The
Fed Has Another $3.9 Trillion In QE To Go (At Least)
23
September, 2012
Some
wonder why we have been so convinced that no matter what happens,
that the Fed will have no choice but to continue pushing the monetary
easing pedal to the metal. It is actually no secret: we explained the
logic for the first time back in March of this year with "Here
Is Why The Fed Will Have To Do At Least Another $3.6 Trillion In
Quantitative Easing."
The logic, in a nutshell, is simple: everyone who looks at modern
monetary practice (as opposed to theory) through the prism of a 1980s
textbook is woefully unprepared for the modern capital markets
reality for one simple reason: shadow banking; and when accounting
for the ongoing melt of shadow banking credit intermediates, which
continues to accelerate, the Fed has a Herculean task ahead of it in
restoring consolidated credit growth.
Shadow
banking, as we have explained many times most
recently here,
is merely an unregulated, inflationary-buffer (as it has no matched
deposits) which provides the conventional banking credit
transformations such as maturity,
credit and liquidity, in
the process generating term liabilities. In yet other words, shadow
banking creates credit money which can then flow into monetary
conduits such as economic "growth" or capital markets,
however without creating the threat of inflation - if anything shadow
banks are the biggest systemic deflationary threat, as due to the
relatively short-term nature of their duration exposure, they tend to
lock up at the first sing of trouble (see Money Markets breaking the
buck within hours of the Lehman failure) and lead to utter economic
mayhem unless preempted. Well, preempting the collapse in the shadow
banking system is precisely what the Fed's primary role has so far
been, even more so than pushing the S&P to new all time highs.
The problem, however, as we will show today, is that even with the
Fed's balance sheet at $2.8 trillion and set to rise to $5 trillion
in 2 years, it
will not be enough.
Before
we begin, we urge readers new to this topic to read some of the more
pertinent posts we have written on the issue of shadow banking, as it
is not a simple subject. Some of the more relevant ones:
-
-
- Here Is Why The Fed Will Have To Do At Least Another $3.6 Trillion In Quantitative Easing - March 2012
-
For
those who are somewhat familiar with the topic, but not quite, we
believe a useful visualization of how traditional bank liabilities
(defined simplistically and easily recreated using the Flow of Funds
report using total liabilities at U.S.-Chartered Depository
Institutions, L.110, plus total liabilities of Foreign Banking
Offices in the US, L.111, plus Total Liabilities of Banks in US
Affiliates Areas, L.112) which
serve as the backbone of the entire US fractional reserve banking
system, compare
to US GDP is in order.
More
than anything the chart above, which shows the amounts of traditional
bank liabilities and GDP on
the same Y axis,
confirms one simple thing: economic "growth" is only and
nothing more than an increase in systemic credit, aka money creation
(just as Ray Dalio observed a few days ago). The problem with
traditional bank liabilities is that for the most part they have
corresponding money aggregates in the form of M2, which in turn
is primarily
fungible deposits,
as an opportunity cost. And, as Germans living in the 1920s recall
all too well, putting meaningless theory aside, deposits, when
escaping the fractional reserve system and used to pursue hard
assets, are the primary driver of such unpleasant monetary events as
hyperinflation.
The
nuisance that are "deposits" is also why the banking system
is desperate to prevent bank runs, which are not so much a threat to
systemic liquidity: any central bank can and will step in and
guarantee all the banks' viability overnight if it has to, as it did
at the peak of the financial crisis, but an asset allocation decision
to shift out of an asset equivalency system built upon faith, and
into a mode of hard asset ownership, based on lack of faith in the
system (it also explains why the Fed hates when you use your cash to
buy "worthless" and cash-flow free hard assets as gold,
silver, copper, crude, etc). Of course, what happens with asset
prices should $9 trillion in deposits suddenly exit bank vaults and
seek to purchase "stuff" would make even the Hungarian
hyperinflationary episode, in which prices doubled every several
hours, seem like a walk in the park.
So
how to fix this? How to ensure economic growth without the threat of
inflation at any corner should a central planner make a false move
leading to an uncontrollable bank run and deposit outflow? Simple:
create a representation of money without the actual money, i.e., M2
equivalents, whether currency in circulation, or even electronic
deposits.
Enter
the shadow banking system, which is simply the traditional banking
system however without the deposits and without the threat of
monetary redemptions from the banking system (and the threat of a
collapse of fractional reserve banking): it is quite simply, the
essence of bank transformation funded by "faith", or a
system in which credit money is created, but without an offsetting
money equivalent unit. It is a system in which assets and liabilities
are essentially the same concept, interwoven in a daisy chain of
rehypothecated ownership claims, and in which every incremental layer
of credit money creation serves to ultimately boost the nominal
quantity of credit money in circulation.
What
this does is it allows for near infinite credit-money expansion
within a financial system, without a threat of inflation. It does,
however, not prevent the threat of a deflationary collapse should
faith in this same system be shaken, and counterparties demand to be
made whole on their exposure, which incidentally peaked at $21
trillion in 2008.
But
by far the biggest threat with shadow banking, which perceptive
readers have already grasped is nothing but the greatest ponzi scheme
ever conceived, is that it works brilliantly in an environment of
increasing leverage, but should deleveraging commence, is an asset
price black hole, as the entire Schrodinger Asset/Liability Function
collapses in on itself upon the realization that there are no real
asset at the end of a rehypothecation chain. In other words, the
moment a liability is accelerated, due to maturity, request for
deliverable or any other inverse "faith" transformations,
the jig is up.
As
the second chart below shows, one of the primary reasons for the
surge in US capital markets beginning in 1980 is not so much the
"great moderation", which was certainly a necessary but not
sufficient condition for Dow 36,000, as much as that starting in
roughly June of 1982, when shadow liabilities crossed the $1 trillion
line for the first time and never looked back, the US shadow banking
system became a more and more prevalent form of credit money
creation, until it overtook traditional liabilities in 1995 in terms
of total notional. While traditional liabilities have historically
matched GDP dollar for dollar, when one throws shadow
liabilitiesinto
the mix, one can see a distinctively different picture: the one
below.
But
where did all those extra trillions in credit money created via
Shadow intermediation end up if not in the economic growth of the US?
Why in its capital markets of course! This, ironically, makes sense
from a symmetrical point of view. Recall that shadow liabilities, by
their nature, are not inflationary as they do not have matched
monetary aggregates: the US Stock market is also, at least according
to the US government and the economic canon, is ot viewed as being
part of any inflationary measurement, even though all it really is
deferred purchasing power: for example, if everyone is long AAPL and
if everyone manages to cash out at the very top, when the market cap
of AAPL is $1 quadrillion (for illustrative purposes), all that cash
would then exit the capital market and compete with other former AAPL
shareholders for physical goods and services. It is in this sense
that the S&P merely is a conduit to the latent inflationary build
up that infinite credit money creation can lead to. Implicitly, and
as a rational benchmark, this boils down to creating infinite
purchasing power based on "faith" in a world of very finite
goods and services. Not to get cute about it, but when an infinite
purchasing power meets an immovable and very finite universe of goods
and services, what one gets is hyperinflation. But that is irrelevant
in the topic at hand: we will write more on that in a different post.
As
noted above, it all worked great for nearly 30 years... and then
Lehman brothers hit. What happened next can only be classified as an
epic collapse in shadow banking as all the faith in the system had
been extinguished and counterparties, unsure if anyone would be
standing tomorrow, demanded an acceleration on their credit,
liquidity and maturity transformed liabilities, irrespective of what
state or what penalty such acceleration would entail. And this is
where the Fed comes in.
The
chart below shows the total amount of shadow liabilities broken up by
constituent parts since the 1960s. What is obvious is the exponential
surge in notional, hitting a peak of just shy of $21 trillion in Q1
of 2008, and then going straight down.
More
important, however, is the sequential change in liabilities within
this "shadow" system: having grown every quarter for
decades until June 2008, things changed rapidly with the end of
Lehman brothers, and much to the chagrin of the Fed, have not
improved 4 years later. In fact, as the chart shows, the
peak draw down in one quarter was a stunning $1.5 trillion in credit
money deleveraging in one quarter!
This is an amount that all else equal, would have caused an epic
collapse in either US GDP or the stock market, as trillions in credit
money were taken out of the system. Remember: credit money is
fungible, and 'fractionally
reserved.'
All said, there has been over $6 trillion in deleveraging within
shadow banking since the Lehman collapse.
Which
brings us to the point of this post.
In
Q2, as per the just released Flow
of Funds report,
the deleveraging continued. In fact, between money market funds,
GSEs, Agency Mortgage Pools, Asset Backed Security Issuers, Funding
Corporations, Repos, and Open Market Paper, also collectively known
as "shadow banking liabilities", in the second quarter the
US saw another $141 billion in deleveraging take place, following the
$164 billion in Q1, or a total of over $300 billion year to date.
This
took the total amount in shadow liabilities to $14.9 trillion for the
first time since 2005. It also means that as of right now, the shadow
banking system, which continues to deleverage, and the traditional
banking system's liabilities, which continue to grow primarily due to
reserve creation by the Fed during periods of unsterilized QE (such
as right now courtesy of QEternity), and which amounted to a record
$14.9 trillion as well, have
reached parity.
This
is a historic inversion point for three main reasons:
- As the shadow banking system delevers, the Fed has no choice but to relever traditional bank liabilities, via reserve injection to keep the system at least at equilibrium, if not leveraging at the consolidated level. In both Q1 and Q2 the Fed failed to generate the all critical credit releveraging, as first $110 billion in Q1, and then $58 billion in Q2 credit money exited the closed system via maturities without being rolled over, redemptions, conversion into hard assets, etc.
- Paradoxically, it is precisely due to its action, with which the Fed continues to remove faith in the US financial system as a standalone entity and one that can function effectively without a central bank backstop at every corner, that the ongoing deleveraging within the all critical shadow banking system - the one monetary conduit which as noted above is the closest thing to a inflation-free lunch due to the lack of immediate inflationary threats - continues. As noted above, so far in 2012 there has been $300 billion in deleveraging here alone.
- Completing the Catch 22 loop, the Fed, which is cornered, will continue to do what it does, reflating traditional liabilities, creating reserves, deposits, and currency, all of which have an exponentially greater inflationary propensity that the circular liabilities continued within shadow banking, and which eventually will breach the dam door of inflationary expectations leading to an epic surge in priced in and/or concurrent inflation.
Visually,
this can be presented as follows:
The
chart above shows what the consolidated deleveraging - combining
shadow and traditional banks - since the Lehman collapse. All told
there is still a $3.9 trillion hole that need to be plugged for the
'market' to simply return back to its 2008 peak credit levels. But
what is truly a slap in the face of the Fed, and what confirms that
the more the Fed "acts" the more it shoots itself in the
foot, is that the
last time we did this analysis,
the hole was "only" $3.6 trillion. In 6 short months, the
Fed's relentless intervention in markets,managed
to force the deleveraging of over quarter of a trillion in additional
credit money!
It
also explains why the Fed knew long ago, that it would have to engage
in a relereving program that offset at least the continuing
deleveraring in shadow aggregates: first $40 and then $85 billion a
month sounds about right, and is an amount that will at best keep the
system at its current state as opposed to actually growing it.
And
while one does not have to be a rocket scientist to have grasped by
now that all the Fed does is self-defeating, what the above analysis
does do is provide a primer to all those Economy PhD's who still fail
to grasp how the modern economy works, specifically why so far the
inflationary surge has been deferred.
In
short: the more the Fed actively relevers using conventional conduits
that spur the threat of inflation, and the more that shadow conduits
delever, the greater the risk that inflation will finally come to
roost. Because that $3.9 trillion in incremental reserves (and recall
that already both BofA and Goldman,
following our
example,
determined that the Fed will need to do at least another $2 trillion
in QE, which means much more in reality) that will be created to
offset the ongoing shadow deleveraging will simply pump up various
asset classes, until the hard asset spillover finally hits, and no
matter how much SPR jawboning, no matter how many CME margin hikes,
no matter how many Saudi rumors of increase crude production, prices
of hard assets will finally explode.
We
can at this point say that an inflationary surge is an absolute
certainty if not for one thing: if somehow the deleveraging in the
shadow banking system is finally offset (and with the GSEs now in
runoff mode this is a virtual impossibility), and Bernanke can take
his foot off the gas, then there may still be a chance. However, as
noted, 4 years in, this has not happened, and it will not happen for
one simple reason: at its core, the market, which despite all of
Bernanke's attempt to the contrary, realizes that a centrally planned
system is ultimately unsustainable, and quietly, behind the scenes,
those who have shadow credit relationships are promptly unwinding
them while they still can, and using the proceeds to invest into hard
asset for the inevitable T+1 moment.
The
bottom line paradox here is that the more forcefully the Fed
intervenes, the greater the implicit loss of confidence in the
system, the greater the shadow deleveraging, and the more definitive
is the ultimate destruction of the capital markets as we know them.
Of course, there is still a chance that Bernanke will step back and
realize what he is doing. However, since all Bernanke is, is a pawn
of those whose wealth is conserved in the US equity tranche, it means
that it is now, and has been for the past 4 years, impossible for him
to stop.
And
in not stopping, Bernanke has sowed the seeds of not only his, but
everyone else's destruction.
* *
*
Finally,
and confirming the above observations have some basis in actual
reality, is the following chart from Citi's Matt King, who implicitly
summarizes everything said above as follows: "Much
credit growth was based on collateralized lending."
Well, the collateral has now run out.
And
the "wrong
horse"
is precisely what all those who come up with convenient, three letter
goal-seeking theories to justify an ideological bent, are focusing
on. If instead of reading 1980s textbooks, all those "modern
market" thinkers were to grasp just what it is that drives the
market, we might still have a chance.
No comments:
Post a Comment
Note: only a member of this blog may post a comment.