Five
Looming Dangers That Could Tear The Eurozone Apart
Business
Insider (via the Guardian)
29
September, 2012
Spain
Spanish
prime minister Mariano Rajoy has battled for months to avoid the
indignity of applying for a formal bailout from his European
partners.
With
Spain much closer to the single currency's heart – both
geographically and politically – than laggardly Greece, Rajoy has
received plenty of support, including the promise of a €100bn
injection of funds directly into the bombed-out banking sector. After
Friday's announcement of the results of an audit of the sector
revealed a €60bn black hole, those funds will be essential.
But
with borrowing costs for Spain climbing close to the 6% level that
has repeatedly signalled danger throughout the crisis, most
euro-watchers expect Rajoy to be forced to accept a package of aid,
along with the strict list of terms and conditions that would imply.
Meanwhile,
Moody's is expected to deliver its verdict on Spain's sovereign debt
rating in the coming days, and a downgrade could just be the catalyst
the markets need to drive up Madrid's borrowing costs to dangerous
levels.
Last
week's Spanish budget, which contained numerous new spending cuts and
reform measures and won the approval of the European commission, was
widely seen as a bid to pre-empt any extra austerity measures that
Spain's creditors might be likely to impose.
A
bailout would allow European Central Bank president Mario Draghi to
deploy his "outright monetary transactions" and make
unlimited purchases of Spain's bonds. But going cap in hand to the
troika – the ECB, European commission and International Monetary
Fund – would still be a deep political humiliation for Rajoy, at a
time when Spain's regional leaders are jockeying for independence and
sky-high unemployment of more than 25% is imposing an excruciating
cost on the population.
Even
if Rajoy can drive through the measures needed to secure a bailout in
the face of mass public opposition, hold the Spanish state together
despite growing separatist sentiment and rebuild the country's
battered banks, the road back to prosperity looks like a long, hard
one – and that's already a lot of ifs.
Greece
Rumour
has it in Brussels that eurozone politicians have sworn not to push
Greece out until after Barack Obama is safely back in the White
House. But few analysts believe it has a long-term future in the
single currency.
After
fraught negotiations that stretched on all summer, the coalition
government, led by Antonis Samaras, appeared last week to have
reached agreement on a new package of cuts, which it hopes will
satisfy the demands of the troika.
But
Greece's economy remains in a wrenching recession, and it looks
likely they will continue to miss the goals set by international
lenders, even if the next €31bn (£24.7bn) disbursement from its
bailout fund is released. Eventually, Greece's partners may decide to
let it go – especially if they believe they have elected a solid
firewall that would prevent a "Grexit", as it's known,
creating a devastating chain reaction in financial markets.
And
Greece could yet decide to leave of its own accord, if domestic
political pressure becomes too intense. With Samaras elected on a
promise he would exact concessions from the country's creditors, the
political reaction to a fresh round of cuts from a population already
scarred by the downturn is likely to be furious. Protesters threw
Molotov cocktails at riot police at a protest during last week's
general strike, the latest of many as the workforce has endured cuts
in benefits, wages, pensions and public services to meet the troika's
deficit targets.
In
theory, the "internal devaluation" Greece is going through
is aimed at making the country's goods more competitive on world
markets by cutting the cost of production. But there is little sign
that growth is about to be restored.
"If
you look at what Greece is going through, it's comparable with the
Great Depression," says Dario Perkins of Lombard Street
Research, pointing out that economic output has already plunged an
extraordinary 20% since the start of the crisis. "The US Great
Depression didn't end because of austerity, it ended because they
left the gold standard and they had a massive devaluation, and
because fiscal policy was moving in the right direction."
Hardliners
One
of the things that most alarmed Europe's financial markets last week
was the outcome of an obscure meeting in Helsinki that suggested the
single currency's paymasters have decided to play hardball.
Finance
ministers from the Netherlands, Germany and Finland – the
eurozone's paymasters, and also its most hardline members –
gathered for talks in the Finnish capital and issued a statement
clarifying the eurozone rescue deal that was reached after
make-or-break talks in June.
At
the time, the agreement appeared to mark a positive departure in the
crisis, helping to sever the connection between the balance sheets of
sickly banks and the finances of states. It was agreed – or so it
appeared – that the eurozone bailout fund, the European Stability
Mechanism (ESM), would be allowed to inject money directly into
ailing banks in eurozone countries.
That
would prevent their governments from having to apply for a full-blown
bailout, with all the attendant misery of troika inspections, and
halt the vicious circle in which bank bailouts shift losses onto the
public finances and weaken public finances by depressing the value of
the government bonds that are the banks' main source of capital.
However,
after last week's discussions in Helsinki, the canny northern
Europeans spelt out their conditions. Before the ESM can bail out
banks, they insisted that the eurozone-wide banking union must be
"established" and its "effectiveness… determined"
– which is a tough hurdle, since the plan so far remains a glint in
José Manuel Barroso's eye.
More
importantly, they insisted that "legacy assets" – that
is, all the dodgy loans from the credit crisis era, must remain "the
responsibility of national authorities".
At
a stroke, they seemed to dash Ireland's hopes of receiving help from
its eurozone neighbours for the cost of its massive banking bailout
and undermine Spain's hopes of repairing its financial sector without
Madrid going cap in hand to the troika.
But
most damagingly, the announcement from Helsinki underlined the fact
that, in the long-running eurozone crisis, the devil is always in the
detail.
Italy
With
Spain still firmly in the markets' crosshairs, Italy's moment of
danger appeared to have passed, at least for the time being. But
after 30,000 strikers forced the closure of the Colosseum on Friday
as they marched in Rome against the government's public sector cuts,
political support for austerity in the eurozone's third-largest
economy is looking increasingly fragile.
A
year into a deep recession, the technocratic prime minister Mario
Monti, installed last November after intense pressure from the
markets and eurozone politicians helped force Silvio Berlusconi out
of office, is struggling to meet his budget goals. His support is
also fading – though he said last week that he might agree to stay
on if elections, due to be held in the spring, failed to yield a
definitive result. He has acknowledged the concerns of protesters,
saying his austerity policies have subjected the public to an
"unprecedented amount of sacrifices".
When
the ECB president Mario Draghi announced his policy of "outright
monetary transactions" – or OMT – the expectation in
financial markets was that Italy would follow Spain in asking for an
official EU bailout so that it could benefit from the scheme, which
is designed to bring down weaker governments' borrowing costs by
buying their bonds.
But
that would be a severe political humiliation – and, what's worse,
it is not even clear that Europe has the money. As Karen Guinand of
the bank Lombard Odier put it in a research note last week: "If
and when Spain does appeal for help, another problem will then
emerge: much of the EFSF/ESM [bailout fund] resources would probably
be used up … leaving little for Italy."
Once
a Spanish bailout happens – and most analysts now believe it is a
case of when, not if – attention will inevitably turn to Italy,
just as the country gears up for a general election in which
Berlusconi and his supporters are expected to run on an anti-euro
ticket. The former prime minister last week described the single
currency as a "big swindle"; staying inside the euro will
require more painful sacrifices, and Italians may decide that they
have had enough.
Growth
Even
if all the other pieces fall into place – the Spanish bailout, the
latest tranche of the Greek rescue, Mario Draghi's bond-buying
splurge – there remains the question of whether the widely
diverging fortunes of the eurozone's economies can be brought closer
together.
Europe's
statistical agency, Eurostat, expects the eurozone economy to
contract by 0.3% in 2012, and expand by a paltry 1% next year.
But
that average disguises a sharp divide: while the powerhouse of
Germany continues to expand – though at a less healthy pace than in
the last 12 months – much of the rest of the single currency area
is trapped in a deep recession, unable to compete with the wealthy
economies of the north, where, certainly in Germany's case, falling
real wages over a number of years have created a super-competitive
manufacturing sector.
"The
bigger issue for us always is: does any of this address the
underlying problems?" says Jonathan Loynes, European economist
at Capital Economics.
"Even
if the ECB comes out with all guns blazing, all it's doing is dealing
with one of the symptoms: it's not reducing anyone's debts."
He
fears that while Europe's politicians may be able to paper over the
cracks with emergency bailouts in the short term, voters in Germany
and the other "core" economies in the currency bloc may not
be willing to countenance the large-scale financial transfers that
would be necessary if Greece, Portugal and Spain were to be brought
up to speed with the rest of the eurozone.
Dario
Perkins of Lombard Street Research warns that public opinion in all
the struggling economies – Portugal, Greece, Spain and Italy – is
likely to become increasingly impatient if the universally prescribed
recipe of austerity fails to improve people's lives. "You can't
continue with no growth indefinitely: these are democracies."
This
article originally appeared on guardian.co.uk
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