This seems like a fair and intelligible assessment of the situation and the likelihood of a Lehman moment in the world economy.
Bank
runs spreading across Europe!
What
next?
Martin
D. Weiss Ph.D.
28
May, 2012
This
is not the first time we’ve warned you about an imminent financial
megashock.
In
our Money and Markets of December 3, 2007, we specifically named
Lehman Brothers as the next major firm to collapse on Wall Street.
(See “Dangerously
Close to a Money Panic.”)
In
our Money and Markets of March 17, 2008, precisely 182 days before
its failure, we again named Lehman, making it abundantly clear that
it could be the trigger of a financial meltdown. (See “Closer
to a Financial Meltdown.”)
And
now, starting with last
week’s edition, we are warning you of ANOTHER Lehman-type
megashock.
A
new telltale sign: Bank runs, the final nail in the coffin of any
modern economy, are spreading among the PIIGS countries of Europe —
and possibly beyond.
In
Greece it’s already a tsunami — a desperate effort by millions of
citizens to get their money out of danger before Greece is forced to
leave the euro zone.
In
Spain, it’s quickly turning into a flood, as individuals and
businesses — with $1.25 trillion in total bank deposits — wonder
if their country will be the next to leave the union.
In
Portugal, Ireland, Italy or even France, banks are vulnerable to
similar outflows. And once the stampede strikes more than two or
three major countries, you could see bank runs all across Europe.
Sound
Familiar?
It
should. Because last year we witnessed a very similar contagion when
investors stampeded from the bonds of the weakest European countries.
Much
like today, the first to be attacked was Greece, the weakest link in
the chain. Then, Spain, Portugal, Italy and even France got hit hard.
Soon,
nearly all of Europe was infected, prompting its central bankers to
suddenly break their solemn vows of monetary piety and print more
than $1 trillion worth of new euros.
Now,
despite all those efforts, they’re facing a new contagion of a
second kind — by bank depositors.
But
bank runs are far more infectious — and dangerous — than investor
stampedes.
They
spill out onto the streets and onto the airwaves.
They
invoke frightening flashbacks to the Great Depression.
And
they immediately threaten the entire banking system.
According
to the New York Times, “the havoc that a stampede might cause to
the Continent’s financial system would greatly complicate efforts
by European Union officials to fashion a longer-term plan to ease the
debt crisis and revive Europe’s economy, because authorities would
have to cope with the staggering added costs of shoring up banks.
“‘A
bank run can happen very quickly,’ said Matt King, an expert on
international fund flows in London for Citigroup. ‘You are fine the
night before, but on the morning after it’s too late.’”
And
just as I explained here last week, the Times points out that it “was
a similar liquidity crisis on Wall Street in September 2008 — which
started with nervous investors pulling money from troubled
institutions, then quickly from healthier ones — that set off the
financial crisis.”
I
repeat: It was just last Monday that I showed you how Europe and the
U.S. are now on a collision course with a second Lehman-type
megashock.
And
here we are today, only seven days later, with the snowball of events
bringing us a few steps closer.
Worse
Than 2008?
Politicians
and investors all over the world are now trying to prepare for the
inevitable consequences. What they don’t seem to realize is that
the next major megashock could be more severe than the Lehman
Brothers failure.
Never
forget the key differences between then and now:
•
In 2008, it was strictly
individual financial institutions that were on the edge of collapse.
Today, entire nations are on the brink.
•
In 2008, the U.S. federal
deficit of the prior fiscal year was $161 billion. Today, it’s
$1.327 trillion, or 8.2 times larger.
•
In 2008, most of the
megabanks at the epicenter of the crisis were in the United States.
Today, although some U.S. megabanks are still taking excessive risk,
it’s primarily the far LARGER European banks that are in the most
trouble. In fact the weak European banks are so large, their total
assets are greater than the total assets of ALL U.S. commercial banks
combined.
•
In 2008, governments had
not yet deployed their “big gun” cures for the debt crisis. So
they still had the firing power to squelch the crisis with a series
of unprecedented rescues. Today, we have seen the rapidly diminishing
returns — or outright failure — of nearly every possible stimulus
plan, bailout deal or austerity measures known to man.
•
In 2008, governments
encountered little public resistance to major new policy initiatives.
Today, millions of citizens are rebelling at the polls — or on the
streets — in France, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy, and even
Germany.
•
Most important, until
late 2008, central banks restricted their role to traditional
manipulation of interest rates. Now, however, four of the most
powerful central banks in the world (the Fed, ECB, BOE and BOJ) have
departed radically from tradition and embarked on the greatest wave
of money printing in the history of mankind.
So
how can you prepare yourself for this type of megashock and its
impact on the markets? For an answer let’s take a closer look at …
What
REALLY Happened During
And
After The Lehman Collapse …
Over
a single weekend in mid-September 2008, the Fed chairman, the
Treasury secretary, and other high officials huddled at the New York
Fed’s offices in downtown Manhattan.
They
seriously considered bailing out Lehman, but they ran into two
hurdles:
First,
Lehman’s assets were too sick — so diseased, in fact, even the
federal government didn’t want to touch them with a 10-foot pole.
Nor were there any private buyers remotely interested in a shotgun
marriage.
Second,
foreshadowing the public rebellion that would later bust onto the
scene in the Tea Party movement, there was a new sentiment on Wall
Street that was previously unheard of:
A
small, but vocal, minority was getting sick and tired of bailouts.
“Let them fail,” they said. “Teach those bastards a lesson!”
was the new rallying cry.
For
the Fed chairman and Treasury secretary, it was the long-dreaded day
of reckoning. It was the fateful moment in history that demanded a
life-or-death decision regarding one of the biggest financial
institutions in the world — bigger than General Motors, Ford, and
Chrysler put together.
Should
they save it? Or should they let it fail?
Their
decision: To make a break with the past. To let Lehman fail.
“Here’s
what you’re going to do,” was the basic message from the federal
authorities to Lehman’s highest officials.
“Tomorrow
morning, you’re going to take a trip downtown to the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court at One Bowling Green.
“You’re
going to file for bankruptcy.
“Then
you’re going to fire your staff.
“And
before the end of the day, you’re going to pack up your own boxes
and clear out.”
As
in the prior Bear Stearns failure, America’s largest banking
conglomerate (JPMorgan Chase) promptly appeared on the scene and
swooped up the outstanding trades. And as with Bear Stearns, the Fed
acted as a backstop.
But
Lehman’s demise was unique because it was thrown into bankruptcy
and put on the chopping block for liquidation.
Exactly
182 days earlier, we warned that it could be the financial earthquake
that changes the world. And it was.
Until
that day, nearly everyone assumed that giant firms like Lehman were
“too big to fail,” that the government would always step in to
save them.
But
that myth was shattered on September 15, 2008, when the U.S.
government decided to abandon its long tradition of largesse and let
Lehman go under.
A
major U.S. money market fund, the Reserve Primary Fund, immediately
suffered a direct hit in its portfolio from exposure to Lehman
securities, pushing its share value below $1 — an unprecedented
event that spread panic in the entire industry.
Money
funds, mutual funds and other institutions refused to buy the
short-term IOUs (commercial paper) that thousands of companies rely
on for ready cash.
All
over the world, investors recoiled in horror, abandoning short-term
credit markets — the lifeblood of the global financial system.
Bank
lending froze. Borrowing costs went through the roof. Corporate bonds
tanked. The entire world seemed like it was coming unglued.
“I
guess we goofed!” were, in essence, the words of admission heard at
the Fed and Treasury. “Now, instead of just a bailout for Lehman,
what we’re really going to need is the Mother of All Bailouts —
for the entire financial system.”
The
U.S. government promptly complied, delivering precisely what they
asked for — a $700-billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP),
rushed through Congress and signed into law by President Bush in
record time.
In
addition, the U.S. government loaned, invested, or committed:
•
$300 billion to
nationalize the world’s two largest mortgage companies, Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac
•
over $42 billion for the
Big Three auto manufacturers
•
$29 billion for Bear
Stearns
•
$150 billion for AIG, and
$350 billion for Citigroup
•
$300 billion for the
Federal Housing Administration Rescue Bill to refinance bad mortgages
•
$87 billion to pay back
JPMorgan Chase for bad Lehman Brothers trades
•
$200 billion in loans to
banks under the Federal Reserve’s Term Auction Facility (TAF)
•
$50 billion to support
short-term corporate IOUs held by money market mutual funds
•
$500 billion to rescue
various credit markets
•
$620 billion for foreign
central banks
•
trillions more to
guarantee the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC’s)
new, expanded bank deposit insurance coverage from $100,000 to
$250,000
•
plus trillions more in
bailouts and for other sweeping guarantees.
Governments
of the UK and the European Union followed a similar pattern.
And
everywhere — both inside and outside of government, apologists for
these mega-rescues argued that it was “the lesser of the evils,”
the only way to save the world from an even direr fate.
They
were wrong, and we told them so on September 25, 2008.
That’s
when Safe Money Report editor Mike Larson and I submitted a white
paper to the U.S. Congress specifically documenting why the
government bailouts would ultimately transform the debt crisis into a
sovereign debt crisis.
Sure,
governments can bail out big banks, brokers and insurers, we argued.
But when the next crisis strikes, who will bail out the governments?
At
the time, no one even bothered asking the question. Now, the question
is everywhere.
But
no one has an answer.
Yes,
with trillions in bailouts since the 2008 debt crisis, the
governments of the U.S. and Europe were able to calm the waters and
restore credit markets.
But
no government anywhere can create wealth and prosperity with
worthless paper.
And
no government can repeal the laws of gravity or change the laws of
thermodynamics:
•
When investors sell bad
government bonds, the value of those bonds must plunge, making it
next to impossible for those governments to borrow.
•
When savers run to
safety, money must flood from the weakest banks to the strongest,
making it impossible for the weak banks to survive.
That’s
what’s happening now and what will continue to happen in the weeks
ahead — until and unless the authorities unleash a new wave of
money printing that makes previous waves look puny by comparison.
Stand
by for our team’s specific instructions on how to protect yourself
and profit.
Good
luck and God bless!
Martin
Dr.
Weiss founded Weiss Research in 1971 and has dedicated the past 40
years to helping millions of average investors find truly safe havens
and investments. He is president of Weiss Ratings, the nation’s
leading independent rating agency accepting no fees from rated
companies. And he is the chairman of the Sound Dollar Committee,
originally founded by his father in 1959 to help President Dwight D.
Eisenhower balance the federal budget. His last three books have all
been New York Times Bestsellers and his most recent title is The
Ultimate Money Guide for Bubbles, Busts, Recesssion and Depression.
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