Saturday, 20 August 2016

The failed Ukrainian sabotage in Crimea

POLITE ANALYTICS: failed Crimean sabotage Ukraine the causes, results, items, effects

19 August, 2016

POLITE ANALYTICS: failed Crimean sabotage Ukraine the causes, results, items, effects
[the causes, results, items, effects] by RoSsi BaRBeRa
Translated by Scott Humor
Previous posts  on the Ukrainian terrorism in Crimea
Other articles by the same author
Articles by other sources
Somewhat belated, but in many ways comprehensive information on the development, goals, timing and course of the failed anti-terrorist operations. The customers, beneficiaries, the geopolitical results and little-known aspects of the incident.

The timing of sabotage

1. At the time of a personal visit of Erdogan to Russia.
2. On the eve of the Crimean parliamentary elections.
3. During the Olympic games.

The goal of aggression
The target of this sabotage was the critical infrastructure the Crimean Peninsula. The ferries, the Titan, shipyards, the town of Krasnoperekopsk, aniline paints plant, gas distribution stations, strategic highways, a water supply system, stations of water purification, bridges.
Groundwork for the sabotage operations

1. The saboteurs repeatedly visited the Peninsula in advance under the guise of tourists, conducted information gathering, surveys, approaches, and studied the mode of operation of the objects under the guise of fake IDs in related fields.
2. Later, the group of saboteurs was divided into two parts. The first continued to remain in Crimea under the guise of tourists, and kept in touch with an organized network of local contacts. Second, the officers of the military human intelligence of the GUR Ukraine Ministry of Defense, a.k.a. the Main directorate of intelligence of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine or HUR MOU, left Crimea after conducting intelligence gathering.
3. The operation was scheduled to start on the night of 6 to 7 August.

The timetable of events

According to the FSB of Russia, on the night of August 6th, a group of seven armed men dressed in camouflage uniforms of the old Soviet model was transferred by the inflatable boats across the Gulf of Perekop and landed near Armyansk.
A few kilometers from the coast, this saboteurs group was discovered by a group of special counter-terrorist forces of the FSB “Vympel.”  Three servicemen of this group were conducting the guarding of this very complicated part of the border between Russia and Ukraine. After asking for support of the border control troops, the FSB servicemen become engaged into the armed conflict with the group of saboteurs. During the collision, one counter-terrorism officer was deadly wounded. Before he died he killed two of his adversaries. The remaining five were corned and taken into custody alive.
Most of the detained turned out to be the residents of Crimea, some of them had Russian passports. In their testimonies, the detained saboteurs stated that they were recruited and trained by the GUR of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense. Plus, they disclosed information about several other groups dispatched by the Ukrainian intelligence on the territory of the Crimean Peninsula with the objective to commit the acts of sabotage and other unlawful misconduct.  This particular group was involved in the organization of a series of explosions at the various places around the resort. The testimony of detainees indicated that the explosives for them were supposed to be delivered by the second group which was planned to illegally enter the territory of Crimea through a different route. Once in Russia, this group was supposed to stock explosives and other weapons in a specially prepared vault.
The search operations the second sabotage group were conducted during the day of August 7th. At night of September 8th, the paratroopers of the 247-th airborne assault regiment of the airborne troops (a group of enforcement) detected the second group of the saboteurs. The members of the second group made an attempt to retreat to the mainland Ukraine across the shallow water of the Bay. A battle ensued.
At the location of the armed collision there were found 20 improvised explosive devices with total capacity of more than 40 kg of TNT, ammunition and special means of initiation, regular antipersonnel and magnetic mines as well as grenades and special weapons, consisting of arms of special units of the armed forces of Ukraine. The detained leader of this group was a citizen of Ukraine, Eugene Panov, born in 1977, a career officer of the GUR of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.
In addition, it was discovered that Suleymanov, arrested by the Crimean law enforcement in early August for planting a fake bomb at the Simferopol airport has also been found associated with the events. In the course of him giving his testimony he revealed that the announcement about the bomb scare was supposed to distract the attention of the Crimean law enforcement and to create the favorable conditions for a successful passage onto the territory of Crimea the subversive groups from Ukraine. In addition, it was assumed that the calls with threats of explosions were to identify and reveal the ways the Crimean law enforcement agencies would react to such messages.
The aims and objectives
1. To destabilize the socio-political situation in Crimea on the eve of elections to the Russia’s Parliament Duma and municipal councils.
2. To cut off the flow of tourists from both Russia and from Ukraine, that were receiving dangerous for the Kiev authorities knowledge about the real situation on the Peninsula that didn’t not correlate with the Ukrainian media propaganda about the “dying” Russian Crimea.
3. Bringing damage to the Russian economy.
1. Recently, Crimea systematically being omitted of the global agenda and is becoming increasingly unfit for international pressure on Russia. In this context, the main aims of the series of the planned terrorist attacks were:
a) to return the Crimea into a focus of international media from the position of the “Russian aggression,” in favor of this speaks the fact of absolute silence of the foreign media in the days following the incident.  It’s clearly shows the arranged trap similar to one that was set up on the eve of the events of 08.08.08., when the first shots of the Russian side was immediately followed by the massive coverage of foreign propaganda.
b) to increase pressure on Russia and Europe to prevent the construction of the North Stream-2, Turkey Stream, and the South Stream (Considering that upon completion of these projects, the value of such expensive Western assets like “Ukraine” and “Syrian opposition” would turn into zero in its significance);
c) to strengthen the “fifth column” inside Russia, under the auspices and slogans about the “impotence of the Russian authorities”.
The military outcome of the operation
All the detained are suspects in the preparation of acts of sabotage on the territory of Crimea They are taken into custody, and  each of them will be receive a procedural evaluation. This is “the toughest and the most reasonable in this situation, a preventive measure“. (N. Poklonskaya)
The Russian side disclosed information about the death of an officer of the special division “Vympel,” and a serviceman of the airborne division. Losses on the Ukrainian side were not disclosed.
The political outcome of these events

The United States and Ukraine
For the United States and for a part of the Ukrainian “elite” the ideal outcome of this saboteur operation would be a direct military response of Russia. The war would allow to write off of everything: theft, the killings of civilians, and profits of the oligarchs.
The Ukrainian elite would become an “elite in exile” with political guarantees by the type of Saakashvilli had received. American hawks would prove their thesis about “barbaric Russian,” with all the ensuing economic and political consequences. Contracts and a number of critical contracts with partners would be disrupted, the internal social situation undermined the objectives are achieved.
However, due to the prudent actions of the Russian leadership, all did not go as planned. So, if until now the “modern Ukraine” got used to sit on two chairs at once, holding its weight of the Russian “legs,” after committing this insane act, these legs will be purposefully and actively “broken”.
In particular, by calling Poroshenko a terrorist, Putin is already raising a bar, and with this he is increasing the internal opposition in the Ukrainian society, giving a very clear signal to the Eastern regions.
It becomes harder to hide the fact that the existence of a terrorist state between Europe and Russia is a thing far more dangerous than “wild steppe.”
The transition to terror by our “friends and partners” says a lot. In particular, it means that other ways to achieve a desired results simply don’t work. The resumption of hostilities in the Donbass apparently seems to them futile, maps with the downed Boeing and other preparations, finally exhausted itself and the entire arsenal of forces and means, was parried by the Russian diplomacy, politics and the army, unexpectedly successful.
In addition, the positive aspect of this failed saboteur operation is the fact that these events in Crimea would give to more Russian citizens understanding as to why in 2014, LDNR were not included in the Russian Federation.
For reference, clarify that at the time of the “Russian spring”, support for Russian actions on the part of the Crimean population was 94%. After joining, the only way to the Russian Peninsula from Ukraine has become the way through 20 km long isthmus and a full-fledged state border of the Russian Federation. From a military point of view, the protection of the Peninsula to Russia – in the conditions of an unfriendly neighbor, feasible with a high degree of control and the success of the action. This was confirmed by the events, but they also showed how difficult it is to ensure the safety of citizens and the integrity of borders, even in such a positive environment. In the mainland part, within the boundaries of the LDNR, where each forest can have hiding places or Bandera style caches of ammunition. Also, at the time of the “Russian spring” the support of the local population was “suspended” somewhere at the bottom mark (as evident from the migration of refugees, half of them at the beginning of Ukrainian forces attacks on the civilian towns of Donbass moved not in Russia, and to Ukraine.) In these conditions, providing the security might become extremely challenging. The basis for this complexity would be multiplied by the political realities and related military and protective restrictions.
In a similar way and for similar reasons, the Russian Empire at the time didn’t absorb Istanbul, although according to generally accepted international historians, it certainly could have from a militaristic point of view.
A part of the citizens of our country believe that Russia should act “directly and strongly,” and any other behavior for her is erroneous and incorrect. Such an opinion is ill-advised.
In its foreign policy Russia consciously acts not in a “direct,” but more like “curved” way in accordance with its national interests, and  using any means including military, special intelligence, and social, to drive the enemy into madness, while they are waiting and trying to anticipate our next steps and planned actions. And this practice shows that it’s absolutely the right modus of operation for our “Polite Country.”
Since Russia has no media that would be comparable with the Western by the size of its audience, we have to act carefully, and anticipate what’s coming from behind a curve. Modern Russia is not going to throw mindlessly its weight around, as some would like. It works carefully and accurately, and therefore produces results with minimum losses, and maximum benefits.
Russia with Putin, unlike many other incarnations of our country, understands the most important thing. Threats call for the appropriate responses. We can’t react to everything with the use of the simple fact that we can fight the wars better than anyone else on this planet. We will not respond to information war of the West – with military action. We are not going to die, fighting with puppet regimes, manipulated by the West. We don’t get engaged in pre-planned and pre-prepared for us war in Ukraine.
Instead of introducing an embargo of the Olympics, and having the wars with half of the planet, Russia professionally acting from unfavorable positions, without nervous breakdowns, took back South Ossetia and Abkhazia, in one day had returned the Crimean Peninsula, has protected and continues to provide support and patronage to DLNR, successfully supports Assad, extends the influence of the state hitherto in the region of the Middle East. Russia has demonstrated an exemplary model of modern war in Syria, it’s building ICBMs and “Kalibrs” to protect the country and its future, it’s rerouting the Internet to its own territory. Russian has already have created a competitive national satellite navigation system, went back into space, confidently parries the attempts of its isolation, introduces the round of Euro-sanctions, that make the inhabitants of the European Union themselves to pressure hard on the European authorities. It successfully without stress or strain on its forces resists the US pressure on the world stage…
As for the banana republic,  described in this material, according to the known principle, she’ll get hers, and predominantly by the remote methods…

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