blows because it was convinced
that for Israel, this was a war of no choice that had achieved is
operational goals. The policy of restraint was based primarily on
this assumption.
c.
Iran has only limited tools and a limited ability to hit Israel
directly, and therefore must operate its proxies against it. Iran has
tools that are more relevant in the Persian Gulf sector, capable of
hurting American interests and causing global oil prices to spike.
Nonetheless, Iran clearly understood the cost it would have to pay
should it ignite the Persian Gulf, especially the United States
joining the fighting. This would only incur greater damage to its
nuclear infrastructures and greater destruction to a wide array of
quality targets in Iran.
d.
A successful Israeli attack with clear cut results and the meeting of
the operational objectives would lead to two contradictory trends: on
the one hand, Iran would be obligated to respond militarily and via
its proxies; on the other hand its dependence on proxies would allow
deterrence of the relevant actors and insertion of a wedge between
Iran and its regional allies, thereby preventing regional escalation
and encouraging containment.
e.
Two other important elements likely to help contain the events are
America’s clear resolve to stand with Israel and a restrained
policy on Israel’s part, especially if the strategic objectives of
the attack were met in the initial attack.
f.
The simulation again raised the disadvantage of having no access to
Iran's Supreme Leader and the limited levers of influence. In
general, it became clear that there are no reliable lines of
communication with the Iranian leadership. While Russia cannot serve
as a credible channel for dialogue, it emerged that China may be
capable of serving as a mediator.
g.
In planning the exit strategy and a mechanism to contain and mitigate
negative developments, Israel cannot rely on the international
community. It is highly probable that the deepening of the divide
between the United States and Russia would paralyze the international
community. Some of the players on the international arena would like
to see Israel "bleed" in order to pay for attacking Iran,
regardless of the interests of others, and to restrain its actions in
the future. If the crisis were prolonged, it could generate
unintended consequences with the risk of regional escalation. Efforts
by regional and international elements to end the event may involve a
cost to Israel in the area of arms control.
Conclusion
When
the simulation was planned, it appeared that the fall of 2012 would
be a critical period, and therefore it was decided to examine the
possible developments subsequent to an Israeli attack. This sense of
an imminent decision has since abated somewhat, but after the US and
Israeli elections, the question of an attack will undoubtedly
resurface. It is therefore critical to continue to examine the
potential ramifications of an attack.
The
scenario of an Israeli attack immediately after the US elections does
not reflect the position of the Institute for National Security
Studies. The possibility of an Israeli attack at any time is complex
and has been analyzed in many INSS publications. Overall, there are
two opposing assessments of the implications of an Israeli attack.
- One anticipates the outbreak of World War III, while
- the other envisions containment and restraint, and presumes that in practice, Iran’s capabilities to ignite the Middle East are limited.
The
war game that took place developed in the direction of containment
and restraint, with the actors motivated mainly by rational
considerations and critical interests
No comments:
Post a Comment
Note: only a member of this blog may post a comment.