has committed an act of War against the Russian Federation, in its
downing of a Russian Su-24 fighter jet.
Turkish fighter jet shot down the Russian plane. Turkmen
militia, under Turkish command, have killed one pilot who attempted
to surrender. The pilot, being one man surrounded by hostile
forces, clearly unable and not wanting to fight, followed protocols
and Geneva convention proscribed procedures, and would have
attempted to surrender. Instead, he was either killed in the field,
while landing, or executed by the Turkmen militia once captured.
At the time of writing this, the other pilot is still MIA.
is highly probable that these actions taken by Turkmen militia, as
a proxy force under direct command from Ankara, carried out these
actions with tacit state approval. Turkmen militias have
played a supportive role in supporting ISIS border crossings and
ISIS oil shipments into Turkey.
claims the jet violated airspace, and that therefore the aggression
was Russia's. There are numerous problems with this claim,
leading to the conclusion that the 'Act of War' is Turkey's.
the question here is whether the airspace was in fact violated.
The previous Russian response to the October 5th incident
should be deemed a short-term diplomatic success, but an overall
strategic failure. Russia did not challenge that a technical
violation had occurred, but relied on technical-legal factors such
as degree of the violation, the intent of the pilot (scope of
mission) and that no harm was done. Two stories ran immediately
following the October 5th incident - 1.) that the violation was
accidental, and contrary to this, 2.) that the violation was a
maneuver meant to avoid anti-air activity from the ground in Syria.
Instead of sticking to the second story, the first story was more
heavily promoted and became dominant. This precludes an 'easy
course' for Russia to use this pretext in the event of a future
incident, which has now happened.
violation of airspace is in and of itself a legal matter within
international law and agreements between states.
manner and degree in which airspace is trespassed, and the probable
intentions of the pilot, are both factors that must figure into a
state's legal and diplomatic justifications in deciding to shoot
down a plane that has allegedly violated airspace.
justifiable responses are largely considered those which contain
sufficient elements of parity or mirroring of the initial activity
in question. The factors are the degree of the violation (how many
km into the territory), which also speaks to the intention itself;
The official mission of the pilot(s) and whether an ulterior
mission is probable or possible; In connection with this, whether
the offending party, in this case Russia, has any actual or
possible targets in Turkey; If it posed any threat immediate to
Turkish national security (immediate threats are dealt with
immediately, other kinds dealt with diplomatically, etc.). Finally,
there is the question as to whether the offending party has any
overt goal in an outright provocation.
the first factors which lead us to conclude that the Turkish
response did not mirror the Russian actions are that
Russia has no formal or informal targets in Turkey - The plane
posed no threat to Turkish national security, when construed
legally or militarily.
Russia has no geopolitical gain to be made from violating Turkish
airspace (therefore, incidental).
means that Turkey's act was not merely responsive, but exceed this
and become an overt act of its own, and therefore can be construed
as an act of war.
is performing NATO's task - establishing a No-Fly zone in Northern
No-Fly zone is to protect ISIS supply lines in the north and
north-east, including into Iraq as well.
response to the Turkish aggression, Putin today has openly declared
that the Turkish state itself is supporting ISIS terrorism. This
follows a major report released last week showing the individuals
and private-co-public institutions from certain states (Qatar,
Turkey, KSA, etc.) supporting ISIS. Today's statement from the
Kremlin is aimed at disambiguation.
Turkey's actions against Russia a provocation, or a
indicates a bit of both, but tending towards response.
struggles to maintain its interest in the Syrian conflict,
importing oil from ISIS controlled areas. Russia recently
dealt a serious blow to ISIS, striking a convoy of oil trucks
headed to Turkey. From this perspective, Turkey has retaliated
son Bilal Erdogan is the owner of some 500 of the trucks used by
ISIS to transport oil into Turkey. It was these trucks that
were struck by Russian attack jets during the past week. Therefore,
Erdogan's decision to shoot down the Russian Su-24 met these
important requirements for NATO and Erdogan's increasingly unstable
Develop a NATO No-Fly Zone in northern Syria\
Establish Turkey unabashedly as a supporter of ISIS (to deflate the
impact of the Russian investigation)
Force increased NATO official action, possible invocation of
Article 5 which would, for France, make independent or even
Russian-coordinated anti-ISIS action extremely difficult. It would
also openly activate German anti-air batteries located on the
Force a Russian response, which regardless of the nature of the
response, has the advantage of requiring the opponent to make a
move at a predictable time (known time of move is very important in
Further activate anti-Russian, pro-Atlanticist opposition within
Russia. Inside Russia, the 5th and 6th column will use this against
the Russian state - the 5th saying this is proof that the Russian
activity in Syria produces unwanted consequences. The 6th
will say that this is proof that Russia needs to push further
(pursue a course of blind entanglement).
Eliminate all positive speculation about Turkish-Stream - push
Russia into a one-track solution 'Nordstream II', which later can
be singled out and attacked by NATO through pressure on Berlin
Retaliate and 'make a strong statement' about Bilal Erdogan's
personal business being targeted
Marginalize anti-Erdogan forces within Turkey, shift the national
dialogue from internal to external
the present time it is difficult to order these by significance,
except that the last two points are probably secondary or tertiary
in importance in the broad geostrategic schemata.
will Russia's response be?
response, to be sufficient, must address each of the above NATO and
Turkey goals. These are ordered in direct relation to the above.
Some responses are short term, others more long term, in
relation to the actions of Turkey and NATO.
Continue to be active in Northern Syria - it has 4 mandates for
this: legal, political, sovereign, and strategic. The loss of this
plane, even several others, is militarily and strategically
Concretize the discourse - following up on the ISIS finance
investigation and Putin's statements today - that Russian
activity in Syria that happens to be anti-Turkish is in fact
anti-Terrorist and therefore lawful action. Distinguish between
Turkey as a sovereign state, Turkish long term interests, and
thirdly the individual players running the Turkish establishment
(Erdogan, AKP, et al) in anti-Turkish activities in Syria. Make
Turkish support for ISIS a criminal matter of 'the regime' and its
supporters, and not Turkish security and the Turkish state all
Continue to invoke the Paris attacks as further pretext for
anti-ISIS actions in Syria: Perpetuate the rift between anti-ISIS
France and pro-ISIS Turkey, focus and broaden the scope of this
obvious contradiction. Create a security related 'amicus brief' to
the French prosecutors and courts pursuing the Paris attack matter:
this should focus on Turkish connections to ISIS. Push the
Paris-Berlin axis to oppose Article 5 invocation.
Russia must not be controlled by any forced response, but must
forge its own activity. Initial public statements may suffice -
further actions should follow the doctrine of mirrored/parity based
response. These do not need to be carried out immediately.
Again, single plane and the loss of a single pilot is an
acceptable loss in purely strategic and military terms. The only
possible problems are internal public discourse, as well as
diplomatic. Russia must regain control time and timing. Among
Turkmen fighters in Syria are Turkish nationals
as advisers and leaders: Deploying a Syrian,
Iranian, or Russian special force to neutralize or arrest these
individuals would be an example of a mirrored/parity based
Activated Russian 5th and 6th column threats exist at top
levels, but cannot create much political instability in
Russia outside of mass media. Thus, their modes of attack in this
stage are primarily rhetorical. Therefore, activities to
neutralize these should be rhetorical.
The Kremlin must continue its course of public statements. Rule
number 1 - never directly address the 5th and 6th columnists, only
make statements which are totally based in one's own policy and
proclivities, and never as a response to the critiques of others,
which may seem to give the specter of legitimizing
such criticisms. The opposition cannot be helped to
exist as a viable source of policy formation, in any way.
Neutralizing the 5th column, this is along the lines
of acknowledging the risks and responsibilities that go along
with military action - emphasizing the need for them, invoking a
combination of the Sinai terrorist attack, the Paris terrorist
attack, and Russia's own experience with Wahhabi terrorism
Neutralizing the 6th column, reaffirm the need and plan for a
robust and adequate counter-measure, while emphasizing the need to
avoid being ensnared or losing sight of the mission; this will
tacitly accuse the 6th column of promoting an irresponsible course
without ever addressing them.
Aggressively push Bulgaria back onto a South-Stream course. All
options on the table including the complete utilization of the
Color-Spring technology: 'peaceful' regime change in Bulgaria if
Russia can here capitalize on its successes to thwart NATO attempts
at Color-Spring maneuvers in Macedonia and Montenegro. Publicly
affirm that Serbia's course towards the EU is a positive one.
Welcome increased security integration of the Serbian military and
deep-state into already developing Russian structures in Serbia.
Alternately, Romania can be a surrogate for Bulgaria in
South-Stream - at least as a stand-in to push Bulgarian energy and
political elites into the course of a pro-Russian oriented power
transition. Romania can be brought in with adequate resolution of
Moldova and Transnistria issues, as well as other more mundane -
but still outstanding - matters relating to grain and
Publicize Bilal Erdogan's role in supporting ISIS - engage in a
media campaign which personalizes an otherwise state-based,
abstracted accusation into a personality
based, anthropomorphic version of the same. Publicly
connect Turkey's actions against the Russia to the criminal
activities of Bilal Erdogan.
Re-activate the pro-Eurasianist NGO's which took part in the
'Turkish Spring' at Taksim Gezi park in Istanbul. Here is where
Russia first showed its ability to utilize the Color-Spring tactic
outside of defensive internal counter-operations. Capitalize
from the Russian success in getting Dogu Perincek released from
prison, along with other pro-Eurasian military leaders, former
generals, and members of the Worker's Party (now called Patriotic
Party), following the so-called
Ergenekon conspiracy and Sledgehammer cases. Raise
the demands - "political reform, anti-corruption,
infrastructure, healthcare, education, anti-war/militarism,
pluralist and civil rights". Pursue full support for the
active socialist or social-nationalist opposition groups in Turkey
today. These are not likely to succeed in taking power, will
succeed in creating internal disruptions that make present Turkish
regional aims more difficult to pursue.
theatres of Russia-Turkey Conflict - Recipe for Total War
does not war. Ultimately, war only benefits the US ruling
class, safely across the Atlantic, and supports the needs of both
the Military Industrial Complex and City of London and Wall Street
based banking elites. To that end, we should expect the
Increased Turkish support for Tatar extremist groups in Crimea,
making a two-pronged attack on Crimea following the recent Kiev
backed attack on the power station. These extremist groups exist
based on Turkish support, actual Crimean laws in the wake of the
constitutional process to re-join Russia have granted minority
status rights to Tatars which were denied to them by previous Kiev
governments, including rights to language, schools, and plural and
civic institutions. Therefore, today's Crimean Tatar extremist
groups cannot exist outside of artificial foreign backing.
Moderate Crimean minority leadership is institutional and
supports the Crimean government and, by extension, Russia.
Increased support of Turkey for Azerbaijan - supporting their aims
in the conflict with Armenia over the contested border regions.
Russia will increase its support for Armenia. This will
act in connection with the Azeri natural gas project controlled
presently by the Shah Denis consortium, now running the Shah Dennis
2 or Full Field Development (FFD) project. This will revive the
Nabucco project in the wake of the total freezing of
Turkish-Russian stream speculation. This will mitigate the
economic/speculative impact on energy markets of this major cooling
in Russian-Turkish bilateral relations.
Turkey will collaborate further in supporting ISIS with Qatar and
KSA in Khorasan/Kwarazem and Turkmen regions east of the Caspian,
broadly speaking, Turkic lands - creating a total or final link
between Caucus conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, Syria-Iran
conflict with Qatar/Israel/Turkey/KSA, and Afghan 'Al Qaeda'
Mujahideen who will attempt push into Uzbekistan and
Final short-term goal will be breach of security in pro-Russian
Kazakhstan, and Russian Dagestan, and Chechnya. Uzbekistan pulled
from the CSTO in 2012, but remains in the Chinese SCO: NATO
destabilization attempts in the region hold the promise of pushing
Uzbekistan closer to Russia (while remaining close to China).