Persian
Gulf turns to net gasoil imports
26
July, 2012
The
Persian Gulf region shifted to net gasoil imports in May, in what
could be a game changer for a region that was traditionally a supply
source, according to latest data on the Joint Organisations Data
Initiative's website.
The
eight countries in the region for which data is available include
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, United Arab Emirates,
Iran and Iraq. In May, these countries imported 211,000 mt more of
the utility and automotive feedstock than they exported, according to
JODI data.
That
was the first time the group of countries saw net imports for several
years. Over the previous decade, the countries together had on
average seen net exports of 1.3 million mt of gasoil each month.
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practical insight into the global refining environment, product and
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for increased refinery responsiveness, risk mitigation and investment
procurement.
MEAN
OF PLATTS ARAB GULF CASH PREMIUMS PEAK AT 3-4 YEAR HIGHS
Reflecting
the growth of imports, premiums for the FOB Arab Gulf 0.5% sulfur
gasoil and 500 ppm sulfur gasoil grades have been climbing throughout
this year, and reached near four-year highs this week. Both gasoil
grades are typical requirements for the Middle East countries.
Even
in April, the premiums were already showing significant strength. The
FOB Arab Gulf 0.5% sulfur gasoil premium averaged $1.69/barrel to
Mean of Platts Arab Gulf gasoil assessments, up 9.74% from the same
period the previous year. The medium sulfur or 500 ppm sulfur gasoil
cash premium averaged $4.13/b, up 9.84% from the same period in 2011.
Since
then the premiums have risen sharply. The FOB Arab Gulf 0.5% sulfur
gasoil premium Wednesday peaked at $2.65/b against MOPAG gasoil,
while the previous high was on December 12 2008, when it stood at
$3.10/b over MOPAG gasoil assessments.
And
the 500 ppm sulfur gasoil cash premium Wednesday stood at $4.75/b
against MOPAG gasoil, while the previous high was on March 26, 2009,
when it stood at $4.80/b over MOPAG gasoil.
EFFECTS
OF RISING DEMAND RIPPLE BEYOND REGION
An
environment of sustained or higher cash gasoil premiums in the Middle
East could pull more gasoil cargoes from further afield than just the
West Coast of India, which has been a significant source of middle
distillates.
Middle
Eastern refiners have been significant sources of gasoil supply for
countries in East Africa and Asia, but the shift in fundamentals has
meant that several importers have already had to look elsewhere for
supplies, notably to Indian refiners.
In
May, Pakistan State Oil, for example, was forced to look beyond its
usual term seller, Kuwait Petroleum Company, for increased supplies
ahead of its annual peak season. PSO tendered to buy two spot cargoes
in May for the first time since November 2010.
"We
have no extra volumes available this time round, and we have met all
our contractual requirements," a source at KPC said at that
time. "Summer is around the corner and Ramadan is approaching."
In addition, the source said, there had been a rise in regional
demand in part due to a general increase in infrastructure
development within the Middle East.
"Gasoil
buying is no longer just about seasonal imports," said a source
familiar with the region's fundamentals. "The Middle East as a
whole has definitely been a net importer for the last four to five
years when you consider countries such as Yemen, Jordan, [Israel and
Lebanon]."
Some
market watchers said they were still uncertain of the possibility of
a sustained change in the fundamentals of the Middle East, pointing
to the possibility of a reduction in armed conflicts or sabotage and
increased refining capacities from countries such as Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait and UAE.
"But
I'm sure the region will still be net importers next year," a
Middle Eastern trader said.
JORDAN,
ISRAEL, YEMEN AFFECTED BY INFRASTRUCTURE, PIPELINE ATTACKS
Indeed,
of the remaining countries in the region for which data is not
available, evidence points to significant imports since at least
early 2011.
Continued
attacks and sabotage on a Gasco gas pipeline in Egypt's Sinai
Peninsula have disrupted supply to both Jordan and Israel since early
2011.
Israel
Electric Corp., the largest customer for Egyptian gas, has been
forced to switch to gasoil, fuel oil and coal due to the severe
shortage of gas supplies. There has been no gas flow to Israel from
Egypt since March 2012.
According
to figures released by IEC this week, the state-owned utility
consumed 929,000 mt of gasoil compared to 51,000 mt in the same
period in 2011. Fuel oil consumption totaled 554,000 mt versus 14,000
mt last year.
Over
in Yemen, a nine-month shutdown of the Marib oil export pipeline has
reduced flows to the country's main refining facility at Aden.
The
Marib pipeline carries about 120,000 b/d from the Marib and Shabwa
oilfields to the Ras Isa terminal in the Red Sea. The pipeline,
however, resumed operations July 16.
SAUDI
ARABIA INCREASES GASOIL IMPORTS
Meanwhile,
state-owned Saudi Aramco is slated to import around 1 million mt of
medium sulfur gasoil over June-August to meet utility demand during
the peak summer period when air-conditioning usage goes up in the
Middle East country.
While
some traders have said the volume being imported seemed significant,
in fact Saudi Arabia's imports of gasoil have been steadily growing
since 2007, according to JODI data. Prior to that year, imports were
a rarity and limited to a few thousand tonnes at a time. But over
2010-11, the country imported on average 221,000 mt of gasoil each
month. From January to May this year that figure rose to 619,000
mt/month.
Saudi
Arabia may have switched from burning crude oil for utility purposes
to using more gasoil and fuel oil, several sources have said. That
has allowed the country to boost crude oil exports to make up for
declining Iranian crude oil exports due to United States and European
Union sanctions.
In
the first five months of 2012, Saudi Arabia imported as much as 3.09
million mt of gasoil, versus 1.26 million mt imported in the same
period the year before, JODI data showed. Exports from the kingdom in
2012 stood at around 2.024 million mt, while 2011 export volumes were
around 4.02 million mt.
The
Joint Organisations Data Initiative is an outcome of the
producer-consumer energy dialogue. The initiative relies on the
combined efforts of producing and consuming countries and the seven
JODI partner organizations to build timely, comprehensive and
sustainable energy data, according to the JODI website.
Iraqi
Oil Showdown and the Syria End-Game
As
the Iraqi central government struggles to subdue the implications of
the unilateral oil deals northern Iraq’s Kurdish government is
making with Western oil majors, an end-game scenario for Syria comes
into play in a complicated geopolitics-big oil cocktail.
25
July, 2012
Chevron,
the second oil major to have struck a deal with the Kurdish Regional
Government (KRG) in northern Iraq, by passing Baghdad, has been
banned from any oil dealings with the Iraqi Oil Ministry.
On
19 July, Chevron announced it had signed a deal with the KRG for oil
exploration rights in northern Iraq, taking over exploration from
India’s Reliance Exploration and Production in the Rovi and Sarta
blocks. This gives Chevron 80% of the contract and Austria’s OMV AG
20%. Last October, ExxonMobil signed a similar deal for six
exploration blocks with the KRG, inviting the ire of Baghdad, which
is losing control of the country’s northern oil capacity.
The
KRG has signed a number of similar deals in the past, but always with
smaller companies. ExxonMobil changed the game, as the first Western
oil major to step on Baghdad’s toes, with some hefty geopolitical
blessings.
Earlier
this year, Baghdad held a failed auction of some of its exploration
blocks and failed to attract any oil-major bids. Among the concerns
during the auction was a clause that banned anyone bidding on
exploration blocks to do business separately with the KRG. Chevron
held out for the KRG instead. Now, the Iraqi central government is
banning Chevron from cutting any oil deals with the Iraqi national
oil ministry. But Chevron was prepared for this move in advance, and
its usefulness as a deterrent is weak.
Turkey
has also inked a number of deals with the KRG, despite warnings from
Baghdad. In early July, Ankara and Irbil launched their first oil
trade operation via the private sector. Turkish engineering and
construction firm Siyah Kalem is going to a KRG contract to transport
natural gas from Kurdistan to Turkey.
For
now, although Baghdad’s feathers have been seriously ruffled,
Ankara’s dealing with the KRG has not kept Turkey and Iraq from
making deals of their own.
While
Chevron and ExxonMobil are banned from any oil deals with the
authorities in Baghdad, Turkey is not. On 16 July, Baghdad signed an
initial deal with a Turkey-Kuwait consortium to drill for oil and
natural gas. Plans have also been revealed for the shipment of oil
from Basra, in southern Iraq, to Turkey via pipeline.
We’ve
talked about how Turkey is setting its sights on an unconventional
alliance with the KRG, and how Washington is pushing that
relationship, which could result in the making of Kurdistan.
Adding
the Syria element to this equation sheds more light on the
KRG-Washington-Ankara nexus and the wider end game. In this respect,
the actions of KRG leader Massoud Barzani are very interesting to
follow.
Barzani
is a key figure in Washington’s overall Syria plans, but he is
walking a thin line at home, though so far he has not tipped the
balance critically. The Barzani-Washington relationship can be traced
back to ExxonMobil’s deal with the KRG last October. Since then,
Washington has been following Barzani around closely and keeping him
on a tight leash.
Here
it would be fortuitous to take a look at Syria as a convenient
transit country for Kurdish oil and gas to Turkey (and beyond, to
Europe). From this standpoint, Washington and Ankara have similar
interests in Syria. But in order to make these interests viable, the
Kurds have to be brought into the game.
Barzani
is the key to this, as well as Turkish leader Erdogan, though the
latter’s situation is decidedly more complicated at home. It is
important to remember that there are various Kurdish groups of
Turkish, Iraqi and Syrian origin.
Barzani
is working to bring these three Kurdish factions together, with
financial help from Turkey. The first goal will be to get the Syrian
Kurdish faction to side with the opposition in Syria to help force a
regime change.
The
reward for the Kurds will be a Kurdistan empowered by oil and gas
exports outside the central government’s fold, and supported by
Washington and Ankara. And they key to convincing the Kurds to come
on board will be convincing them that they can trust Turkey, their
long-time foe.
This
brings us to a recent explosion and ensuing fire that disabled a
pipeline carrying oil from the northern Iraqi city of Kirkuk to the
Turkish city of Ceyhan. The explosion hit a portion of the pipeline
in Turkey’s southeast, near Midyat. Turkish officials are calling
it “sabotage”. Typically, they would immediately blame Kurdish
rebels, who have bombed the pipeline before.
If
the Kurds, then it signals that Barzani is having some problems in
his efforts to unite Kurds around the newest Washington-Ankara policy
and that he is treading on dangerous ground. It could also be
Baghdad, through Kurds who may not be inclined to understand
Barzani’s movements, sending a message that it can go beyond
conventional means to suppress the increasing boldness of the KRG
with Iraqi oil.
By.
Jen Alic of Oilprice.com
Jen
Alic is a geopolitical analyst, co-founder of ISA Intel in Sarajevo
and Tel Aviv, and the former editor-in-chief of ISN Security Watch in
Zurich.
Saudis,
Emirates push nuclear power plans
Saudi
Arabia is pressing ahead with its ambitious plans to develop nuclear
power to meet rising electricity demand, and save oil for export
26
April, 2012
But
the outlook for other Arab states is less promising because of
political turmoil and a lack of financial resources.
The
Saudis have built a foreign assets cushion of around $500 billion
from oil exports. It has used this immense wealth to buy its way out
of trouble; for instance, heading off pro-democracy protests with
massive social spending in recent years.
But,
the Middle East Economic Digest observed, "a more serious set of
challenges now faces the kingdom that threaten to be even more
destabilizing.
"Inefficient
and wasteful energy consumption, coupled with a rising population, is
leading the kingdom to burn even more of its natural resources at
home rather than selling them abroad and adding to the proceeds of
the half-trillion-dollar cash pile.
"Unless
action is taken, the kingdom could find it needs the oil price to be
$320 a barrel by 2030 just to balance the budget," the weekly,
published in the United Arab Emirates, warned.
Nuclear
power is seen as the solution. But, as MEED stressed, "time is
of the essence."
For
one thing, Saudi Arabia and other Arab states, including the United
Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar and Egypt, have no wish to lag any
further behind Iran and Israel in developing nuclear technologies.
In
2010, the King Abdallah Center for Atomic and Renewable Energy, known
as KAcare, was established to oversee the gulf state's nuclear
program under its president, Hashim bin Abdullah Yamani, who was
accorded ministerial powers.
KAcare
consultant Ibrahim Babelli said in 2010 it took 3.4 million barrels
of oil equivalent a day -- known as boe/d -- to power electricity
generation. This is expected to more than double by 2028 to 8.3
million boe/d.
The
aim of the Saudis' $100 billion nuclear program is to achieve an
electricity output of 110 gigawatts by 2032.
The
Financial Times reports that in 2009, the latest data available,
Saudi electricity capacity was 52GW from 79 power stations.
At
least 16 nuclear reactors, each costing around $7 billion, are
planned, with the first producing by 2019.
Some
estimates state the kingdom, the world's largest oil exporter, will
burn as much as 1.2 million barrels of oil daily on electricity
production, almost double the 2010 total, to meet domestic and
industrial demand.
This
is crucial, as the Saudis are driving to build an industrial
infrastructure to sustain the economy when the oil fields run down.
Some have already begun to decline.
For
total reliance on nuclear power, Babelli says, 40-60 reactors would
be needed by 2030. That's four-six reactors per year from 2020.
"That's
stretching it," he said. "The answer is an energy mix."
That
means fossil fuels will still be needed, probably as the primary
energy source, while wind, solar and nuclear power capabilities are
developed. KAcare is developing solar power projects that MEES
estimates should produce 41GW within 20 years with geothermal and
waste-to-energy systems providing 4GW.
The
Emirates, which launched its nuclear energy program in 2009, is the
most advanced in the Arab world, with Saudi Arab running second.
The
United Arab Emirates' $30 billion program -- $10 billion more than
originally planned -- is smaller in scale than that in Saudi Arabia.
Both
states benefit from political stability and vast financial reserves.
Other regional states are less fortunate.
Bahrain,
Qatar, Kuwait, Egypt and Jordan all have announced plans to invest in
nuclear energy to crank up electricity generation but all have lagged
behind or scrapped their programs because of lack of funds or foreign
investment.
"Kuwait
has the cash," MEED reported, "but it's been through eight
governments in the past six years."
Sunni-ruled
Bahrain, an island state neighboring Saudi Arabia, "continues to
face destabilizing protests by its majority Shiite population and its
budget is already in deficit."
Egypt
remains convulsed by the political turmoil that ensued following the
February 2011 overthrow of President Hosni Mubarak, its economy
sagging dangerously.
In
Jordan, heavily reliant on foreign aid, parliament recently scrapped
nuclear plans as "hazardous and costly."
Failure
to start boosting electricity generation for burgeoning populations
in the coming decades almost certainly will mean more political
upheavals.
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